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CHAPTER 1 
 Introduction 
1.1 Aims of the thesis 
This study aims to offer a fresh perspective on why, nearly twenty years after the collapse 
of socialism, the countries of post-socialist Europe have experienced such divergent 
trajectories of political development.
1
 The study is based on the assumption that societies, 
or social orders, can be distinguished by the extent to which competitive tendencies 
contained within them – economic, political, social and cultural – are resolved according 
to open, rule-based processes. Social orders are also assumed to exhibit a ‗double 
balance‘ between political and economic systems in which political systems will tend to 
reflect the prevailing economic system within a society, and that changes in one are 
necessary for changes in the other. In turn, this has implications for the wider form of 
social order; if a social order is to be characterized as open-access then the economic 
system must provide the conditions that facilitate greater political competition. In short, 
the two arenas are assumed to be mutually constitutive. The focus of this dissertation will 
therefore be on tracing which economic conditions facilitate increased levels of political 
competition. Principally, it will test the hypothesis that the nature of a country‘s ties with 
the international economy, and the level of competition within a country‘s economic 
system, will shape the nature of political competition within that society. After several 
decades of relative ‗bloc autarky‘, the ongoing process of reintegration across the post-
socialist region has resulted in varying patterns of interaction with the international 
economy. This study will focus primarily on the links with the international economy that 
are formed through export sectors.   
 
                                                 
1
 Where appropriate, the term ‗socialism‘ is employed throughout this study in place of ‗communism‘. This 
is based on the manner in which Marxism-Leninism, the official ideology of the ruling Communist parties 
of the region, used the expression ‗communist‘ to describe the unattained utopian society of the future. 
Indeed, according to Kornai (1992, p.10), the ruling parties of the region never referred to themselves as 
communist, instead preferring to employ the term socialist to indicate that their rule was merely a point on 
the journey towards the attainment of communism. There are a range of other synonyms that might also be 
used to describe the socialist systems, including ‗Soviet-type system‘, ‗centrally administered economy‘, 
‗command economy‘ and ‗centrally planned economy‘.    
 2 
 
So far, a wide body of literature has sought to identify the determinants of 
variation in political development across the post-socialist region. Explanations for this 
variation that have been offered so far, include, but are not limited to: the role of ethnicity 
and nationalism (e.g., Horowitz, 1993; Karatnycky, 2002); the success or otherwise in 
building capacious state structures (e.g., Holmes, 1996; Ganev, 2005, 2007; Colton and 
Holmes, 2006); the choice of institutional arrangements after the collapse of socialism 
(e.g., Frye, 1997; Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998; Ostrow, 2000; Fish, 2006); the extent of 
political party development (e.g., Kitschlet et al, 1999; Lewis, 2002; Kopecky, 1995, 
2008); the strength of civil society (e.g., Linz and Stepan, 1996; Ekiert and Kubik, 1999; 
Morje-Howard, 2003; Uhlin, 2005); geographical location (Kopstein and Reilly, 2008); 
the choices made by elite political actors (e.g., Przeworski, 1991; Eyal, Szelenyi and 
Townsley, 1999; Haughton, 2005); initial conditions and the legacies inherited from the 
socialist-era (e.g., Stark, 1994; Crawford and Lijphart, 1995; Bruszt and Stark, 1998; 
McFaul, 1999; Hedlund, 1999); and the role of external forces, such as the European 
Union (e.g., Jacoby, 2004; Vachudova, 2005; Hanson, 2007a). These explanations all 
have their merits and constitute valuable contributions to the debate surrounding the 
determinants of the divergent trajectories of political development across the region.  
 
Few studies, however, have examined the role of structural economic variables in 
explaining political outcomes. Where economic variables are considered, it is very often 
as the dependent variable, with political factors being used to explain why, for example, 
some countries have been more successful than others in undertaking economic reform 
(e.g., Fish, 1998, 2005; Hellman, 1998), why some countries adopted the privatization 
strategies that they did (e.g., Hare, Batt and Estrin, 1999; Gould, 2003; Appel, 2004), and 
how institutional structures have shaped the emergence of different ‗varieties of 
capitalism‘ across the region (e.g., Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003; Lane and 
Myant, 2007).  Where economic phenomena are considered as explanatory variables, 
trends in economic output have been considered to be an important factor in shaping 
political development. For instance, sustained economic growth has been posited as a 
necessary condition for the development of democratic tendencies (e.g., Lipset, 1959; 
 3 
Rostow, 1961; Bunce, 2000; Janos, 2000). However, cases where countries that have 
experienced periods of high rates of economic growth have become more, not less, 
authoritarian indicate that perhaps economic growth is not a satisfactory explanation on 
its own (see, e.g. Karl, 1997; Ross, 2001; Fish, 2005). Rather, it suggests that what a 
country produces, and how its economy is organized, might offer a more plausible 
explanation of patterns of political development.       
 
 The structural characteristics of an economy, the relationship between its 
constituent organizations, and the implications that these have for the development of 
competitive political tendencies, are the subjects of this study. The crucial importance of 
political variables in explaining political outcomes across the post-socialist space is not 
disputed. However, the conception of politics that underpins this study is much broader 
than studies that focus primarily on political explanations of political outcomes. For 
example, where comparative studies focus on, for example, institutional design – i.e., on 
the constitutional arrangements of a country, the distribution of legislative and executive 
functions, and electoral rules – it is often assumed that political outcomes are contingent 
on choices made at the onset of the reform process (Hellman, 1998; Fish, 1998). This 
neglects the importance of political and, more frequently, economic legacies from the 
socialist-era, broader political factors beyond the scope of how central governments are 
organized, and on structural economic factors that shape the incentives for certain types 
of political behavior. It is this imbalance that this study seeks to redress.     
 Broadly speaking, the focus throughout this study is on the relationship between 
the structure of a country‘s economic system and the types of social order that have 
developed across the post-socialist region. Specifically, attention is focused on how 
different patterns of integration with the international economy, primarily through the 
role of export sectors, have shaped the development of different types of social order. 
Social order type – defined in greater detail in Chapter Two – broadly refers to the extent 
to which competition within societies is resolved according to impersonal, universally 
applied rules. Thus, unlike many existing studies in comparative political economy, the 
explanatory framework emphasizes not the role of the state in shaping the economy (e.g., 
 4 
Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995, Wade, 2004), but instead on how structural economic 
variables shape politics (e.g., Shafer, 1994; Karl, 1997; Robinson, 2004; Greskovits, 
2005).  
Although progress or otherwise in developing democratic institutions across the 
post-socialist region is the subject of a large body of existing research, the focus here is 
not on explaining variation in the formal, procedural indicators of democracy. Instead, the 
dependent variable – the type of social order – is more narrowly defined to encompass the 
extent to which competition within societies (in both the economic and political arenas) is 
resolved according to impersonal, universally applied rules. In this sense, issues of 
accountability, the rule of law, and the prevalence of corruption are emphasized more 
directly than the procedural aspects of democracy (e.g. elections, constitutions, formal 
institutional configurations, etc). These variables do, however, act as a measure of the 
quality of democracy in societies, particularly where many of the formal institutions of 
democracy may have already been adopted but only in a manner that is inconsistent with 
the substantive meaning of democracy (Wilson, 2005; Berg-Schlosser, 2007). Thus, 
while the focus is not on democracy per se, it is on those very factors that determine 
whether or not the informal practices of a society are consistent with the formal, 
procedural institutions. As such, any conclusions drawn on the relationship between 
economic structure and the dependent variable, as defined in this dissertation, are likely 
to have implications for the wider study of democratic development, both across the post-
socialist region and elsewhere.      
The conceptual framework presented in this study is, however, also broader than 
much of the existing research on, for instance, the processes of state formation across the 
post-socialist region (see, for example, Gryzmala-Busse, 2006; O‘Dwyer, 2006; Ganev, 
2007). Although these studies also explore the impact of competition on political 
outcomes, their attention is directed towards the narrower task of explaining patterns of 
state exploitation by political parties through the development of patronage networks. In 
this sense, the subject of this dissertation is broader because any variation in type of 
social order has much wider implications than simply for patterns of state exploitation, or 
relations between political parties and the state. While the type of social order prevalent 
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in any given society will surely help explain why some states are subjected to more 
predation by particular organizations than others, it also has implications for myriad other 
spheres of political and economic life. Furthermore, where these studies identify political 
competition as the key to restraining ‗rent-seeking‘ across the post-socialist region, the 
sources of this political competition remain ambiguous (Hellman, 1998; Grzymala-Busse 
and Jones-Luong, 2002).
2
 In short, this study proposes an analytical framework that 
might lead to a greater understanding of why some societies exhibit greater levels of 
economic and political competition than others.    
Given that the object of this study – variation in social order type – is broadly 
related to a range of other areas of research, this dissertation is expected to make a 
contribution to two main existing areas of research. First, it is hoped that the study will 
make a contribution to research on institutional explanations of political behaviour. As 
will become clear in the next chapter, the dependent variable is defined in a relatively 
new manner, with the concept of social orders still very much in its infancy in terms of 
the volume of academic attention that has been paid to it. So far, discussion of social 
orders – as defined by North, Wallis and Weingast (2006, 2007, 2009) - and their 
determinants has been limited to the mature democracies of Western Europe and North 
America. In examining social order variation in less economically and politically 
advanced countries, this study represents an application of an original conceptual 
framework in a new setting. The use of a structural economic explanatory variable  offers 
an additional, original explanation of social order variation to those posited by North, 
Wallis and Weingast. Indeed, while structural economic explanations of political 
outcomes are not entirely new – they have, for example, been used in both transition 
(e.g., Robinson, 2004; Fish, 2005) and non-transition (e.g., Paige, 1991; Karl, 1997) 
contexts - the precise causal relationship as specified in this dissertation is new. In 
particular, the emphasis on how economic competition and political competition is 
mediated through organizations located in the civic, political and economic sphere (see 
                                                 
2
 Rents can be defined as ‗profits in excess of the competitive level‘(see Brealy and Myers, 2000). Rents, 
like competiton, are ubiquitous. They accrue to the individuals or organizations that own or control an 
economic asset, when the benefit received by that asset for performing any action exceed the opportunity 
cost of performing the action. Because of the similarity between profit and rent the choice of using the 
latter over the former is, in effect, down to the discretion of the user.  
 6 
Chapter Two) offers a simple yet compelling explanation of how changes in the 
production structure of an economy can lead to increased competition at the political 
level. In this sense, this study builds on existing concepts and develops them further, 
offering a more precise specification of the causal mechanisms that link economic and 
political competition than currently exists. 
Second, this study is intended to make a contribution to the existing research on 
the different patterns of political behaviour that have been observed across the post-
socialist bloc since the collapse of the socialist regimes between 1989-1991. Unlike many 
of the existing accounts of political behaviour in the post-socialist area, the dependent 
variable is defined not in procedural terms, but instead in a way that focuses attention on 
those substantive factors that offer a more meaningful measure of institutional 
development across the region. Again, while existing studies have also examined 
institutional development across the region, the specification of the variables, and the 
causal mechanisms linking them, has not been examined in the post-socialist context. 
Moreover, if the use of a structural economic explanatory variable is relatively rare in the 
wider literature on institutional political economy, it is a similarly underresearched 
determinant of institutional development in the post-socialist region.    
What follows is an exercise in testing a small number of conceptually simple, but 
original, hypotheses. These hypotheses are derived from a broad range of sources and 
disciplines, including political science, political economy, institutional economics and 
politics, and industrial organization. While this seemingly diverse array of theoretical 
influences makes classification of the subject area of this dissertation somewhat difficult, 
it is probably best viewed as an economic explanation of political behaviour. It is not an 
explanation of economic outcomes per se (e.g., variation in levels of output, employment 
levels, etc); although it is certainly true that the nature of a given social order has 
important implications for the organization of economic activity that takes place within 
that society. The fact that this dissertation represents an attempt at providing an original 
explanation of a relatively originally defined dependent variable also means that the 
conceptual framework, and any conclusions derived from this study, should be viewed 
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not as definitive, but instead as merely the preliminary stages of the construction of a 
more robust explanation of political behaviour.    
1.2 How the study is approached 
This is primarily a study in comparative political economy, making use of data – both 
qualitative and quantitative - for nineteen countries over a period of nearly twenty years. 
As outlined above, some chapters compare more countries than others, with Chapter Four 
providing a very broad overview of the relationship between the two main variables 
across the nineteen countries under examination in this study, while the case study 
chapters examine only one or two examples at a time. Broadly speaking, the comparative 
method centres on three main objectives (Landman, 2000, pp.4-12). The first objective of 
comparison is contextual description; the process of describing the political phenomena 
and events of a particular country, or group of countries. Quite simply, this enables 
political scientists to describe the main features of different countries. Good description 
serves the purpose of providing the raw data that can permits higher levels of explanation. 
The data contained in Chapters Three and Four, along with the observations made in the 
case study chapters perform this role in this study. The second objective of comparison is 
hypothesis-testing, the raison-d’être of newer fields of comparative politics (Mayer, 
1989). Comparisons of countries enable rival explanations to be ruled out and hypotheses 
derived from certain theoretical perspectives to be tested. This study performs this role by 
first generating a series of simple hypotheses in Chapter Two, identifying a method of 
measurement in Chapter Three, and then marshalling the evidence furnished from both 
the broad cross-country data and the case studies to test these hypotheses. The third 
objective of comparison is prediction based on the generalizations and conclusions that 
emerge from rigorously testing hypotheses. This study does not focus on making 
predictions about other countries, but the conclusions drawn throughout the study can 
form the basis for making predictions in future research.    
 While these constitute the objectives of the comparative method, there are both 
advantages and limitations associated with it that ought to be considered. In order to 
illustrate these differences, it is should be noted that the central distinction between 
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different comparative methods depends on the trade-off between the level of abstraction 
and the scope of countries under examination (Mair, 1996). In general, the greater the 
level of conceptual abstraction, the more potential there is for the inclusion of a large 
number of countries, allowing conceptual frameworks to ‗travel‘ across different contexts 
(Sartori, 1974, 1994). Alternatively, focus on one country or a few countries permits 
researchers to use less abstract concepts that are more tailored to the specific contexts 
under scrutiny. Representing all three types of analysis (large-n, small-n, and single case 
studies) as comparative differs from some other typologies contained in the literature on 
comparative politics (e.g., Lijphart, 1971; Collier, 1991).
3
  For example, single case 
studies are not always considered comparative even if they have comparative merit. 
However, if research – even in a single case study – strives to make larger inferences 
about political behaviour through some form of comparison and uses concepts that are 
applicable to more than one country, it should be considered comparative (Lichbach and 
Zuckerman, 1994, p.4).   
 The advantage of large-n studies lies in the extensive coverage of countries that 
facilitates stronger inferences and theory-building, since a hypothesized relationship can 
be demonstrated to exist with a greater degree of certainty. A second advantage lies in the 
ability to identify ‗deviant‘ cases or ‗outliers‘. These are cases where values on the 
dependent variable are different to than those that would be expected given the values on 
the independent variable. There are, however, several disadvantages to the large-n study. 
First, because most large-n studies tend to be of a quantitative nature, researchers can 
often be constrained by the availability of good quality data.
4
 Secondly, measurement of 
variables can also be problematic. Finally, the high level of conceptual abstraction can 
sometimes lead to a misspecification of the causal relationship between the two variables 
(i.e., a Type I error).  
                                                 
3
 It should also be noted that this nomenclature tends to confuse the terminology (Eckstein, 1975). It is 
possible to have a single-country study with a large number of observations, such as in a single-case study 
that examines multiple elections over different periods of time, or separate instances of high employment 
within the same country. Here, n is used to denote the number of observations.  
4
 Finer‘s (1997) qualitiative comparison of regime types over 5000 years and across space is a notable 
exception.   
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 Single-case studies exhibit the opposite tendencies. As noted above, a single-
country study can be considered comparative if it employs or develops concepts that are 
applicable to other countries (i.e., as opposed to ‗atheoretical‘ or ‗configurative-
ideographic‘ studies). Such studies are useful for generating hypotheses for theories that 
are yet to be fully specified, or as ‗plausibility probes‘ (Eckstein, 1975, p.108), where the 
studies the study represents the first test case for a fully specified theory. Single-country 
studies can also be used to confirm or infirm existing theories, or to identify deviant 
countries in the hope of testing existing hypothesized relationships more rigorously. 
While enhanced detail and attention to country-specific phenomena are obvious 
advantages of single-country studies, the main disadvantage lies in the temptation to treat 
each case as ‗unique‘, effectively disregarding the comparative method.       
  Finally, the ‗focused comparison‘ (Hague et al. 1992) of only a few cases 
achieves control through the careful selection of countries that are analyzed using a level 
of conceptual abstraction that falls somewhere between the single-country study and the 
large-n study. This enables the researcher to test more variables in greater depth. This 
type of study is often referred to as ‗case-oriented‘ (Ragin, 1994), due to the country 
being the usual unit of analysis. Such methods of analysis permit the more rigorous 
testing of hypothesized relationships than is possible in a large-n study, while allowing 
more room for explicit comparison than is possible in single-case studies. As such, a 
range of analytical tools – both quantitative and qualitative - are available to the 
researcher, depending on the object of analysis.    
 This dissertation attempts to combine elements of all three approaches. Chapter 
Four utilizes a range of data and statistical techniques to provide a preliminary test of the 
hypothesized relationship between economic structure and social order type across the 
nineteen countries from the post-socialist region. This is then followed by a number of  
case studies that are used to investigate the link between the two variables in greater 
depth using a range of quantitative and qualitative methods, including the use of statistics, 
elite-level and expert interviews (for Belarus, Estonia and Russia), and extensive use of 
secondary sources. Given that the theoretical framework employed throughout this study 
is original, it is hoped that this mixture of methods will help test the framework more 
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rigorously than would be possible through an exclusive use of either the large-n or single-
case study approach.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis explores the relationship between economic structure and social order 
development across post-socialist Europe, adopting a broadly comparative approach. The 
chapters analyse developments in both economic structure and social order up to the end 
of 2007. The time frame selected is due in part to data availability, but also because the 
events surrounding the global economic crisis that began in the summer of 2007 
constitute an exogenous shock to the region that is likely to have significant implications 
for the economic and political development of the region in the future. As such, this 
provides a natural ‗cut-off‘ point for the chronological scope of the study. Some basic 
observations on the global economic crisis that began at the point at which this study 
ends, and its implications for the issues that are discussed here, are made in the 
concluding section. The chapters are ordered as follows.  
Chapter Two outlines the conceptual framework. It opens with a discussion of 
the methodological foundations on which the remainder of this study is based, and then 
outlines the conceptual framework that will be tested throughout the study. The first 
section provides an overview of institutional approaches to economic and political 
behaviour, locating this study in the historical institutionalist tradition. This is followed 
by a discussion of the dependent variable: social orders, or more precisely, the 
institutional order of a society. Social orders are shown to differ in the degree to which 
competition is prevalent, and also in the extent to which competition is resolved 
according to impersonal, universally enforced rules. A third section then outlines an 
explanation for the variation in how competition is channeled across the post-socialist 
region. It is suggested that different patterns of integration with the international 
economy, as manifested in the structure of a country‘s export profile, offer a 
parsimonious explanation of the sources of social order variation across the region. In 
essence it is argued that different patterns of integration with the international economy 
result in distinct patterns of economic and political competition across the region.   
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 Chapter Three provides an overview of the data that are used to measure the 
relationship between the dependent variable (social order) and the independent variable 
(economic structure) since the collapse of the socialist regimes across the region between 
1989 and 1991. Subsequent sections that refer to economic structure or type of social 
order before the collapse of socialism utilize a range of different sources and subjective 
assessments due to the unavailability of comparable data. However, the focus of much of 
this study is on developments since the collapse of socialism and it is for this period that 
data are available. The first section describes the World Bank data sources that are used 
to measure types of social order. The second section outlines the measures used to 
identify different types of economic structure across the region. This is done by 
comparing export profiles. The final section provides the rationale behind the case 
selection for subsequent chapters, identifying three clusters of cases among the countries 
of the region. The subsequent case studies examine exemplar cases from each of these 
clusters.     
 Chapter Four provides a comparison across space and time of the main features 
of the region‘s place within the wider international economy. The overall objective of this 
chapter is to provide a historical overview of the development of both economic structure 
and social-order development across the socialist and post-socialist region. Specifically, it 
examines the variation in export structures across the region between the 1980s, before 
the collapse of socialism, and in 2006, assessing not only whether they have changed 
over time, but, perhaps more importantly, how they have changed. The overall objective 
of this chapter is to provide an historical overview of the development of both economic 
structure and social-order development across the socialist and post-socialist region. The 
first section traces the main patterns of interaction between the countries of the region 
and the international economy up until 1980. The second section considers the structure 
of the region‘s exports at the collapse of socialism and also the different regime-types 
that were in existence at this point. The third section outlines the broad patterns of 
continuity and change in economic structure across the region. The final section explores 
the relationship between economic structure and social order type by comparing the 
explanatory variable with other possible explanations of variation in social order across 
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the region. It is argued that the hypothesized relationship between the two variables does 
appear to be evident across the region. The subsequent case studies are used to examine 
this relationship in greater detail.    
Chapter Five differs from the other case-studies contained within this study in so 
far as it examines a case from the socialist period. However, the application of the 
conceptual framework is just as pertinent. The Soviet Union was a classic limited-access 
order. It also had a very specific economic structure with a distinct pattern of integration 
with the international economy. These two features – a limited-access order and an 
economic structure that left it dependent on natural resource exports from the 1970s 
onwards – existed in a symbiotic relationship that prevented the Soviet Union from 
adapting to the changing conditions of the international economy. Quite simply, natural 
resource rents reduced the incentive for the Soviet leadership to engage in the sort of 
systemic change that was required for it maintain its position as a geopolitical 
superpower. However, once these rents dried up, the fragilities of the prevailing limited-
access order, which prevented it from modernizing the technological base of the 
economy, left the leadership in a position where it was forced to engage in a reform 
process that grew rapidly more radical. The ultimate consequence – the collapse of the 
Soviet Union – was almost certainly unintended. In this respect, the reforms undertaken 
in the face of declining natural resource rents were a classic case of agents attempting to 
alter the institutional framework around with them with unintended consequences.  
Chapter Six picks up from the previous chapter and examines the role of the 
natural resource sector on the political development of the Soviet Union‘s largest 
successor state, the Russian Federation. Russia is selected as an exemplar case from the 
first group of countries identified according to their position on the independent variable.  
This chapter is the longest of the case studies, essentially because it contains two distinct 
periods – the Yeltsin period (1991-1999) and the Putin period (1999-2007) - that require 
separate attention because of the contrasting trajectories of political economy in Russia 
during these two periods. Here it is argued that Russia has failed to develop an open-
access order and has instead been constrained by a transnational economic structure that 
is concentrated in only a few natural resource sectors that tend to be characterized by 
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monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures. This has reduced economic competition 
in Russia, preventing the emergence of the sort of broad array of social and political 
forces that, independent of the state, are crucial in providing the foundations for open-
access order development.  
Chapter Seven compares two cases from the middle cluster of countries that are 
identified in Chapter Three, Belarus and Romania. These two countries have both 
exhibited contrasting trajectories of economic restructuring and social order development. 
As such, they represent excellent cases against which the conceptual framework can be 
tested; if the divergent patterns of economic restructuring appear to explain the variation 
in social order development, then the conceptual framework employed throughout this 
study will be given greater support. The evidence presented in this chapter appears to 
confirm the hypotheses outlined in Chapter Two. Belarus has experienced very limited 
economic restructuring, with relatively low levels of investment – both domestic and 
foreign – and a low level of private sector activity. This has resulted in continued state 
dominance of the Belarusian economy with very little evidence of significant levels of 
economic competition, in turn reducing political competition to an almost non-existent 
level. In such conditions, Belarus has experienced a persistent decline on all indicators of 
social-order development. By contrast, the Romanian case illustrates the decisive effect 
of economic restructuring on social-order development. After experiencing very limited 
economic and political change during the 1990s, the burst of investment, particularly 
foreign, that accompanied the beginning of substantive negotiations for EU accession in 
1999, helped stimulate the diversification and technological upgrading of Romania‘s 
transnational economy. This boosted economic competition in Romania, leading to a 
slow but steady improvement in Romanian social-order indicators.  
In Chapter Eight, Estonia represents the third group of countries identified in 
Chapter Three. It is the smallest economy in the sample and has the best state statistical 
service of the case studies. This permits greater detail being paid to the structure of 
particular sectors. It is argued that Estonia is an example of a country that has developed 
a diverse, and in some areas, technologically sophisticated, economy. Because of 
favourable initial economic and political conditions, and as a result of judicious and 
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autonomously formulated policy choices made early after independence from Soviet rule, 
economic pluralism and competition have been the defining characteristics of Estonian 
development. Estonia‘s integration within the wider international economy has been deep 
(i.e. it displays a high degree of openness to trade) and based on a diverse range of 
activities, meaning that no single sector dominates Estonia‘s export profile. This has been 
complemented by vibrant competition within sectors, thus facilitating the development of 
an open-access political system that has so far proven to be one of the success stories of 
post-socialist Europe. Rapid economic restructuring based on deep integration with the 
international economy, a diversification of the production profile, and market structures 
characterised by high levels of competition, have all helped cultivate a competitive 
political system, resulting in a broadly positive trajectory of social order development.  
 The Conclusion considers the main findings of the thesis, assesses theoretical 
considerations, and identifies areas for future research. It is argued that while the 
conceptual framework developed in this study does appear to have some analytical utility, 
further research would be required to provide greater evidence to support the 
hypothesized links between the independent and dependent variables, and that the model 
employed here is not mis-specified. Finally, the findings of this thesis are placed in the 
context of the current economic crisis that is, at the time of writing, ongoing, and likely to 
exert a considerable influence over both economic restructuring and social order 
development in the region. Economic restructuring and institutional development – along 
with demographic pressures and the effects of the ongoing financial and economic crisis 
– are identified as the most important challenges that are likely to face the region in the 
future. It is argued that the countries of the region will only be able to cope with the 
challenges of its demographic structure and the effects of the economic crisis if further 
economic restructuring and institutional development take place.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
Conceptual framework: economic structure, the international economy, and social-
order development  
2. Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical apparatus that is used to explain political 
developments across the post-socialist region from a fresh perspective. Broadly speaking, 
the focus throughout this study is on the relationship between the structure of a country‘s 
economic system and the types of social order that have developed across the post-
socialist region. Specifically, attention is focused on how different patterns of 
reintegration with the international economy, primarily through export sectors, have 
shaped the development of different types of social order. This chapter presents a 
discussion of the methodological foundations on which the remainder of this study is 
based, and then outlines the conceptual framework that is employed throughout. The first 
section provides an overview of institutional approaches to economic and political 
behaviour, locating this study in the historical institutionalist tradition. The second 
section defines the object of explanation: social orders, or more precisely, the institutional 
order of a society. Social orders are shown to differ in the degree to which competition is 
prevalent, and also in the extent to which competition is resolved according to 
impersonal, universally enforced rules. The third section proposes an explanation for the 
variation in how competition is channeled across the post-socialist region. It is suggested 
that different patterns of integration with the international economy, as manifested in the 
structure of a country‘s export profile, help explain the variation of social order across the 
region.  
2.1 Institutional explanations of political and economic behaviour 
2.1.1 Institutions and organizations 
Institutional accounts of both politics and economics do not share a common conception 
of what exactly constitutes an institution. As a result, a certain level of ambiguity 
 16 
surrounds the precise definition, with institutions meaning many things to different 
people. In general, however, most working definitions tend to emphasize the importance 
of formal structures and the informal rules and norms that structure human conduct. 
Douglass North‘s (1990, p.3) widely used definition of institutions suggests that 
institutions are ―the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction‖ and that they ―structure incentives in 
human exchange, whether political, social or economic‖. Elsewhere, March and Olsen 
(1989, p.22) define institutions more broadly to include ―beliefs, paradigms, codes, 
cultures‖ so that human behaviour is guided by a logic of appropriateness. All 
institutions, at the formal, social, or personal level, contain a degree of abstraction; they 
are frameworks for analyzing the world in which humans live. This implies that 
institutions are sometimes difficult to identify observationally. While some components 
of institutions are readily observable, such as formal rules (e.g. constitutions, legal 
frameworks), other components are almost impossible to observe or measure precisely, 
such as shared beliefs or conventions. 
If institutions that are at times abstract frame human behaviour, it is through 
organizations that humans undertake myriad forms of social interaction (North, 1981, 
p.33).
5
 Organizations are somewhat more concrete than institutions as they are composed 
of groups of individuals, more or less directed toward a common goal through more or 
less coordinated behaviour (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006). It is organizations that 
make political and economic choices within a society. Most human activities involve a 
degree of cooperation among individuals and the organizational forms of cooperation and 
coordination that exist within a society directly affect a country‘s political and economic 
performance. Therefore, any institutional explanation of political economy must show an 
appreciation of the manner in which the institutional structure of a society shapes the kind 
of organizations that can be created and sustained within it, with certain institutional 
structures being more or less supportive to the existence of certain organizations.  
                                                 
5
 There is some ambiguity within institutionalist literature as to where institutions end and organizations 
begin. For example, some argue that the state is an institution, while others view it as an organization, albeit 
the primary organization within a society. Others use the terms interchangeably, seeing the state as both 
institution and organization. 
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This distinction between institutions and organizations is somewhat confused by 
the fact that almost all organizations have an institutional structure. As noted previously, 
institutions are essentially frameworks for interpreting the behaviour of other people and 
a significant benefit of belonging to an organization is the ability to coordinate the actions 
of actors with the actions of other actors within an organization. Effective coordination 
requires that individuals share a set of models about how people behave. Coordination 
within an organization requires that actors share a set of models about how they each will 
behave. Because the rules, norms, and conventions structure the relationships of an 
organization‘s members, they constitute its institutional structure. In some organizations 
these structures are formal; in others, they are informal. These rules can be labeled 
‗organizational forms‘ (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, p.22).  
2.1.2 Analytical approaches to studying institutions 
Institutionalism and the study of institutions have become increasingly prevalent 
in explaining political and economic behaviour.
6
 Its origins lie in the attempt to 
contextualize both politics and economics in institutional terms and to view the 
conditions of human opportunity as being, to varying degrees, framed institutionally.
7
 In 
economics, institutions were, at least until the 1970s, largely taken for granted. The 
dominant neo-classical paradigm assumed a frictionless world in which the effects of 
government and institutions were ignored, thereby assuming transaction costs to be zero 
(see, for example, Arrow and Debreu, 1954). Once it was accepted that different 
institutional structures might raise or lower transaction costs for economic actors, it 
became apparent that the elegance of rational choice based attempts at explaining 
economic behaviour might be matched only by their limited utility in explaining 
economic reality. In political science, institutions - particularly those associated with the 
state - had been perceived as neutral arenas upon which certain political actors imposed 
                                                 
6
 This is evident in studies that focus on the post-socialist region. See, for example: Crawford and Lijphart 
(1995); Hausner, Jessop, and Nielsen (1995);  Elster,  Offe, and Preuss (1998); Robinson (2000).    
7
 Early examples from the new institutional economics include: Coase (1937, 1960, 1988); Olson (1965); 
Demsetz (1967); North and Thomas (1973). In political science, notable examples include: Skocpol (1979); 
Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, eds. (1985); Krasner (1988); Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 
(1992). 
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their own preferences (e.g. rational choice theories and pluralist accounts), or as 
reflections of social structures (interest-group theories and Marxist accounts).  
The rise of institutionalism in both economics and political science can be seen as 
a reaction to the prior ascendancy of rational choice based, deductive methods in the 
social sciences and as a move towards incorporating a more inductive and contextually 
sensitive approach to explaining both politics and economics. In economics, the new 
institutional economics (NIE) literature emphasized the context in which economic 
behaviour is located, with institutions shaping the incentives and constraints imposed 
upon economic actors, and thereby raising or reducing transaction costs and increasing or 
decreasing the economic efficiency of a given social system. Indeed, institutions have 
been seen by some as offering the best explanation of variation in patterns of economic 
growth and prosperity throughout history.
8
 Furthermore, such theorists argue that not 
only are economic institutions thought to determine the aggregate economic growth 
potential of an economy, but also as shaping the potential economic outcomes in the 
future, such as the future distribution of resources amongst groups within a society.  
Broadly speaking, both strands of literature share the view that institutions – both 
economic and political - are not entirely derivative of either social structures or the 
preferences of individuals, and that institutions have an independent effect on economic 
and political behaviour, the influence of which fluctuates depending on the historically 
specific conditions of each case. However, the diverse array of methods employed to 
analyse the effects of institutions on political and economic behaviour render the field a 
conceptual mélange, with different approaches taking varying positions on the role of 
structure and agency, rationality and rule following, and the extent to which institutions 
evolve or are the product of purposeful design.  
2.1.3 From the ‘old’ institutionalisms to the ‘new’ 
No account of institutional thought, however brief, would be complete without 
first mentioning the old institutionalisms used to analyse economic and political 
                                                 
8
 See, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002, 2005).  
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behaviour. In political science, the old institutionalism focused on the formal institutions 
of government and conceived the state in terms of its political, administrative and legal 
arrangements (Schmidt, 2006, p.99). It employed an essentially descriptive methodology 
to explain the different relationships within a given polity among the various levels and 
branches of government. In so far as it was comparative, it described various state 
configurations and examined the similarities and differences in the manner in which each 
worked and, consequently, its approach was considered to be largely atheoretical with 
very little predictive utility. Later, more ‗holistic‘ approaches (e.g. structural-functionalist 
and Marxian accounts) became dominant, with the formal institutions of the state being 
replaced as the object of analysis by an emphasis on the wider political system, 
explaining political behaviour in terms of the equilibrium-seeking functioning of its 
component parts through interest articulation and aggregation (e.g. Almond and Powell, 
1966). Systems were viewed in static terms and revolutionary change was considered an 
anomaly, with political changes absorbed by the system as an instance of ‗homeostatic 
equilibrium‘. Where structural-functionalist approaches were linked to theories of the 
state, it was assumed that the state‘s role was that of arbiter among competing interest 
groups (Dahl, 1961). 
These approaches were later challenged by Marxian analyses which, although 
similar in their systemic focus, viewed the state (the pre-eminent political institution) as a 
superstructure operating in the service of the bourgeoisie. Here the system was 
considered as functioning via class conflict rather than as competition among interest 
groups, with the predicted outcome being systemic self-destruction through revolutionary 
change (e.g. Dahrendorf, 1959). Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, the 
‗methodological holism‘ of structural-functionalist accounts gradually gave way to the 
‗methodological individualism‘ of behaviouralist explanations which explained political 
behaviour in terms of general laws and propositions that were established by observation 
(Downs, 1957; Riker, 1981; Przeworski, 1991 and 2000). This involved attempts at 
quantifying political behaviour and, where this was not possible, importing rational 
choice approaches based on mathematical models employed in economics (e.g. Downs, 
1957). The behaviouralist approach treated institutions as arenas in which utility 
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maximizing politicians and groups sought to advance their own interests. It was against 
this background that a renewed emphasis on the role of institutions in framing human 
behaviour emerged towards the end of the 1970s. 
   The old economic institutionalism was also based on a rejection of the assumption 
that human behaviour could be reduced to its methodological individualist parts. 
However, it emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century and so predated the turn 
against methodological individualism in political science by around 70 years. The most 
prominent strand of old institutional economics (OIE) is associated with the work of 
Thorstein Veblen (see, for example, 1904, 1915, 1919) and, later, Clarence Ayres (e.g., 
1952, 958), who built upon Veblen‘s previous work.9 According to Veblen, economic 
behaviour is socially rather than individually determined with economic organization 
being a process of ongoing evolutionary change in which there exists a dichotomy 
between the instrumental (or ceremonial) and technological (instrumental) forms of 
behaviour. He addressed the effects of the introduction of new technology on existing 
institutional structures, and the manner in which established social conventions and 
vested interests resisted or welcomed these changes. Consequently, Veblen appreciated 
that existing institutions might not ‗fit‘ the prevailing instrumentalities (technology) if 
powerful political and economic interests saw the newly available technology as inimical 
to their interests.  
 
                                                 
9
 Rutherford (1993, pp. 1-3) also identifies a second strand.  The second school within the OIE has its 
foundations in the work of John Commons (e.g., 1924 and 1931) and was later developed by the likes of 
Warren Samuels and Allan Schmid (1981). Whereas the work of the first school fails to address the judicial 
and political processes of conflict resolution that shape economic behaviour, the second school emphasizes 
legal structures, property rights and organizations, in particular how organizations evolve and affect the 
distribution of legal, political and economic power within a society. Institutions are viewed as outcomes of 
formal and informal processes of bargaining and conflict resolution between organizations, with the success 
of an institution being measured by the extent to which it generates satisfactory outcomes to the 
organizations that created it. This emphasis on institutional outcomes led opponents of the OIE, particularly 
those from the new institutional economics school (NIE), to complain that the OIE is not grounded in any 
rigorous, testifiable theory and is too descriptive; that there is a tendency to argue in holistic rather than in 
individualistic terms; that a rule-following, norms based decision-making framework is used instead of a 
rational choice framework; that there is a failure to appreciate the importance of economizing in decision-
making processes; and that they suffer from an inability to give sufficient emphasis to unintended processes 
in institutional development, as opposed to processes of collective decision-making and institutional design 
(Rutherford, 1993, p.4). It was not until the 1960s that attempts were made by NIE scholars to incorporate 
some of insights of the OIE into more mainstream economic theory.              
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2.1.4 The ‘new institutionalisms’: a conceptual mélange 
The ‗new‘ institutional explanations of human behavior that emerged later differ 
over a wide range of methodological issues. Four broad schools of institutionalism can be 
identified that straddle both economic and political institutionalism: rational choice 
oriented approaches; structural institutionalism; historical institutionalism; and 
constructivist institutionalism. Each school varies according to the extent to which they 
emphasize: (i) methodological individualism or holism as the epistemological foundation 
on which their accounts are based; (ii) whether mathematically formal or non-formal 
methods of analysis are employed; (iii) the degree to which individuals are conceived as 
rational or rule-following actors; and (iv) the intentional and deliberative, or spontaneous, 
evolutionary nature of institutional design. This classification broadly captures some of 
the key similarities and differences between different strands of thought across both 
political science and economics; it is therefore an approximate categorization that does 
not capture many of the more subtle similarities, differences and crossovers between the 
four approaches. 
2.1.5 Rational choice institutionalism 
While accepting the importance of institutions in framing human behaviour, 
rational choice institutionalism places greater emphasis at the individual level of analysis. 
Individuals are seen as rational actors possessing fixed, stable and endogenously 
determined preferences who make strategic calculations in order to maximize those 
preferences. Consequently, institutions – both political and economic - are viewed in 
more instrumental terms.
10
 This instrument – the institutional framework of a society - 
structures the incentives within which rational actors advance and attempt to maximize 
their preferences. With the emphasis placed firmly on individual agency, many of the 
rational choice institutionalist approaches share the characteristics of traditional, neo-
classically rooted (economics) methods of analysing social behaviour. In this respect, 
                                                 
10
 Here the term ―supervenience‖ has been proposed to indicate the priority of the individual over the 
social, while allowing for the social conditioning of individuals, stating that ―whatever compex and 
reciprocal relations there are between social entities and individuals, it is the totality of individual facts 
which determines the totality of social facts‖ (Currie, 1984, p.345). 
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many examples of this approach are more reliant on mathematically formal methods of 
analysis, with a preference towards assuming actors‘ behaviour as being rational rather 
than rule (or norm) following, and, by extension, viewing the emergence of institutions as 
a function of deliberate human design (e.g. Coase, 1937, 1960, 1988; North and Thomas, 
1973; Becker, 1995).
11
 Despite this apparent emphasis on individual agency in rational 
choice approaches to institutional analysis, some studies adopt a stronger version of 
functionalism and presume that every organizational device has a function and that the 
function explains its presence. For example, studies that focus on the cost-reducing 
properties of certain organizational forms and organizational innovations – such as works 
that analyse the performance of the firm – show a tendency towards explaining individual 
motivations in terms of their functions, e.g. a reduction in a firm‘s transaction costs 
(Coase, 1937, 1988; Williamson, 1975, 1985).
12
 
   Rational choice approaches to institutional analysis have been criticized for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, they are weak in explaining anything other than interest-
motivated action and offer only a ‗thin‘ definition of rationality, thereby raising the level 
of abstraction but missing the more subtle, and often more important, sources of human 
behaviour (Mansbridge, 1990). Second, rational choice analyses are weak in their 
approach to change. Because of their emphasis on fixed preferences and equilibrium 
conditions, it is difficult to account for change in anything other than functionalist terms, 
i.e. the origins of institutions are explained by their outcomes and are, more often than 
not, seen to be socially efficient. Finally, rational choice explanations are weak in their 
treatment of power (Olson, 2000). The creation of institutions is seen as a quasi-
                                                 
11
 Rational choice institutionalist analyses are also common in principal-agent theories of how ‗principals‘ 
– e.g. senior state and government officials, or enterprise managers – maintain control or gain compliance 
from ‗agents‘ to which they delegate power – e.g. bureaucracies, regulatory agencies, or lower level 
employees within a firm. The degree to which principals can ensure compliance from agents is viewed as a 
function of the prevailing incentive structure, and the extent to which asymmetries of information between 
principal and agent exist. In terms of institutional analysis, the behaviour of an institution can be reduced to 
the aggregate behaviour of individuals at all levels within that institution, each of whom bases their 
decisions on the perceived costs and benefits to each of their alternative courses of action (Ostrom, 1991, 
p.243). The reliance on methodological individualism is evident in the assumption that utility maximizing 
principals and agents often exhibit opportunism as well as self interest, or as Oliver Williamson suggests, 
they exhibit ―self interest seeking with guile‖ (Williamson, 1985, p.30). 
12
 All of these works share in common a focus on institutional frameworks serving the purpose of solving 
the problems of agency by reducing the transaction costs faced by individuals and organizations.  
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contractual process rather than being governed by asymmetries of power (Hall and 
Taylor, 1996). By neglecting the interests of the powerful, i.e. the practical context in 
which choices are formulated and made, this approach fails to appreciate that power and 
its distribution is the essence of both politics and economics, and that power and its 
application can explain socially inefficient outcomes.
13
   
2.1.6 Structural and constructivist institutionalism 
Structural institutionalist accounts describe the range of analytical frameworks 
that assert culture, values and norms as the primary explanatory factor in analysing 
institutions. Institutions are viewed as socially constituted and culturally framed, with 
actors operating according to each distinct ‗logic of appropriateness‘ that exists within a 
society and is itself a function of culturally-specific rules and norms. In contrast to 
rational-choice theorists who see human behaviour in terms of an endogenous ‗self-
interest‘ that exists prior to institutions, structural institutionalist accounts see actors‘ 
preferences as exogenous, i.e. as being framed by cultural institutions and historically 
specific values and norms (e.g. Fligstein, 1990; March and Olsen, 1989). These accounts 
do not lend themselves to formal methods of analysis and the tilt towards methodological 
holism sees individuals behaving not in the manner assumed by rational choice theorists, 
but instead in terms of rule or norm following behaviour. The main flaw in structural 
accounts lies in its implicit relativism that is a result of its emphasis on culturally unique 
structures and norms, i.e. on the system level of analysis, rendering cross-country 
analyses difficult as outcomes in individual cases are largely viewed as being the result of 
culturally specific conditions.
14
  
It is also important to briefly consider the importance of the role of ideas and 
discourse in institutional analysis as it can introduce a dynamic element to approaches 
that may otherwise appear to be quite static. Although this can be considered as a 
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 Instead, for rational choice theorists institutions are seen as largely neutral phenomena, existing to create 
a more stable environment in which rational actors can maximize their utility.  
14
 Because of its neglect of human agency and its emphasis on cultural norms rather than individual action, 
structural institutionalism can appear ‗culturally deterministic‘. Consequently, this invites criticism that it is 
an analytical framework that is inherently static with too much attention paid to equilibrium conditions.    
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separate category in itself, it is possible to view the role of ideas within the context of 
each of the three constructs described here as each approach has its own view of the role 
of ideas within their original frameworks of analysis. Perhaps the central issue in terms of 
the role of ideas within the constructs outlined above is whether ideas are constitutive of 
institutions (or interests, in the case of rational choice approaches) or vice versa. Thus, 
while discursive institutional approaches do not incorporate formal mathematical models 
of analysis, the extent to which they perceive human behaviour as being essentially 
rational or rule-following varies depending on each case. For example, while Peter Hall 
sees ideas as constitutive of both interests and institutions in the introduction of 
monetarist ideas under the Thatcher government, he asserts the primacy of institutional 
structures in framing the environment in which Keynesian economic ideas were adopted 
across the world (Hall, 1989 and 1993). In the post-socialist context, Hilary Appel (2004) 
places the ideology of market liberalism at the centre of her analysis of the privatization 
process in the Czech Republic and Russia in the 1990s.
15
  
2.1.7 Historical institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism emphasizes the importance of the origins and 
development of institutions, which are explained as the outcomes of purposeful choices 
(although the outcomes may be unintended) and historically unique initial conditions. In 
this context, the central premise of rational choice institutionalism: that actors‘ 
preferences are fixed, stable and exogenously given, are rejected in favour of a more 
nuanced and realistic view that preferences are neither fixed nor entirely exogenously 
determined. As a result, such approaches tend not to utilize formal methods of analysis as 
the degree of abstraction associated with these methods would not capture the context-
specific detail that is central to historical institutionalist analysis. Although lacking a 
common position on the role of structure or agency explaining human behaviour, most 
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 Appel highlights the power of market ideology in driving the privatization process in spite of the array of 
structural forces that opposed such ideas. She does, however, argue that ideology can only go so far in 
explaining the adoption of certain privatization policies, and that agency level variables – such as the fact 
that opponents of liberal economic reform diluted many of the reforms that were implemented, particularly 
in Russia, and that the personal characteristics of key actors (especially Vaclav Klaus in the Czech 
Republic) in the privatization process were of significant importance – were also key factors in shaping the 
privatization process across the two cases.   
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proponents of historical institutionalism view actors as both shaping and being shaped by 
institutions (Hay and Wincott, 1998). Institutions, while shaping actors‘ preferences and 
effecting an uneven distribution of resources and power, are also created, reformed and 
altered by actors. This relationship is dynamic and mutually constitutive with institutions 
shifting in their role as both the independent and dependent variable at different points in 
the analysis.  
Consequently, historical institutionalism incorporates both structure and agency 
with each empirical case determining which is more prominent in the explanation. Unlike 
rational choice analyses, historical institutionalist approaches tend not to neglect power. 
Instead, for example, in politics, the state is seen ―no longer as a neutral broker among 
competing interests but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character 
and outcomes of group conflict‖ (Hall and Taylor, 1996). However, by focusing on the 
effects of positive feedback, timing, sequencing, and phases of change, the emphasis can 
often be placed not only on asymmetries of power and how they influence the 
development of institutions, but also on path-dependencies and unintended consequences 
(e.g. Thelen, 1999; Pierson, 2000, 2004). Interests, therefore, are contingent on context 
rather than being universally defined and change is viewed as an evolutionary process, 
often as the result of conflicts between competing groups. This emphasis on context can 
be perceived as being the primary weakness of historical institutionalism in the sense that 
it limits the extent to which generalizable hypotheses can be made and rigorously tested, 
rendering it a more descriptive method of explaining human behaviour with less 
predictive utility. These charges are discussed in more depth below.   
2.1.8 Continuity and change in historical institutionalism 
As the discussion above implies, many institutional approaches display an 
inherent tendency towards viewing institutional development in static terms. Because of 
the emphasis on fixed preferences in rational choice institutionalism, institutional 
continuity is often assumed as institutions are simply viewed as an extension of 
individual preferences. Structural institutionalist accounts also tend to emphasise the 
continuity of institutions, although this is a function of the preference for explaining 
 26 
human behaviour in terms of cultural norms and social structures. Both sets of 
approaches also display an inherent functionalism that sees institutions as socially 
efficient. By contrast, historical institutionalist accounts – with the incorporation of both 
structure and agency – facilitate more realistic accounts of both institutional continuity 
and change that are not weighed down by accusations of functionalism. Integral to the 
historical institutionalist approach is the appreciation of the importance of the shifting 
distribution of power within a society in shaping the prospects for future change or stasis. 
This is particularly important in the post-socialist context where institutional structures – 
both formal and informal – have tended to be more fluid than in many other parts of the 
world, often creating the conditions for certain organizations to be able to impose their 
preferences on institutional development (Horak, 2007).  
2.1.9 Institutional continuity: path dependence 
The concepts of path dependence and historical contingency are central to the 
historical institutionalist explanation of human behaviour, with path dependency being 
cited as the defining characteristic of the institutionalist analytical framework (Krasner, 
1998, p.67).
16
 The combination of historically specific circumstances framing the choices 
of self-interested actors can offer a path dependent explanation of institutional change in 
which prior institutional choices constrain the options available to actors and 
organizations for future development. Previous choices made by actors shape the choice 
set available to future actors and increase or reduce the probability for the occurrence of 
certain eventualities. Consequently, much attention is paid to moments of institutional 
formation, which are viewed as being crucial because of the possibilities for ‗locking in‘ 
                                                 
16
 The concept of path dependency employed in economics is similar to that described here. Like historical 
institutionalist accounts, the historical past and cumulative processes are viewed as largely determining the 
choices available to decision-makers and the context in which these decisions are made. In a strictly 
economic context path dependence implies that the components of an economy – productive technologies, 
economic institutions, and the geographic distribution of economic activity – are the consequence of many 
minor and random developments. Where neo-classical economics tends to see the magnitude of an effect as 
derivative of the magnitude of the cause (i.e., that there is a linear relationship between the two), path 
dependence implies that small, and sometimes apparently minor causes, can have disproportionately large 
effects, often due to the importance of ‗increasing returns‘ to specific courses of action. Prominent 
examples include Veblen (1915), Krugman (1991), Arthur (1994) and David (2000).   
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certain historical paths for future development.
17
 Nothing in path dependent accounts 
presupposes that institutional development will move towards teleologically defined, 
socially efficient outcomes, as in some rational choice and structural institutionalist 
explanations, because the outcomes of actors‘ decisions are not considered predictable, 
with unintended outcomes considered as much a possibility as intended outcomes. With 
this in mind, historical contingency – the notion that accidents or coincidences of history 
may leave lasting legacies – and the inevitability of multiple equilibria, are also integral 
elements of institutional development. 
There are three main causal mechanisms by which the past can be viewed as 
shaping the present: first, by influencing the values, beliefs and habits of actors; second, 
that the existing institutional structure has created organizations with a vested interest in 
the maintenance of the existing structure; and third, past institutional frameworks may 
serve as a model for the creation of new institutional frameworks.
18
 Consequently, path 
dependence has a more precise meaning than simply asserting that ‗history matters‘. 
Instead, it is the direct and indirect effects of past choices and beliefs of political and 
economic organizations that shape the options available to decision-makers in the 
present. In this respect, inefficient outcomes, i.e. poor institutional performance, may 
persist because of the power of vested interests and because of potential imbalances in 
power between political and economic actors. This also incorporates the notion of 
‗sequencing‘ in which the order of events can also be of critical importance to explaining 
how certain future choices are made possible or impossible as the ‗feedback‘ from 
previous choices shapes decisions in the present.       
It has been argued that historical institutionalist approaches, with their focus on 
path-dependencies, can be ―too contingent and too deterministic‖ leading them to over 
emphasise structures and processes over specific events and individuals (Thelen, 1999, 
p.385). This then leads to a weakness in explaining change as the focus is on continuities 
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 It is also true that too much attention can be paid to the moment of institutional formation, and sometimes 
too little paid to the reasons behind the original choices that produced this particular path. The problem of 
locating the sources of institutional formation in the post-communist context are highlighted in Fish (1998).  
18
 Prominent accounts of path dependence include: Elster, Offe, and Preuss et al. (1998); North (1990, 
2005) and North, Wallis and Weingast (2006, 2006 and 2009) .  
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and path-dependence. However, this implied hyper contingency is an oversimplification 
of the position. For example, the ‗critical junctures‘ literature that considers 
‗configurative‘ moments and ‗punctuated equilibrium‘ focus on specific moments or 
choices that open up certain possibilities for later developments but preclude others 
(Gourevitch, 1986; Krasner, 1988; Karl, 1997; Collier and Collier, 1999). Indeed, 
―nothing in path-dependent analyses implies that a particular alternative is ‗locked in‘ 
after a critical juncture has passed, merely that certain outcomes are more probable than 
others (Pierson, 2004, p.52). Instead, change continues, but is seen as ‗bounded change‘, 
with structures facilitating or inhibiting certain courses of action (Simon, 1982). This 
point is perhaps best summarized by Bob Jessop (1990, p.260) who, when discussing the 
state – but could equally be referring to any other organization or institution - argues that 
it is a dynamic and constantly unfolding system with its specific form at any given 
moment representing a crystallization of past strategies with the institutional structure 
―more open to some types of political strategy than others‖. As will be discussed below, 
an openness to the possibility of path dependence in social science is not incompatible 
with moments of dynamic institutional change; merely, that the probability of either is 
contingent on the specific circumstances of each case.  
2.1.10. Institutional change: path contingency 
Change as much as continuity is part of the historical institutionalist approach to 
analyzing politics and economics, despite the fact that it is often criticized as being under-
theorized with too much emphasis placed upon institutional stasis, stability and path 
dependence constraining action. Because of its incorporation of the assumption that 
actors‘ preferences can be both endogenously and exogenously formed at different points 
over time, the relationship between institutions and behaviour is viewed as being 
mutually constitutive, thus facilitating a more dynamic conception of institutions within a 
framework that also facilitates continuity and path dependence. Change is usually 
incremental, as political and economic entrepreneurs perceive new opportunities or react 
to new threats to their well-being (North, 2005, p.6). However, sudden, sharp, non-linear 
periods of change are also possible, depending on the nature of the political-economic 
structure that is under examination, as some structures may be more ‗brittle‘, and appear 
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stable on the surface, but are only capable of sudden change.
19
 Four sources of 
institutional change can be identified within the existing historical institutionalist 
literature: the ‗incidental institutions‘ view; the ‗social conflict‘ view; the ‗endogenous 
change‘ view; and the ‗exogenous change‘ view. These sources of change are often 
complementary and should not be viewed as mutually exclusive. Moreover, each source 
of institutional change demonstrates that institutional development need not always be 
path dependent, but instead that it can be path contingent.  
The first approach to institutional change can be termed the ‗incidental 
institutions‘ view.20 This approach sees institutional change emerging as an unintended 
product of decisions taken at any given time, i.e. as an historical accident in which 
causes, intentions and outcomes do not fit tidily together. For example, Barrington Moore 
argues that class coalitions, and the way agriculture was organized, helped shape the 
political development of a number of democratic and non-democratic countries (Moore, 
1966). However, the organization of agriculture is not chosen with an eye to its effects on 
political institutions, so these institutions are seen as an unintended consequence and, ex 
post, as historical accidents. In other words, historical accidents at critical junctures might 
shape institutional development, and these institutions may persist for a long time, with 
significant consequences. Such approaches can be weakened by placing too much 
emphasis on unintended consequences; clearly, history demonstrates that institutional 
development can be a function of both intended and unintended consequences.  
    The ‗social conflict‘ approach asserts the importance of conflict between social 
groups as explaining institutional change within and across countries (e.g., Acemoglu, 
2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2008). According to this view, economic and 
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 The example of the Soviet Union is instructive in this respect. While it was often considered a very stable 
system, it was the inherent conservatism within the system that prevented it from changing and adapting to 
the changing demands imposed upon it by technological progress and political and economic competition 
with the West. When change did occur, it occurred at an extremely fast pace. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 5. 
20
 The field of New Comparative Economics also emphasizes the differences in historical institutional 
choices across capitalist countries to explain later outcomes. In a similar way, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shliefer et al. (1998, 1999) argue that the efficiency of institutions is largely explained by the choice of 
legal systems within a country. This choice then determines the potential for future efficiency. A summary 
of the literature and the basic foundations of this field is contained in Djankov, Glaeser, La Porta et al. 
(2003).   
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political institutions are not always chosen by the whole society (and not for the benefit 
of the whole society), but by the groups that control political power at the time (perhaps 
as a result of conflict with other groups). These groups will choose the institutions that 
maximize their own rents, and the institutions that result may not coincide with those that 
maximize total surplus, wealth or income. For example, institutions that enforce property 
rights by restricting state predation may not be in the interest of a ruler or organization 
that wants to appropriate assets in the future. By establishing property rights, this ruler or 
organization would be reducing its own future rents, and so may prefer institutions other 
than enforced private property. Consequently, ―equilibrium…institutions will not be 
those that maximize the size of the overall pie, but the slice of the pie taken by the 
powerful groups‖ (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005, p.36). Thus, changes in the 
distribution of resources among competing actors and organizations and their perceptions 
of whether they are able to effect a corresponding increase in their size of the social ‗pie‘ 
are central to any explanation of change. Opportunities for change can also emerge from 
endogenous competition if the socio-economic structure of a society is amenable to 
competitive tendencies among organizations.  
The ‗endogenous change‘ approach identifies variation across countries in terms 
of the differences in beliefs and ideological structures as a source of institutional change 
across and within countries. According to this view, societies may choose different 
institutional structures, with very different implications, because they – or their leaders – 
disagree about what would be good for the society. According to this approach, there is 
sufficient uncertainty about what constitutes the ‗correct‘ institutional framework that 
even well-intentioned actors disagree about what might be good for their own people. 
When actors or organizations with a different conception of how to organize society find 
themselves in a position to effect institutional change – such as after a major social 
upheaval, or after an electoral victory – the probability of change increases, at least at a 
formal level. However, the extent to which the changes in belief structures are accepted 
by wider society at a more conventional and informal level often diverges with the 
changes that may have taken place at the formal level. This has been particularly apparent 
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in the post-socialist context, where changes within leaderships concerning formal 
institutional structures have often been lagged by changes in informal practices.     
Finally, the ‗exogenous change‘ approach to explaining institutional change 
focuses on the effects of external factors in precipitating institutional change by altering 
the goals, strategies or resources available to actors or organizations within a country. 
Examples of such exogenous shocks include periods of crisis, changes in relative price 
levels for goods or services, and changes in the technology used within an economy; or, 
conceivably, all three may occur simultaneously (Krasner, 1984; Gourevitch, 1986). The 
effects of such exogenous changes may be mediated by the factors described above. For 
example, a new technological development in a specific economic sector may raise the 
relative distribution of resources available to organizations within this sector, thus 
increasing the perception of what goals are achievable to these organizations. This may 
result in conflict between these organizations and those that have been made relatively 
worse off by the price change, but who have a stake in preserving the status quo 
institutional framework that benefited them (Acemoglu, 2008).  
This brief overview of approaches to institutional continuity and change within 
the historical institutionalist framework illustrates that the charges of under-theorization 
in relation to change, and an overemphasis on continuities, are clearly exaggerated. It is 
the complexity and historical contingency of these types of accounts of change that often 
leads to accusations of under-theorization. However, the ingredients for constructing a 
useful analytical framework are clearly present. What is required is a conceptual 
framework that incorporates the different insights presented above, but that is still 
capable of indicating when certain outcomes (change or stasis) are more or less probable, 
while accepting that historically specific conditions may explain why hypothesized 
outcomes may not always occur. This need not be a weakness, however. Cases in which 
the predicted outcome does not occur can be used to sharpen the analytical framework by 
using them to identify circumstances that are or are not compatible with the framework 
being employed. After all, different conceptual frameworks can only explain so much, 
with anomalous cases illustrating those instances when a particular model may or not be 
of much utility.   
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2.1.11 Institutional analysis: conclusion 
Although the approaches to institutional analysis outlined above are each unique 
and appear to be very different from one another, the four constructs are not as mutually 
exclusive as they might initially appear, and there are in fact many shared assumptions 
between the approaches that leave room for a more synthetic approach that bridges some 
of gaps that exist between them (Rutherford, 1993; Kato, 1996).
21
 A recent study by 
Douglass North (2005), for instance, offers a framework for analysing institutional 
change that integrates elements of all of the constructs discussed above. North 
emphasises the importance of non-ergodicity in shaping rationality assumptions, the role 
of cultural beliefs and norms, and the varied effects of human intentionality to offer a 
more comprehensive framework of institutional evolution, arguing that individuals and 
their perceptions, preferences and intentions (fulfilled or otherwise) are central to 
explaining institutional development. However, the importance of structural factors, such 
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 For example, it is possible to adopt an agency centred approach to institutional analysis that explains the 
emergence of cultural norms and beliefs by viewing these norms as outcomes of a series of aggregated 
principal-agent relationships. Those studies that focused on the emergence of informal networks between 
state officials and enterprise managers within the Soviet Union often do this by first emphasising the self-
interest and opportunism of agents (in the context of information asymmetries) responding to the demands 
imposed by a restrictive formal institutional environment, which then resulted in the emergence of informal 
practices that over time became embedded within the institutional framework of Soviet society (e.g. Urban, 
1985; Solnick, 1998; Harrison, 2002).   Such approaches might be termed as ‗individual institutionalism‘ 
which indicates a methodological viewpoint that gives slightly extra weight to the preferences and 
rationality of the individual actor, while acknowledging the importance of institutions and other social 
structures (such as ideology or belief systems) in shaping those preferences and in constraining rationality 
(Agassi, 1975). It is, however, difficult to be precise when employing such terms. Quantifying just how 
much structure or how much agency is being emphasised in any given account is fraught with difficulty. 
However, if the strengths of all approaches are appreciated it ought to be possible to give extra weight to 
one stance, if only to identify those cases where other approaches may have been more useful. For example, 
Steven Solnick‘s (1998) account of institutional collapse in the Soviet Union provides a vivid example of 
an agency centred explanation of how self-interested individuals behaving opportunistically responded to 
the signals of weakening formal state structures (the central Soviet authorities) and, by choosing to ‗exit‘ 
the formal structures of the USSR, inadvertently caused the collapse of the Soviet state. This approach is 
parsimonious, elegant, and captures some of the dynamics that were active during the later years of the 
Soviet system,  but the model is more useful in some contexts than in others. For example, the ‗exit‘ of the 
Baltic states from the Soviet state was characterized more by the emergence of nationalist forces that came 
to dominate the political agenda than by the activities of self-interested and opportunistic middle-level state 
officials (e.g. Lieven, 1993; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Laar, 1998; Raun, 2001). Thus, rather than suggest that 
Solnick‘s agency centred approach is fundamentally weakened because of its failure to explain all aspects 
of the Soviet Union‘s collapse, it should be praised for its capacity to identify those situations that were 
amenable to analysis using this particular framework and those that were less amenable. Consequently, 
Solnick‘s framework is an extremely useful heuristic device, even when not directly applicable, as its 
failure to explain certain cases might help point the analyst in the direction of a set of analytical tools that 
will be more useful.         
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as norms, conventions, belief systems and the potentially dynamic effects of ideology are 
all incorporated into his analysis, with individual rationality ‗bounded‘ by the 
institutional framework in which it exists. For North, none of the constructs described 
above – in their less extreme forms - are viewed as being necessarily incompatible with 
the other, and the emphasis placed on structure or agency is contingent on each case.
22
  
In light of this, the conceptual building blocks for the framework that is employed 
in this study will emphasize: (i) the self-interest and choices of powerful actors and 
organizations within society, and thus the distribution of power between these groups and 
the potential for conflict between them; (ii) the incentive structures that these self-
interested actors operate within (both political and economic), therefore appreciating the 
‗bounded‘ nature of self-interest and the constraints and opportunities that these 
structures present; (iii) the fact that the choices of self-interested actors and the structures 
within which they exist can lead to specific norms, values or ideologies becoming 
embedded within societies, leading, in certain circumstances, either to structural 
behavioural barriers to change or incentives to change; (iv) the recursive nature of human 
behaviour, i.e. the mutually constitutive nature of the interaction between agents and 
institutions, and the complicating effect that this has on actors‘ intentions in shaping 
institutions; and, finally, (v) an appreciation that institutional change (path contingency), 
as much as continuity (path dependency), is possible depending on the combination of 
endogenous and exogenous variables that shape institutional development within 
different contexts. 
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 Thus, when discussing the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, North emphasises the importance of the 
belief structure (Marxism-Leninism) of the Soviet leadership in his account of the rise of the Soviet Union 
(North, 2005, pp.146-154). The practical exigencies imposed by the ongoing crises of revolution, civil war, 
starvation and international events all had the effect of shaping the manner in which the initial ideological 
framework was imposed upon Soviet society, so that the eventual outcome of the revolution (the Stalinist 
model of political economy) was a function of both the intentions of actors grounded in the dominant 
ideological framework, and also of the unintended consequences of the compromises that were made as the 
revolutionary leadership grappled with the desperate challenges imposed by their domestic and 
international situation. Conversely, when discussing the fall of the Soviet Union, greater emphasis is placed 
upon the individual responses of actors to changes in the incentive structure caused by Gorbachev‘s 
reforms, although the nature of the reforms themselves were shaped by ideological considerations. North‘s 
framework can therefore be viewed as benefiting from the scope of its methodological assumptions.  
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 To be clear, the methodological position adopted in this study will proceed on the 
assumption that self-interested agents and organizations operate within the constraints of 
formal and informal institutional environments. In this sense, the approach tends more to 
the rational-choice oriented variant of historical institutionalism. While this facilitates the 
formulation of a small number of testable hypotheses that can be tested across time and 
space, the approach adopted here will not be too rigid in its application of these 
methodological assumptions. Instead, where the hypotheses generated in this chapter 
appear to be contravened by the evidence, or where perhaps the influence of economic 
structure on social order development is mediated by other variables, an appreciation of 
other methodologies will be shown. This enables an analysis that is both parsimonious in 
its model of explanation, but equally open to the influence of other explanations. 
Consequently, the approach here is both deductive (in the formulation of hypotheses) and 
inductive (in the openness to other explanatory variables). By qualifying any explanation 
of social order development that is made using the conceptual framework in this study, 
this methodological openness should help develop a better theoretical framework for 
future research. Indeed, in effect, an openness to alternative methodological approaches 
and other explanatory variables introduces an implicit appreciation of the margin of error 
of the explanatory power of the conceptual framework.       
2.2 The object of explanation: social orders across the post-socialist region 
So far the conceptual discussion has dealt with the different approaches to analyzing 
economic and political institutions simultaneously, arguing that both share common 
methodological traits rendering them amenable to categorization along similar lines. 
However, in reality political and economic institutions and organizations are analytically 
distinct, in as much as they perform different functions and roles within a society, while 
at the same time they are intimately intertwined due to the fact that different political and 
economic institutional structures support specific forms of political and economic 
organizations, which in turn has implications for the type of state-society relations that 
will characterize a given society. The symbiotic relationship between economy and polity 
is captured by the concept of limited-access (LAO) and open-access (OAO) social orders 
(North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, 2007, 2009). These constitute two broadly defined 
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poles of a social order dichotomy that emphasize the ‗double-balance‘ between political 
and economic systems, highlighting the complex interplay between organizations and 
institutions in both the political and economic sphere.  
Social orders encompass the wide array of political, economic, cultural, religious, 
military, and educational systems that might be present within a society. The form of 
social order shapes the organizational pattern of its constituent systems. The types of 
organizational patterns that can exist within a social order can vary widely. However, the 
key manner in which social orders differ is in their ability to create and maintain 
contractual organizations, and can therefore be distinguished by the nature of competition 
between organizations and the manner in which rents are created.
23
 In open-access 
systems, open competition ensures that an impersonal form of contractual organization is 
prevalent, while in limited access systems contractual organizations are more informal 
and arbitrary. The ‗double-balance‘ described above refers to the manner in which the 
distribution of economic rents and political power are related; LAOs see the distribution 
of rents intertwined with political power, while OAOs exhibit a more even distribution of 
economic rents and political power.
24
      
Although all societies contain competitive tendencies, it is the manner in which 
societies channel competition that distinguishes a social order, with LAOs resolving 
competitive tendencies among organizations in a more arbitrary and sometimes violent 
manner than in OAOs. Similarly, rents are created in different ways within the two social 
orders. Whereas in perfectly competitive open access markets, competition for rents 
among organizations leads infra-marginal rents to accrue to many producers and 
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 Organizations can be broken down into two main types of  organization: ‗adherent organizations‘ and 
‗contractual organizations‘ (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, pp.21-33). Adherent  organizations are 
characterized by self enforcing, incentive-compatible agreements among their members and are not reliant 
on third parties to enforce agreements among members. Cooperation requires that it must be in the interests 
of all of the members to remain in the organization, or ultimately those individuals will cease to cooperate. 
Contractual organizations, on the other hand, utilize third party enforcement of contracts among their 
members. Contractual organizations may also rely on incentive-compatible agreements among members in 
contractual organizations, but they employ third party enforcement for some arrangements so that members 
can pre-commit to a subset of arrangements among themselves that may not, at all times, otherwise be 
incentive-compatible.  
24
 Other theoretical and empirical discussions of the relationship between political and economic 
competition include: Schumpeter (1948); Rose-Ackerman (1999); Rustow (1970); Migdal (1988); Demsetz 
(1982); Stigler (1972).  
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consumers, in LAOs organizations limit market entry and competition to ensure that 
individuals or organizations (whether it be the state or firms) with market power can 
accrue rents. Rents can also be created by differential access to organizational forms or 
resources if, for example, a firm in an industry is able to ensure the special enforcement 
of its contracts, then even in a competitive market that firm earns infra-marginal rents 
because of lower costs. On a wider scale, the purposeful creation of rents by states in 
LAOs is a consequence of the purposeful creation of differential access for individuals or 
organizations to the goods and services that the state can provide, such as enforcement of 
property rights and contracts, legal systems, etc. Consequently, it is the extent to which 
social orders are governed by rules and legal frameworks that distinguishes whether it is a 
limited or open access order and it is this that constitutes the object of explanation 
throughout this dissertation.  
2.2.1 Limited-access orders (LAOs) 
In limited-access orders – as in open-access orders - politics and economics are 
mutually constitutive. Actors within the state limit economic entry to other actors within 
society to generate economic rents which are used to create credible commitments among 
competing elites to support the current regime and provide some sense of order within 
society (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, 2007, 2009; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 
2008).
25
 Because the political system is used to manipulate the economic system to 
produce and maintain order, it is possible to conceive of economic and political systems 
as existing separately, but not as independent entities. Thus, the political system is not 
exogenous to the economic system due to the political system being the primary actor in 
the economy. Similarly, the economic system is not exogenous to the political system, 
since the existence of economic rents structure political relationships.
26
  
LAOs are relatively conservative orders in which only limited economic and 
political change occurs. This is because although LAOs possess some inherent incentives 
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 Such elites can be labeled ‗distributional coalitions‘ (Olson, 1982).  
26
 The forms of state autonomy in LAOs can be either absolute, in which case rents accrue directly to a 
predatory state rather to private organizations, or compromised, in which case the state is itself the subject 
of predation by private organizations. The distinction between predatory and predated states is made in 
Evans (1995).  
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to promote specialization and division of labour – through the provision of rents to 
powerful elites – they only extend to the point where elites will be required to increase 
the degree of entry, openness and access to the economic system. This would then reduce 
the rents that had previously accrued to the elite in question and increase the threat to the 
prevailing status-quo (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The potential development of an 
LAO therefore involves a tradeoff in which ―the gains from specialization must be 
balanced against the threat of disorder‖ (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, p.16).27  
Although there are differences in the internal structure of LAOs, they all share in 
common a propensity among their ruling elites to limit economic, political, and social 
access to generate economic rents and then use the rents to create credible commitments 
between elites to the existing social order.  
In comparison with the OAOs, typical LAOs today have state-controlled 
industries, problematic business licensing regimes (for new entrants), and patron-client 
networks characterized by high levels of corruption. ―All are manifestations of rent-
creation‖ (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, p.11). LAOs often share many formal 
institutional structures with OAOs – including, elections, legal frameworks, corporations, 
etc. - but the extent to which the informal beliefs, conventions and patterns of behaviour 
‗fit‘ with the formal rules is very different to that observed in OAOs. More sophisticated 
LAOs possess robust institutional structures for the state and can enable a wide array of 
elite organizations to exist separate from the state. In practice, this means that the 
institutions of the state must be readily identifiable by members of the dominant 
coalition. A sophisticated LAO, therefore, ―has a well articulated body of public law that 
specifies the offices and functions of the state, the relationship between the offices and 
functions, and provides for methods of resolving conflicts within the state, and by 
extension, within the dominant coalition‖ (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2006, p.14).28 
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 See also, Acemoglu (2008). 
28
 It should be noted that in order to facilitate the emergence of more sophisticated LAOs, increasingly 
independent and sophisticated elite organizations are not only a source of socio-economic development, but 
their existence stimulates the emergence of more sophisticated institutions and organizations within the 
state. This is due to the manner in which non-state organizations fight to protect the differentiation and 
autonomy of public institutions, such as courts and the central bank.  This process is more visible in OAOs, 
where sophisticated private organizations in a market economy serve as a counterbalance to political 
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2.2.2 Open access orders (OAOs) 
In contrast to LAOs, open-access orders are sustained by competition rather than 
rent creation. Specifically, political competition is necessary to maintain open access in 
the economy, and economic competition is necessary to maintain open access in the 
polity. Open-access orders are sustainable when a society is able to produce three 
outcomes: (i) entry into economic, political, religious, and educational activities is open 
to all citizens without restraint; (ii) support for organizational forms in each of those 
activities that are open to all citizens; and (iii) the rule of law enforced impartially for all 
citizens. Schumpeterian creative destruction ensues when entry into economic activities is 
open to all citizens and organizations. With open access market entry, economic actors 
create rents through innovation. Competition then gradually erodes those rents as new 
firms and individuals enter either new markets or by transforming existing markets. 
Although economic organizations might prefer to shape the political process to restrict 
entry and maintain access to rents and, although political actors might prefer to use the 
political process to restrict entry, create rents, and bind economic actors to support a 
developing political coalition, what prevents elites from transforming open access orders 
into LAOs is the fact that the persistent competition that is a consequence of open entry 
frustrates the wishes of economic and political actors to create permanent rents through 
limiting access to markets.
29
 This reduction of rents through open competition is the 
defining characteristic of open-access orders.  
The creation of privileges for one person or organization that is the defining 
characteristic of LAOs necessarily involves the denial of opportunities and access to 
other individuals or organizations. However, because all actors within an open-access 
order wield the ability to form organizations, the selective distribution of rents by the 
state is likely to stimulate opposition by other well organized groups. If access to 
organizational forms is open, the state cannot prevent groups forming to oppose the 
                                                                                                                                                 
organizations. In sophisticated LAOs, the government can credibly commit to a wider range of policies and 
institutions because elite private organizations can effectively punish the government if it deviates from its 
commitments. In this way, a double balance between the sophistication of public and private organizations 
emerges in mature LAOs that can sustain a considerable level of political and economic development. 
29
 Studies that examine the role of competition in reducing rent-seeking behaviour include: Demsetz (1982) 
and Stigler (1972).   
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state‘s action. Indeed, in open-access orders one organization cannot prevent the 
formation of another organization with conflicting goals. This is the essence of relative 
state autonomy: no organization, whether it be the state itself or a private organization is 
able to prevent the entry of other organizations in order to maintain access to rents. This 
is because competition between organizations limits the exploitation of the state by 
raising the costs for ruling elites and lowering the benefits. In contrast, LAOs support the 
selective creation of elite organizations with similar interests to those of the dominant 
coalition. An LAO exercises greater influence over the distribution of interests within 
both the elite and wider society through the systematic manipulation of rents. This is 
because state autonomy is either absolute or compromised in LAOs whereas the 
autonomy of the state is relative, or ‗embedded‘, within OAOs (Evans, 1995).30  
Any attempt to create rents by the political actors may stimulate other economic 
organizations that are adversely affected by rent creation to organize politically. Because 
organizations mobilize and coordinate their members when their interests are threatened, 
open access to organizations of all types, especially economic, helps sustain political 
competition. Indeed, political competition in the context of open access to organizations 
also provides opposition political parties with both the formal incentive and legal right to 
monitor the state and oppose developments that may potentially compromise competition 
and the integrity of an open-access system in general. Open access to organizational 
forms is therefore critical to both political and economic activities. While competition 
and its beneficial effects upon the development of a social order are clearly of immense 
importance, it is not clear what causes some societies to become more competitive – both 
within the economy and at the political level - than others.   
 
 
                                                 
30
 Relative state autonomy, or ‗embedded‘ autonomy, refers to a situation where the state is immersed in a 
dense network of ties that binds it to groups or classes that can become allies in the pursuit of socially 
negotiated goals. Thus, they are neither fully insulated from social groups, as is the case of absolute 
autonomy, nor are they subject to predation by a few powerful groups. This is because the density of the 
state‘s links to different segments of society ensures that no group enjoys disproportionate access to the 
state. This concept is outlined in more detail in Evans (1995).  
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2.2.3 The ‘double balance’ between politics and economics 
The concept of the ‗double-balance‘ suggests that open access political and 
economic systems cannot sustain themselves independently of the other system.
31
 A 
competitive political system cannot be sustained by its own internal structure and 
institutions if it is located within a limited access economy. For example, open access for 
economic organizations sustains a wide range of organizations that could potentially 
mobilize against a ruling coalition that seeks to limit access to the economy and create 
rents for its favoured organizations. Indeed, if political competition is to be maintained 
over a longer period of time, the shifting distribution of economic resources that exists in 
an open access economy should discipline political actors. Conversely, the distribution of 
economic resources does not shift as frequently or with the same degree of freedom in an 
LAO, because the of the manner in which the leaderships of LAOs control the pattern of 
access to economic resources, which is then reflected in a less frequent shift in the 
distribution of resources among political organizations. Thus, the nature of the principal 
sources of economic power within a society is likely to have important implications for 
the types of political institutions that are likely to emerge (Karl 1997, p.44-5). Existing 
research on patterns of state formation supports this by asserting the importance of the 
nature of economic resources in shaping the extraction strategies (i.e. taxation) that elites 
pursue to impose different patterns of governance (Tilly, 1992; Herbst, 2000).
32
 
In contrast to LAOs, all open-access orders have sophisticated public and private 
organizations as open entry in both economy and polity stimulates the creation of more 
sophisticated groups and generates forces that provide balance in both systems. As with 
the limited-access order, the logic of open-access describes a self-sustaining social order 
where all of the constituent parts are involved in a complex interrelationship that  
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 This is where the exogeneity assumptions of many orthodox approaches to economics and political 
science suffer severe weaknesses. Any approach that seeks to explain either needs to take into account the 
other. Consequently, traditional political economy approaches like those employed by Adam Smith and 
David Ricardo, in which poltics and economics are seen as mutually constitutive, are more comprehensive 
in their coverage and, arguably, substantively more realistic. 
32
 The sociological literature on the the emergence of state institutions sees leaders demanding greater 
resources from their subjects in order to increase their war fighting capacity. In return for greater resources, 
primarily taxes, leaders are forced into making concessions, such as political representation for taxed elites, 
as a quid pro quo. Which sections of society provide tax receipts and are granted political representation 
then shapes the types of state structures that are formed.  
 41 
maintains the prevailing social order. Indeed, political competition in an open-access 
order demands the existence of many sophisticated, well organized organizations that can 
compete effectively with one another through the prevailing political institutions. To 
sustain open entry, the state in an open-access order must have significant specialized 
institutions that both provide these services and that make the necessary credible 
commitments to maintain them without expropriating the value they create. It is 
imperative that the state possess the capacity to create incentive compatible institutions so 
that both those in power and their constituents have an incentive to abide by the rules of 
the game, whether they be formal or informal rules.  
Central to the limited-open access order dichotomy is the emphasis on the 
importance of both formal (de jure) and informal (de facto) rules (see, for example, 
Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The adoption of, for example, formally open-access 
institutions in a society – such as a legal framework that guarantees private property 
rights, or a constitution that guarantees citizenship rights – requires a corresponding 
adoption of informal practices and conventions that mirror these formal rules. Without 
this, the formal rules will remain hollow with an increased probability of them being 
rejected at a later point in favour of formal rules that reflect prevailing dissonant informal 
rules and conventions. Indeed, it is the mutually constitutive relationship between 
institutions and organizations within that gives substance to formal rules. Without open 
access to all organizational forms in both polity and economy, the maintenance of open 
access in the political arena is not possible in the long run. Thus, in both limited- and 
open-access social orders there are a range of economic, political, religious, military, and 
educational organizations that reinforce one another, with the mutually supporting logic 
of each respective order ensuring that any formal institutions will, over time, broadly 
reflect the interests and beliefs of the constituent parts of a given society.  
As noted in the preceding discussion of institutional change, change and 
continuity are both possible within institutional structures. In limited-access orders, elites 
are impelled to balance the distribution of elite interests within the dominant coalition. A 
shift in the incentives facing a major actor to defect from the coalition and use violence or 
other means to forward his interests will produce instability, if not open conflict. Because 
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many shocks – including technological advances, changes in relative prices, international 
pressures – may affect the relative distribution of elite resources and organizational 
capacity the internal structure of the dominant coalition and its distribution of rents are 
not immune to change. Any shock that changes the distribution of resources across the 
elite can force the renegotiation of the distribution of rents; and a violent resolution to 
conflict may be a constant possibility, because members of the dominant coalition may 
fail to reach a negotiated redistribution. Consequently, it is possible to argue that although 
LAOs are relatively stable as a social order, they are certainly not static. Although 
frequent changes in the composition of the dominant coalition and the distribution of 
rents may occur, they remain limited-access orders. 
2.2.4 Conclusion: social orders in the post-socialist context  
The overview of limited-access and open-access orders given above should focus 
attention on the types of challenges that have confronted and continue to face societies 
across the post-socialist region. Socialist societies were, without exception, limited-
access orders, although there was some significant variation in the internal organization 
of the different states.
33
 Unlike most contemporary examples of limited-access orders 
across the world, the economy was to all intents and purposes dominated by the party-
state with almost all independent private economic organizations suppressed.
34
 In this 
respect, the autonomy of socialist states was, in most cases, close to absolute with the 
state performing a predatory role within the economy as rents accrued to the party-state, 
which itself acted as a sort of ‗ruling class‘ (see, for example, Cliff, 1974). The absence 
of any significant independent economic organizations was mirrored by the political 
domination of each ruling communist party and meant that competition on all levels was 
extremely limited and, when present, was largely confined to internal competition within 
the ruling party.  
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 See the typologies contained within Kitschelt et al (1999) and Linz and Stepan (1996).  
34
 Some significant private economic activity was tolerated to varying degrees in Yugoslavia, Hungary and 
Poland, but still the general tendency was towards state ownership. However, within the Soviet Union the 
only private economic activity that was officially sanctioned was, until the mid-1980s, largely confined to 
small-scale (i.e. allotment level) agricultural production.    
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With the collapse of the ruling communist parties that started in 1989 in Eastern 
Europe, and culminated in 1991 with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most ruling 
elites across the region expressed – at least at a formal level - a desire to transform their 
respective countries from limited-access orders to more open-access orders, usually citing 
the formation of democratic political systems and free market economies as the desired 
outcome. Indeed, most countries across the region initially did just that and adopted many 
of the formal features of open-access systems, including measures to liberalize their 
economies and to democratize their political systems. However, as time has passed, it has 
become apparent that there remains a great deal of variation across the region in the 
degree to which these formal institutions have been given more substantive meaning by a 
change in informal practices. Furthermore, the ‗double balance‘ described above has 
often thwarted attempts to install democratic practices in countries that have not managed 
to create open-access economies, thus inhibiting the development of open-access political 
systems. The framework explicated above suggests that the sources of this variation lie in 
the degree of competition present within a society, with higher levels of competition 
providing the demand for greater emphasis on rule-based institutional practices.     
This relationship between political competition and institutional outcomes across 
the post-socialist region has been the subject of increasing attention (Grzymala-Busse and 
Jones-Luong, 2002; Grzymala-Busse, 2002, 2006; O‘Dwyer, 2004, 2006; Ganev, 2005, 
2007; Sikk, 2006; Haughton, 2008). Although much of the research so far has focused on 
patterns of state-building or ‗state-stealing‘, central to all of these explanations is an 
appreciation of the importance of robust political competition in reducing the 
opportunities for rent-seeking among post-socialist elites. Where competition is less 
intense there appears to be a tendency towards greater exploitation of the state for private 
benefits. The focus in this study is somewhat broader than on the patterns of state 
exploitation or patronage politics that are the object of explanation elsewhere. Here, the 
emphasis is on whether social orders within post-socialist societies are defined by more 
or less regard for formal rules and encompasses not just relations between political parties 
and the state, but also among business, trade unions, civil society and any other sections 
of society whose behaviour might be regulated by state-sanctioned legal frameworks. 
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Indeed, while the focus on patterns of patronage in political parties is relevant in 
parliamentary democracies, it can be of less importance in presidential systems where the 
relationship between business and the presidential administration might be of more 
importance. Furthermore, defining state exploitation in terms of the changes in the size of 
state administrations can be problematic as these may not necessarily be a function of 
party patronage, but instead of broader public sector reform or reorganization (Meyer-
Sahling, 2006; Haughton, 2008).   
The conclusions derived from the studies cited above suggest that the sources of 
lower levels of state exploitation are to be found in the levels of wider political 
competition. This is consistent with the hypothesis that higher levels of competition lead 
to societies resolving the competitive tendencies present within them through open, rule-
based frameworks. If robust political competition is integral to ensuring lower levels of 
rent-seeking among elites and to compelling elites to play by the rules, perhaps the most 
obvious challenge would therefore be to locate the sources of robust political 
competition. The remainder of this chapter proposes one factor that might be of 
explanatory significance: namely, that the sources of political competition are to be found 
in the structure of a society‘s economy, and, in turn, that economy‘s place in the wider 
global economy. This is consistent with the concept of the ‗double balance‘ outlined 
above and offers a parsimonious explanation of how the structural features of a society‘s 
political economy can explain the variation in forms of social order across the post-
socialist region.       
2.3 The explanatory variable: economic structure and the international economy 
The ‗double balance‘ between economy and polity outlined above suggests that political 
systems will tend to reflect the prevailing economic system within a society, and that 
changes in one are necessary for changes in the other. In turn, this has implications for 
the wider form of social order; if a social order is to be characterized as open-access then 
the economic system must provide the conditions that facilitate greater political 
competition. In short, the two arenas are mutually constitutive. The focus of this 
dissertation will therefore be on tracing which economic conditions facilitate increased 
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levels of political competition. Principally, it will test the hypothesis that the nature of a 
country‘s ties with the international economy, and the level of competition within a 
country‘s economic system, will shape the nature of political competition within that 
society. After several decades of relative ‗bloc autarky‘, this ongoing process of 
reintegration within the post-socialist region has resulted in varying patterns of 
interaction with the international economy. This study will focus primarily on the links 
with the international economy that are formed through export sectors. Import flows and 
capital flows are only addressed in so far as they directly affect export capacity (e.g., 
through foreign direct investment). This is not to dismiss the importance of other aspects 
of integration with the international economy; however, the parsimony of the model 
outlined here is contingent on a narrow focus.   
As will be explained in the following chapter, export structures are measured in 
three ways. First, the degree of inter-sectoral concentration or diversity will be measured. 
Second, the technology intensity of these sectors will be measured. Finally, the market 
structure of leading export sectors will also be considered, i.e. whether a leading sector 
exhibits monopolistic, oligopolistic or competitive tendencies. Export structures that are 
characterized by inter-sectoral diversity, medium to high levels of technology intensity 
within the leading export sectors, and higher levels of intra-sectoral competition will be 
expected to facilitate more robust political competition.     
In order to outline the approach that will be employed throughout this dissertation, 
the next section describes the mechanisms through which increasing participation in the 
world economy can shape domestic economic and political organizations. It will be 
shown that changes in the levels of trade and in relative prices between factors of 
production and economic sectors can affect the relative distribution of resources among 
organizations within a society. This is followed by an overview of how specific sectors 
might be expected to interact with the state. It is argued that a country‘s export structure 
(the inter- and intra-sectoral distribution of production, as well as the technology intensity 
of these sectors) is an important factor in moulding the behaviour of economic 
organizations vis-à-vis the state. These factors will be shown to affect the distribution of 
resources among domestic organizations with particular implications for the autonomy of 
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the state. In turn, it will be argued that certain patterns of state autonomy will result in 
specific types of social order.  
This explanation of institutional development places issues of institutional 
continuity and change at the centre of analysis. For example, an awareness of the 
influence of the international economy and of the role of technological change introduces 
exogenous variables that can be crucial in explaining institutional change.  Similarly, an 
emphasis on the effects of economic sectors and their constituent organizations on state 
autonomy can also shed light on why some societies are more resistant to change – both 
economic and political - than others. For instance, the presence of powerful economic 
organizations with an interest in resisting change may explain the prevalence of 
continuity rather than change in certain cases.   
2.3.1 The international economy and domestic economic organizations 
There are a number of ways in which increasing integration with the international 
economy can affect the preferences and resources of actors and organizations within 
countries. Firstly, increased integration can expand the tradables sector within an 
economy, thus exposing an increasing amount of economic activity within a country to 
the fluctuations of world markets. Therefore, ceteris paribus, increased interaction with 
the world economy should increase the sensitivity of national economies to developments 
in world markets. As will be discussed later, this can affect the strategies that some 
organizations employ against the state in order to insulate themselves from fluctuations in 
international markets. Furthermore, increased interaction with the world economy affects 
the relative prices of goods or assets owned by organizations within the economy, 
compared to both each other and also to foreign goods and organizations. These changes 
in relative prices have important implications for growth, and more importantly in the 
context of this study, for the distribution of income and resources across the economy. 
Consequently, organizations that benefit from these changes may pressure the state to 
maintain or increase levels of interaction with the world economy, or organizations that 
are disadvantaged may resist integration by pressuring the state for protection or 
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restrictions to trade. Either way, changes within the international economy result in 
fluctuations in the relative power of domestic economic and political organizations. 
The likelihood of organizations achieving their aims is contingent on both the 
resources at their disposal and on their relationships with the state. This is because 
increased integration with the world economy affects organizations and their capacity to 
organize in different ways, depending on the institutional context and the relative power 
of organizations prevailing in each case. For instance, limited-access orders will already 
be characterized by compromised state autonomy with some selected organizations 
enjoying the benefits of rent creation. In these instances, the likelihood of increased 
integration with the world economy affecting the relative distribution of domestic 
resources will be somewhat reduced due to the expectation that the institutional structures 
mediating the effects of increased integration will insulate elite organizations from at 
least some of the effects of relative price changes. Thus, the mediating role of domestic 
institutions is central to explaining how the effects of increased interaction with the world 
economy can be absorbed, blocked or refracted, depending on the institutional context 
that conditions the incentives facing organizations within a country.  
There are main four arguments within the existing body of literature that identify 
the likely effects of increasing interaction with the world economy on domestic politics 
and economics (Milner and Keohane, 1996). The first, associated with Ronald 
Rogowski‘s (1989) Commerce and Coalitions, argues that changes in international trade 
flows affects domestic political alignments by altering the returns to factors of 
production. Rooting his analysis in the Heckscher-Ohlin approach to international trade, 
Rogowski argues that organizations characterized by factors that gain or lose from 
changes in international markets form distinct political coalitions that tend to mark the 
major political cleavages within countries, with winners pressuring the state for the 
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maintenance of links with the international economy and losers pressuring the state to 
slow or reverse patterns of integration.
35
  
This argument can be developed by suggesting that coalitions formed along 
factors is too broad an approach, and that the factors of production used are in fact tied to 
specific sectors within the economy, thus suggesting that coalitions will form along 
cleavages defined by economic sector  rather than factors of production per se. 
Consequently, political conflicts will not crystallize along labour versus capital lines, or 
landowners versus industrialists, but instead between tradable or non-tradable sectors or 
between primary product exporters and domestic producers or consumer goods. This 
view is exemplified by Peter Gourevitch (1986) who argues that countries‘ production 
profiles, defined by ―the preferences of societal actors as shaped by the actors‘ situation 
in the international and domestic economy‖, can help explain why countries adopt certain 
trade policies. Indeed, the implications are broader for changes in trade flows and 
volumes and the competitiveness of sectors mould the preferences of sectorally defined 
organizations as well as the relative distribution of resources among sectors.  
The third argument that stresses the effects of increasing integration with the 
global economy focuses attention at an even more specific level than sectors. In Resisting 
Protectionism, Helen Milner (1988) argues that the sheer complexity of modern 
economies means that the gains or losses from trade are felt among even more specific 
groups of organizations than broadly defined factors of production or sectors. Instead, the 
gains and losses from trade accrue to particular firms with domestic political and 
economic coalitions formed between firms that share the same interests. Milner illustrates 
this point by pointing to the manner in which the differing extent of export dependence or 
multinationalization of production by firms shape the preferences of organizations 
towards the regulation of trade.  
Finally, the manner in which different levels of integration into the world 
economy may shape the character of institutional structures themselves is considered, 
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 In short, the Heckscher-Ohlin model suggests that countries will export products that utilize their 
abundant and cheap factor(s) of production and import products that utilize the countries' scarce factor 
(Ohlin, 1967).  
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rather than on organizations as in the studies described above. This can be seen as a 
natural extension of the conflict between organizations over the gains and losses from 
trade and the effect that this has on the relative distribution of resources. As groups 
negotiate the terms on which trade may be permissible, compromises may be forged 
between winners and losers to ensure that a ‗zero-sum‘ outcome does not ensue. For 
instance, David Cameron (1978) demonstrates how the increasing exposure to the 
international economy among developed countries in the 1960s and 1970s led to an 
increase in the size of public sectors as winners from trade sought to reduce the impact on 
losers from trade. Elsewhere, Peter Katzenstein (1985) in Small States in World Markets 
argues that the corporatist structures of some small European states were purposefully 
designed to provide an institutional mechanism that might mobilize support among the 
populations to cope with the costs of rapidly increasing levels of interaction with the 
world economy.    
All of the studies cited above illustrate the importance of the role of increasing 
levels of interaction between domestic economies and the international economy, thereby 
highlighting the Janus-faced nature of states‘ positions in the world economy, and the 
implications that this has for domestic politics (Skocpol, 1979). Following Gourevitch, 
this study will focus on the role of economic sectors, specifically export sectors, in 
shaping institutional development across the post-socialist region. The impact of changes 
in the world economy on sectors‘ distribution of resources and the strategies employed by 
sectors to achieve their aims are considered to be of central importance. The sectoral 
attributes of economic organizations and the market structures of prominent sectors are 
seen as integral to explaining what levels of competition or rent-seeking are present 
within an economic system which, it is argued, has important implications for the 
development of robust political competition within a society and the type of social order 
that is likely to emerge. 
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2.3.2 How sectors shape politics   
The importance of a country‘s ties with the international economy suggests that 
the structure of a country‘s export profile, and the distribution of power and resources 
among domestic organizations that is a function of this structure, is a significant factor in 
shaping the developing of different types of social order. Principally, it is will be argued 
that the development of patterns of social orders within societies is, to some degree, a 
product of the characteristics of the dominant export sectors within an economy. 
Particular sectoral attributes result in distinct market structures (both domestically and 
internationally) that endow organizations with varying levels of power and shape their 
preferences, each of which reward different kinds of organizations and demand particular 
strategies. By shaping the degree of competition or rent creation within an economy, 
these sectoral attributes influence the nature of competition within a society and result in 
distinct patterns of institutional development, and of interest groups with sectorally 
determined interests and collective action capabilities. These sectorally framed 
organizations and interests interact to produce different patterns of social order. In short, 
a sectoral approach to institutional analysis explains how different sectoral profiles affect 
the nature of economic and political competition within a society. As illustrated in Table 
2.1 below, the exposure of the post-socialist economies to trade has tended to increase 
since 1991, and is high relative to many other economies in the world.
36
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 It should be noted that the figures given in this table are not directly comparable across cases. This is for 
the simple reason that smaller economies tend to be more open to trade as a proportion of gross domestic 
product (GDP) than larger economies. Thus, small economies like the Baltic states will always display 
higher figures than, for example, the United States.  
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Table 2.1 Trade openness in the post-socialist region and other selected countries, 1991-
2006 (imports plus exports as a proportion of GDP)
37
 
1991 1995 2000 2006
Armenia 100.9 86.1 73.9 58.5
Azerbaijan 86.9 69.4 77.4 105.3
Belarus 70.3 103.7 141.6 124.1
Bulgaria 82.7 91.0 116.8 146.2
Czech Republic 98.5 105.8 129.8 148.3
Estonia - 144.5 174.4 167.3
Georgia 58.9 67.8 62.7 89.9
Hungary 66.5 89.3 147.8 155.1
Kazakhstan - 82.5 105.7 91.6
Kyrgyzstan 72.0 71.8 89.4 115.7
Latvia 60.7 87.5 90.3 109.5
Lithuania 50.7 109.3 95.9 129.8
Moldova 66.4 107.3 125.2 137.0
Poland 49.0 44.2 60.6 81.2
Romania 39.1 60.8 71.4 78.5
Russia 26.3 55.2 68.1 54.9
Slovakia 95.6 112.6 143.1 172.6
Slovenia 157.8 103.0 113.0 135.7
Ukraine 50.1 97.2 119.9 96.1
Memorandum items
China 38.3 43.9 44.2 72.0
France 44.2 44.4 56.2 55.1
Germany 51.9 47.4 66.4 84.7
Thailand 78.5 90.4 124.9 143.3
United Kingdom 47.4 57.2 58.2 61.6
United States 20.5 23.4 26.3 27.2
Unweighted regional 
average (excluding 
memorandum items) 72.5 88.9 105.6 115.6    
Source: World Bank (2009).  
The relationship between economic structure and politics has been investigated 
elsewhere. Earlier analyses (Wittfogel, 1957) link different agrarian modes of production 
to the development of specific social formations, and argue that class coalitions and the 
way agriculture was organized determined which political institutions emerged in the 
early modern period and afterwards (Moore, 1966). This line of argument was extended 
to more recent examples in Latin America, where economic structure is identified as the 
                                                 
37
 Data for former Soviet states in 1991 includes intra-USSR/inter-republican trade. 
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primary source of variation in behaviour across agrarian social movements (Paige, 1975), 
with it being argued that the interests and capacity for collective action of agrarian 
economic organizations are determined by the sectoral organization of the export crop 
that they are producing. In a later study, Paige (1991) developed this theory from one that 
dealt only with agrarian societies to one that examines the role of a wider array of 
economic organizations, suggesting that the policy variation among Latin American 
countries to similar external challenges were a result of ―choices made by social groups 
[whose] economic interests…are central to their political choices‖, and that economic 
interests are the primary factor in affecting the evolution of national politics (Paige, 1991, 
pp.7-8). For Paige, the level of pressure exerted by economic interest groups would be in 
direct proportion to the amount that such groups had to gain or lose from policy and to 
the amount of resources that could be mobilized to advance their cause.   
In more recent studies, Terry Lynn Karl‘s (1997) analysis of ‗petro-states‘ also 
illustrates how the dominance of certain economic sectors can result in particular political 
and economic outcomes. Karl argues that oil resources shape the structure of state and 
non-state organizations and interests which lead to political regimes defined by deeply 
entrenched patterns of rent-seeking. This has since been supported by further research 
exploring the link high natural resource endowments and dysfunctional political 
development (see, for example, Auty, 1990; Chaudhry, 1997; Ross, 2001; Jones-Luong 
and Weinthal, 2004; Tompson, 2005). Elsewhere, Michael Shafer (1994) indentifies the 
ways in which the dominant export sectors tie a country to the international economy and 
how the characteristics of these leading sectors then affect the development of domestic 
state autonomy and capacity. He argues that when a state‘s production and export profile 
is highly concentrated in one sector, the characteristics of the leading sector play a crucial 
role in moulding political institutions. If the leading sector is dominated by a small 
number of organizations, with high barriers to entry and exit, and a high degree of asset 
specificity, it is likely to be exceptionally politically influential. In such a context, state 
autonomy is eroded as the dominant sector imposes its preferences upon the state (Shafer, 
1994, pp.17-24). Such states then become dependent on the leading sector and develop 
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specialized institutional capabilities that deal with the dominant sector to the detriment of 
the requirements of other economic sectors.   
2.3.3 Sectoral attributes and the implications for economic and political competition  
In order to gauge the attributes of a particular sector, a sectoral approach begins 
by measuring four variables: (i) capital intensity; (ii) the extent of economies of scale; 
(iii) production flexibility; and (iv) asset/factor flexibility/specificity (Shafer, 1994, 
pp.22-25). As will be discussed below, these variables are broadly related to the level of 
technological development within a sector. On the surface, capital intensity simply refers 
to the amount of capital available per unit of labour. However, the term indirectly refers 
to a lot more, including start-up costs, production costs, and research and development 
costs. These serve as a proxy for other characteristics of a particular sector, such as 
technical complexity, management professionalism and the skill level of the work force. 
Similarly, whilst economies of scale describes the extent to which the production costs of 
a good decline with the number of goods produced, it also acts as a proxy for the 
geographical concentration of production, the size and composition of the workforce, and 
the extent to which specific infrastructure is required. Production flexibility is the ability 
to meet short-term market shifts by varying output levels or product mix. Finally, 
asset/factor flexibility/specificity refers to the sector-specificity of facilities, supporting 
infrastructure, and workforce skills. The first two variables tend to be inversely related to 
the last two variables.  
These variables are interrelated and consequently it is possible to group them 
together in order to describe particular sectoral ‗syndromes‘ that broadly result in 
distinctive institutional structures and capabilities, external and internal distributions of 
power, and sets of societal actors. It is possible to imagine a single continuum between 
two ideal types: ‗concentrated‘ sectors characterized by high levels of capital intensity, 
high economies of scale, low production flexibility and low factor flexibility; and 
‗dispersed‘ sectors marked by low levels of capital intensity, low economies of scale, 
high production flexibility and high factor flexibility. This dichotomy is a simplification 
of reality made for heuristic purposes; it does not describe all types of sectors that might 
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be observed. For instance, some sectors may display high levels of capital intensity and 
high economies of scale alongside high production flexibility and asset flexibility. The 
presence of high asset and production flexibility along high capital intensity might be a 
function of high levels of technological development within a firm or sector. In which 
case, the flexibility afforded by high technology capital may make a firm or sector less 
resistant to change. In short, however, different mixes of concentrated and dispersed 
sectors will be expected to influence the development of distinct patterns of competition 
within a society.  
Concentrated and dispersed sectors exhibit different market structures and impose 
different behavioural opportunities and constraints upon organizations located within 
them.
38
 Concentrated sectors are typified by monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structures with high barriers to entry and exit. Conversely, dispersed sectors are 
characterised by larger numbers of relatively small, competitive firms. Barriers to entry 
and exit are lower due to the absence of high levels of economies of scale and low levels 
of capital intensity. These different conditions give rise to different political strategies 
that are employed by firms in their respective sectors. Firms within concentrated sectors 
tend to be fewer in number and larger in size, and employ stabilizing strategies to manage 
the risks to their large investments. Of these strategies, collusion - either with fellow 
oligopolists and with or through the state – is seen as a rational means to providing 
stability to their respective markets. This makes change in concentrated sectors more 
difficult because large firms responsible for export earnings and for the provision of 
employment are able to mobilize resources (lobbying, strikes, etc) to insulate them from 
the pressures of competition, thus making firms from concentrated sectors potent political 
actors that might be more likely to be resistant to change. Conversely, dispersed forms of 
productive organization lower barriers to entry and exit, thus creating larger numbers of 
firms; this in turn encourages competition, making it more difficult to coordinate 
collective responses to changes in the market. Thus, the level of competition or rent-
                                                 
38
 The following section is informed by the ‗collective action‘ literature, especially the work of Mancur 
Olson. See: The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, 1965); The Rise and Decline of 
Nations (Yale University Press, 1982); and Power and Prosperity (Basic Books, 2003). 
 55 
seeking within an economy can be seen as a direct consequence of a country‘s sectoral 
profile.
39
   
2.3.4 The technology intensity of production and the implications for economic and 
political competition 
The level of technological development within and across different sectors is 
broadly related to the factors described above.
40
 Specifically, it affects the flexibility and 
organizational complexity of a sector which in turn has important consequences for the 
level of competition within a given sector and also for the manner in which the incentive 
to pressure the state is shaped by its flexibility. Higher technological levels of 
development tend to increase the organizational complexity and production flexibility of 
sectors with three main effects: (i) sectors are less likely to be affected by the sort of 
sudden fluctuations in prices associated with primary products; (ii) they are more likely to 
possess more flexible production systems, enabling quicker changes in product mix in 
response to market changes, and reducing the incentive to attempt to alter state policy; 
and (iii) higher technology sectors are more likely to be information intensive, rather than 
simply just capital intensive, and more likely to be organised ‗horizontally‘ than is the 
case in ‗vertically‘ organised sectors that rely on economies of scale.  
Conversely,  countries that possess export profiles that are concentrated in 
exporting primary products or other goods requiring a relatively low level of 
technological development will, in general, be likely to: (i) be prone to crises imposed by 
                                                 
39 The international dimension also explains some of the pressures that are imposed on domestic firms and 
the broad range of strategies employed to cope with these pressures. Domestically, firms‘ interests are also 
shaped by the international sector that they are located within. For example, concentrated sectors will 
oppose attempts at economic restructuring within their respective state, if they perceive that their sector will 
become less important. This is because such sectors (and to a certain extent, the state) have a range of 
‗sunken costs‘ in their given industry (capital – fixed and human, investment in infrastructure, etc.) that 
restrict their flexibility to adapt to a changing environment. Collectively, these international pressures and 
domestic pressures form collective action opportunity structures that ―provide incentives for people to 
undertake collective action by affecting their expectations for success or failure‖ (Tarrow, 1994, p.85).  
40
 The technological level of development across an economy is a function of both exogenous and 
endogenous factors. It is exogenous when interaction with the world economy transmits technology across 
state boundries as firms adopt technology and practices from other firms. Endogenous development occurs 
when domestic organizations increase their level of technological development in response to competitive 
pressures, relative price changes, improvements in property rights provision or through the allocation of 
increased resources to technological development. 
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fluctuations in world prices for commodities; (ii) be characterised by high levels of asset 
specificity, i.e. possessing dedicated plant and equipment producing stable product mixes, 
thereby increasing the incentive for firms to pressure the state into protecting their sectors 
from world market conditions; and (iii) possess sectors characterised by high levels of 
capital intensity and economies of scale, thus reducing the number of firms, but 
increasing their size. In these instances, collective action problems for firms within 
concentrated sectors are reduced and the incentive to influence state policy is higher.  
High levels of market concentration within and across sectors increase the 
likelihood of a concentration of economic resources, thereby reducing the probability of 
the development of any robust political competition that sustains the development of 
open-access orders. Consequently, economies dominated by a small number of sectors 
that are themselves monopolies or oligopolies, are more likely to experience high levels 
of rent-seeking behaviour and also closer links between state and economy. Such close 
links between state and economy cause the lines between public and private property to 
be blurred, resulting in: (i) higher levels of corruption; and (ii) a tendency towards either 
state predation over dominant export sectors; or predation of dominant export sectors 
over the state. In both instances, the end result is largely the same; a fusion of public and 
private resources and the control of economic resources by a relatively small number of 
actors, the hall mark of a limited-access order.  
The differences between ‗older‘ techno-economic production structures and 
newer ones are summarised in Table 2.2. This general tendency towards diffusion of 
information and economic power in higher technology sectors reduces the concentration 
of market share in companies and facilitates competition, thereby reducing the incentive 
and capacity for exerting pressure over the state. A state‘s role in such sectors is one of 
information coordination and selective regulation, with a very low incentive for state 
ownership and interference due to the myriad problems associated with centralised, 
bureaucratic control of information and allocation of resources that increases with 
technological complexity (von Hayek, 1945). Consequently, close direct links between 
state and economy should be lower, given the limited opportunities presented by the 
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diffusion of production and information, and the opportunities for predation, by either 
state or industry, are severely curtailed by competition. 
Table 2.2 Two techno-economic paradigms 
Fordist production techniques (old) IT  led production techniques (new) 
Energy intensive Information intensive 
Standardized Customized 
Rather stable product mix Rapid changes in product mix 
Dedicated plant and equipment Flexible production systems 
Automation Systemization 
Single firm Networks 
Hierarchical structures Flat horizontal structures 
Departmental Integrated 
Product with service Service with products 
Centralization Distributed intelligence 
Specialized skills Multiskilling 
Government ownership, control, and 
planning 
Government information coordination and 
regulation; vision 
Source:  Adapted from Freeman (1992).  
2.3.5 The mechanisms linking economic structure and political competition 
In the context of a sectoral approach to institutional analysis, the incentives for 
organizations to undertake collective action are framed by their sectoral interests, which 
in turn are shaped by the market structure and market signals at both the international and 
domestic level, with sectors‘ expectations for success or failure largely determined by the 
size and resources at the disposal of economic organizations. However, the mechanisms 
linking export sectors to political competition should be expected to vary across cases, 
depending on the level of competition prevalent within each economy, and varying also 
according to the institutional environment. For example, mechanisms might be expected 
to include the representation of business interests directly in parliamentary parties (where 
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parliaments have power), or indirectly through dialogue between political parties or the 
government and non-party economic organizations such as business associations, trade 
unions, etc. Alternatively, in formally presidential systems, the expectation that sectorally 
defined organizations might concentrate on influencing political parties would probably 
be lower. Instead, such organizations might be expected to channel their energies into 
exerting influence over presidential institutions. In general, greater competition within the 
economic arena would manifest itself in more or less open, transparent and rule-based 
competition within business associations, political parties, wider civic assoctions, and in 
relations between the state and sectorally organized organizations.  
More limited economic competition, however, is likely to manifest itself in lower 
levels of competition within those mechanisms that might be targeted by economic 
organizations In such circumstances, political parties, business associations, and civic 
associations, might be dominated by a single or a very few economic interests. 
Alternatively, the concentration of economic activtity might have resulted in a high 
degree of state domination of the economy. In cases where the state is dominant in the 
economy, it might be expected that, in the absence of strong, well-funded sources of 
opposition, the state would also dominate political parties, business associations and civil 
society. This might result in informal mechanisms, such as personal links between 
economic organizations and political organizations, becoming the primary mechanism of 
interest articulation. In short, while the mechanisms through which economic and 
political competition are channeled may vary, it is the degree of competition within the 
economy that will be expected to be of most importance in shaping whether that 
competition is channeled onto the political level in an open and rule-based manner or not.   
The broadly unicausal relationship between economic structure and social order 
development outlined here might, however, conceal a more complicated underlying 
process of political and economic change. The argument presented throughout this study 
is essentially that changes in economic structure, and the effects that this has upon wider 
economic competition, exert a decisive effect over the degree to which political 
competition is present, thereby shaping the prospects for positive or negative social order 
development. However, the relationship between economic structure and social order 
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development is no doubt far more circular or mutually constitutive than would be implied 
by the explanation outlined above, with social-order type itself likely to be a key factor in 
explaining the degree of economic restructuring. This issue of specifying the precise 
direction of caulity between economic and political variables is important. However, the 
hypotheses that underpin this study assume, for heuristic purposes, that it is economic 
variables that explain political change.  
2.3.6 Testable hypotheses  
The outline of the independent variable and the dependent variable provided 
above provides the framework to generate a series of hypotheses that will be tested 
throughout the remainder of this study. Chapter Four will provides a stylized analysis of 
the relationship between economic structure and social order development. It will contain 
a rudimentary statistical analysis of the explanatory power of the independent variable in 
accounting for the variation on the dependent variable in the post-socialist period. 
Because this will focus on broad cross-country tendencies, only first order hypotheses 
will be tested. They are: 
(H1) Developments in the wider international economy will affect the distribution 
of power between organizations within a society, and thus shape the prospects for 
economic competition within a society. 
 (H2) A higher level of economic competition, manifesting itself in the form of a 
diverse and technologically sophisticated inter-sectoral export profile, and 
dispersed intra-sectoral market structures, will help facilitate the development of 
an open-access social order. 
The subsequent case studies will provide a higher degree of detail. While the first case 
study, the Soviet Union, will test the first order hypotheses outlined above as an example 
of a limited-access order from the socialist era, the subsequent case studies will test a 
series of second order hypotheses that are intended to lend greater credence to the results 
of the first order hypothesis tests. These focus on the hypothesized mechanisms linking 
the two variables. Specifically, they examine intervening variables that include political 
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parties, civil society, business associations, and direct relations between business and the 
state. These variables are qualitative in nature and so can only be tested through the more 
detailed case study analyses. The second order hypotheses are: 
(H3) Greater economic competition will provide the basis for the development of 
a broader array of political parties. Possessing support bases independent of the 
state, competition among these parties is expected to exert a positive influence 
over social order development.    
(H4) Increased levels of economic competition will also provide the basis for the 
emergence of a broader array of groups independent of the state and the more 
overtly political sphere in general. Consequently, increased activity by civic 
groups should also be expected to inject greater competion into the the wider 
social sphere, thereby facilitating the development of an open-access social order.  
(H5) A higher degree of economic competition will ensure greater competition 
within and between business associations, reducing the capacity for such 
organizations to impose their preferences on state policy.   
(H6) Greater economic competition between and across sectors should reduce the 
scope for close state-business relations.   
This constitutes the theoretical model that will be probed and examined throughout the 
remainder of this dissertation. The model offers a parsimonious way to explain the 
variation in social order type across the region that has emerged in the aftermath of the 
collapse of socialism. As argued in section 2.2 of this chapter, the conceptual simplicity 
of this model is intended only as a starting point for future research; the case study 
chapters highlight other important variables (such as external factors) that might be 
incorporated into this basic framework to increase its explanatory power.  
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2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has outlined the methodological foundations on which this study is based 
and described the conceptual apparatus that will be employed to analyse political 
behaviour across the post-socialist region. It was argued that a rational choice variant of 
the historical institutionalist approach is most suitable for use in this study. After locating 
this study within the historical institutionalist approach to analyzing economics and 
politics, the second section provided an overview of the dependent variable. Social orders 
were shown to differ primarily in the degree to which competition is prevalent, and the 
extent to which this competition is resolved according to impersonal, universally 
enforced rules. The third section outlined a hypothesized explanation for the variation in 
the dependent variable across the region. It was suggested that different patterns of 
integration with the international economy, as manifested in the structure of a country‘s 
export profile, can help increase our understanding of the sources of social order 
development across the region. This was concluded with the presentation of the 
hypotheses that will be tested throughout the remainder of this study. This will be done in 
two parts. First, a stylized historical overview of the relationship between the two 
variables will test the first-order hypotheses on a general cross-country level. This will be 
followed by four cases study chapters that will test the hypotheses generated here in 
greater detail. The cases studies will afford the opportunity to test the second order 
hypotheses relating to the causal mechanisms linking the independent and dependent 
variables outlined above.   
To summarize, economic systems characterized by competition are expected to 
provide the conditions for more competitive political orders, while high levels of market 
concentration within and across sectors increasing the likelihood of a concentration of 
political power, thereby reducing the probability of the development of open-access 
social order. Consequently, the sectoral profile that a country possesses, and the market 
structure of these sectors, will be the main focus of analysis in this study. However, as the 
previous discussion of structure and agency in institutional analyses highlighted, the 
relationship between sectors, the state and the international economy will be a dynamic, 
mutually constitutive relationship with actors from both types of organization effecting 
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changes in both the institutional landscape and upon each other that will then restrict or 
create different possibilities for future developments. This pattern of action and reaction 
on the part of organizations is the central tenet of institutional analysis. As such, each 
specific case will display its own historically contingent dynamic. The sectoral approach 
outlined above does, however, give a starting point for making a small number of simple 
hypotheses concerning the probability of institutional change or continuity. 
 In short, it is expected that concentrated production profiles will result in a 
concentration of economic power and lower levels of political competition, leading to 
limited-access orders, while more diverse production profiles will be reflected by greater 
levels of political competition, leading to open-access orders. The next chapter (Chapter 
Three) describes the data and measurement of the variables used throughout this study. 
Chapter Four sketches a broad historical outline of the relationship between the 
international economy, economic structure and the development of different types of 
social order, and tests the first order hypotheses outlined above. Subsequent chapters will 
focus on more detailed case studies of specific countries in order to test both the first 
order and second order hypotheses generated in this chapter with more rigour.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
Data description, measurement and case selection 
 
3. Introduction 
 
This chapter reviews the data that are used to measure the relationship between the 
dependent variable (social order) and the independent variable (economic structure) since 
the collapse of socialism across the region between 1989 and 1991. The conceptual 
foundations of these variables were discussed in the previous chapter. Subsequent 
sections that refer to economic structure or type of social order before this period utilize a 
range of different sources and subjective assessments due to the unavailability of 
comparable data. However, the focus of much of this study is on developments since the 
collapse of socialism and it is for this period that data are available. The first section 
describes the data sources that are used to measure types of social order. The second 
section outlines the measures used to identify different types of economic structure across 
the region. The final section provides the rationale behind the case selection for 
subsequent chapters.   
 
3.1 Measuring the dependent variable: social order type   
The outline of the core distinguishing characteristics of social orders presented in Chapter 
Two indicates that any attempt to operationalize the dependent variable should focus on 
two key areas. First, it is essential to capture the extent to which impersonal, rule-based 
behaviour is prevalent within a society. Second, the openness of politics within a society 
should be measured. Open-access orders would be characterized by the dominance of 
impersonal, universally enforced legal frameworks in which competition between 
organizations (economic, political and otherwise) is conducted in a more open manner. 
By contrast, limited-access orders would be defined by the selective application of rules, 
both at the elite level and within wider society, and by the channeling of competitive 
tendencies through informal, personalistic (i.e. non-universally applicable) ties and 
relationships. Clearly, this dichotomy covers a number of different phenomena including 
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corruption, the nature of political competition (open or closed), and broader issues of the 
rule of law.  
Naturally, any attempt to measure these phenomena is fraught with some 
difficulty. For example, assessing the extent to which a society, on aggregate, conforms 
to formal laws and regulations, is tainted by corruption, or is characterized by an open 
and transparent manner of channeling competition, all involve referring to subjective 
judgments about which criteria to include, how to weight criteria, how to observe these 
phenomena, who is best placed to observe them, and so on. However, this does not mean 
that analysts should avoid trying to measure these phenomena; merely that they should 
remain cognizant of the potential pitfalls that surround any attempt to do so. With this 
qualification in mind, the measurement of social orders employed throughout this study is 
a composite index utilizing three of the six ‗governance indicators‘ (WBGI) constructed 
by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2008).  They are: 
 
(1) Voice and Accountability (VA) – this measures the extent to which a country's 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association, and a free media. Of the two components of 
social-order type discussed above, this indicator measures the openness of 
competition within a society;  
 
(2) Rule of Law (RL) – this captures the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence; 
 
(3) Control of Corruption (CC) – this indicates the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, 
as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Indicators two and 
three measure the extent to which impersonal, rule-based behaviour is prevalent 
within a society. 
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Scores range between – 2.5 (the lowest level on each indicator) to +2.5 (the 
highest level on each indicator). The composite score is a simple un-weighted average of 
the three component indicators. The scores are based on extensive, multiple surveys and 
are available bi-annually for all major countries from 1996 to 2002, and annually from 
2003 until 2007. The components for the three scores are composite perceptions-based 
indicators and are drawn from 33 data sources provided by 25 different organizations, 
including assessments by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multilateral 
development agencies (e.g., European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World 
Bank, etc.), other public sector data providers, and commercial business information 
providers (e.g. Economist Intelligence Unit, Global Insight, Political Risk Services, etc.). 
A comprehensive description of the data and the methodology used in its compilation is 
contained in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007).
41
 The individual coefficients, as 
well as the composite scores, are described in Table 3.1. The two time periods – 1998 and 
2006 – are chosen (i) because they approximate the earliest and latest points for which 
complete datasets for all three indicators were collected; and (ii) because they are 
temporally consistent with the data collected to measure the independent variable (see 
below). Data from several other countries from outside the region are included for 
comparison.   
 
A number of weaknesses with the WBGI have been alleged (Arndt and Oman, 
2006) and include: (i) the likelihood of correlation of errors among the sources from 
which the composite indicators are constructed, which significantly limits the statistical 
legitimacy of using them to compare countries‘ scores; (ii) their lack of comparability 
over time; and (iii) sample bias.
42
 The authors of these indicators have addressed these 
criticisms and have accepted that their attempts at measurement are not perfect 
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 Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi also provide standard error terms for each of the indicators in each 
given year.  
42
 The same study also highlights the strong and positive correlation between the governance indicators and 
measures of per capital national income. Indeed, the correlation between the dependent variable and per 
capita GDP (PPP) is strong (r =.83) among the cases under observation in this study. However, it is difficult 
to ascertain the direction of causality in the relationship between the two variables. Consequently, although 
it might be argued that high levels of economic development help cause higher scores on the dependent 
variable, it might also be argued with as much justification that higher scores on the dependent variable in 
this study (social order) is an important factor in facilitating economic development.   
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(Kaufmann and Kraay, 2007; Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2007). However, their 
response suggests that while there is room for improvement, the existing indicators are 
both useful and superior to existing alternative indicators.
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Table 3.1 Variation in type of social order across post-socialist region, 1998 and 2007 
(scale from – 2.5 to + 2.5) 
  
Voice and 
Accountability 
Rule of 
 Law 
Control of  
Corruption 
Composite  
Coefficients 
Change in  
Composite 
Coefficients 
  1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998 2007 1998-2007 
                    
Armenia  -0.54 -0.59 -0.41 -0.51 -0.78 -0.68 -0.58 -0.59 -0.01 
Azerbaijan  -0.95 -1.13 -1.02 -0.83 -1.13 -1.04 -1.03 -1 +0.03 
Belarus  -0.86 -1.8 -0.73 -1.09 -0.72 -0.88 -0.77 -1.26 -0.49 
Bulgaria  0.38 0.65 -0.23 -0.14 -0.33 -0.22 -0.06 0.1 +0.16 
Czech Republic  0.95 0.98 0.82 0.77 0.45 0.26 0.74 0.67 -0.07 
Estonia  1 1.05 0.5 1 0.42 0.94 0.64 1 +0.36 
Georgia  -0.41 -0.19 -1.18 -0.44 -0.84 -0.38 -0.81 -0.34 +0.47 
Hungary  1.08 1.1 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.44 0.83 0.76 -0.07 
Kazakhstan  -0.75 -1.06 -0.9 -0.83 -0.9 -0.91 -0.85 -0.93 -0.08 
Kyrgyzstan  -0.73 -0.64 -0.71 -1.19 -0.71 -1.08 -0.72 -0.97 -0.25 
Latvia  0.81 0.86 0.18 0.57 0.1 0.31 0.36 0.58 +0.22 
Lithuania  0.89 0.93 0.41 0.49 0.19 0.17 0.5 0.53 +0.03 
Moldova  0.03 -0.38 -0.26 -0.66 -0.35 -0.68 -0.2 -0.57 -0.37 
Poland  1.05 0.81 0.69 0.28 0.6 0.14 0.78 0.41 -0.37 
Romania  0.36 0.47 -0.11 -0.17 -0.35 -0.19 -0.03 0.04 +0.07 
Russia  -0.58 -1.01 -0.84 -0.97 -0.88 -0.92 -0.77 -0.97 -0.2 
Slovakia  0.71 0.98 0.23 0.35 -0.03 0.28 0.3 0.54 +0.24 
Slovenia  1.2 1.08 1.07 0.84 0.94 0.9 1.07 0.94 -0.13 
Ukraine  -0.32 -0.09 -0.96 -0.7 -1.16 -0.73 -0.82 -0.51 +0.31 
Memorandum 
items                   
United Kingdom 1.3 1.38 1.8 1.75 2.16 1.89 1.75 1.67 -0.08 
China -1.38 -1.7 -0.38 -0.45 -0.38 -0.66 -0.71 -0.94 -0.22 
Mexico -0.09 -0.02 -0.51 -0.58 -0.53 -0.35 -0.38 -0.32 +0.06 
Burkina Faso  
(Upper Volta) -0.48 -0.31 -0.71 -0.48 -0.03 -0.4 -0.41 -0.40 +0.01 
                    
Regional average 
(excluding 
memorandum 
items) 0.17 0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.25 -0.22 -0.07 -0.08 -0.01 
Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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 It should be noted that after assessing the strengths and weaknesses of World Bank Governance 
Indicators, Amdt and Oman (2006) do refer to the indicators as ―probably the most carefully constructed 
governance indicators‖.  
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In response to the first criticism, the authors argue that the presence of correlated 
errors among sources does not eliminate the benefit of constructing an aggregate 
governance indicator, although it does reduce it. However, as long as the errors among 
data sources are not perfectly correlated, the gains from the aggregation of data make the 
WBGI superior to using any single source.   
 
 The criticism of a lack of comparability over time is made on two points. The 
first refers to the fact that the world average governance indicators are scaled to have a 
zero mean and unit standard deviation in each period. While this only applies to the world 
average, and not to individual country scores, it does mean that any change over time in a 
country‘s score conveys information only about changes in that country‘s governance 
relative to world averages. As such, changes in governance coefficients over time do not 
necessarily indicate that any change has taken place within a given country. This 
weakness, while valid, can be overcome through a sensitivity to the margin of error; if 
large, a change in a country‘s score may be considered to be of less significance.       
 
The second criticism, related to the first, is that the presence of margins of error in 
the indicators obviates the ability to make comparisons over time. However, the authors 
argue that it is precisely the presence of margins of error that enhances the WBGIs as 
they provide guidance as to which observed changes are likely to be meaningful. Again, 
users of the WBGIs should display a sensitivity to such methodological issues if the 
indicators are to be used responsibly. The contextual analysis that is presented within the 
case studies should perform the function of adding sensitivity to the WBGI data. 
 
     Finally, the third criticism accuses the authors of sample bias in their 
underlying data sources. Specifically, they are accused of an overdependence on the 
views of business elites, particularly foreign investors. These accusations are quite weak. 
First, the range of data sources is considerably broader than just the perceptions of 
businesses and includes the views of a range of other sources, including governments and 
multilateral organizations. Second, where data sources do consult firms, there are a wide 
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range of respondents, including domestic and foreign firms, as well as firms of different 
sizes. 
 
3.2 Measuring the independent variable: the structure of exports 
 
Four measures - three quantitative and one qualitative - are employed to measure the 
structure of export profiles across the post-socialist region. First, the degree to which 
export profiles are concentrated or dispersed will be measured using the Krugman 
Specialization Index (KSI), which identifies the overall concentration or diversity of a 
country‘s export profile. Second, an index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) is 
used to highlight the sectors that occupy a relatively important role within a country‘s 
export profile. Third, each of the 260 export activities are classified according to the level 
of technology intensity required in their production. Using these data, a Technological 
Development and Diversity Index (TDDI) is constructed to simultaneously measure the 
overall level of production diversity/concentration and technological development within 
a country‘s export profile. Finally, more detailed case-studies are used to gauge the level 
of intra-sectoral competition in a country‘s leading export sectors. 
 
The data are taken from the Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade, 
2008) from the United Nations Statistics Division, and there are some limitations. For 
example, the reporting of some goods is sometimes incomplete, and certain sensitive 
goods (such as some precious stones or armaments) can be hidden or included in different 
commodity groups. A note of caution also applies to any analysis that considers different 
countries at different periods of time due to the probability of fluctuations in exchange 
rates and in the relative prices of different products.  
 
3.2.1 Inter-sectoral concentration and diversity 
 
The Krugman Specialization Index. The Krugman Specialization Index (KSI) is 
a relative measure of sectoral specialization (Krugman, 1991), indicating whether a 
country possesses a concentrated or diverse inter-sectoral export profile. For each 
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country, the share of sector i in that country‘s total exports is calculated, followed by the 
world average share of sector i in total world exports. The index is the sum of the 
absolute difference of the sectoral structures of the two areas j (the country under 
observation) and w (the world average). Thus, Kjw = ∑i │S 
s
ij -- S 
s
iw│. The index is zero if 
the two areas have the same export structures, whereas its maximum value is 2.0, reached 
if the two areas do not have any commonality in export structures. It should be noted that 
the KSI tends to under represent the degree of specialization of larger countries. One-
digit positions of the Standard International Trade Classification, Revision 3 (SITC, Rev. 
3) are used for 1997 and 2006, the first year for which data are available for all countries 
under examination and the most recent year. The KSI coefficients for both years are 
presented below (Fig. 3.1)  
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Figure 3.1 Krugman Specialization Index, 1997 and 2006
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Source: UN Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations.  
 
The Balassa Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage. The Balassa 
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index is the ratio of the share of a product 
group i for country j and the share of the exports of the product group i in the total export 
for a group of countries (Balassa, 1965). The RCA index thus indicates whether country j 
has a comparative advantage with respect to a certain product i. The index for country j, 
                                                 
44
 Countries are sorted in descending order by their KSI scores in 2006. 
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product i, is RCAji = 100 (Xji/Xwi)/(Xjt/Xwt), where Xab is exports by country a (w = 
world) of product b (t = total for all products). Values higher than 1.0 indicate a 
comparative advantage in that product which, in the context of this study, indicates that it 
is a relatively important sector within a country‘s economy. RCA is calculated at the 
more detailed three-digit position of the SITC, Rev. 3 classification in 1997 and 2006.  
 
3.2.2 The technology intensity of exports 
 
In order to capture the technological intensity of sectors in which countries are 
competitive, the 260 activities described at the three-digit level are grouped according to 
the level of technological sophistication involved in their production. There are a number 
of ways in which activities can be categorized by technology. A commonly used method, 
based on Pavitt (1984), is to distinguish between resource-based, labor-intensive, scale-
intensive, as well as differentiated and science-based manufactures. This can be difficult 
because the analytical distinctions are unclear, and there are large overlaps between 
categories. The OECD (1994) suggests a more detailed classification based on 
technological activity within each category. Lall (2000) has combined elements of both 
methods, grouping the three-digit data into five broad categories (primary products, 
resource-based, low-technology, medium-technology, and high-technology) containing 
nine subcategories within them. The classification employed here draws heavily on Lall‘s 
classification, with some modifications. Export activities are grouped under four 
categories: primary and resource-based; low-technology; medium-technology; and high-
technology. Two further subcategories from within the high-technology group are 
identified and three from within the medium-technology group. The proportion of 
medium- and high-technology exports is used as an indicator of a country‘s overall 
technological development. A description of trends in changes in the structure of export 
profiles across the region is contained in the next chapter.   
 
Primary and Resource-Based Products (PRBP). This category includes two 
types of activity—extractive activities and those that involve the simple processing of 
primary products extracted from the territory of a given country, including livestock, 
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metals, oil, and gas. In technological terms, the simple processing of these products does 
not generally involve much technological addition to the product itself.
45
  
 
Low-Technology Products (LT). These products  tend to require stable, well-
diffused technologies. Any technology that is used is primarily embodied in capital 
equipment, requiring simple labor skills to operate. Such products (e.g., textiles) are, in 
general, undifferentiated, with price being the main determinant of competitiveness. 
Given the relatively low capital intensity, scale economies and barriers to entry are 
generally low.
46
 
 
Medium-Technology Products (MT). These products, comprising the core of 
skill- and scale-intensive technologies in capital goods and intermediate products, 
constitute the largest proportion of export manufacturing activity in middle- to high-
income economies. These activities tend to utilize relatively complex technologies, with 
moderately high levels of research and development, advanced skill-set requirements, and 
lengthy learning periods; they thus rely upon a higher level of human capital. These 
activities are split into three subgroups. Activities within the automotive and engineering 
subgroups (MT1 and MT3) are very linkage intensive, require significant inter-firm 
interaction, and emphasize product design and development. Many have mass assembly 
or production plants and extensive supplier networks, both domestic and foreign.
47
 
Barriers to entry tend to be high because of the high economies of scale and moderate to 
high capital intensity. Subgroup MT2 comprises industries that produce chemicals and 
process basic metals. Such process sectors tend to produce stable and undifferentiated 
goods; they too are often characterized by high economies of scale, and possess relatively 
high levels of technological sophistication, particularly in the production of high value-
added steel products, chemicals, and plastics.   
 
                                                 
45
However, some products, such as oil and gas, may require advanced technology to perform the process of 
extraction itself. This type of machinery, however, is assigned to other categories.  
46
Some low-technology products can be found in high-quality industries in which brand names, skills, 
design, and technological sophistication are very important, even if technology intensity does not reach the 
levels of other categories. Examples might include high-end, designer fashion products for which the brand 
name is important. 
47
Small and medium-sized enterprises often are important in these sectors.  
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High-Technology Products (HT). High-technology activities utilize advanced 
and dynamic technologies, with substantial investments in research and development and 
a considerable emphasis on product design. The most advanced technologies require 
sophisticated technological infrastructure, high levels of specialized technical skills, and 
close interaction among firms, and also between firms and universities or other research 
institutions. Here, high-technology activities are split into two sub-groups.  
 
The first (HT1) comprises activities that can be described as light industrial 
products. These include the manufacture of electronic equipment such as computers, 
computer components, audio-visual equipment, and office equipment. Many such 
products are labor intensive at the final assembly stage, and their high value-to-weight 
ratios make it economical to locate this stage of production in low-wage areas. The role 
of multinational corporations (MNCs) and integrated international production networks 
(IPNs) are of crucial importance, as the different stages of production can be distributed 
across countries to capitalize on labor cost differences. In this respect, the extent to which 
these activities reflect the development of indigenous technological capacities can vary, 
as in some cases a country may only be involved in the final, labor-intensive assembly 
stage and not in the higher value-added earlier stages (such as R&D, or earlier, high-tech 
production of components for assembly).  
 
The second sub-group (HT2) comprises other high-technology activities that are 
more likely to involve the domestic production of the higher value-added components, 
with greater emphasis on domestic human capital, technological research and 
development, and denser local supply networks. This group includes products such as 
pharmaceuticals, power generation equipment, aircraft, optical and other precision 
instruments, and measurement equipment.        
 
There are limitations associated with this method of categorization. Given the 
nature of the export data, it is not possible to capture every aspect of technological 
change from national statistics. Activities involving different levels of technological 
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complexity may be grouped together within the same product category.
48
 Furthermore, it 
is not possible to gauge quality differences within product groups. It is thus difficult to 
distinguish between a low-technology, low-reliability personal computer and a top-end, 
machine designed for specialists. As mentioned above, it is difficult to identify the 
processes involved in manufacturing the same product across different locations. In the 
electronics sector, for example, high-end processes such as micro-fabrication or software 
development may take place in Japan, Germany, or the United States and the final 
assembly stage may take place in China or Hungary. However, the data treat the two 
processes as technologically equivalent. It is also difficult to determine whether 
technological upgrading has taken place within product groups over time. Thus, smaller 
N studies are desirable to draw out more subtle, intra-sectoral changes within economies. 
Notwithstanding these limitations, the data do display a considerable level of product 
differentiation and can provide useful insights into broad patterns of technological 
development across countries.  
 
3.2.3 The Technological Development and Diversity Index  
 
The discussion in Chapter Two suggests that, at least theoretically, a relationship 
exists between the diversity of production and higher levels of technological 
development. Figure 3.2 confirms that there is a considerable correlation (Pearson‘s r = 
.82) within the sample chosen for this study between a country‘s score on the Krugman 
Specialization Index and the proportions of medium- and high-technology products 
within a country‘s export profile.  It is possible to observe three distinct groups. The first, 
Group A, comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and Russia. 
All have concentrated export profiles and tend to export comparatively low levels of 
medium- and high-technology products. Group B consists of those countries that, while 
not overly specialized in terms of their export profiles, score moderately in terms of their 
total medium- and high-technology products as a proportion of their total exports. This 
group includes Bulgaria, Belarus, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Ukraine. 
                                                 
48
For example, office machines may encompass a range of technologies ranging from simple personal 
computers to more advanced, specialized equipment.  
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Finally, Group C contains Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia. They all possess export profiles that are diverse and score highly in terms of 
their proportion of medium- and high-technology products.
49
 
 
Figure 3.2 Krugman Specialization Index and the Technological Development and 
Diversity Index, 2006
50
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: UN Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
 Within this group it is interesting to note that this sector is composed of sub-sectors that should display a 
diverse mix of inputs and might be expected to display varying levels of capital intensity, economies of 
scale, asset/factor flexibility and production flexibility. For example, whilst the production of motor 
vehicles might be seen as an industry that would be dominated by few firms, the outsourcing of the 
production of components used within the production process is likely to be spread across a large number 
of smaller firms. 
50
 This chart describes the association between the two variables in 2006. In 1997 - the other year for which 
export data are collected - the association is also considerable (Pearson‘s r = .73).  
Ukr
Slo
Slvk
Rus
Rom
Mol
Pol
Lit
Lat
Kyr
Kaz
Hun
Geo
Est CzR
Bul
Blr
Aze
Arm
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
Medium and High Technology Exports (%)
K
ru
gm
an
 S
p
e
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
 In
d
e
x
Group A 
Group B 
Group C 
 76 
Table 3.2 Technology and Diversity Index, 1997 and 2006 
Country 1997 2006 
Change  
(1997-2006) 
        
Armenia 0.36 0.31 -0.05 
Azerbaijan 0.20 0.16 -0.04 
Belarus 0.66 0.51 -0.16 
Bulgaria 0.48 0.45 -0.02 
Czech Rep. 0.69 0.71 +0.02 
Estonia 0.57 0.61 +0.05 
Georgia 0.43 0.50 +0.08 
Hungary 0.68 0.73 +0.05 
Kazakhstan 0.28 0.22 -0.06 
Kyrgyzstan 0.33 0.34 +0.02 
Latvia 0.40 0.45 +0.06 
Lithuania 0.54 0.54 +0.00 
Moldova 0.32 0.27 -0.05 
Poland 0.54 0.67 +0.13 
Romania 0.46 0.58 +0.12 
Russia 0.27 0.27 0.00 
Slovakia 0.60 0.69 +0.09 
Slovenia 0.64 0.67 +0.03 
Ukraine 0.48 0.50 +0.02 
        
Regional average 0.47 0.48 +0.01 
Source:  UN Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s own calculations. 
 
This observed association between the two variables allows the construction of a 
separate variable that captures both the KSI and the proportion of medium- and high-
technology scores into a single coefficient, the Technological Development and Diversity 
Index. This index is the sum of the reversed KSI score and the proportion of medium- and 
high-technology exports. Both variables are given equal weighting by dividing the 
numerator by two. If K = Krugman Specialization Index, T = Medium- and High-
Technology Exports, and TDDI = Technological Development and Diversity Index, this 
can be expressed as TDDI = ([1-K]+[T])/2. The index is zero if a country‘s export profile 
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is concentrated in one resource-based or low-technology activity. A maximum value of 
1.0 is reached if a country has an extremely diverse export profile and all of its exports 
are either medium- or high-technology products. The scores for each country within the 
region are listed above in Table 3.2. The classification of countries within the region into 
three groups provides the basis for case selection that will be employed throughout the 
rest of this study as it captures clear dividing lines between the export structures of the 
sample, with cases from each group examined in greater depth in subsequent chapters.    
 
3.3 Case study selection and timeframe 
 
So far this chapter has described the data that will be used to test the strength of the 
hypothesized relationship between economic structure and social order across the post-
socialist region. The correlation between the two variables in 2006-07 is indeed strong 
(Pearson‘s r = .80) and is depicted in Figure 3.3. The three clusters of countries described 
here are the same groups that were identified in Figure 3.2 (i.e. according to their 
economic structure). Investigating what, if any, link exists between the two variables is 
the subject of subsequent chapters. This is done in several stages. First, the next chapter 
(Chapter Four) assesses the relationship between the international economy and the 
countries of the socialist bloc before 1989-91. This is followed by a more detailed 
description of patterns of continuity and change in economic structure across the region. 
The explanatory power of the TDDI variable in explaining variation of the dependent 
variable is then statistically tested against other alternative explanations. As will be 
demonstrated, the substantive and statistical significance of the explanatory variable is 
strong relative to existing explanations, thus warranting further investigation. This is the 
subject of the case studies that constitute chapters five to eight. Before describing which 
cases are to be examined, it is first necessary to briefly outline the method of case 
selection that is used in this study.  
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Figure 3.3 Association between Technological Development and Diversity Index and 
Social Order in 2006-7
51
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Source: UN Comtrade Database; World Bank Governance Indicators; author‘s own calculations. 
 
The method of comparison can be divided primarily into two types of system 
design: ‗most similar systems design‘ and ‗most different systems design‘ (Faure, 1994). 
‗Most similar systems design‘ (MSSD) involves comparing cases that share some 
common features in order to neutralize some differences while highlighting others. Based 
on J.S. Mill‘s ‗method of difference‘, MSSD  seeks to identify the key features that are 
different among similar countries and which account for observed outcomes. ‗Most 
different systems design‘ (MDSD), on the other hand, compares countries that do not 
share any common features apart from the outcome that is the object of explanation and 
explanatory factors that are viewed to important in explaining these outcomes. This 
method is based on Mill‘s ‗method of agreement‘, which seeks to identify those features 
that are common among different cases in order to help account for a particular outcome.   
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 The correlation between the two variables in 1997-98 is also strong (Pearson‘s r = .71). 
Group A 
Group B 
Group C 
 79 
In this context of this study, it can be argued that the countries of the post-socialist 
region all had broadly similar economic and political systems prior to the collapse of 
socialism, and that they all underwent a period of economic and political transformation 
at around the same period of time: from 1989 in Eastern Europe, and 1991 in the Soviet 
Union. As the data above illustrate, these countries exhibit varying levels on the 
explanatory variable (the TDDI) which, it is argued, accounts for the variation in 
outcomes across the region (social order type). This corresponds with MSSD, or Mill‘s 
‗method of difference‘. Because there appear to be three main clusters of cases  according 
to the explanatory variable, a case from each cluster in examined in greater detail in each 
case study to test the hypothesized relationship between economic structure and social 
order type in greater detail.         
 
Chapter Five explores the role of economic structure in the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. Chapter Six examines a case from Group A, Russia, in greater detail. Chapter 
Seven explores two cases from Group B, Belarus and Romania. Both countries are 
roughly equivalent according to the measure of economic structure, but score quite 
differently on the type of social order. These two cases are chosen because they display 
the greatest changes in economic structure between 1997 and 2006 from within this group 
(see Table 3.2). Since 1997, the score for Belarus has declined from .66 to .51, while 
Romania has risen from .46 to .58.  Furthermore, Belarus is selected due it being an 
outlier case, with its score on the dependent variable being much lower than would be 
predicted by its score on the independent variable.
52
 Finally, Estonia, a case from Group 
C, is examined in Chapter Eight. This is a country that scores highly in terms of both 
economic structure and social order. It is also the only case from Group C that is a former 
Soviet republic, making its successful development even more interesting. These case 
studies are used to examine the mechanisms that might link economic structure with 
different types of social order. Because they afford a greater level of detail, it is also 
possible to establish what levels of intra-sectoral competition exist within leading export 
sectors, and also to test the second order hypotheses generated in Chapter Two. 
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 Indeed, if Belarus is removed from the calculations the correlation is stronger (Pearson‘s r = .88). 
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3.4. Conclusion  
 
The previous chapter outlined the conceptual framework, positing a theoretical link 
between economic structure and social order development. This chapter has reviewed the 
data that are used in this study to measure the relationship between economic structure 
and social order across the post-socialist region. The first section described the data 
sources that are used to measure types of social order. The second section outlined the 
measures used to identify different types of economic structure across the region. The 
final section provided the rationale behind the case selection for subsequent chapters.  
The following chapter provides a historical overview of the relationship between the two 
variables in the socialist and post-socialist region. The data described in this chapter are 
used to perform a rudimentary statistical exercise to illustrate that the hypotheses 
generated in Chapter Two appear to be supported by the data that are available, and that 
the conceptual framework used in this study also appears to compare favourably with 
other alternative explanations for variation on the dependent variable.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The international economy and political economy in the post-socialist region: a 
historical overview 
 
4. Introduction 
 
Nearly two decades have passed since the disintegration of the socialist bloc. During this 
time, the countries of the region have achieved varying success in re-establishing 
themselves within the global economy, with some adjusting their production structures to 
occupy a higher rung in the global division of labour, while others have experienced 
continuity rather than change. This chapter examines what roles the countries of the 
region now play within the global division of labour and how these different positions 
might have shaped political developments across the region. Specifically, it examines the 
variation in export structures across the region between the 1980s, before the collapse of 
socialism, and in 2006, assessing not only whether they have changed over time, but, 
perhaps more importantly, how they have changed. According to the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter Two, countries with diverse and technologically 
sophisticated export structures will be more likely to support the development of open-
access political orders. Conversely, countries with export structures that are less 
technologically developed and more concentrated in the production of a few products are 
more likely to become limited-access orders. Changes in economic structure across the 
region should therefore be expected to be of considerable importance in laying the 
foundations for specific forms of social order.  
 
The overall objective of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the 
development of both economic structure and social-order development across the 
socialist and post-socialist region. This should provide the historical context against 
which to test the conceptual framework developed in Chapter Two. The first section of 
this chapter traces the main patterns of interaction between the countries of the region and 
the international economy up until 1980. The second section considers the structure of the 
region‘s exports at the collapse of socialism and also the different regime-types that were 
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in existence at this point. The third section outlines the broad patterns of continuity and 
change in economic structure across the region. The final section explores the 
relationship between economic structure and social order type by comparing the 
explanatory variable with other possible explanations of variation in social order across 
the region.     
 
4.1. Socialism and the international economy: 1917-1980  
 
The revolutionaries that participated in the Russian revolution in 1917 had hoped that the 
imposition of Soviet rule would be the first step in the collapse of capitalism across the 
world. For Lenin, the spread of colonialism and conflict among the imperial powers that 
reached its apogee with World War I revealed the bankruptcy of capitalism as a way of 
organizing economic relations within society. However, as revolutionary movements 
elsewhere across the world failed to topple any more of the major capitalist powers, and 
after Joseph Stalin emerged ascendant in domestic politics after the death of Lenin, the 
optimistic internationalism of the socialist movement soon gave way to the more cautious 
‗socialism in one country‘. Now that the Soviet Union was no longer part of the capitalist 
‗chain‘, and in the context of heightened international antagonism between the USSR and 
the rest of the capitalist world, the period of Soviet industrialization that took place from 
the late 1920s up until the Second World War was largely conducted away from the 
outside world. Although not entirely autarkic – the USSR was, for example, one of the 
world‘s largest exporters of oil and grain even in 1930 (Jensen, Shabad and Wright, 1983, 
p. 624; Goldman, 2008) – the almost total control of trade by the state meant that its place 
within the global economy was one of effective autarky (Lavigne, 1991).  
 
In the Soviet Union, and later in the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, trade 
was conceived in very narrow terms; exports would earn hard currency which would in 
turn fill gaps that may have emerged in the planning process, usually technological 
products that could not be produced domestically (Kornai, 1992, pp.333-356). However, 
despite this limited dependence on foreign trade, the essence of ‗functional autarky‘ lay 
in the manner in which central planning eliminated the effects of the price mechanism 
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and international competition; that is, international prices were not reflected in domestic 
prices, while the administrative allocation of imports and systemic export ‗aversion‘ 
insulated firms from international competition.
53
 Consequently, the traditional 
mechanisms through which international trade exerts an influence on the domestic 
economy – price and competition - were absent from traditional socialist economies.   
 
The victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, and communist takeover in 
Central and Eastern Europe, afforded the Soviet Union the opportunity to establish 
socialist trading relations with a new group of countries. Whereas the sheer size and 
abundance of natural resources of the Soviet Union had enabled it to exist under autarky, 
the new socialist countries were much smaller and were therefore in much greater need of 
international trade. The formation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(CMEA) in 1949, ostensibly in response to the introduction of the Marshall Plan in 
Western Europe, laid the foundations for closer ties between the Soviet Union and the 
newly socialist countries. Along with geopolitical considerations, economic and 
ideological factors also made the formation of the CMEA likely.  
 
The Soviet strategy of economic growth was, with few exceptions, imposed on 
the smaller countries of Central and Eastern Europe and involved: (i) the prioritization of 
industrialization by the accelerated development of heavy industry, such as steel and 
machine-building; (ii) the shift of labour from agriculture to industry; and (iii) the 
allocation of a large proportion of national product to investment. This strategy was 
extremely intensive in its consumption of raw materials and consequently caused the 
smaller, more resource poor countries to become dependent on Soviet raw materials. 
Thus, the CMEA became a mechanism though which this dependence could be managed 
and, through the central planning process, in a manner consistent with socialist ideology. 
Any trade within the bloc would also be insulated from the effects of prices and 
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 The aversion to international trade was systemic because one of the fundamental objectives of a planned 
economy is to reduce uncertainty and risk through the administrative allocation of resources. Limiting trade 
is one way to achieve this. Indeed, the planned nature of Soviet-type foreign trade caused all trade to be 
organized at a central, macro-economic level. Direct trade between firms which is the foundation of trade 
between capitalist economies was simply not possible. It is for this reason that the mechanism of 
competition was eliminated for producers in Soviet-type economies.   
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competition that was a characteristic of trade between capitalist countries, thus 
characterizing trade between the socialist countries as effective ‗bloc autarky‘.  
 
The imposition of socialism heralded a period of industrialization that took place 
at different times across the region – in the 1930s in USSR, and, later, in the late 1940s 
and 1950s in Eastern Europe – and was based on the extensive increase of capital and 
labour into heavy industry. This initially resulted in periods of high output and 
considerable modernization as these countries made use of the classical benefits of 
backwardness; the ability to imitate technology and techniques as well as state direction 
of investment to achieve rapid growth from a baseline of a low capital to labour ratio 
(Gerschenkron, 1962). This model was not without its merits. The Soviet Union was able 
to overcome extreme backwardness and disarray at the end of World War I to emerge as 
one of only two superpowers at the end of World War II, while Central and Eastern 
Europe between 1950 and 1973 enjoyed an annual per capita growth rate of 3.9 percent, 
higher than any other region of the world during this period (Maddison, 1989). By the 
1970s, however, the growth model that had served these countries so well during the 
initial stages of development began to atrophy as the extensive import-substituting 
industrialization strategy began to flounder.
54
 This model achieved some success until the 
reserves of underutilized labour were all transferred from lower productivity branches of 
the economy (agriculture, household) to higher productivity industry. After this process 
was complete, and once socialist countries had achieved full employment, it became 
apparent that the factor extensive growth model needed to be replaced by a more factor 
intensive strategy of development; that is, it needed to be based on increased 
technological development, improvements in human capital and the rationalization of 
investment strategies. It was within this context that the trading arrangements that took 
place under the CMEA framework were to prove increasingly redundant. 
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 Import substitution industrialization refers to a trade and economic policy that is based on the premise 
that a country should attempt to reduce its foreign dependency through the local production of 
industrialized products. An overview of the literature surrounding both the theoretical underpinning of the 
concept, as well as review of its historical application, is contained in Chang (2003). 
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After the initial burst of output growth in the decade after the imposition of 
socialism the extent to which the trading arrangements within the CMEA framework 
could satisfy all of the domestic economic requirements within the bloc declined. 
Although trade remained most concentrated within the CMEA, this concentration 
decreased from the 1950s onwards insofar as the share of each country‘s exports to 
CMEA countries declined as a proportion of total exports (see Table 4.1).
55
 Evidently, the 
centralized planning process had failed to adequately restrain the degree to which 
socialist countries had interacted with the rest of the world economy and was thus unable 
to generate the ideologically desirable functional autarky.  
 
Table 4.1 Exports to CMEA countries as a proportion of total exports, 1952-80 (percent) 
USSR Bulgaria Hungary Poland GDR Romania Czechoslovakia
1952 80 89 71 67 80 85 71
1960 55 80 61 55 68 66 64
1980 49 69 53 53 66 37 65
Source: Lavigne (1991, p.17).  
 
This increase in the proportion of total trade conducted with non-CMEA countries 
was a function of several interrelated systemic factors. First, as explained by the 
Hungarian economist, Janos Kornai, in centrally planned economies, demand tended to 
exceed supply, generating a ‗seller‘s market‘ and perpetuating chronic shortages within 
the economy (Kornai, 1980). Because the main pressure on enterprises was to fulfill the 
excessively high targets set down in the plan, and because enterprises were not subject to 
hard budget constraints, there existed a systemic ‗investment hunger‘. This demand for 
investment, and the inability of the domestic economy to supply it, led to the micro-level 
enterprise ‗investment hunger‘ that resulted in an import hunger at the macro, national 
level. This import hunger was, however, disguised in as much as the need to import was 
only acknowledged by central planners once all internal solutions, including import-
substitution, had been exhausted (Lavigne, 1991, p.21). Whether the input in question 
would be imported depending on the priority assigned to it by planners. This would 
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 The only exception to this general trend was Czechoslovakia. This can perhaps be explained by the fact 
that Czechoslovakian policy was, after the events of 1968, more conservative and ideologically doctrinaire 
than its CMEA counterparts.   
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reflect the usual priority schedule of socialist planned economies, i.e. an emphasis on 
goods employed in heavy industry and for military purposes, and a neglect of agriculture 
and light industry.
56
  
 
Once import requirements had been defined, planners then had to identify which 
goods would be exported to generate the hard currency to pay for the imports.
57
 As such, 
it was not any requirement to maximize profits at the enterprise level that stimulated the 
entry of socialist firms into the global economy. Rather, it was the macro-constraints of 
financing imports that impelled countries to export first so that they would be in a 
position to import later. Thus, whether it was ideologically desirable or not, the centrally 
planned economies became systemically oriented towards increasing their contacts with 
the global economy and reducing bloc autarky over time.
58
 Indeed, as imports became 
increasingly important, so did exports. Because the maximization of exports had only one 
goal, that is, to increase the volume of resources available to fund imports, it was in effect 
deemed provisionally more important than imports, precisely because export policy was 
the mechanism through which import policy could be achieved. Therefore, the general 
slowdown in growth across the socialist economies from the mid-1960s onwards 
increased the pressure on planners to increase imports from non-CMEA countries, and 
thereby impelled the countries of the region to abandon functional autarky and to produce 
exports that were competitive on the world market.   
 
However, political and ideological factors impeded any attempts at systemic 
reform, thus undermining efforts at restructuring their economies to become more 
competitive in global export markets, and locking in the level of technological 
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 Logically, this implied a need for greater interaction with non-CMEA countries. Because all countries 
within CMEA had the same systemic shortage economies and ‗import hunger‘ caused by enterprise level 
‗investment hunger‘, the aggregate imports requirements of all of the countries could not be met by trade 
within the CMEA.   
57
 This was not strictly the case with intra-CMEA bloc trade the considerations of planners resulted in 
money not being assigned the same importance as it was by capitalist countries. However, the focus here is 
on relations with the international economy outside of the CMEA.  
58
 This tendency for socialist countries to become increasingly integrated within the international economy 
was equally true when the direction of trade was reversed, i.e. when imports of machinery were used to 
manufacture products manufactured by this machinery during the ‗import-led growth‘ strategy developed 
by some countries within the region in the 1970s, see Hanson (1982a).   
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backwardness that was becoming increasingly apparent. The ideologically driven bias 
towards heavy industry, the geopolitical necessity to maintain large and capable armed 
forces, and the sheer power of entrenched bureaucracies and industrial ministries ensured 
that any attempts at shifting production towards a more rational mix of heavy industry, 
light industry and consumer goods would fail. This failure to effect any significant shift 
from industrial to consumer production, and the general structural and ideological 
constraints that favored industrial and military good production resulted in declining 
returns on investment and declining labour productivity. In addition, the paucity of 
consumer goods and the absence of any significant banking system that could provide 
more than a nominal return on savings reduced the incentive for socialist workers to earn 
higher wages by boosting productivity.  
 
This disincentive for labour to become more productive was reinforced by the 
provision of full-employment, the existence of labour shortages and the absence of 
unemployment as a sanction that could be credibly employed by enterprise managers to 
increase productivity (Kornai, 1992, pp.228-255). Furthermore, excess investment 
demand, caused by the systemic ‗investment hunger‘ of socialist enterprises, ensured that 
although socialist countries had some of the highest investment rates in the world 
(Kornai, 1992, pp.160-202), there was rarely ever enough investment to enable the 
majority of investment projects to be completed either on time or to a sufficiently high 
standard of quality. Only prestige projects that were consistently identified as priority 
areas by planners were ever assigned the requisite resources. Finally, these obstacles to 
productivity and the rational deployment of resources also resulted in socialist countries 
lagging far behind Western countries in terms of technological innovation (Amman and 
Cooper, 1982; Kornai, 1992, pp.298-300).  
 
In short, while socialist economies were ‗modern‘ in the sense that they had 
undergone a period of industrialization and were no longer agrarian economies, they 
possessed distorted industrial structures that were excessively capital intensive, low and 
declining levels of total factor productivity, and produced goods of generally low quality 
(except in areas connected to the military branches of industry). Consequently, in the 
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absence of systemic reform the socialist bloc was generally ill-equipped to sell enough 
competitive exports to fund the desired imported goods that were hoped would facilitate 
the next wave of modernization. Ideological imperatives thus trapped the countries of the 
region in a downward spiral in which planners‘ desire to import sufficient technology to 
compensate for systemic deficiencies were stymied by their inability to produce goods of 
sufficient quality to fund import purchases.  
 
This became particularly unfortunate for the countries of the socialist bloc 
because the recognition that their economies were in need of modernization, and that 
their export capabilities needed to be restructured, occurred at precisely the same time 
that the rest of the world economy found itself in the midst of a technological revolution 
(Berend, 1996; Eichengreen, 2007). The postwar period saw the invention of 
technologies that, over time, resulted in the dawning of a new, post-industrial era in 
which traditional, ‗Fordist‘ production techniques gradually gave way to newer, 
information technology intensive methods (see Chapter Two). This technological 
revolution required new infrastructure and new methods of organizing production. In 
particular, it was distinguished by three new important characteristics: refinement; 
complexity of production; and an increasingly complex division of labour (Berend, 1996, 
pp.226-228). ‗Refinement‘ refers to the increasingly minute size of technology that 
contained within it increasingly large capacity. This affected, for example, the precision 
of machine tools and the purity of materials used in various production processes. The 
complexity of production was increased by these technological developments. Electronic 
circuits contained millions of independent elements, airplanes and automobiles were 
comprised tens of thousands of components, while the communications infrastructure that 
enabled and was itself a product of this technological revolution required computers and 
software that were capable of processing millions of different actions.  
 
The increasing specialization of technology was reflected in the increasing 
specialization within the division of labour. Unparalled complexity of technology entailed 
a concomitant narrowness of labour specialization. Modern technological achievements 
were at times a consequence of the well-organized interaction of thousands of 
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individuals, sometimes conducted across different countries. All three of these 
characteristics were interrelated and required both a new, advanced infrastructure and, 
perhaps most importantly, because of the dynamism of this highly complex system, an 
educated, flexible and adjustable labour force. While this technological revolution spread 
slowly and incrementally around the world, the socialist economies continued to be 
characterized by poor property rights structures, low incentives to work and innovate, an 
over reliance on a bloated central bureaucracy that was becoming increasingly ineffective 
in economic management (Rutland, 1993), and, perhaps, most importantly, was 
experiencing increasingly severe problems in securing the flow of accurate and reliable 
information throughout the system. The strategies employed by enterprises to overcome 
the deficiencies of the planned economy, such as the cultivation of informal networks and 
the emergence of patterns of ‗binding and bonding‘ (Urban, 1985), encouraged the 
concentration of information and resources within enterprises, rather than their diffusion, 
as was the case in those countries in the grip of the technological revolution.
59
  
 
The 1970s represented a juncture for the world economy as the effects of the 
technological revolution became increasingly manifest, causing a structural crisis. This 
crisis contributed to the onset of ‗stagflation‘ in developed economies – the combination 
of high inflation and low levels of growth. However, the crisis was even more acute in 
the developing world and those countries operating on the periphery of the world 
economy. These countries were unable to respond to the demands imposed by the 
structural crisis by developing new leading sectors based on new technology to replace 
those sectors that were becoming increasingly obsolete and uncompetitive. Those 
countries that failed to adjust their production and export structures became increasingly 
left behind with the consequences being similar in Latin America and the socialist bloc; 
in the absence of competitive export sectors, countries were either indebted as they 
attempted to import the technology that would enable them to ‗catch up‘, or they became 
raw materials appendages to the more dynamic ‗core‘, exporting raw materials and semi-
processed manufactures. As Berend argues (1996, p.228), state socialism created 
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 Binding and bonding refers to the patterns of horizontal relations that emerged in socialist-type systems 
as agents within the hierarchy subverted the orders of their principals through informal co-operation. This is 
discussed in Urban (1985)  
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additional obstacles and: ―on top of the ‗natural‘ peripheral disadvantage was their 
continued fidelity to post-Stalinist ideology…[and] the rigid rejection of structural or 
even policy changes as ‗revisionism‘ or as attempts to restore capitalism‖. This caused a 
systemic rigidity that preserved the political, techno-economic conditions which had 
already proven to be anachronistic in light of the technological advances made elsewhere 
in the world.  
 
By the 1980s the socialist countries found themselves in an invidious position. 
The period in which significant gains could be made through the employment of the 
extensive growth model that was employed earlier on in their development was over. 
Full-employment, declining total factor productivity and technological backwardness 
caused many leaders and intellectuals within the socialist bloc to acknowledge the need to 
shift towards a more factor ‗intensive‘ model of growth. However, the political 
constraints imposed by the communist leadership in the Soviet Union effectively ruled 
out any systemic reforms of the sort that were required to result in any structural changes 
in the way that socialist countries participated in the world economy. These conflicting 
tendencies - the need to adopt decentralizing reforms in response to changes in the world 
economy in order to facilitate economic development domestically, on one hand, was 
balanced by the desire within the ruling elites to preserve party power on the other – 
occurred at a time of great change in the world economy. In effect, the more socialist 
countries prevaricated and avoided structural reforms, the further they fell behind 
countries in the West and solidified their position on the periphery of the world economy.  
 
A wide mix of policies was adopted across the region in response to these 
challenges, none of which dealt with fundamental issues of systemic reform (Nuti, 
2007a).
60
 The USSR, due to its large natural resource endowment, was able to paper over 
some of the cracks within its system by using export earnings to import technology from 
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 Attempts at substantive reform were, until the mid-1980s, largely abandoned in the aftermath of the 
Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia. The invasion signalled the beginning of the ‗Brezhnev doctrine‘ and 
constrained the autonomy of countries within the socialist bloc to undertake reform. See Batt (1988) and 
Kornai (1992).  
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abroad, as well as food.
61
 This strategy began to fail as soon as the price of oil slumped in 
1985-6. By contrast, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria adopted variations on the 
import-led modernization strategy, some more aggressively (Poland and Hungary) than 
others (Romania and Bulgaria). These strategies involved borrowing on international 
capital markets to fund technology imports that would then be used to facilitate the 
modernization of their export sectors (particularly in medium-technology manufactures) 
in order to then increase their shares in foreign markets (Batt, 1988; Berend, 1990; 
Poznanski, 1996). This policy was largely deemed to be a failure for several reasons 
(Berend, 1996, pp.229-232). Firstly, changes in the lending conditions on international 
markets resulted in a ‗credit squeeze‘, adversely affecting their ability to increase their 
borrowing and to service existing debt. Secondly, exports did not improve sufficiently to 
improve productivity or the general standard of living in these countries. Taken together, 
these two factors gave the impression that the group had taken on huge levels of debt for 
very little perceived positive effect.  
 
However, as will be shown below, some restructuring did take place in the two 
countries that pursued the import-led strategy most aggressively (Poznanski, 1996). Thus, 
although most countries within Eastern Europe increased the proportion of total exports 
to Western Europe (Table 4.2), only Poland and Hungary saw a significant shift in trade 
towards more complex manufactures, showing the largest gains in terms of relative unit 
values (Poznanski, 1996, p.57). More conservative borrower-importers, such as 
Czechoslovakia, saw a declining significance of machinery exports to developed markets 
over the same period, although there was a shift in the direction of overall trade from 
CMEA to countries in Western Europe.
62
 In Romania, the desire to increase the 
technological level of exports was, like the USSR, eventually tempered by its ability to 
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 The ability of the USSR to import foreign technology was reduced somewhat by two factors. First, the 
creation of CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls) in 1949 placed an embargo 
on the transfer of high-technology material to socialist countries. This was reinforced by a further embargo 
imposed by the USA in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. There were limits to the 
effectiveness of the US embargo, however, as illustrated by the gas pipeline dispute between the USA, and 
the countries of Western Europe along with the USSR. See Mastanduno (1992) and Lavigne (1991). 
62
 Due to its higher level of prior development, Czechoslovakia did start from higher level of development 
than other countries within the region. Therefore its relative decline was not as pronounced as it might 
otherwise have been.  
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export raw materials. Although Romania had initially adopted a less aggressive version of 
the import-led growth strategy, the high levels of debt incurred in the process persuaded 
policy makers to concentrate more on debt repayment through raw material exports than 
on any attempts at improving the technological base to increase manufactures exports 
(Shafir, 1985; Roper, 2000).  Because it possessed oil reserves and significant refinery 
capacity, Romania was able to quickly pay off its foreign debt, with it eliminated by 
1989. However, this was at the expense of nearly all other imports, both consumer and 
industrial.  
 
Table 4.2 Exports to Western European countries and USSR (percent of total trade) 
1980 1989 1980 1989
USSR 73 65 - -
Bulgaria 27 41 - 18
Hungary 28 45 34 25
Poland 31 37 32 21
Romania 29 37 19 21
Czechoslovakia 50 52 38 31
Western Europe USSR
Sources: IMF (2007); United Nations UNCTAD Database (2007); author‘s calculations.  
 
There is, therefore, some evidence of a positive relationship between the scale of 
Western technology imports and export performance within the region during the late 
1970s and early 1980s. The different strategies that were employed within the socialist 
bloc in response to both changes in the world economy and to domestic challenges left 
some countries in different positions vis-à-vis the international economy. Some, such as 
Poland, Hungary, and to a lesser extent, Czechoslovakia, possessed export structures that, 
while inefficient relative to Western countries, did possess some elements that had the 
potential to be competitive on the world market should the political conditions in the 
region improve. Others, such as the USSR, Romania and, to a lesser extent Bulgaria, had 
not undertaken any significant attempts at improving their technological level of export 
production in response to international and domestic challenges. With time, the need for 
more serious reform became imperative. Attempting to respond to challenges that the 
socialist system was unable to meet – both domestic and international – was, ultimately, 
the most significant factor in ensuring the collapse of socialism; the socialist model, in all 
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its different manifestations, simply wasn‘t able to compete on the international stage or to 
satisfy domestic demands and the burgeoning economic crisis, for which the state was 
entirely responsible, undermined whatever legitimacy the regimes of the region might 
have previously enjoyed (Lewis, 1994).  
 
4.2 The collapse of the socialist system, 1980-1989 
 
4.2.1 Export patterns among the socialist economies 
 
By the 1980s the trends in both the international economy and within the individual 
economies of the region described above resulted in all of the CMEA countries having 
established deeper links with the international economy. The nature of these relations was 
not uniform, however. Some had export sectors that were better prepared for the onset of 
a new phase of economic relations with the rest of the world. With the removal of the 
constraints on the development of free trading relations imposed by the CMEA 
arrangements, the real value and competitiveness of the region‘s exports were to be 
tested, with significant shifts in terms of trade in store for all countries of the region.
63
 
Therefore, it is necessary to briefly survey the export structures across the region at the 
end of the 1980s. Sectors in which countries enjoyed a comparative advantage at this 
point, and that were already competitive on the world market, were likely to shape the 
direction of future of reintegration with the world economy. There are some inherent 
difficulties in using data from the socialist period, both in comparing them with each 
other and in comparing with data for the post-socialist period. First, the boundaries 
between states were radically different in the period up until 1989-91. Most significantly, 
the USSR disintegrated into 15 independent states.
64
 Consequently, tracing precise 
changes in export profiles for newly independent states is particularly problematic. 
Second, the data that are available are at times sketchy and unreliable due to differences 
in definitions and reporting procedures that reduce the comparability of much of the data 
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 This applied both to countries that existed as states up until 1991, and also to those states that were newly 
independent following the collapse of multi-national states (the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia).  
64
 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia also separated, causing similar problems for the collation and 
comparison of the data for the successor states in these countries. 
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that are available for the period (Lavigne, 1991, pp.356-7). With these qualifications in 
mind, it is still possible to observe a number of broad tendencies that were apparent at the 
end of the 1980s.  
 
Table 4.3 Exports to the West in 1990 (percent of total trade with West) 
Commodity Groups Eastern Europe Soviet Union
Primary products 28.5 23.1
Food 16.9 2.4
Raw materials (excluding fuels) 5.1 8.9
Mineral fuels 10.7 56.5
Oil 5.6 40.6
Gas 0.1 11.7
Manufactures 60 14.4
Semi-manufactures: 21.4 9.5
Iron and Steel 7.2 2.6
Chemicals 9.3 4.4
Machinery and transport equipment: 13.6 3.4
Road vehicles 1.6 1.6
Transport equipment 6.8 1
Specialised machinery 4.8 0.7
Industrial Consumer Goods 25 1.5
Textiles 3.4 0.4
Clothing 9.8 0
Total 100 100  
Source: Lavigne (1999, p.85).  
 
The commodity structures of exports from the USSR and the countries of the 
Eastern Europe to Western countries were radically different.
65
 As Table 4.3 illustrates, 
the USSR‘s export structure was significantly more concentrated in primary product 
sectors than the countries of Eastern Europe as a whole. Exports from the USSR were 
                                                 
65
 Statistics that record the exports from the region to the West are used for two reasons. First, intra-CMEA 
trade figures are calculated by volume and not in internationally comparable prices. Secondly, they also 
contain a great deal of trade that would otherwise be uncompetitive in other markets. As such, exports to 
the West have the double advantage of being denominated in common prices and of also revealing those 
sectors that would be likely to continue to be competitive. 
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concentrated in primary products that required very little processing, including metals, 
gas and oil. As well as enabling it to import food and technology from the West (Khanin, 
1998, p.76), the USSR‘s rich endowment of natural resources also served to subsidise the 
socialist economies in Eastern Europe (Bunce, 1986; Lavigne, 1991, pp.242-247), 
accounting for the majority of total exports from the USSR to Eastern Europe in 1985 (an 
increase in the share of fuels in the total exports of the USSR to the CMEA countries 
from 22 percent in 1973 to 55.5 percent in 1985). Higher technology exports accounted 
for a very small proportion of Soviet exports to the West. This was partially for political 
reasons, but also because the import-led growth strategy of the 1970s that had seen a 
sharp increase in technology imports had, by and large, failed to change the overall 
technological level of non-military output. The relatively low quality of higher quality 
manufactures was further exacerbated by systemic impediments to high-quality and 
effective marketing of manufactures that were produced (Hanson, 1982b, p.439).  
 
Discerning the contribution of individual republics to the aggregate Soviet export 
profile is more difficult due to the production of different components for the same end 
product taking place in different republics. With this in mind, any statistics purporting to 
measure the export profile of Soviet republics prior to 1992 should be treated with even 
greater caution. United Nations data from 1992 that measure the sectoral distribution of 
republican export structures to non-USSR destinations are available (United Nations, 
1992, pp.572-584). Given that these data include exports to CMEA countries and other 
‗client‘ states in the developing world, the proportion of higher technology goods 
exported should be treated with particular caution. However, what statistics are available 
do give at least a rough indication of which products republics would be more likely to 
export when independent. Several broad trends can be observed.  
 
First, the export profiles of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Turkmenistan were dominated by fuels (ranging from 20 percent of total non-USSR 
exports in Turkmenistan to 61 percent in Azerbaijan), although Belarus is only included 
because of its refinery capacity rather than any significant endowment of natural fuels. 
Second, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgrzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine 
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(ranging from 10 percent in Russia to 79 percent in Tajikistan) all exported significant 
volumes of metals, both ferrous and non-ferrous. Third, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, the 
three Baltic republics were all exporters of food and agricultural products. Finally, 
Armenia, Belarus, Latvia, Russia and Ukraine exported the highest proportions of 
machinery (ranging from 30 percent of total exports in Russia to 66 percent in Armenia). 
Again, these are very rough statistics as: (i) production of the same product took place in 
different republics, distorting the data; (ii) much of the machinery and higher technology 
manufactures would be unsellable on the world market; and (iii) the collapse of inter-
republican trading arrangements upon the collapse of the USSR would terminate the 
production of many of the manufactures that were exported prior to 1991.  
 
Despite this, it is reasonable to suggest several intra-USSR tendencies. First, the 
Baltic republics, particularly Estonia, were proficient in the production of light industrial 
goods, particularly in the food processing sector and in the production of light machinery 
(Arkadie and Karlsson, 1992). The republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia exported 
primary products, while Georgia and Moldova were more reliant on food exports. The 
three Slavic republics, Russia, Ukraine and Belarus were all reliant in the export of either 
fuels or metals, although both Belarus and Ukraine tended to process fuels or act as 
transit routes for export rather than extract it themselves. The subsequent export 
performances of the republics subsequent to the collapse of the USSR are largely 
consistent with these observations (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5).   
 
By contrast, the export profile of the Eastern European economies as a whole was 
more evenly spread with a diverse mix of primary products and manufactures.
66
 Within 
this bloc, most fuel exports were accounted for by Romania‘s oil exports (31 percent of 
total exports to the West in 1988) and by Poland‘s declining exports of coal (14 percent 
in 1988). Hungary was the leading exporter of agricultural products (SITC-0, 21 percent 
in 1988), closely followed by Poland (19 percent). The higher value-added manufactures 
(SITC-7) were exported by Czechoslovakia (11 percent in 1988), Hungary (11 percent) 
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 The following data are taken from: Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies (1990), 
COMECON Data 1989, London: Macmillan Press. The data are presented at the Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) single digit level (ranging from 0-9).  
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and Poland (15 percent). Bulgaria and Romania exported a higher proportion of lower 
technology manufactures, such as agricultural products and light industrial goods, such as 
textiles and clothing. In 1988, over 60 percent of Romania‘s exports to the West were 
concentrated in commodities under the SITC-3 category (fuels) and SITC-7 category 
(light industry, including textiles), while nearly half of Bulgaria‘s exports to the West 
consisted of agricultural, crude and fuel products (SITC- 0 to 3), with chemicals (14 
percent) and other light industrial manufactures (14 percent) accounting for much of the 
remainder. Therefore the Eastern European countries were, on aggregate, less reliant on 
only a few natural resource products for export earnings and appeared to possess a 
comparative advantage, at least relative to the USSR, in exporting manufactured goods 
on the world market, with the region exporting a broader range of higher technology 
products. However, intra-bloc variations are discernable with Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia exporting higher technology products than Bulgaria and Romania who 
instead tended to export more labour intensive, low technology products.  
 
There were also significant changes in the direction of trade that had become 
increasingly apparent from the beginning of the 1980s. As Table 4.2 illustrated, the 
direction of exports from the Eastern European countries to the countries of Western 
European underwent a proportionate increase in most countries over the course of the 
1980s. This was mirrored by a gradual decline in the proportion of total exports to the 
USSR so that by the mid-1980s, the countries of Eastern Europe were exporting 
proportionately more to the countries of Western Europe than they were to the Soviet 
Union. Thus, by the 1980s any pretence of bloc autarky within CMEA had evaporated. 
Although enterprises within the region were still not subjected to normal levels of 
competition and exposure to world prices, they were at least beginning to conduct the 
majority of their trade with the more developed countries of the West, thereby 
familiarising enterprises both with Western business practices and with the sort of quality 
that was required if manufactures were to be competitive on the world market in the 
future. Whereas the Soviet Union simply sold raw materials to the West, the countries of 
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Eastern Europe began to develop increasingly strong trading links with the Western 
Europe across a diverse range of products, including higher value added products.
67
 
 
In the context of the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the emerging 
patterns of engagement with the international economy that had begun to crystallize at the 
onset of the collapse of socialism suggested different prospects for the development of 
social orders across the region. In terms of economic structure, only Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, Estonia appeared to possess a relatively 
diverse and well-developed base on which they could build as they re-entered the 
international economy on market terms. Elsewhere, lower technology and more labour 
intensive sectors appeared to be dominant in Bulgaria, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania and 
Romania. Primary products and semi-processed products dominated the export profiles of 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Russia and the Central Asian states. Finally, Ukraine and 
Belarus exhibited a hybrid mix of medium- to high-technology sectors (machinery, 
specifically tractors, in Belarus, and defence products and steel processing in Ukraine) 
alongside clear natural resource exploitation opportunities in the form of oil refinery 
capacity (Belarus) and gas pipelines that travelled west across both states. This diverse 
mix of export structures across the region would be expected to produce different social 
orders upon the collapse of socialism. Before examining the association between 
economic structure and social order in the post-socialist period, it is first necessary to 
briefly consider the range of different political orders that existed across the socialist 
region prior to its collapse.       
 
4.2.2 Variation in state- type across the socialist bloc 
 
The variation in patterns of interaction with the world economy was mirrored by 
patterns of state-type across the region (Robinson, 2004). Although all the socialist 
countries could be considered to be fundamentally limited-access political orders, the 
prevailing system of political relations was not uniform. This is not to suggest that all of 
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 This explains why the percentage of trade between the Soviet Union and the Western European countries 
took a downturn over the course of the 1980s – the price of oil was at a peak immediately after the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 and began a steady decline thereafter (see Chapter 5).  
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the variation in state-type across the socialist bloc was solely caused by links with the 
international economy. Other factors such as levels of economic development prior to the 
imposition of socialism, cultural legacies, and varying degrees of regime legitimacy were 
also important in shaping the type of socialist rule that developed (Janos, 2000, pp.324-
327). The regime-type at the point of the collapse of socialism should be considered as 
important because ―historical legacies and actors‘ strategic choices matter in the path-
dependent process of creating new polities and economies‖ (Kitschelt et al, 1999, p.19). 
Indeed, the interaction between prior regime-type and the opportunities and constraints 
created by countries‘ export structures would shape the sort of incentive structures and 
opportunities for collective action among political and economic actors that would exist 
in the post-socialist period. Kitschelt at al (1999, pp.36-37) outline a threefold typology 
of socialist regimes, based on their historical and institutional legacies.  
  
Patrimonial socialism: These countries included Bulgaria, Romania, and all of the 
former Soviet Union, apart from the Baltic states. These regimes were imposed onto 
historically underdeveloped agricultural countries, in which society had been 
characterised by hierarchical traditions in which social classes were generally weak and 
unable to resist the socialist takeover. Over time, they became repressive systems in 
which pre-socialist forms of governance were recreated. These included the development 
of patron and client relationships in which a small, socially insulated clique ruled with 
low levels of popular interest articulation and low levels of rational-bureaucratic 
institutionalisation. In such regimes, the excessive dominance of the party-state system 
meant that forces emerging from the party-state were able to benefit from access to 
organisational and material resources that were unavailable to the other inchoate social 
forces that might emerge in the aftermath of socialism. Members of the party-state were 
thus best placed to emerge as ‗winners‘ during the redistribution of state resources that 
followed the collapse of socialism and appropriate the most obvious sources of rent. This 
persistence of clientalist traditions and survivors from the previous regime, combined 
with the weakness of non-socialist organisational and ideological traditions, contrived to 
ensure that access to existing economic resources was largely denied to those outside of 
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the party-state elite (see, for example, Urban et al, 1994; Fish, 1995; Roper, 2000; Hale, 
2006; Gallagher, 2006; Ganev, 2006).  
 
National consensus socialism: These countries included Poland, Hungary, 
Slovenia and the Baltic states.
68
 These countries had semi-democratic pre-socialist 
polities with a strong base for political mobilisation, but with weaker prospects for class-
based politics. The socialist regimes existed alongside a weak working-class power base 
with a relatively weak domination of civil society. Such regimes adopted ‗national 
consensus‘ strategies in which society was co-opted rather than repressed, and in which 
the regimes permitted moderate levels of contestation and interest articulation alongside 
strong professional bureaucratic organisations. Interest groups emerging from these 
systems tended to possess relatively strong reformist impulses due to the lack of 
legitimacy of the socialist regimes. There also tended to be higher levels of competition 
within post-socialist systems owing to the fact that the previous regimes had been less 
repressive of sources of power independent of the regime. Thus, access to material and 
organisational resources were somewhat higher for non party-state actors than that in 
patrimonial socialist societies.          
 
Bureaucratic authoritarian socialism: Comprising Czechoslovakia and the GDR, 
these countries were relatively developed at the inception of socialism, with some 
experience of democratic politics and comparatively advanced industrial structures.
69
 
This created a stronger class basis for politics. The ruling socialist parties had strong links 
with the organised working class and access to a pre-existing professional state 
bureaucracy. This assisted the regimes in implementing repressive policies that 
suppressed the emergence of independent sources of social and economic power. They 
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 The inclusion of the Baltic republics in this category is somewhat spurious. All three republics were 
tightly integrated into Soviet political and economic system and the leaderships only displayed a marginal 
propensity to engage in ‗national consensus‘ politics (see Lieven, 1993). However, the existence of semi-
democratic polities and the presence of strong, if latent until the late 1980s, nationalist identities among the 
majority of the populations do suggest that their inclusion under this category is not entirely unreasonable.  
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 It is worth noting that there were significant differences between the Czech and Slovakian parts of 
Czechoslovakia. Even after the period of socialist modernization, Slovakia‘s economic structure was 
considerably less developed than that of the Czech areas (see Myant, 1989). These differences were to 
prove significant in post-1989 politics in both the Czechoslovakian period (pre-1992) and afterwards.  
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were, however, able to preserve comparatively high levels of bureaucratic and state 
autonomy and resist the sort of clientalist relationships that were forged between rulers 
and ruled in other parts of the socialist bloc. However, because they had experienced 
much stronger pre-socialist levels of modernisation and democracy, bureaucratic-
authoritarian regimes, and because their repressive nature had alienated most parts of 
society, they always faced much stronger competition from latent social forces that, 
although muted under the old regime, were more vocal in the post-socialist period. 
Therefore, once the socialist regimes collapsed the level of elite and popular competition 
increased sharply. Furthermore, the legacy of a strong bureaucracy left these countries 
more open to technocratic policy responses to the challenges imposed by political and 
economic transformation.      
  
Although this typology is convincing in its description of different socialist 
regime types, the authors argue, somewhat curiously, that  ―there [was] no longer a close 
relationship between economic modernisation and the type of socialist rule by the 1970s 
or 1980s‖, and that ―patrimonial communist countries that began with a more ‗backward‘ 
economy in the 1940s often had pretty much caught up with their initially more advanced 
neighbours in national-accommodative or bureaucratic-authoritarian communist polities‖ 
(Kitschelt et al, 1999, p.28).
70
 Instead, they view the political institutions of socialist rule, 
not the levels of economic development, as the key determinants of political 
transformation strategies in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This is a spurious statement 
for two reasons.  
 
First, there was at least a broad correlation between economic structure, the level 
of economic development of export profiles and regime type. For example, all of the 
patrimonial socialist countries tended to be exporters of primary products and low 
technology or labour intensive manufactures. The national consensus countries were 
among the most economically developed countries of the region. Poland, Hungary and 
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 The view of post-communist change in which ‗political‘ variables are often viewed as the dominant 
factors in explaining change was discussed in Chapter 2. Here it was argued that this represents a rather 
narrow conception of what constitutes politics and demands a closer examination of the influence of 
economic variables in shaping prospects for change.  
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Slovenia exported the highest proportions of medium to high technology manufactures 
and also had per capita incomes (adjusted for purchasing power parity, PPP) that were 
among the highest in the region (Maddison, 2003). Indeed, Poland and Hungary had 
arguably pursued the most aggressive attempt at re-establishing themselves within the 
world economy through their import-led growth strategies of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Similarly, the Baltic republics had the highest per capita incomes (PPP) among all of the 
republics of the USSR, as well as possessing higher proportions of efficient light industry 
than the rest of the USSR (Arkady and Karlsson, 1992; Maddison, 2003). The 
bureaucratic authoritarian regime in Czechoslovakia was perhaps (along with the GDR) 
the most well developed in economic terms, exporting higher proportions of medium- to 
high-technology manufactures than all of the patrimonial socialist countries (Myant, 
1989).  
 
Second, the concentration or diversity of economic resources, market structures 
within sectors and the ease with which rent-seeking opportunities could be seized in the 
aftermath of the collapse of socialism were important factors in endowing emerging 
political actors with varying material and organisational resources and in forming 
constituencies that supported or opposed reform. As was argued in the previous chapter, 
economic systems tend to produce complementary polities, and so techno-economic 
variables, particularly the nature of a country‘s export profile, would be important factors 
in shaping institutional and political developments across the region. The remainder of 
the chapter will examine changes in export structures across the region in the post-
socialist period and consider the extent to which this may have affected the development 
of types of social order.   
   
4.3 Economic reform and re-integration with the international economy   
 
The process of reintegration with the world economy that began with the collapse of 
socialism between 1989 and 1991 took place in a context of declining economic systems 
that were lagging further and further behind the West and that were now being overtaken 
by countries from East Asia. The evidence was clear: the previous decade of socialism 
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had resulted in declining output and living standards, increased levels of debt, and, most 
importantly, a general lack of adjustment to the changing mode of production that had 
shaped the international economy from the 1970s onwards. The project of economic 
transformation that was adopted as a guiding principle in most countries of the region had 
three main components, all with significant political implications: (i) stabilization; (ii) 
liberalization; and (iii) integration. Stabilization referred to macroeconomic stabilization; 
i.e. reducing state budget deficits, controlling money supply, reducing inflation, etc. . The 
second component involved the abolition of restrictive state regulations, the creation of a 
legislative framework to provide better conditions for business, price and import 
liberalization, reduction in state subsidies and the reduction, if not abolition, of ‗soft 
budget constraints‘, and the privatization of state owned enterprises (Landesmann and 
Szekely, 1995, p.3-4). The final component required readjusting the economy to the 
demands imposed by the international economy, particularly the development of modern 
infrastructure, an increased service sector, technological and organizational 
improvements in agriculture and industry, and the establishment of new export sectors as 
well as the preservation of older, but more competitive ones.
71
   
 
These three elements, if undertaken simultaneously, would be mutually 
reinforcing. For example, in order to achieve macroeconomic stabilization, exports would 
need to become competitive quickly if foreign trade balances were to be established and 
if a stable exchange rate was to be achieved. Furthermore, the three strands consisted of 
short- and long-term goals, some of which were ostensibly conflicting, such as the need 
to develop new infrastructure while reducing state expenditure, or improving the 
technological capacity of enterprises while at the same time cutting state support.   
Integration with the global economy played an integral role in the transformation process. 
Specifically, it has taken the form of increased trade flows between the region and the 
rest of the world, increased flows of foreign direct investment (FDI), and increased 
interaction with world capital markets and international financial institutions (IFIs). 
Indeed, integration with the world economy could be viewed as both an end to which 
economic reform was directed and a means of achieving this reform. In a mutually 
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 Concise overviews of the varying reform strategies are contained in Aslund (2007a) and Nuti (2007a). 
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constitutive process, proponents of market reform hoped that increased integration would 
‗lock in‘ progress made in domestic reform, strengthening the ‗winners‘ from the reform 
process and forming durable constituencies that would facilitate further integration and 
reform (Robinson, 2004).  
 
In strictly economic terms, trade liberalization (including opening up to FDI) was 
expected to deal rapidly and most efficiently with two major flaws of the centrally 
planned economic system: (i) the distorted price structure, resulting from the previous 
system of state administered prices, and (ii) the centralized and highly integrated 
production system formed by large monopolistic enterprises. Essentially, increasing 
openness to trade was designed to ‗import‘ world prices and to ‗inject‘ more competition 
into national economies that were dominated by a few large domestic producers that had 
previously benefited from ‗soft budget constraints‘. The role of FDI would be crucial in 
this respect as multinational companies (MNCs) would expose enterprises to competition 
as well as provide technological and organizational ‗spillovers‘ to rest of the economy. 
Access to world capital markets would also enable firms with limited access to domestic 
sources of savings (due to both the absence of large-scale savings and the 
underdevelopment of satisfactory financial institutions) to borrow the funds required for 
investment. Similarly, it was hoped that assistance from IFIs would help stabilize the 
macroeconomic environment in which policymakers were formulating and implementing 
reforms.  
 
The economic effects of increased integration with the global economy were not 
intended by reformers to be politically neutral. ‗Importing‘ prices and ‗injecting‘ 
competition would threaten the pre-existing particularistic exchange relations (Urban, 
1985) that were prevalent in the economic sphere across the region prior to transition by 
exposing domestic enterprises to foreign competition and subjecting them to the 
remonetisation of the economy and the imposition of ‗hard budget constraints‘. 
Therefore, integration with the global economy would also contribute towards political 
reform by undermining the social power of entrenched actors that had previously used 
particularistic exchange relations to generate ―positions of power and advantage 
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unregulated by legal rules‖ (Elster et al. 1998, p.25). Consequently, moves towards 
greater integration with the global economy were viewed as only part of a much wider 
struggle to move towards a market economy and a more democratic polity.  
 
However, the extent to which countries would follow this ideal-type transition 
process would depend largely on the array of structural economic and political forces that 
might oppose or support reform. It is in this respect that the degree of competition or 
concentration within the dominant sectors of the economy would prove crucial. For 
example, if concentrated rent-seeking opportunities existed within a few existing export 
sectors that were still competitive on the world market (e.g. in raw material extraction 
sectors), the opportunity for the concentration of political power would present itself to 
those that were able to capture them. Furthermore, the incentive to continue pursuing 
market reforms aimed at deepening integration with the international economy through 
diversifying and upgrading a country‘s export profile would be lower, as ‗winners‘ chose 
to maintain ‗partial reform equilibriums‘ that favoured entrenched rent-seekers to the 
detriment of wider society (Hellman, 1998). In such cases, access to international sources 
of capital might be denied to potential domestic competitors, and entrenched rent-seekers 
might also exert influence over the state to limit the introduction of foreign competition.  
 
If, on the other hand, reintegration with the wider international economy could be 
undertaken by a broad range of sectors, characterised by more or less competitive market 
structures, the opportunities for rent-seeking and the concentration of political and 
economic power would be curtailed. If these sectors were located in higher value-added 
industries, the organisational and technological impediments to political development 
would be reduced. Furthermore, the role of those countries that succeeded in upgrading 
their export capabilities would benefit materially, as well as politically, owing to the fact 
that higher technology manufactures have been the highest growing sectors in the world 
economy over the previous two decades (Lall, 1999).
72
 Thus, the first years of 
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 According to Lall (1999), high-technology production by 68 developed and newly industrializing 
countries grew nearly 3 times faster over 1980-95 than total manufacturing production (5.9 percent and 2.7 
percent respectively). Within these countries high technology exports grew at 11.2 percent while all other 
lower-technology  manufactured exports grew at 6.5 percent per annum in this period.  
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reintegration would be crucial. Differing paths towards development or stasis lay open; 
success or failure early on could ‗lock in‘ export profiles and wider structures of 
economic production that might promote or impede the development of open access 
economic and political systems. This in turn might then ‗lock in‘ patterns of dependence 
or integration with the ‗core‘ of the international economy.          
 
4.3.1 Post-socialist patterns of structural economic continuity and change  
 
The export data presented in this section capture the main contours of structural 
continuity and change across the region. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 describe the structure and 
composition of export sectors at a three-digit level across the region since the collapse of 
socialism. These data are grouped according to the technology intensity classification 
outlined in Chapter Three. The left hand side of each column indicates the number of 
product groups in which a country enjoys a comparative advantage according to the 
Balassa index of Revealed Comparative Advantage. The figure on the right hand side of 
each column reveals the proportion of exports from each technology group. Figures are 
given for 1997, the first year for which data are available for all countries of the region, 
and 2006, the most recent year for which data are available. The countries are ranked in 
descending order by the change in the proportion of medium- and high-technology 
products exported between 1997 and 2006.  It is possible to make several broad 
observations concerning the structure of exports across the region.  
 
In terms of the development of high-technology exports across the region, only 
eight of the nineteen countries increased their relative share of high-technology products 
between 1997 and 2006: Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland, 
Georgia and Kazakhstan. Indeed, the regional average has increased only modestly, from 
6.2 percent to 8.8 percent. Kazakhstan enjoyed a rise in its proportion of high-technology 
exports only because the proportion of radioactive material (S3-525) exports increased. It 
did not develop a comparative advantage in any other product group since 1997. Georgia 
also has RCA in radioactive materials but also exports power generating equipment and 
helicopters owing to it having adjusted production in its Soviet-era Tbilisi Aircraft 
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Manufacturing plant (TAM, 2008). They are the only two countries from the former 
Soviet Union, except Estonia, to have increased their share of high-technology exports. 
Within the other six countries, the majority of growth in high-technology exports has 
taken place in HT1 products, ‗electronic and electrical products‘. In the HT2 category, 
only Poland, Slovenia, Hungary and Czech Republic have RCA in ‗steam turbines‘ (S3-
712), while only Slovenia and Hungary enjoy RCA in ‗medicaments‘ (S3-542). The most 
significant gains have been made by Hungary (19.4 to 30.4 percent) and Slovakia (6.1 to 
15.5 percent). Overall, it is reasonable to suggest that the majority of the growth in high-
technology products across the region is the result of: (a) growth in radioactive material 
exports; (b) socialist-era production facilities that have been maintained or converted; or 
(c) in electronic and electrical groups. Elsewhere, all other countries have, despite 
maintaining RCA in some product groups, experienced a decline in the proportion of 
high-technology exports. The proportion of high-technology exports is closely associated 
(Pearson‘s r = .87) with levels of FDI (see Fig 4.1). 
 
Figure 4.1 Cumulative per capita foreign direct investment (current U.S. dollars) and 
high-technology exports in post-socialist Europe, 2006. 
 
Sources: UN Comtrade, (2008); UNCTAD (2008); World Bank (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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Table 4.4 Structural changes in export activities, 1997-2006 
Country
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports Percent Change
Poland 3 7.3 4 8.8 27 23.6 29 39.9 25 33.6 21 21.3 56 35.5 42 30.0 17.7
Slovakia 4 6.1 4 15.5 36 35.2 28 41.9 18 30.6 21 19.9 38 28.1 25 22.7 16.1
Hungary 6 19.4 8 30.4 25 34.0 25 38.9 18 17.8 10 10.0 47 28.8 28 20.7 15.9
Romania 3 2.5 4 5.7 20 20.8 20 32.3 25 49.2 27 35.3 31 27.5 31 26.7 14.7
Czech Rep. 5 10.0 6 18.5 45 39.5 35 43.3 28 27.0 25 19.7 47 23.5 23 18.6 12.2
Latvia 4 9.1 2 7.9 12 9.0 13 16.5 19 30.5 25 24.7 36 51.4 35 51.0 6.2
Slovenia 6 12.8 6 14.4 30 36.0 30 40.3 27 28.3 22 22.8 33 22.9 25 22.6 5.9
Estonia 4 13.3 4 16.9 14 20.5 14 21.1 14 23.2 16 18.5 46 43.0 30 43.5 4.2
Georgia 3 2.7 3 8.4 11 31.8 13 30.1 3 4.0 3 3.5 31 61.5 23 58.0 4.0
Ukraine 2 4.3 4 3.6 15 32.1 16 36.6 12 25.5 12 25.7 43 38.1 35 34.1 3.9
Lithuania 2 7.4 2 7.0 20 24.9 21 26.8 20 22.5 18 19.2 49 45.2 43 47.0 1.4
Armenia 3 6.3 0 1.1 13 14.3 3 20.0 7 9.5 5 8.7 21 69.8 11 70.2 0.5
Russia 1 2.1 1 1.5 8 10.7 5 8.5 4 6.7 3 3.7 28 80.4 25 86.3 -2.8
Kazakhstan 1 2.1 1 2.4 7 8.8 4 4.3 3 10.8 4 3.5 35 78.3 29 89.8 -4.2
Azerbaijan 1 1.3 0 0.2 7 8.2 2 4.3 2 2.9 0 1.0 21 87.6 15 94.6 -5.0
Bulgaria 3 6.3 1 5.7 20 20.1 16 15.5 23 26.2 19 27.4 49 47.4 40 51.3 -5.1
Kyrgyzstan 2 6.4 1 3.4 7 10.4 5 7.4 5 4.6 8 12.0 32 78.7 33 77.2 -6.0
Moldova 1 10.0 0 3.0 8 10.9 8 7.1 6 9.0 17 38.6 34 70.1 29 51.4 -10.9
Belarus 2 5.4 2 2.5 28 41.8 16 28.6 20 23.3 14 13.1 38 29.6 16 55.9 -16.1
Change in 
medium and high 
technology (1997-
2006)
N  of groups: 19 N  of groups: 71 N  of groups: 45 N  of groups: 125
1997 2006
Primary and resource-based products   
1997 2006 1997
High-technology Medium-technology Low-technology
2006 1997 2006
 
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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Table 4.5 Structural changes in high- and medium-technology export activities, 1997-2006 
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
N ,
 RCA >1
Percent of 
total exports
Poland 2 5.6 3 7.5 2 1.7 1 1.3 0 5.4 4 12.8 13 7.4 11 7.1 16 10.6 16 20.0
Slovakia 2 4.1 4 14.4 2 2.0 0 1.1 2 10.1 2 19.9 17 11.0 12 6.9 20 14.0 16 15.1
Hungary 5 17.1 6 26.1 1 2.3 3 4.3 1 5.0 2 8.8 11 5.9 11 5.1 15 23.0 17 24.9
Romania 2 1.7 3 4.6 1 0.8 1 1.2 0 2.1 1 6.1 11 9.4 9 7.3 10 9.1 13 18.9
Czech Rep. 3 6.9 5 16.3 3 3.1 1 2.1 5 12.0 3 16.5 18 9.1 13 6.6 25 18.4 27 20.1
Latvia 3 6.1 1 4.1 1 3.1 1 3.8 0 1.1 0 4.3 8 3.8 8 5.2 5 4.1 6 7.0
Slovenia 4 6.8 4 6.4 2 6.0 2 8.0 1 11.3 3 12.8 12 7.0 13 7.9 18 17.7 20 19.6
Estonia 2 11.3 3 15.9 2 2.0 1 1.1 1 7.0 0 5.0 6 6.3 6 5.0 8 7.0 9 11.1
Georgia 1 1.4 1 0.6 2 1.3 2 7.8 0 1.4 2 7.1 8 26.5 5 15.5 3 3.8 7 7.5
Ukraine 2 2.3 2 2.3 2 1.9 2 1.4 0 1.2 0 1.4 10 22.8 10 28.0 7 7.9 8 7.2
Lithuania 1 4.9 2 5.3 1 2.5 0 1.7 2 6.7 3 7.1 11 9.5 8 9.3 8 8.7 12 10.4
Armenia 2 4.2 0 0.6 1 2.2 0 0.6 0 0.2 0 0.2 4 4.0 1 16.5 10 10.1 3 3.4
Russia 1 1.6 1 0.9 0 0.5 0 0.7 0 0.9 0 0.8 8 7.3 6 5.7 1 2.4 1 2.0
Kazakhstan 0 0.7 0 0.1 1 1.4 1 2.3 0 0.3 0 0.0 2 4.8 3 3.5 5 3.8 1 0.8
Azerbaijan 1 1.0 0 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.1 4 3.8 2 2.5 4 4.1 1 1.7
Bulgaria 2 3.1 1 3.3 2 3.1 0 2.4 0 0.4 0 0.5 12 11.9 9 5.4 9 7.7 11 9.6
Kyrgyzstan 1 4.3 1 2.7 1 2.0 0 0.8 0 2.9 0 1.9 1 1.3 2 1.6 7 6.2 3 3.9
Moldova 0 1.8 0 1.1 1 8.2 0 1.9 0 0.6 0 0.9 4 2.0 3 1.4 5 8.2 6 4.8
Belarus 2 3.4 2 1.7 2 1.9 0 0.7 4 11.8 2 6.7 12 16.1 6 11.4 15 13.8 9 10.5
High Technology 3
N  of groups: 11 N  of groups: 8 N  of groups: 5 N  of groups: 28 N  of groups: 38
High Technology 1 High Technology 2 Medium Technology 1 Medium Technology 2
1997 2006 1997 20061997 2006 1997 2006 1997 2006
 
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2008); author‘s calculations.  
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In the medium-technology group, the regional average of medium-technology 
products as a proportion of total exports increased from 22.4 percent to 25 percent. 
However, a clear bifurcation has occurred in terms of the growth of export products in 
this group. All of the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states have increased 
their share of medium-technology exports, while in the other former Soviet states, 
however, only Ukraine and Armenia have increased their share. Increases in MT1, 
‗automotive‘ exports, have increased in Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia. Nearly all of the East European and Baltic states have increased 
their share in MT2, ‗process industries‘, along with Ukraine and Armenia. MT2 is a 
rather diverse category, with some machinery products, chemicals and semi-processed 
goods, including metals (such as steel) and wood. It is in steel and wood that Armenia 
and Ukraine accounted for much of their increases in medium-technology exports. In the 
MT3 category, only the countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states experienced any 
growth, with Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Romania experiencing the 
most growth. The sharpest decline in this area was suffered by Belarus (down 13.2 
percent), followed by Bulgaria (down 4.5 percent).  
 
Logically, low-technology and primary product exports exhibit the opposite 
tendencies to those observed in the high- and medium-technology products. As a region, 
low-technology products account for a lower proportion of total exports. There are only 
three countries that have significantly increased their low-technology exports since 1997: 
Moldova (29.5 percent), Kyrgyzstan (7.4 percent) and Bulgaria (1.2 percent). All have 
increased their exports of textiles, pottery and glassware. The other countries of Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic states have seen reverses in their shares of low-technology exports 
mainly owing to a shift towards medium- and high-technology exports. The most notable 
example within this group is Romania as it has seen a decrease of 13.8 percent since 1997 
as it has seen its exports shift towards medium-technology exports, most notably 
automobiles (see Pavlinek, 2002; Egresi, 2007). Belarus has also seen its share of low-
technology exports decrease since 1997, but this has been due to a sharp shift towards 
primary product exports, rather than any improvement in its technological base. 
Interestingly, Belarus‘ leading export is fuels, despite it possessing very limited reserves 
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of natural resources (with the exception of potassium sulphates). This derived from its 
ability, until recently, to import low-cost Russian oil, which it then refined and re-
exported. In this case, the Belarusian state was not dependent on a domestic source of 
exports per se, but instead on its favorable relationship with Russia. The dependence of 
Belarus on this source for much of its foreign currency earnings (Lisovskaya, 2004) 
demonstrates a compromised autonomy of the state not from a powerful domestic export 
sector, but from another state. Recent Russian actions leading to the reduction in its 
exports of subsidized unprocessed oil products (Marples, 2008) could prompt a reversal 
of this process.
73
  
 
In the primary and resource-based products group, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria 
Kazakhstan, Lithuania and Russia have all seen their proportions of primary products 
exports increase since 1997. In Russia,  crude oil accounts for the highest proportion of 
exports. This is complemented in Russia and Kazakhstan by exports in natural gas, and in 
Azerbaijan and Lithuania by exports of electricity and wood. With the exception of 
Lithuania, this has occurred at the expense of medium- and high-technology products 
with the proportion of these activities declining over the period under examination. It is 
highly probable that the sub-sectors within the primary and resource-based groups will be 
characterized by high levels of capital intensity, high economies of scale, along with low 
asset/factor flexibility and low production flexibility.  
  
4.4 The relationship between economic structure and social order across the region 
  
The second chapter outlined the conceptual framework that highlighted the association 
between economic structure and social order. The third chapter operationalized the 
dependent and independent variables, and described the data that will be used to measure 
any cross-country association between them. So far, this chapter has described the 
historical relationship between the countries of the region and the international economy 
and illustrated how economic structures as measured by export profiles have changed 
                                                 
73
 Because of their strikingly divergent fortunes, Belarus and Romania are discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Seven.  
 112 
over time. This section now focuses on testing the independent variable – economic 
structure as measured by the Technological Diversity and Development Index (TDDI) – 
against other possible explanations of variation in type of social order across the region in 
2007.
74
 The TDDI is tested against six other explanations: two economic, four political-
institutional.
75
 As will be shown, economic structure – as defined in this study - is both 
substantively and statistically significant, and stands up well against other alternative 
explanatory variables. While this does not necessarily indicate that economic structure is 
the best explanation of social order type across the region, it does suggest that it is an 
explanation that is worthy of further exploration. Before describing the results of the 
regression analyses comparing the competing explanations, it is first necessary to explain 
why the alternative explanations might be considered as plausible explanatory variables.  
 
4.4.1 Alternative explanations of social order development    
    
 The first two alternative explanations of variation in social order give primacy to 
economic variables. The first measure uses GDP per capita in 1990 (purchasing power 
parity) as a crude but useful indicator of countries‘ starting points in terms of their level 
of economic development at the end of the socialist period.
76
 The level of development in 
1990 might be considered to be important because of the perceived benefits that might 
accrue to countries that had higher levels of economic sophistication and modernization 
at the point of the collapse of socialism (Lipset, 1959; Moore, 1966; Luebbert, 1991; 
Bunce, 2000; Janos, 2000). The literature that views economic modernization as causing 
greater levels of democratization might also lead one to expect it to be conducive to 
supporting open-access social orders. .  
 
The second economic explanation is the stock of foreign direct investment per 
capita in 2006. Greater levels of foreign investment might be expected to facilitate the 
                                                 
74
 The construction of this variable is described in Chapter Three.  
75
 A more extensive list of possible determinants of political change across the region is contained in 
Cameron (2007). All of the variables contained in Cameron‘s study were included in the initial statistical 
exercises that make up this section. However, only those that were deemed to be both of greater theoretical 
substance and statistically significant were selected for inclusion here.  
76
 These data are taken from World Bank (2008). 
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emergence of open-access social orders through two main mechanisms (Feng, 2003): 
first, through the demands imposed by foreign investors for firmer protection of property 
rights and for improvements in the general business environment; and second, through 
the more indirect, but positive effect that foreign competition might have within the 
domestic economy. The presence of foreign firms may also be expected to inject greater 
competition into a country‘s economy, thus helping to establish greater competition at the 
political level.
77
   
 
 The second group of explanations is political-institutional in nature. The first is 
based on the idea that the mode of transition from socialism might have created political 
path dependencies that shaped the possibility for later patterns of political behavior.
78
 
Originally, Kitschelt et al (1999) distinguished between four main modes of transition: 
transition by implosion; transition by negotiation; transition by preemptive reform; 
regime continuity. However, after performing an analysis of variance test (ANOVA) to 
compare the mean social order-type scores of countries within the four categories, this 
was reduced to three categories as the difference in mean scores between the second 
category (transition by negotiation) and the third (transition by pre-emptive reform) was 
only modest.
79
 The three remaining categories range from total socialist regime implosion 
(coded 0), to those that experienced some negotiation between socialist elites and 
opposition forces (coded 1), and to those countries that experienced only continuity of 
elites (coded 2).  
The second political-institutional explanation focuses on the level of elite 
dispersion at the point of socialist collapse, measuring the extent to which the socialist 
elite in each country was fragmented or consolidated in the transitional period.
80
 This 
might be important because the structure of old regime elites, as they emerged from the 
                                                 
77
 The cumulative stock of per capita foreign direct investment is measured in current US dollars. The data 
are taken from: United Nations Comtrade (2008); United Nations UNCTAD (2008); World Bank (2008); 
and author‘s calculations. 
78
 Data derived from Kitschelt et al (1999) and author‘s calculations. 
79
 ANOVA involves comparing the mean scores of independent variables regressed on the dependent 
variable. In this instance, the mean scores on the dependent variable (social order type) were .60 for 
transition by implosion; .30 for transition by negotiation; .34 for transition by pre-emptive reform; and -
1.04 for regime continuity.  
80
 Data are derived from Easter (1997) and author‘s calculations.  
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breakdown phase, may have been an important factor in shaping the types of institutional 
choices made in the period of post-socialist politics (e.g., Stepan, 1986; Higley and 
Burton, 1989; Huntington, 1991). This variation in structure is seen to be determined by 
the continuity in the internal integrity of old regime elites and by the manner in which 
they retained access to the resources of power.  The nature of elite cohesion or dispersion 
might be expected to affect the development of certain types of social order by shaping 
the institutional framework adopted (see below) or by facilitating or limiting both 
economic and political competition. Three categories of elite dispersion exist ranging 
from consolidated (coded 0), consolidated but reformed (coded 1), and dispersed (coded 
2).  
Linked to the previous point is the notion that the constitutional configuration of 
executive and legislative power chosen after the collapse of socialism is an important 
factor in providing the right environment for open political competition to flourish. 
Scholars are divided on the relative merits and deficiencies of parliamentary or 
presidential constitutional types in laying the foundations for more open and competitive 
politics. Proponents of parliamentary systems (e.g., Linz and Valenzuela, eds., 1994; 
Stepan and Skach, 1993) stress the flexibility of parliaments (i.e. legislatures may depose 
prime ministers and governments before the end of their terms) in contrast to the rigidity 
of presidential systems (where presidents serve fixed-terms). They also applaud the 
dependence of the executive on the legislature in parliamentary systems in contrast to the 
perceived unconstrained executive power in presidential systems. Supporters of 
presidential constitutional types (Horowitz, 1996; Mainwaring and Shugart, eds., 1997; 
Shugart and Carey, 1992) emphasize the fact that presidents may be capable of more 
decisive action than parliaments, and that the institutional separation of executive and 
legislature might reduce the hazards implicit in any temporary concentration of power.    
A government-type dummy variable is constructed to indicate whether a system is 
presidential (coded 0) or parliamentary (coded 1).
81
  
  
                                                 
81
 Data are taken directly from Fish (2006). 
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The final political-institutional variable that is included in this test of alternative 
explanations of variation in the dependent variable measures the outcome of the initial 
elections after the collapse of socialism.
82
 This might be considered important because of 
the effect that this first election might have on elite turnover; if little turnover of elites 
takes place after the initial election it might be expected that political competition would 
be more limited than in countries which experienced significant elite turnover. This might 
then have important implications for the rapid reformation or marginalization of socialist 
elites, and also for the emergence of non-communist politicians (Grymala-Busse, 2002). 
If communist elites refused to contest elections or to relinquish power, the implications 
for political competition would be expected to be poor.  Initial election scores range 
between 0 (no contestation by, or turnover of, communist elite) and 5 (robust contestation 
and high elite turnover).  
 
Table 4.6 Bivariate regressions of social order type on hypothesized determinants 
      
Variable Coefficient Adj. R² 
Technological Development and Diversity Index (2006) 3.38*** 0.63 
Initial election result 0.36*** 0.63 
Stock of cumulative FDI (until 2006) 0.0002*** 0.61 
Elite dispersion at collapse of socialism  .65*** 0.60 
Government-type (dummy variable) 1.28*** 0.57 
Mode of transition   -0.9** 0.42 
Economic development (GDP per capita, 1990 at PPP) .0002** 0.31 
N = 19 countries 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
 
All seven of the variables tested here (i.e. the TDDI and the six alternative 
explanations) are suitable for Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) analysis: they have normal 
(i.e. Gaussian) distributions, and all exhibit a linear relationship with the dependent 
variable. Table 4.6 shows the results of bivariate regressions of the social order type score 
                                                 
82
 Data are taken directly from Fish (1998). 
 116 
on each of the independent variables. The regression coefficients for six of the variables 
are positive, while the coefficient for the ‗mode of transition‘ variable is negative. All 
seven variables are statistically significant to a confidence level of at least 99 percent (p < 
0.01). However, there is evidence of significant multicollinearity, especially between 
several of the political-institutional variables (Table 4.7).
83
 This is unsurprising given the 
close conceptual links that exist between some of them and is overcome by applying 
caution to the specification of multivariate regression models. The hypothesized 
determinants are ranked by their explanatory strength. Here, the relative explanatory 
power of the TDDI variable is apparent. 
 
Table 4.7 Correlation matrix of selected of independent variables 
TDDI 
(2006)
Initial 
election 
result
Economic 
development 
(GDP per 
capita, 1990 
at PPP)
Government 
type (dummy 
variable)
Elite 
dispersion 
at collapse 
of socialism
Mode of 
transition
Stock of 
cummulative 
FDI (up to 
2006)
TDI_2006 1
Initial Elections 0.64 1
PPP Per cap 1990 0.40 0.47 1
Gvt Type 0.63 0.64 0.32 1
Dispersion of elites 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.57 1
Mode of transition -0.62 -0.73 -0.40 -0.75 -0.55 1
FDI Stock_2006 0.66 0.63 0.53 0.40 0.66 -0.52 1
Source: see above section and footnotes. 
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 For example, as illustrated in the correlation matrix, there are particularly strong correlations between 
mode of transition and initial election outcome (Pearson‘s r = .73); and mode of transition and government 
type (Pearson‘s r = .75).   
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Table 4.8 Multivariate regressions of social order type on hypothesized determinants 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 
 -1.18  
(3.17)* 
 -1.54  
(-2.68)*** 
 -2.14  
(-7.06)*** 
 -2.16  
(-7.21)*** 
 -1.8  
(-3.13)*** 
 -2.68  
(-4.85) 
       
TDDI (2006) - - 
1.9 
(3.18)** 
1.82 
(3.01)** 
1.42 
(2.15)* 
1.50 
(2.62)* 
       
Initial Election - 
0.16 
(1.89) 
0.18 
(2.85)* - .15 (1.95) .16 (2.41)* 
       
Cumulative FDI  
(until 2006) 
0.00018 
(3.98)** - - - 
0.00074  
(1.76) - 
       
Elite dispersion at  
collapse of socialism  - .29 (2.11) - - 
  -.03  
(-.12) - 
       
Government-type  
(dummy variable) - .66 (2.18)* - 
0.67 
(2.92)* - .64 (2.49)* 
       
Mode of transition  - 
0.11 
(0.41) - - - .26 (1.17) 
       
Economic development  
(GDP per capita 1990 
at PPP) 
0.00008  
(1.39) - 
0.000073 
(1.71) 
0.000008 
 (2.45)* 
0.00049  
(1.13) 
0.000079  
(2.41) 
F-Test  16.51*** 15.84*** 23.55*** 24.07*** 15.81*** 19.34*** 
Standard Error  0.46 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.30 
Adjusted R² 0.63 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.84 
N = 19 countries. Entries are un-standardized regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parentheses.  
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. 
  
Table 4.8 specifies several multivariate regression models utilizing the 
explanatory variables described above. The first column presents the results of a 
multivariate analysis that includes only the two economic variables described above.  
Although the adjusted R
2
 is considerable (.63) for the overall model, only cumulative FDI 
is statistically significant. The second column presents the results when only the political-
institutional variables are included. In this model only government-type is statistically 
significant (at the .05 level) with the other three variables insignificant at even the .05 
level. Evidently, more robust specifications are required if these variables are to be 
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considered useful. The third column introduces the TDDI variable and is presented 
alongside the initial election and economic development variables. This model is 
substantially significant (Adj. R
2
 = .79) with the TDDI variable proving the most robust 
explanatory variable. Model four in the fourth column tests the TDDI against government 
type and economic development in 1990. All three variables are statistically significant in 
this equation, although only the TDDI variable is highly significant (p<0.01). Finally, 
columns five and six contain the results of multivariate analyses that comprise five 
independent variables. In both models, the substantial significance is considerable (Adj. 
R
2 
= .80 and .83) with the TDDI variable remaining the only variable that consistently 
reaches a satisfactory level of statistical significance. The sixth column presents the 
model with the best fit in terms of R
2 
and the standard error of the regression.  
 
In short, the results of the regression analyses indicate that although there are a 
number of potentially useful variables, only the TDDI variable and the government-type 
variable consistently achieve statistical and substantial significance across a range of 
regression specifications. Consequently, the relationship between the economic structure 
of a country as measured by its export profile and social order-type appears, prima facie, 
to be worthy of further attention. This link is explored in greater detail in the subsequent 
case studies. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation outlined the conceptual framework that is 
employed throughout and described the measurement of the independent and dependent 
variables. This chapter has provided a broad historical overview of the relationship 
between the countries of the socialist and post-socialist region and the international 
economy, positing a qualitative and quantitative link between economic structure and 
social order-type.  
 
The first section of this chapter traced the main patterns of interaction between the 
countries of the region and the international economy up until 1980. Here it was argued 
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that despite the aspirations towards bloc autarky the countries of the socialist region 
became gradually more integrated with the world economy as time progressed. However, 
this interaction was not enough to compensate for the structural deficiencies of the 
planned economy that was the prevalent economic mechanism across the region. The 
second section considered the structure of the region‘s exports during the 1980s and at 
the point of the collapse of socialism. It was suggested that significant differences in 
patterns of integration with the international economy existed across the region. It was 
also proposed that these differences in economic structure were associated with different 
regime-types within the socialist bloc. The third section outlined the broad patterns of 
continuity and change in economic structure across the region in the post-socialist period. 
There is considerable variation among the countries of the region in their patterns of 
integration with the international economy, with some countries diversifying and 
upgrading their export base and others making less progress. The final section explored 
the statistical robustness of the relationship between economic structure and social order-
type by comparing the explanatory variable with other possible explanations of variation 
in social order-type across the region.  
 
The results of bivariate and multivariate regression analyses indicate that the 
explanatory variable that is tested in this dissertation is both statistically and substantially 
significant, and is worthy of closer attention. The subsequent four case studies explore 
this link in greater detail. They examine the intervening variables that were hypothesized 
in Chapter Two to act as the causal mechanisms that link the independent variable with 
the variation on the dependent variable. These case studies are intended to give greater 
substance to the tentative link between the two variables that is statistically illustrated in 
this chapter.      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Economic structure, the international economy  
and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
 
5. Introduction 
 
This chapter is the first of four case studies that aim to explore the link between economic 
structure, the international economy and social-order development. It considers the 
influence of the natural resource sector on Soviet politics. Whereas subsequent chapters 
examine the link between economic structure and politics in countries in the period after 
the collapse of socialism, this chapter examines the role of economic structure in causing 
a limited-access order to collapse. Two main arguments are made. First, that 
developments in the wider international economy directly affected the decision-making 
of Soviet leaders. Second, it is argued that the economic structure of the Soviet Union 
constrained the choices available to the Soviet leadership when events in the international 
economy, and its own systemic inefficiencies, compelled it to undertake increasingly 
radical reform measures in the 1980s.  
 
This is done in three parts. The first section outlines the broad patterns of 
interaction between the Soviet economy and the international economy. After the 1960s, 
the Soviet Union developed much deeper links with the international economy (i.e. 
outside of the socialist bloc). The pattern of interaction was quite simple: the Soviet 
Union exported natural resource products and used the proceeds to pay for imported food 
and, increasingly, machinery that the domestic economy was unable to produce. The 
second section offers a stylized outline of the basic features of the Soviet system. Here it 
is suggested that the Soviet Union was a limited-access order in which the fusion of state 
and economy ensured that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) possessed 
unchallenged political power. However, the effects of a centrally planned economy 
reduced the efficiency of the Soviet economy and intensified the internal contradictions at 
the heart of the political system in which the CPSU possessed extreme formal powers that 
were increasingly undermined by informal practices. The deleterious effects of such a 
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system were masked by the export of natural resources that increased revenues at 
precisely the same time that the domestic economy began to falter. In the context of 
rising resource revenues, the incentive to engage in systemic reform was considerably 
reduced.  
 
The third section considers the role of the precipitous drop in the price of natural 
resource exports in the mid-1980s on the decision of the Soviet leadership to engage in 
efforts at systemic reform. Although tentative efforts at reform were made in the early 
part of the 1980s, the decline in state revenues that accompanied the decline in world 
commodity prices induced the Soviet leadership to embark upon a considerably more 
rigorous reform program. However, the extent of the challenge that faced the Soviet 
leadership was profound and the weakening of the state through declining revenues 
exacerbated an already imposing situation. Faced with a recalcitrant party-state apparatus 
that proved unresponsive to the initial round of reforms, the Soviet leadership under 
Mikhail Gorbachev introduced increasingly radical reforms that were aimed at 
transforming the Soviet political system into a more open-access order. Unfortunately for 
the Soviet leadership, rising nationalist tendencies and a severe economic downturn 
weakened the credibility of the centre to govern and ultimately resulted in the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The plethora of existing explanations of Soviet collapse suggest that it 
was an event that was, in many ways, over determined. However, the argument presented 
in this chapter suggests that even though the structure of the Soviet economy and its 
relationship with the international economy may not explain the collapse of the Soviet 
empire on its own, it was certainly a crucial factor in explaining the timing of the 
leadership‘s decision to undertake the radical reforms that ultimately led to the collapse 
of the Soviet system.           
 
5.1 The role of natural resources in the Soviet economy  
 
The Soviet economy was characterized by overspecialization in heavy industry and 
‗productive‘ sectors that were deemed to be of political importance to the party 
leadership (Nove, 1977, p.3). The roots of this emphasis on heavy industry were to be 
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found partly in the veneration of industry that was a feature of Marxian thought, and also 
in the need for a strong industrial base to support geopolitical competition with the West. 
In order to expedite the transition from an agrarian economy to a modern industrial 
economy, the period of rapid industrialization under Stalin saw the adoption of left-wing 
policies that caused a ‗big push‘ in rates of investment in fixed capital at the expense of 
consumption (see Preobrazhensky, 1964). This heavily industrialized system built under 
Stalin‘s rule provided the resources with which the Soviet Union was able to defeat Nazi 
Germany in World War Two and emerge as one of only two superpowers. After his 
death, the consumption needs of the population was given greater attention under the 
leaderships of Khrushchev and Brezhnev and led to increased investment and changes in 
incentives to increase output in the agricultural sector (Hanson, 2003, p.153). However, 
the general level of productivity within the economy began to wilt as the supply of inputs 
to increase output on a factor extensive model of development was exhausted. 
Consequently, output growth began to decline steadily towards the end of the 1960s 
(Table 5.1). This decline was manifested in a slower rate of technological innovation than 
Western countries (at least in non-military products) and in the continued failure of the 
Soviet economy to satisfy the needs of consumers.
84
 Foodstuffs and other consumer 
products were, in general, either of poor quality or of limited availability (Mau and 
Starodubrovskaya, 2001, pp.85-88).  
 
Table 5.1 Soviet economic growth rate, 1961-85 (average annual growth in Net Material 
Product (NMP), comparable prices, percent)  
    1961-5 1966-70 1971-5 1976-80 1981-85 
Official statistics 6.5 7.8 5.7 4.3 3.6 
Unofficial recalculations 4.4 4.1 3.2 1 0.6 
CIA estimates 4.8 4.9 3.0 1.9 1.8 
 
Sources: Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo (various years); unofficial calculations produced by 
Khanin and Selyunin (1987); CIA estimates from Central Intelligence Agency (1990). 
 
                                                 
84
 Investment planning was significant factor in causing this tendency towards technological backwardness. 
Because investment and the distribution of inputs across the economy was often planned years ahead, the 
system was not responsive to sudden changes in technology or to newly emerging opportunities, thus 
inhibiting the capacity of the system to absorb new technology and act upon it.    
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To ameliorate this situation, the Soviet Union began to import greater quantities 
of machinery and food. Technology that the inefficient and relatively un-innovative 
Soviet economy was unable to produce itself came from abroad, primarily from the 
capitalist countries of the West (Lavigne, 1991; Mau and Starodubrovskaya, 2001). These 
injections of advanced technology were intended to regenerate the productive potential of 
the economy and help close the widening productivity gap between the Soviet Union and 
the West (Hanson, 1982b). Improving the technological base of production would, it was 
hoped, also effect a corresponding improvement in the quality of consumer goods. The 
USSR also imported increasing amounts of foodstuffs to mask the inability of the 
inefficient domestic agricultural sector to produce enough food to satisfy the 
consumption demands of the Soviet population. The Soviet Union, which in 1913 (as the 
Russian Empire) was the largest exporter of grain in the world became the world‘s largest 
importer in the 1980s, accounting for more than 15 percent of the world‘s imported grain 
(FAO, 2007). Table 5.2 describes the secular increase in machinery and food imports. 
These data, however, do not reveal the full extent of agricultural decline. While the 
Soviet Union was importing record volumes of agricultural produce from abroad it was 
also, through lower prices, subsidizing both the inefficient Soviet agricultural complex 
and as well as the Soviet consumer. By the end of the 1980s, subsidies to the agricultural 
sector accounted for approximately a third of the state budget (Gaidar, 1997, p.433).  
 
Table. 5.2 Soviet balance of trade for agricultural products and machinery and equipment 
imports, 1965-1985 (millions of constant 2000 dollars)  
    1965 1970    1975   1980   1985 
Agricultural products -4,707 -3,654 -17,871 -27,615 -22,515 
Machinery and equipment -2,039 -3,709 -12,309 -12, 455 -8,750 
       
Sources: United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization, FAOSTAT data (2007); 
Goskomstat, Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, (various years); author‘s own calculations. 
 
In order to pay the increasing import bill, the Soviet state became increasingly 
dependent on increased exports to earn the convertible foreign currency that was required 
to pay for the imports that maintained social stability, funded geopolitical and military 
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competition with the United States and its allies, purchased capital imports to compensate 
for the low level of Soviet technological innovation, and generally subsidized the more 
inefficient sectors within the economy (Khanin, 1998, p.76). It was thus fortuitous that 
the Soviet economy should begin to slow and exhibit signs of a drop in productivity 
growth just as the Western Siberian oil fields began to yield vast supplies of oil, the value 
of which increased sharply after the first oil shock in 1973, and again after the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979 (Goldman, 2008). Before the late 1960s the USSR had predominantly 
used the oil reserves from Azerbaijan and the Volga Oil Basin for domestic consumption 
and for export to its socialist allies with exports to non-socialist countries quite limited 
during this time (Gustafson, 1989, pp.22-25).  
 
Figure 5.1  Soviet oil production, million tons of crude oil produced per year (left-axis) 
and average annual price per barrel of crude oil (right-axis), 1965-1990   
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Source: Production figures from Goskomstat, Narodnoe khoziaistvo (various years); price data 
from International Energy Agency (2007). 
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However, the discovery of huge oil deposits in Western Siberia during the 1960s 
led to a huge increase in oil production (Fig. 5.1) from 1970 onwards. Coinciding with 
the first oil shock, this stimulated even greater Soviet investment in oil and gas 
production. As Soviet oil production grew, more oil was available for hard currency 
exports. Oil exports to OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) countries grew from  just over $2 billion in 1972 to over $25 billion by 
1980 (Goldman, 2008, p. 114). Accompanied by increased gas exports, as well as the 
periodic sale of gold reserves, this enabled the Soviet Union to fund its considerable and 
growing import bill (Lavigne, 1991, pp.334-337).     
 
As well as providing hard currency for imports of food and machinery, the 
absence of an effective pricing system that could accurately measure the value of goods 
and activities in the Soviet economy caused the price of domestic energy to be artificially 
deflated, thereby enabling the state effectively to redistribute the value of fuels to other 
goods produced within the economy (Gaddy and Ickes, 2005). The opportunity cost from 
sacrificing the export revenue from a barrel of oil in order for it be used elsewhere in the 
production of goods with a much lower value represented a considerable subsidy to 
inefficient enterprises. Indeed, the price of fuel and power in the Soviet economy has 
been estimated to have been as little as 5 percent of world prices (Lane, 2001, p.102). 
While subsidized energy may have disguised the inefficiency of many sectors within the 
economy, the low price did little to encourage the conservation or efficient use of energy. 
Consequently, as oil became more important to both the domestic economy in the form of 
transfers, and to the trade balance in terms of the imports from the West that energy 
exports bought, so the tension between the two end users mounted.  
 
Thus, the Soviet leadership was in a bind; on one hand, oil transfers disguised the 
inefficiency of much of the economy, while on the other the machinery imports 
purchased with oil revenues were vital if the domestic economy were not to fall further 
behind the West, while food imports were vital if social stability were to be maintained. 
The energy production sector was thus assigned high priority by the Soviet leadership 
because of its importance as both a source of foreign currency earnings and as subsidy to 
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domestic consumer, and ensured that it was assigned an increasingly large share of Soviet 
investment, effectively ‗crowding out‘ investment resources for other parts of the 
economy (Hanson, 2002, p.174). Such was the importance of energy production that the 
increase in energy investment between 1981 and 1985 absorbed over 35 percent of total 
investment growth, with energy absorbing just under 90 percent of the 44 billion rouble 
increment allocated to industry, effectively leaving the rest of the industrial sector with 
stagnant investment budgets (Gustafson, 1989, p.39). By 1990 the situation had 
worsened, with the maintenance of existing levels of oil production estimated to have 
required resources approximating that of the entire Soviet investment budget (Kuikov, 
2001, p.172). 
 
The importance of the Soviet Union‘s growing dependence on oil exports from 
the 1970s onwards cannot be exaggerated. It allowed the Soviet leadership to consolidate 
and expand upon the USSR‘s newfound status as a superpower and continue its 
geopolitical competition with the West without having to address the systemic 
deficiencies within the economy that had caused declining rates of productivity. Indeed, 
the 1970s marked the height of Soviet military competition with the West, with the 
development of a blue-water navy, superiority over the United States in the number of 
strategic nuclear weapon systems that it was able to field, and increased assertiveness in 
foreign policy, as illustrated by Soviet activity in the 1970s, first in Africa, and then in 
Afghanistan (Arnold, 1993; Menon, 1986; Patman, 1990). The share of defence spending 
in the USSR‘s GNP rose from 13 percent in 1970 to at least 16 percent in 1980 (Ofer, 
1987), although this may have underestimated the real figure. This momentous defence 
burden was only made possible through the influx of export earnings on natural resource 
exports.  
 
The oil boom also enriched many states in the developing world, particularly in 
the Middle East, who in turn spent heavily on military equipment from the USSR (Golan, 
1990). Later, gas became more prominent as a source of export earnings when pipelines 
were built throughout the 1970s and 1980s to supply continental Europe. In addition, 
increased production and sales of gold also supplemented earnings from oil and gas 
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exports when they were lower, with gold exports tending to rise whenever oil prices 
declined and falling when oil prices were higher (Lavigne, 1991, p.334). The extent of 
the Soviet Union‘s natural resource export dependence was recognized by the Soviet 
leadership in the mid-1980s, with Gorbachev noting only three months after his election 
as General Secretary that the country should export more manufactured goods and less 
raw materials if the Soviet Union were not to find itself in a position of ―inadmissible 
dependence‖ on the West (Gorbachev, 1987, pp. 263-264).  
 
In short, the Soviet leadership had embarked upon a development trajectory based 
on using easily accessible natural resource revenues (primarily oil and gas) to solve the 
increasingly complex social, economic and political problems confronting them. As the 
share of fuels as a proportion of total exports increased from 16 percent in 1970 to 52 
percent in 1982, so the USSR became more dependent on resource revenues to fund state 
expenditure (Gregory and Stuart, 2001, p.150). According to estimates by Gaddy and 
Ickes (2005, p.562), oil rents accruing to the Soviet state increased from only several 
billion dollars (in 2005 dollars) per year in the early 1970s to well over $260 billion 
dollars per year in 1981. The availability of this lucrative source of income allowed the 
Soviet leadership to finance its goals without resorting to any significant economic or 
political reform that might alter the basic Stalinist institutional framework. 
 
Different domestic constituencies competed over access to export revenues: the 
huge arms build-up, the support of client states, the subsidization of inefficient industries, 
the war in Afghanistan, and so forth. This led to a situation where competing claims on 
the commodity windfall caused revenues to be oversubscribed, while the depth of the 
Soviet Union‘s dependence on oil revenues left it especially exposed to any decline in 
commodity prices. It also left the USSR with an export profile that resembled an 
undeveloped state; it exported raw materials, rather than goods to which value had been 
added during the process of production, a point recognized within the top leadership (see 
Ryzkhov in Gaidar, 2006, p. 141).
85
 If anything, Soviet production often created negative 
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 It has been argued that the extent of industrial waste and decay in the Soviet Union was exaggerated, and 
that in fact the Soviet economy, and Soviet manufacturing in particular, was value-adding to a greater 
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value-added goods (Gaddy and Ickes, 1998).
86
 Through postponing systemic reform, 
natural resource revenues indirectly perpetuated the Soviet Union‘s backwardness, rather 
than help rectify it. Most significantly, perhaps, a state that aspired to a high level of self-
sufficiency became increasingly exposed to the vicissitudes of the international economy 
because of its dependence on export earnings and the technology and consumer goods 
that these earnings enabled it to buy. The extent to which the Soviet Union was tied to the 
international economy was perhaps not as apparent to many observers in the early 1980s. 
However, the sudden decline in commodity prices that occurred around 1984-85 exposed 
the deficiencies of the Soviet economic system as the leadership began to run out of 
resources to pay for the imports on which it had become dependent.      
 
5.2 The Soviet system: obstacles to systemic reform 
 
The structure of the Soviet economy that is outlined above, and the positive terms of 
trade shift that accompanied its increasing integration with the international economy, 
enabled the Soviet leadership to avoid the sort of serious systemic reform that began to 
appear more urgent as the factor extensive model of development began to run out of 
steam. In order to understand what type of system was in place it is first necessary to 
consider the core elements of the Soviet system. In terms of the conceptual framework 
elaborated in Chapter Two, the Soviet Union was a limited-access order (LAO) with the 
intimate ‗double balance‘ between the institutional structure of the state and economy an 
integral feature of the Soviet system; state ownership of the economy ensured complete 
political control (see Friedriech and Brzezinski, 1963). The Soviet LAO was, however, a 
hybrid system, combining elements of the absolutist-bureaucratic state-type and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
degree than now seems to be accepted. This argument is made in Kotz and Weir (2006). While it is 
certainly true that the Soviet manufacturing base did produce a high volume of goods, the true value of 
these goods is perhaps best measured by how competitive they are on the world market. In this respect, the 
true value of Soviet production was revelead. Quite simply, Soviet manufacturing was, outside of a few 
areas, only ‗sold‘ to COMECON members as part of the managed trade process in which other socialist 
countries ‗paid‘ for their cheap energy imports from the Soviet Union through imports of Soviet 
manufactures. Even within this system, the proportion of imports from the Soviet Union to COMECON 
countries declined after the 1970s, particularly as those countries attempting import-led modernization 
drives (e.g. Poland and Hungary) switched their purchases to Western countries. According to Aslund 
(1989, p.17), only around 7-8 percent of Soviet goods were exportable beyond COMECON countries.  
86
 In the sense that the goods produced were of lower value than the market value of the inputs used to 
produce those goods. 
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absolutist-patrimonial state-type (Robinson, 2002). Absolutist-bureaucratic states 
‗organize the exclusion of the mass of society from legislative activity and decision 
making by vesting power in bureaucratic organizations‘ (Robinson, 2002, p.10). In the 
USSR, the bureaucratic organization was the CPSU, and its ideology provided the 
parameters within which policy was formulated. Because of the universal nature of the 
ideology of the CPSU, not only did it aspire to define all state goals, but those officials 
from within the CPSU itself were also subjects of ideological imperatives (Robinson, 
1995). Consequently, because the state claimed ownership of all facets of Soviet life, 
party members were not supposed to use their positions in a proprietary manner, as is 
often the case in patrimonial, limited-access systems. State ownership of the means of 
production was an essential part of this system as the elimination of private property gave 
the state monopoly power within the economy and was thus a precondition for the party‘s 
monopoly on power as well as an essential element of official ideology (Kornai, 1992). 
Goals were formulated by the upper echelons of the party, and the necessary actions to 
fulfil these goals were transmitted down to party functionaries. Enforcing the will of the 
leadership and ensuring that the economy served the requirements of the party meant that 
economic activity was conducted on strictly hierarchical lines; orders were given from 
above, and those lower down in the hierarchy were required to fulfil their allotted tasks 
(Nove, 1977; Zaleski, 1971).  
 
This at least was the formal manner in which the Soviet state was supposed to 
function. In practical terms, the ideological imperatives imposed by the leadership caused 
the Soviet state and economy to consist of a vast network of inter-linked hierarchical 
institutions; central planning made this all the more pervasive. This complex hierarchy 
can be conceptualized as a chain of inter-linked principal-agent relationships in which 
‗each individual…except at the ultimate levels, is simultaneously a principal and an agent 
when rights are transferred down the organizational ladder‘ (Eggertsson, 1990). The 
central problem in principal-agent theory concerns information asymmetries, i.e. how 
principals can control agents who possess information that they lack. Two types of 
agency problems arise from this information asymmetry: ‗hidden action‘ and ‗hidden 
information‘ (Arrow, 1985, pp.38-40). These correspond to how hard the agent is 
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working (hidden action) and what maximum output level is possible given random 
factors and the agent‘s structural constraints (hidden information). Planners utilized 
several methods to address hidden action: precise output targets were set and monitoring 
agencies were created. Both mechanisms, however, were flawed. For example, meeting 
plan targets became the sole objective of each agent with non-monitored activities 
subordinated to plan fulfilment, thus exacerbating the hidden action problem.
87
 The 
presence of monitoring organizations also provoked costly reactions by agents; officials 
engaged in horizontal ‗bonding‘ practices to deal with the ‗double bind‘ imposed by 
unrealistically high demands and the inability of cadres to meet them (Urban, 1985). 
Furthermore, hierarchies created for monitoring purposes also suffer from precisely the 
same problems of hidden information and hidden action as the subjects that they are 
required to monitor. In the Soviet Union, the CPSU was the pre-eminent monitoring 
organization. However, Party officials were not disinterested monitors as they often 
worked in or with the organizations that they were supposed to be monitoring, thus 
increasing the opportunity and incentive for agents to subvert the commands of their 
principals.  
 
Even if monitoring mechanisms were effective, which they were not, the use of 
targets presupposed the supply of reliable estimates of agents‘ actual performance 
potential. It is here that hidden information undermines the system; accurate assessments 
of performance potential are known only by agents themselves. However, because of the 
demands imposed by principals within the Soviet organizational hierarchy, the incentive 
to provide distorted information was high. In an attempt to overcome this problem, 
planners estimated future performance capacities by employing information on the past 
performance of agents to set output targets. This led to the ‗ratchet problem‘ in which 
principals adjusted output targets to reflect the performance of the agent in the most 
recent period, thus increasing the incentive of agents to hide their true productive 
potential. This inability to deter opportunistic behaviour was one of the central paradoxes 
of the Soviet system; a state with vast coercive potential was effectively unable to control 
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 Hewett (1988, p.179) describes how the shadow economy ‗evolves from the enterprise director‘s search 
for ways to meet their plan; it is the consequence of an effort to achieve the most important targets set in 
the formal system, at the cost of less important targets and norms‘.  
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its most important agents and ensure that the economy was operated entirely according to 
its will.  
 
Thus, the practices that emerged from the within the Soviet institutional incentive 
structure eroded the bureaucratic impersonalism demanded by state ideology. In order to 
avoid censure, officials (and non-officials since all actors were subject to the same 
ideological imperatives) created ‗horizontal‘ alliances with other officials, enterprise 
directors, etc. These alliances were then used to protect individuals as they selected 
which of the demands imposed on them could be met or that would be monitored by the 
authorities (Harrison, 2002). This led to the selective implementation of state policy and 
had the effect of undermining the formal rules and institutions of the state as official 
positions were used in a less impersonal and more proprietary manner; decisions on 
policy implementation were made at the discretion of the individual and the need for 
subordinates to undertake collective action and engage in collusive activity led to 
patronage and clientalist relationships, the opposite of what the system was supposed to 
achieve.
88
 Thus, the risk-minimizing measures taken by agents at all levels within the 
hierarchy in response to the uncertainty imposed by the formal imperatives of planning 
led to the secretion of evolved practices that were the products of historically 
accumulated institutional experience. As noted in Chapter Four, the Soviet Union was a 
classic example of patrimonial socialism.  
 
These institutional features – both formal and informal – had the perverse effect 
of preventing serious systemic reform on the one hand while, at the same time, making it 
all the more imperative by compromising the orders of the planned economy. The 
imperatives of official ideology with its concomitant fusion of state and economy led to a 
delicate balance in which patrimonial tendencies existed to mitigate the formal 
institutional demands of the ideology, despite their apparent dissonance. Such a system 
impaired state capacity because the goals of the leadership and its subordinates were 
                                                 
88
 According to Pipes (1974), the essence of a patrimonial society is that the ruler combined in his person 
both the right to rule over his subjects and the right to dispose of all property In the absence of private 
property it is impossible to distinguish between politics and the economy; both power and property are 
entwined. 
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essentially in opposition to one another. What was supposed to be an absolutist-
bureaucratic state in fact resembled a ‗giant kleptocracy‘, a system whose dominant 
features were force, extortion and tribute, all hallmarks of a patrimonial system (Hedlund, 
1999, p.19). The productivity decline in the economy – something that ensued as the 
dictates of ideology constrained the formation of a suitable incentive framework for the 
transition to a more factor intensive mode of production - was masked only by the boon 
enjoyed by the Soviet Union that was a function of both its natural resource endowment 
and developments in the wider international economy.  
 
From the 1970s onwards, natural resource revenues offered a means for the 
leadership to meet state goals without having to resort to the coercion of the 1930s or 
engage in fundamental institutional reform. Indeed, while the Soviet leadership was able 
to meet its primary goals and satisfy the demands of most politically important domestic 
constituencies, it was faced with a very low incentive to engage in systemic reform that 
might become more urgent should conditions in the international economy deteriorate. In 
this respect, the structure of the Soviet economy - and its pattern of integration with the 
international economy - sustained a parasitic system in which the principal-agent 
hierarchy formed in response to the formal ideological demands of Soviet ideology 
sapped the very economic system in which they existed. Thus, while the state‘s 
dependence on natural resource exports did not cause the institutional idiosyncrasies of 
the Soviet system, it certainly exacerbated them by providing the resources that masked 
the systemic deficiencies of the Soviet economic mechanism. This delicate  equilibrium 
was, however, disturbed once reforms were initiated in the face of declining natural 
resource revenues. The dissonance between the formal and informal institutions within 
the Soviet system became increasingly apparent, ultimately leading to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as self-interested agents within the state-economy responded 
opportunistically to a rapidly changing incentive environment by appropriating state 
resources and undermining the credibility of the CPSU to maintain the existing system.  
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5.3 Exogenous shocks, institutional disarray and the collapse of the Soviet Union 
 
After the death of Yuri Andropov, quickly followed by that of Konstantin Chernenko, it 
became apparent to some sections within the Soviet leadership – most notably to the new 
General Secretary of the CPSU, Mikhail Gorbachev - that reform of the system was 
necessary to inject renewed vigour into an economy that even official figures had shown 
to have experienced declining growth and productivity rates since the late 1960s (Table 
5.1). This became particularly urgent when in 1986 the price of oil dropped by nearly 70 
percent (Figure 5.1), which along with a decline in other commodity prices, led to a 
reduction in earnings from foreign trade, primarily with the West (Table 5.3), and an 
increase in the state budget deficit (Figure 5.2). Indeed, total annual oil rents plummeted 
from a peak of over $260 billion in 1982 to approximately $75 billion in 1986 (Gaddy 
and Ickes, 2005, p.562). This is not to suggest that the fall in oil revenues was solely 
responsible for the rising budget deficit; Gorbachev had also initiated an expansion in 
capital investment across the economy, thus leading to an expansion in state expenditure, 
and had curtailed state revenue through the ill-conceived anti-alcohol campaign.
89
 What it 
did do, however, was restrict the options available to the state at a crucial juncture. The 
decline in revenues destabilized the system, added urgency to the reformist impulse, and 
ensured that any such reforms would have to be undertaken in a climate of fiscal 
austerity. After some small and largely unsuccessful changes in policy, Gorbachev was 
able to persuade the CPSU that it needed to go further than it had done previously in 
reorganizing the Soviet system, with it being accepted that systemic reform was needed 
in order to revive the economic system on which the CPSU‘s legitimacy rested.90 Without 
paying too much attention to the details of the events that were set in motion by 
perestroika, it is necessary to highlight some of the more important reforms that 
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 Between 1984 and 1987, tax revenues in the state budget from sales of alcohol products fell from 4.8 
percent of GDP to 3.5 percent (Gaidar, 2006, p.23).  
90
 Initially, Gorbachev had hoped to raise productivity in the economy through the tightening of 
administrative practices (i.e. though greater discipline within the party). Echoing Brezhnev‘s calls for the 
‗acceleration of scientific and technical progress‘ (uskorenie nauchno-tekhnicheskogo progressa), 
Gorbachev heeded the party to improve discipline in order to kickstart the ‗acceleration of socio-economic 
progress‘ (uskorenie sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo). Both proved ineffective and arguably the measures 
taken to support uskorenie (acceleration), such as the anti-alchohol campaign and increased capital 
expenditure financed through foreign loans, actually served to exacerbate existing problems. The failure to 
reinvigorate the economy using these methods led Gorbachev to undertake more radical measures.   
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fundamentally altered the institutional environment of the Soviet Union and set it on the 
path to systemic collapse.   
 
Table 5.3  Soviet trade with the West (OECD countries) 1984-90, (Billions of nominal 
currency roubles) 
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Exports to West 21.4 18.6 13.1 14.2 14.7 16.4 17.4
Imports from West 19.6 19.3 15.9 13.9 16.3 20.5 20.2   
Source: Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies (1990) 
 
Figure 5.2  The Soviet state budget deficit and earnings from foreign trade, 1985-90 
(as a percentage of national income) 
 
Source: Adapted from Aslund (1989, p.192). 
 
The first group of reforms from the perestroika period that would prove crucial in 
the unravelling of the Soviet system were the laws passed by the Soviet government 
guaranteeing increased autonomy for enterprises (the 1987 Law on State Enterprises, or 
LSE), and private economic activity (the 1988 Law on Cooperatives, or LC), which 
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facilitated the legal creation of economic activity independent from state control.
91
 
Broadly, these changes were intended to improve the incentive environment for economic 
agents in order to raise productivity within the Soviet economy, and to weaken the 
industrial ministries that were seen as the main barriers to reform.
92
 They were not in 
intended to bring about a free-market economy or the privatization of state property 
(Aslund, 1991). Instead, the aim was decentralization of decision-making to weaken the 
ministries and some liberalization at the margin in order to improve economic 
performance while maintaining political control.    
 
The Law on State Enterprises was initially aimed at transferring power over 
enterprises from ministries to local party committees in order to establish a more 
decentralized form of ‗self-management‘ that would still be consistent with the 
ideological precepts of the CPSU (Ericson, 1988). The main source of ministerial power, 
shared with Gosplan (the State Planning Agency), had been their right to appoint 
enterprises‘ top managers, to determine production targets and investment plans, to set 
prices for goods, to allocate inputs, and to instruct enterprises where to deliver their 
output (Whitefield, 1993). The Law on State Enterprises reduced the legal rights of 
ministries over enterprises while also giving enterprises the autonomy to make 
production decisions themselves, to choose their clients, set wages, and determine what 
proportion of profits would be retained.
93
 This should have effectively abolished central 
planning. However, under pressure from conservatives within the party and the 
ministries, the law also stipulated that enterprises should consider control figures, state 
order, quotas and long-term economic goals, thus giving the central planning authorities 
the formal power still to affect enterprise decision-making (Aslund, 1991, p.108). The 
right of workers‘ committees to remove enterprise managers was removed in 1989, thus 
intensifying the confusion over who controlled what and fundamentally altering the 
incentive environment in which economic agents had previously acted. This removed 
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 The Law on Cooperatives was preceeded by the less radical and more limited Law on Individual Labour 
Activity which was designed primarily for small enterprises for craftsman. See Plokker (1990). 
92
 The power of the industrial ministries and their influence in shaping both Soviet and post-Soviet 
development is discussed in Whitefield (1993).  
93
 As perestroika gave way to economic collapse, the shortages within the economy further weakened the 
ministries as they became less capable of guaranteeing the delivery of inputs that were becoming scarcer 
over time. 
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accountability as a consideration for enterprise managers while simultaneously handing 
quasi-ownership over to enterprise managers.
94
    
 
The Law on Cooperatives legalized private enterprise among any group of more 
than three adults and would take place entirely outside of any state direction or control. It 
was hoped that cooperatives would stimulate entrepreneurship that would in turn supply 
the demand for goods and services that the planned economy had hitherto been unable to 
achieve on its own (see, e.g. Hanson, 1988; Plokker, 1990). In addition, this would then 
mobilize latent labour, provide competition to the state owned enterprises, thereby 
impelling them to become more productive, and ultimately raise production across the 
economy. This at least was the intention. However, these economic reforms, alongside 
the political reforms discussed below, would fundamentally alter the institutional 
framework in which state and economic actors operated , changing the incentive structure 
that rational agents would respond to in a manner that none of the architects of the 
reforms could have imagined (Yasin, 2002).   
 
The second significant group of reforms related to the development of the new 
formal political institutions that were intended to galvanise the Party into becoming more 
responsive to the needs of the population. Accordingly, Gorbachev initiated a series of 
reforms that led to the introduction of limited elections to the Soviet legislature, first at 
republican level and then at the All-Union level. Elections were supposed to introduce an 
element of accountability to party behaviour, with the potential sanction of being 
removed from office an incentive to improving the quality of party work and became 
more important bureaucratic resistance increased (see Gregory, 1989; 1990). Several 
issues became important at this point. Firstly, the sequencing of the elections – i.e. 
holding Republic level elections in 1989 and not holding All-Union elections until 1991 - 
had the unintended consequence of conferring more legitimacy on the institutions in the 
constituent republics than at the All-Union level (Linz and Stepan, 1996, pp. 365-400). 
Secondly, the creation of a directly elected Russian presidency in 1991 created a vehicle 
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 Anders Aslund (2007b) describes this as ‗freedom without accountability‘.    
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for centrifugal forces to advance their efforts at gaining more sovereignty.
95
 The fact that 
Gorbachev had not subjected himself to popular approval when he later created the role 
of Soviet President put the central Soviet authorities at a severe disadvantage vis-à-vis the 
republics.
96
 Consequently, there later emerged different competing centres of powers, 
often with the formal powers concentrated in the hands of executive presidencies (or their 
equivalents) in both cases.
97
  
 
Taken together, the reform package termed perestroika fundamentally disturbed 
the delicate equilibrium in which formal and informal institutions had co-existed in the 
Soviet Union since the 1930s. The de jure decentralization of decision-making took place 
within a system that was, de facto, already more decentralized than the leadership had 
realized. The authority of the centre had previously meant that even if the economy was 
not strictly centrally planned, it was at least centrally managed. Even though agents 
within the hierarchy had not always obeyed every order, and had exercised considerable 
discretionary power, the potential sanctions available to the CPSU meant that it  always 
remained a primary consideration in the calculations of any agent within the system. 
However, these constraints on agents‘ actions were considerably reduced as perestroika 
effectively made property rights (initially held unambiguously by the state) more 
ambiguous as the role of the central state subsided. By creating the perception that 
principals within the hierarchy were no longer in full control of state resources, agents 
became more opportunistic in utilizing the assets that were at their disposal, rapidly 
resulting in the organizational equivalent of ‗multiple sovereignty‘ (Solnick, 1998, p.35). 
The ‗horizontal‘ informal networks and practices that had existed as a response to the 
formal power of the state were now used to assert the interests of agents against their 
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 This was preceeded by the Decleration of Sovereignty in 1990 which can be seen as the decisive factor 
in weakening the revenue raising capacity of the Soviet centre and so in strengthening separatist forces 
within Russia and the other republics; see Mau (1998). The creation of the Russian presidency is discussed 
in: Robinson (2000). 
96
 Of course, this was not what Gorbachev had intended. However, as pressure grew from conservatives 
within the CPSU, Gorbachev was impelled to create a new institution that would give him more autonomy 
from the increasingly resistant party apparatus. Without the support base of the party, Gorbachev grew 
more isolated as no durable base of support existed for his presidency; see Robinson (1995).  
97
 This was the case in Russia and the republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the Baltic republics, 
oppostition to Moscow was centred around parliamentary organizations. In Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, 
the balance between parliament (the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Peoples‘ Deputies) and the 
executive.  
 138 
principals. As the situation of ‗multiple sovereignty‘ intensified over the course of 
perestroika, so the credibility of the centre to enforce its will declined.  
 
At the economic level, this resulted in ‗spontaneous privatization‘ with enterprise 
managers tightening their grip on state assets.
98
 Cooperatives were increasingly seen not 
as a vehicle in which to undertake private enterprise, but instead were used to appropriate 
state resources or to engage in speculation. Such phenomena were replicated at the 
political level as republics asserted their sovereignty against the centre. Indeed, the 
economic aspect exacerbated the centrifugal political tendencies as the LSE had negative 
effects on the revenue raised by the state. As the credibility of the centre to raise revenues 
eroded, the republics withheld transfers to Moscow as they focused on measures to 
rectify their own fiscal situations.
99
 Ultimately, each ‗victory‘ by agents within the 
hierarchy undermined the credibility of principals (with the ultimate principal being the 
central Soviet leadership), further increasing the incentive to engage in yet more 
opportunistic behaviour. In the end, the Soviet state was subjected to the political 
equivalent of a bank run as the centre gradually saw its credibility, and ultimately its 
viability, gradually compromised by agents responding opportunistically to earlier signs 
of weakness. The political and economic effects of this desertion by the party-state were 
disastrous, quickly leading to the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
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 The increased autonomy of enterprises facilitated what was, in effect, the first wave of privatization. As 
central planning controls disintegrated and private enterprise was legalized, a process of ‗spontaneous‘ 
privatization occurred as various state enterprises (e.g., the Kama Truck factory) or even ministries (e.g., 
the natural gas ministry) were transformed into legal entities, labelled ‗state concerns‘ or ‗holding 
companies‘. Butressing this process was the emergence of start-up businesses that were initially registered 
as cooperatives. Both processes were closely entwined as the beneficiaries of the de facto wave of 
privatization often, for example, set up banks in the guise of cooperatives (often registered and operated 
under the auspices of of Party organization such as the Komsomol) that were used to expropriate state 
funds and enterprise assets in order to engage in currency speculation and other activities that supported 
personal enrichment.  
99
 Throughout the ‗war of laws‘, both presidencies were the object of demands made from republic level 
political and economic actors, with these forces playing the two presidencies off against one another. As 
perestroika progressed, these institutional reforms entrenched and intensified the patrimonialism that was 
so prominent in the Soviet system as both presidents promised material rewards and assurances of 
increased sovereignty to their subjects in return for support in the battle being fought between the Soviet 
centre and the republics. This further weakened the centre as republics effectively took direct control of the 
monetary and fiscal functions of the centre, thereby exercerbating the fiscal tightening at the centre that 
accompanied the decline in commodity exports.   
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The economic effects were profound and further aggravated the deterioration of 
state capacity that had taken place over the course of perestroika and were to have 
important implications for the newly independent Russian state. Without the constraints 
previously imposed by central authorities, monetary emissions increased sharply within 
enterprises as pay restraints were discarded.
100
 The incentive for enterprise directors to 
withhold taxes also grew, adding further pressure on the state budget deficit, leading to 
the centre to resort to borrowing on international capital markets (Figure 5.3), and to the 
printing of money to cover the gap of lost revenues. This led to a sharp increase in 
inflation, both in terms of the price level and in the shortages that became more acute. 
With directors focused on short-term goals, investment plummeted with a 7.4 percent 
decline in 1988, followed by a further 6.7 percent decline in 1989 (IMF, 1992, p.49).
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Soviet oil production declined considerably after 1989, further intensifying the decline in 
revenue even as prices began to rise, with production declining from over 600 million 
metric tonnes per year in 1988 to around 500 million metric tonnes in 1990 (Gaidar, 
2006, p.281).  
 
The economic collapse that ensued because of the failed policies of perestroika 
left the victorious Russian independence movement, led by the president, Boris Yeltsin, 
in control of new state, but it was a state that had been undermined by the very process 
that had brought it into existence.
102
 By ignoring the process of privatization from below 
in return for political support, the new Russian state perpetuated the same patterns of 
behaviour that existed under the Soviet state. This had the desired effect of undermining 
the collapsing Soviet state, but also laid the foundations for subsequent difficulties for the 
independent Russian state. Consequently, the Russian state that later emerged from the 
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 Perestroika undermined the dual flows of money that had existed previously in the Soviet economy. 
‗Book‘ money had been used by enterprises to finance inventories and working capital, with cash used for 
wage payments treated separately. Thus it was difficult for enterprise directors to divert ‗money‘ used by 
enterprises for the purchase of capital or inputs from other enterprises into cash. By loosening the controls 
over discretionary enterprise expenditure, and through the emergence of co-operatives whose primary 
function was to turn ‗book‘ money into cash, the system of monetary and, by extension political, control 
that had existed previously was fatally undermined.      
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 International Monetary Fund (1992, p.49).  
102
 The nature of the disintegration of the USSR, along with an assessment of the inevitability or otherwise 
of its collapse, is contained in Ellman and Kontorovich, eds. (1998).   
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wreckage of the Soviet Union faced a severe economic crisis, but was not equipped with 
the tools to deal with it.  
 
Figure 5.3 USSR net foreign debt and debt service in convertible currencies, 1985-1991  
(Net debt in billion US dollars; Debt service as a percentage of convertible currency 
exports)  
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Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (1992); International Monetary Fund 
Financial Statistics (2007).   
 
Although it can be argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union was over-
determined, the defection of the party-state apparatus as it responded to the weakness of 
the centre by increasingly pursuing their own goals was the primary cause of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. Popular forces, while prominent at some points, and in some 
republics (i.e. the Baltics), were of secondary importance in Russia. Here, the actions of 
the party-state resulted in a revolution ‗from within‘ as the important decisions of ‗who 
gets what‘ were made largely without reference to social movements and other civic 
organizations. In this respect, the nature of the ‗revolution‘ was closed-access. Indeed, the 
nature of popular mobilization during this period was such that most autonomous social 
and political organizations that emerged during perestroika – alternative parties, strike 
committees and independent trade unions, voters‘ clubs, and umbrella groups such as 
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Democratic Russia – assumed the form of ‗movement organizations‘ (Fish, 1995; Urban, 
Igrunov and Mitrokhin, 1997; Evans, 2006). The principal purpose of such movements 
was the expression of broad, pandemic demands for the demise of the existing system of 
rule. Because these groups were not firmly rooted in any socially or economically framed 
constituency, they did not provide a durable base for any sustained interest articulation 
and representation once their goal of Soviet collapse was achieved (Fish, 1995, 2005; 
Urban, Igrunov and Mitrokhin, 1997; Hale, 2006). Indeed, it is notable that the Boris 
Yeltsin never felt compelled to commit to any of these groups, but instead relied on 
lavishing promises on other sections of the party-state elite for political support.
103
 The 
process of winning independence for the new Russian state was thus essentially elite (i.e. 
party-state) led (Hedlund, 1999; Kotz and Weir, 2006). This further perpetuated the 
patrimonial, unaccountable and closed-access nature of economic and political relations 
that existed under the Soviet regime and would further inhibit the development of 
effective countervailing forces to the Russian state later on.    
 
5.4 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has examined the link between economic structure, the international 
economy and social-order development in the Soviet Union. The importance of the 
natural resource exports that linked the Soviet Union to the international economy was 
clear, with the decline in commodity prices and the subsequent loss of revenue on which 
the Soviet Union was dependent destabilizing the existing system and triggering the 
subsequent series of reforms and measures that were in turn taken in response to these 
reforms. The systemic rot that accompanied the end of the factor extensive mode of 
development set in around the end of the 1960s. Fortuitously for the Soviet leadership, 
the sudden rise in world commodity prices and the rapid increase in Soviet production of 
oil and then gas masked the inability of the planned economy to perform to a satisfactory 
level. The equilibrium in the Soviet economy caused by large resource revenues 
remained relatively undisturbed over the course of the natural resource boom that lasted 
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 During the struggle with Moscow, Yeltsin had implored regional leaders within Russia to ‖take as much 
sovereignty as you can swallow‖; see Dunlop (1993, p.62)  
 142 
from 1970 until the early 1980s. However, the decline in commodity prices on which the 
Soviet Union was reliant meant that the party leadership was suddenly forced to address, 
in the best way possible, the systemic flaws that had dogged the Soviet economy since 
the late 1960s. At this point, the new Soviet leadership under Gorbachev was effectively 
faced with two options: to cut imports and overall spending to match the decline in export 
earnings and other revenues, leading to a decline in consumption among the population, a 
decline in arms expenditure, and ultimately a decline in the legitimacy of the CPSU; or to 
increase the productivity of the wider Soviet economy relative to the natural resource 
sector through reform of the incentive structure within the economy to induce greater 
productivity among agents within the system. The first option was politically impossible. 
Perestroika represented the second option.  
 
The decentralization of decision-making in the economy and of political power in 
general undermined the centralized hierarchy that had kept the system intact up to that 
point. Where previously the state had employed a combination of punishment and reward 
to elicit the cooperation of agents in meeting state goals, the reduction in the credibility of 
the state‘s capacity to administer punishment or reward that emerged because of failed 
policies led to lower expectations among agents of the state‘s ability to do so in the 
future. This erosion of the credibility of the Soviet centre led to a ‗run‘ on the assets of 
the state as the mixture of costs and benefits to appropriating state assets quickly shifted 
towards lower costs and increased benefits (Solnick, 1998; Harrison, 2002). Thus, the 
structure of the Soviet economy and its integration within the international economy were 
crucial variables in explaining the timing of Soviet collapse. If commodity prices had not 
suddenly plummeted, and if state revenues had remained relatively high, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union would have been by no means certain (Ellman and Kontorovich, 1998).  
 
The decline in commodity prices, however, exposed the systemic flaws that had 
appeared towards the end of the 1960s. In the 1960s, the upturn in world commodity 
prices that in turn stimulated the steep increase in Soviet natural resource production 
represented a panacea to these systemic flaws; grandiose state goals could be achieved 
while essentially preserving the existing system. For the Soviet leadership, it was 
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unfortunate that as the price of the exports on which the Soviet Union was dependent 
declined in the mid-1980s, it was then faced with the prospect of implementing systemic 
reform if economic productivity were to improve while simultaneously encountering the 
constraints imposed by heightened fiscal austerity. The reform process itself then 
disturbed the vast, interlinked hierarchy within the Soviet political and economic system, 
ultimately leading to a ‗revolution from within‘ as members of the party-state defected en 
masse, resulting in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In summary, therefore, it is perhaps 
accurate to suggest that although the systemic deficiencies of the Soviet Union were not 
caused by its economic structure, the timing of the crisis encountered by the Soviet 
leadership in the mid-1980s was determined by the nature of the Soviet position within 
the international economy and through its dependence on natural resource export 
revenues.
104
  The subsequent three case studies test the conceptual framework outlined in 
Chapter Two in the post-socialist period.   
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 A number of other studies place the actions of individual actors at the centre of their analysis (e.g., 
Brown, 1997). However, as was argued in Chapter Two, the decisions of political (and economic) actors 
take place within historically contigent contexts. In this instance, Gorbachev‘s personal predispositions, 
decisions and reactions to the unfolding crisis that the Soviet Union found itself in were undoubtably of 
great significance. This is undeniable. What this chapter argues, however, is that the structure of the Soviet 
economy left Gorbachev with only a limited array of choices, making some courses of action more 
probable than others.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
Russia: natural resource sectors and limited-access politics 
 
6. Introduction 
 
This chapter continues from the previous chapter by examining the role of the natural 
resource sector on the political development of the Soviet Union‘s largest successor state, 
the Russia Federation. As was argued in Chapter Three, Russia is one country from a 
wider group (Group A) that score lowly on the Technological Development and Diversity 
Index, and also display low scores on the measures of social order development. Unlike 
the subsequent case study chapters, this chapter does not treat the whole post-socialist 
period together. Instead, two distinct periods are examined. First, the period between 
1991 and 1999 is discussed. This period coincides with Boris Yeltsin‘s presidency and is 
followed by an examination of political economy under Yeltsin‘s successor as President, 
Vladimir Putin. A separate treatment of these periods is considered necessary because of 
the contrasting trajectories of political economy in Russia during these two periods. By 
examining the two periods separately, the second order hypotheses generated in Chapter 
Two relating to the causal mechanisms linking economic structure with social order 
development can be tested with more sensitivity than would be possible if the post-
socialist period were considered as a whole.  
 
In the previous chapter the revenues the Soviet state derived from the natural 
resource sector were shown to have played a crucial role in postponing much needed 
reforms and in perpetuating an inefficient system. Once these revenues declined, the 
system was plunged into economic and political crisis. The reform package - collectively 
known as perestroika – implemented under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev failed to 
save the Soviet system and it ceased to exist after 1991. The failed reforms of perestroika 
and the political struggle for Russian independence did, however, bequeath a set of 
institutional legacies that would interact with the inherited economic structure to prevent 
the Russian Federation from developing into an open-access order. As will be argued 
throughout this chapter, elements of institutional and economic path dependency 
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weighted the dice heavily against the emergence of a broad array of economic, political 
and social forces that would compete openly for political power. Instead, limited 
economic competition in leading export sectors, an institutional legacy that promoted the 
perpetuation of patrimonial politics and the dependence of the state on natural resource 
revenues all conspired to produce a polity characterised by the concentration and fusion 
of economic and political power. However, while the structure and level of economic 
competition were broadly similar over both the Yeltsin and Putin periods, the balance of 
power between business and state has shifted considerably since 2000. As will be argued, 
events in the wider international economy have contributed towards this tendency.    
 
This chapter proceeds as follows. The first section highlights the main economic 
and political legacies inherited by the Russian Federation from the socialist period. Of 
particular importance are the dependence on natural resource revenues, the concentration 
of economic resources, and the legacy of patrimonialism. In the second section data are 
presented to identify the natural resource sectors as having dominated the export profile 
of the Russian economy since 1991. The distinguishing organizational characteristics of 
these sectors are shown to produce a tendency towards a concentration in market 
structure, while the international trends in these sectors indicate that they are also subject 
to quite frequent and sharp fluctuations in price.  
 
A third section examines developments from the early stages of independence 
through to the economic crisis of August 1998. This broadly covers most of the period in 
which Boris Yeltsin served as president of the Russian Federation. During this period, 
ownership of the leading export sectors was concentrated either in the state or in powerful 
financial-industrial groups (FIGs). These existed alongside a moribund ‗virtual‘ domestic 
economy in which the informal institutions developed under Soviet rule continued and 
acted to undermine attempts at market reform. Weakened by the exit from the Soviet 
system, the state was unable to prevent the corrosive informal practices from continuing 
within the domestic economy and instead contributed to its perpetuation through the 
provision of subsidies. Without a durable support base in society or a reliable source of 
tax revenue within the domestic economy, and unable to introduce and implement market 
 146 
reforms with too much success, the Russian leadership became dependent on a loose 
coalition of powerful business interests that controlled significant portions of Russia‘s 
export base. The virtual economy, predatory FIGs and a weak state existed in an uneasy 
equilibrium until events in the wider international economy triggered a sharp decline in 
commodity prices and, ultimately, an economic crisis in August 1998. During this period 
the concentration of economic resources within the hands of a few, and the overwhelming  
preponderance of formal institutional power that resided in the presidency, saw big 
business and the Presidential Administration (PA) formulate policy in an informal and 
often unaccountable manner. Furthermore, these same factors hindered the development 
of effective political parties, business associations and civil society in general that might 
have forced politics in Russia to develop along more competitive and transparent lines.       
 
The final section considers the period after the 1998 crisis up until the end of 
2007. This period encompasses the last year of Boris Yeltsin‘s presidency and the 
majority of the tenure of Vladimir Putin as president. The August crisis, along with a 
steady and enduring rise in commodity prices, resulted in the remonetisation of the 
economy with the resultant decline of the virtual economy, a period of sustained 
economic growth, and the resurgence of the fiscal capacity of the Russian state. 
Empowered by rising revenue, the state then reasserted itself relative to those powerful 
business organizations that had previously preyed upon its weakness. Initially this took 
the form of attacking only a select few of the previously more politically assertive 
business interests. However, as the natural resource boom strengthened the state further, 
the confidence of the leadership grew and it began to de-privatize a considerable portion 
of the economy and take a more active role in industries both within and outside of the 
commodity export sector. This was accompanied by the continued centralization of 
political power in the hands of the president and the suppression of political opposition. 
As economic and political power were recentralized, organizations such as political 
parties, business associations or civic associations that might be expected to compete 
with the state or big business for political power were either repressed or co-opted by the 
state. While this period witnessed the longest period of economic expansion in Russia‘s 
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post-socialist history, it also saw Russia slip down on those indicators that are used to 
measure its development as a social order.  
 
6.1 The socialist legacy 
 
The main features of the collapse of the Soviet Union were described in the previous 
chapter and these factors were of crucial importance for the newly independent Russian 
Federation. Two sets of legacies of the Russian ‗exit‘ from Soviet rule would be of 
particular importance, the first group economic in nature, and the second political.  
 
6.1.1 Economic legacies 
 
 First, the capacity of the nascent state was severely weakened by rampant 
inflation, high foreign debt obligations, a severe contraction in output across the 
economy, a sharp drop in investment, and low tax revenues. Second, the defection of the 
party-state in reaction to the failed reforms of perestroika (Solnick, 1998) led to the 
appropriation of a large proportion of state enterprises by Soviet ‗insiders‘ and left many 
value-subtracting entities intact. Thus, many of the enterprises that had been the object of 
reform during perestroika were now in private hands. Under Soviet rule, these enterprises 
had effectively been reliant on the provision of soft-budget constraints, something that 
was a systemic outcome of planned economies in general (Kornai, 1992). Restructuring 
the economy would require altering the behaviour of these organizations so that they 
would shift towards operating under hard-budget constraints. Third, the concentrated 
organizational structure of the Soviet economy, along with the appropriation of large 
swathes of the economy by the party-state elite, meant that property continued to be 
concentrated in the hands of either the state (in those sectors where spontaneous 
privatization had not been possible) or in the hands of former directors. Consequently, 
little change occurred in the production structure of the economy with the Russian 
economy exhibiting a strong concentration of both production and ownership almost 
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from the outset.
105
 The relative strength of export sectors in Russia, while difficult to 
measure (see Chapter Four), is depicted in Figure 6.1 and indicates that the primary and 
resource-based sectors were to be of particular importance in the early stages of 
economic development in Russia.  
 
Figure 6.1 Foreign trade balance of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 
(RSFSR) by sector, 1988 (million roubles)  
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Source: Vestnik Statistiki in IMF (1992, p.229).  
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 Indeed, the monopolistic nature of many markets was a contributory factor in the inflationary surge of 
the early 1990s. Because so many sectors were dominated by one or a few large enterprises they faced very 
little competition. Consequently, when prices were freed in 1992 they faced very little incentive to exercise 
restraint in terms of pricing.   
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6.1.1 Political legacies 
 
 Of paramount political importance was the fact that Russia was emerging from a 
legacy of patrimonial communism (Kitschelt et al, 1999) in which the regime combined 
elements of extreme repression, extensive networks of patron-client relations and subtle 
competition among competing factions (Pipes, 1974; Hough and Fainsod, 1979; 
Afanasiev, 1997). The distinguishing features of patrimonial socialist systems (vertical 
chains of dependence, extensive patronage networks, low rational—bureaucratic 
institutionalization of rules, and repression of opposition groups) made the selection of 
certain new post-socialist institutional structures more likely than others by forming 
particular patterns of interests and specific distributions of resources among these 
interests (Easter, 1997). For instance, since non-state forces in Russia were generally 
quite weak (Fish, 1995; Urban, Igrunov and Mitrokhin, 1997) due to a legacy of 
repression and limited resources for groups outside of state patronage networks, the 
probability of the adoption of a political system that concentrated power in the hands of 
an executive was high. Because the state was the source of patronage resources, this 
meant that the balance of political power in patrimonial socialist systems was very often 
tilted in favour of those already wielding state authority (see Hedlund, 1999; Kotz and 
Weir, 2006). In Russia and other such cases, electoral institutions were enacted that 
tended to favour incumbents, with presidential systems preferred, or where parliaments 
were present, single-member-district (SMD) election systems rather than proportional 
representation (PR) election systems (Hale, 2006, p.29).  
 
The concentration of resources within the Russian economy, particularly within 
those highly lucrative export sectors, intensified these tendencies; access to the state 
patronage network was crucial to the acquisition of access to or ownership of state assets, 
particularly those export enterprises that were a source of foreign currency earnings. In 
the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period, success in acquiring state assets or in 
forming banks and other new economic organizations (see Rutland, 1999) was very often 
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contingent on accessing the state and long standing patronage networks.
106
 Consequently, 
the activities of budding political and economic entrepreneurs were to be directed at 
penetrating the state rather than building or co-opting strong, non-state organizations, 
such as those groups that form the liberal conception of civil society (Keane, 1988), or 
political parties. Thus, the weakness of civic groups and political parties – which were 
largely wound down or ineffective after the collapse of Soviet power (Fish, 1995, 2005; 
Uhlin, 2005) - reflected both the lack of competition at the economic level (sectors 
tended to be dominated by small numbers of enterprises) and the precarious nature of 
economic activity that took place outside  patronage networks. Unless there a was a shift 
in the production profile and ownership structure of the economy from a closed-access 
economic order, in which access to state patronage networks was central to both property 
acquisition and the establishment of ownership rights, to an open-access one, the existing 
economic structure would not be able to sustain meaningful political competition.  
 
At this early stage, therefore, path dependencies that ‗weighted the dice‘ in favour 
of certain outcomes (strong executive, patrimonial politics, concentration of economic 
resources) over others (economic competition, parliamentary political system, open and 
transparent politics) were very much in evidence. As the rest of this chapter will show, 
the institutional legacies and the economic structure inherited from the Soviet period 
played a large part in hindering the development of an open-access economic and 
political order in Russia. But first, the next section outlines the most important features of 
Russia‘s transnational sectors and their place in the wider international economy.    
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 For example, the late Gorbachev period saw the embezzlement of public funds from state organizations 
such as the Communist Youth League (Komsomol). Access to state resources enabled cynical and 
ambitious officials to create new enterprises from nothing. For instance, the ambiguity of newly established 
laws enabled indivuduals or enterprises to establish under-capitalized banks that often diverted Central 
Bank money into private hands. Alternatively, state officials sometimes engaged in the creation of co-
operative enterprises where the incentive to engage in the creation of networks of transfer-pricing among 
shell companies for private gain outweighed that of generating profitable enterprises.  
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6.2 General features of economic structure in Russia 
 
6.2.1 Leading sectors and Russia’s position in the international economy 
 
Fuels, metals and weapons link Russia to the international economy.
107
 The data 
presented in Chapter Three show that Russia has one of the most specialized export 
profiles in the region, with a comparatively low level of technology intensity.
108
 Since the 
collapse of the USSR, Russia‘s economy has been comparatively open for what is a large 
economy.
109
 However, Russia has perpetuated the Soviet dependence on earnings derived 
from a few natural resource export products. Although world prices for Russian 
commodity exports have fluctuated considerably over the past 20 years, by 2006 sales of 
primary and resource based products accounted for over 86 percent of total merchandise 
exports (Figs. 6.2 and 6.3). Of this, oil and gas exports alone account for over 60 percent 
of exports, nearly 30 percent of GDP and nearly half of total state budget revenues.
110
 
Even in 1999, when the prices for primary and resource-based products were 
significantly lower, they still contributed over 80 percent of total exports with official 
statistics revealing that the state was reliant on the oil and gas sectors for around 25 
percent of its revenue (Tabata, 2002). The dominance of these sectors and their 
importance in anchoring Russia to the international economy looks set to continue due to 
Russia‘s failure to diversify its export profile and become competitive in a broader range 
of manufactures (Cooper, 2006; Connolly, 2008).   
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 Primary and resource-based exports from Russia include oil, gas, gold, nickel, copper, ferrous metals, 
aluminium, wood, fish, and many others. This chapter focuses on products on those sectors that occupy a 
prominent place within the export profile, most notably  oil, gas and some other metals.  
108
 According to the Krugman Specialization Index, Russia has one of the most specialized export profiles 
within the region. In 1997, it had a score of 0.60. By 2006, this scored had gone down slightly to 0.56 
indicating that Russia‘s export profile was slightly more diversified. Despite this, the technological 
intensity of Russian exports (as measured by the proportion of medium- and high-technology goods in total 
manufactured exports) declined from 12.8 percent in 1997 to 10 percent in 2006. To some extent this is a 
function of higher commodity prices relative to other Russian exports. However, such a low proportion of 
manufactures indicates that Russia‘s competitiveness in medium- and high-technology goods was low to 
begin with and has not significantly changed.  
109
 In comparison with other large economies Russia‘s openness to trade is comparatively high. In 2006, the 
sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP was 26 percent in the USA, 27 percent in Japan, 55 
percent in Russia, 60 percent in the United Kingdom, 72 percent in China, and 85 percent in Germany. 
Data taken from World Bank, World Development Indicators.  
110
 Data taken from UN Comtrade Database (2008) for exports, and Russian Central Bank (2007) for 
budget and GDP data. 
 152 
 
Figure 6.2 Technology intensity of Russian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total 
exports) 
   
  
 
      
  
        
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
Source: United Nations Comtrade Database (2008); authors own calculations. 
 
Figure 6.3 Leading Russian primary and resource-based exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent 
of total exports)
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Source: United Nations Comtrade Database (2008); authors own calculations. 
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 These charts are based on 2-digit level data (United Nations Comtrade, 2008) that describe product-type 
rather than technology intensity.   
 153 
 
Even these statistics disguise the true extent of Russia‘s dependence on natural 
resources. Oil and gas have, from the Soviet period onwards, been used to subsidise 
many other less productive sectors of the domestic economy (Kuboniwa, Tabata and 
Ustinova, 2005; Gaddy and Ickes, 2005). The true importance of the oil and gas sectors, 
while sizeable as shown in official statistics, is revealed through transfer pricing schemes. 
Here, Russian gas and oil companies typically sell their output below the market price to 
associated firms, whether in Russia or abroad. Consequently, value-added that may be 
derived from oil or gas output may show up in official statistics as increased output in, 
for example, the trade and transportation sectors (Tabata, 2002). Alternatively, the state 
may forgo tax revenues from oil or gas companies in return for the supply of below-
market price energy to other enterprises within the domestic economy. A World Bank 
study (2005) estimated that such transfer pricing schemes increased the actual share of 
Russian GDP originating from oil and gas output by approximately 12 percent.     
 
6.2.2 Sectoral characteristics 
 
The sectors that have dominated Russia‘s export profile are characterised by high 
levels of capital intensity and economies of scale as well as by high asset specificity and 
low levels of production flexibility. These factors result in the need for specialized 
infrastructure, management and labour, leading to high barriers to entry for other 
organizations. The high cost of sector-specific investments in capital, infrastructure and 
labour ensure that barriers to exit are also high. High switching costs among consumers 
further reinforce the market position of producers (Shafer, 1994, p.25). These factors tend 
to result in monopoly or oligopoly characterising the market structure of these sectors, 
with relatively low levels of intra-sector competition leading to a concentration in 
economic power. In Russia, this tendency towards market concentration was aggravated 
by the Soviet industrial structure that it inherited where planners had previously 
incorporated entire economy-wide industries under the rubric of a single organizational 
entity (see, for example, Berliner, 1957; Rutland, 1993; Whitefield, 1993).  
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Market power in such sectors can also often fluctuate sharply between consumers 
and producers. Because sector-specific investments in these areas tend to increase in 
response to rising prices and growth in demand as organizations seek to increase rents, 
the lag between the decision to invest and the point at which those investments become 
active can often lead to increased supply capacity, just as demand either peaks or 
declines, which in turn exacerbates the downturn in prices. Market participants, 
experiencing lower returns on their investments, are often reluctant to invest in extra 
capacity until prices rise again, thus creating the possibility of future sudden price spikes 
due to limited supply. According to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Two, 
these fluctuations in price levels might be expected to affect the relative distribution of 
resources between organizations (both public and private) within a country‘s political 
economy quite suddenly.       
 
Unpredictable fluctuations in price, as well as the obvious rents available when 
prices are high, increase the incentive among private organizations to employ ‗voice‘ 
strategies in relation to the state in order to increase rents when times are good and to 
ensure protection when times are bad (Hirschman, 1970).
112
 Furthermore, the high degree 
of market concentration inherent to natural resource sectors increases the potential 
capacity of organizations within these sectors to achieve success in eroding the autonomy 
of the state in their favour. Another factor that might lead to closer relations between the 
state and organizations within natural resource sectors is the geographically fixed nature 
of the resources themselves. Because the source of the resources cannot be moved across 
state boundaries, private organizations are often dependent on the state for access to these 
resources. When private organizations are responsible for production, the state benefits 
indirectly, e.g. through the taxation of output and exports. However, as prices and 
resource rents rise, the incentive for the state to tap these resources directly (i.e. through 
direct ownership) increases.
113
 Furthermore, the pressure for rent distribution rises in line 
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 ‗Voice‘ and ‗exit‘ are terms used by Hirschman to describe two types of strategy employed by agents 
(workers, managers, etc) within an economy. The ‗voice‘ strategy manifests itself in attempts by agents to 
shape market ‗rules‘ in their own favour to further their own interests. ‗Exit‘ strategies involve agents 
leaving a market. 
113
 Historically this has proven to be the case, particularly in the oil industry where price rises have often 
been accompanied by new waves of nationalization of private enterprises.  
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with prices, with greater attention given to the spending of resource rents when prices are 
high. This can lead to an emphasis on short-term rent extraction (consumption) rather 
than on long-term rent creation (investment).
114
 Finally, in cases where the administrative 
capacity of the state is low – as is often the case in developing economies – there is 
perhaps a greater incentive for politicians to increase their control over natural resources 
precisely because rents are more easily appropriated and reallocated than is the case with 
most other forms of economic activity (Jones-Luong and Weinthal, 2006).   
 
6.2.3 International trends in natural resource sectors 
 
Figure 6.4 traces the average price (since 1970) of those commodities that 
constitute a large proportion of Russia‘s exports. The prices for these commodities are 
broadly correlated with each other and largely reflect major developments within the 
wider international economy. The oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 were a function of 
increased aggregate global demand, expansionary monetary policies in both developed 
and developing countries, and of the move towards the nationalization of oil assets in oil 
producing nations. These sudden increases in nominal oil prices were mirrored in 
direction, if not quite in magnitude, by prices in other commodities.
115
 All commodities 
saw either steady decline or stabilization of price levels as the reduction of world demand 
for energy (due to increased energy efficiency and reduced aggregate growth rates) and 
for metals (primarily due to a decline in demand). This pattern continued until 1998, but 
has since been dramatically reversed by the increasing importance of large emerging 
market economies (EMEs) such as China, India, Brazil and other newly industrialised 
                                                 
114
 This tendency is described by Terry Lynn Karl in Paradox of Plenty (1997). During the period of high 
oil prices in the 1970s and early 1980s countries as seemingly diverse as Venuzuela, Iran, Indonesia and 
Algeria all displayed the same pattern of nationalization of production, followed by the short-term 
exploitation of reserves to pay for vast public spending projects as well as increased borrowing on 
international capital markets on the back of further projected increases in export earnings. As prices 
declined, governments were unable to maintain existing public spending commitments and were left with 
higher levels of national debt.  
115
 The explanation for this correlation is not the same across commodities, however. Because of the 
inflationary effects of expansionary monetary policies and increased oil prices, the demand for gold grew 
as investors sought safety from the erosive effects of inflation. However, some of the other commodities 
grew in price due mainly to increased demand as, for example, more refined metals were required in the 
manufacture of high-technology goods that increased towards the end of the 1970s.  
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economies in the world economy.
116
 By 2006, over half of world GDP was being 
produced in Asia, with the region being responsible for an even higher proportion of 
world growth (Glyn, 2007, p.153). High growth rates, the relative inefficiency in the use 
of inputs across this region compared to OECD countries, and a slowdown in supply 
growth, has resulted in a rapid increase in the price of those commodities in which Russia 
is a major producer and exporter.  
 
Figure 6.4 Average price of selected commodities in which Russia is a major exporter, 
1970-2006 (1970 price = 100), nominal prices.  
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116
 If the Emerging Market Economies are defined to include Argentina, Brazil, China, Chile, Hong Kong, 
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico,Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam, then their 
collective share of total world output (at purchasing power parity) increased from under 15 percent in 1980 
to  nearly 30 percent in 2007 (World Bank, 2008; author‘s calculations).  
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6.3 Structure and ownership in the Russian economy and the role of leading export 
sectors, 1991-1998 
 
6.3.1 Market reforms under Yeltsin and the failure of structural transformation 
 
Boris Yeltsin, who was elected to the newly created Russian presidency in 1990 and who 
subsequently led Russia and the other Soviet republics to independence from the Soviet 
Union, saw economic reform and the creation of a market-based economy in Russia as a 
crucial component of his rule (Robinson, 2000). Against the backdrop of an economic 
crisis caused by the failed reforms of the late Soviet period and the subsequent struggle 
for independence, and in which the capacity of the state was being weakened almost by 
the day, market reforms were seen as the only solution to the chaos that existed within the 
economy. Economic reform – led by Yegor Gaidar  – was supposed to involve limiting 
the role of the state in many areas of the economy by cutting subsidies to existing 
enterprises and imposing hard-budget constraints.
117
 This was to be buttressed by the 
liberalization of prices which would have the effect of improving the incentives for 
organizations to be profitable (by allowing the price mechanism to reflect supply and 
demand) and to shift production away from value-subtracting activities to areas that that 
would be more beneficial to the economy.  
 
If successful, this process would effect a shift in the relative distribution of 
resources within the economy from the Soviet party-state elite (who would have to 
restructure and become profitable to survive) and towards new economic actors that 
would emerge in response to the changing incentive structure. This would reduce the 
informal, patrimonial practices that were rampant under Soviet rule and increase the 
autonomy of the state relative to economic organizations. The state‘s role would be 
limited to reducing expenditure and controlling the money supply to provide the public 
good of price stability that would support the wider reform package. The state would then 
gradually become stronger through its share of increasing output (i.e. through taxation). 
                                                 
117
 The economic reform program of the early 1990s is discussed in: Gaidar (1996); Mau (1996); Aslund 
(1995); Shleifer and Treisman (2000); Gustafson (1999).   
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Finally, the privatization of a large proportion of state assets would further increase the 
incentive among economic organizations to become profitable and would have the added 
political advantage of further reducing the influence of the Soviet party-state elite. 
Increased competition, firm private property rights and price stability would then lead to 
the formation of more durable socio-economically defined forces within society that 
would ensure political competition mirrored economic competition. Or so the theory 
went.     
 
In practice, Gaidar‘s reformist government was challenged immediately by the 
representatives of the Soviet party-state elite that resided in the Soviet-era legislature, 
primarily represented by Civic Union, led by Arkadii Volskii.
118
 Gaidar‘s reforms 
threatened them with destruction, particularly as the dearth of capital within the economy 
– partially a function of the monetary tightening by the state, but also due to fact that 
access to the state was the best source of funds - limited the prospects for an investment-
led restructuring process.
119
 This resistance took two forms. First, on the formal, national 
level, the state was pressured by factions within parliament to ease monetary controls and 
to increase state expenditure, primarily through the continued provision of subsidies.  
 
Second, on an informal and sub-national level, economic organizations, 
particularly those appropriated by the Soviet party-state elite, simply carried on with the 
particularistic practices that had enabled them to avoid state sanction under Soviet rule.
120
 
In effect, organizations that were simply not profitable under hard-budget constraints 
continued to engage in trade between themselves, building up a vast ‗virtual economy‘ in 
                                                 
118
 Volskii had close contacts with many of the enterprise directors within the domestic economy and was 
the chairman of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). Civic Union and its 
economic policies are discussed in: Ellman (1993); McFaul (1993).  
119
 The partial reforms over this period meant that the opportunity for vast profits from speculation, links 
with the patronage networks connected to the state, etc. resulted in those banks that did have access to 
capital often using it for speculative purposes rather than for lending to enterprises. Thus, finance was not a 
link between savings and investment in the traditional sense, but instead was a vehicle through which a 
narrow elite could engage in speculation and profit from arbitrage opportunities provided by close links 
with the state.  
120
 The continuity of elites in the economy is described through the use of unpublished data compiled by the 
Russian sociologist, Olga Kryshtanovskaya, in Kotz and Weir (2006, p.114). According to 
Kyrshtanovskaya‘s research, over 60 percent of 100 top Russian businessmen in 1992-93 were directly 
connected to the former elite. This strong representation of the old nomenklatura was mirrored in the state 
positions at both the national and regional level. See also: Kyrshtanovskaya and White (1996).  
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which payment for goods and for labour was provided either in kind (through barter 
payments), through the build up of inter-enterprise debts (‗receivables‘), or through 
access to subsidies from central and local governments, either through monetary transfers 
or through the provision of subsidised energy.
121
 The government was complicit in this 
process as it helped keep unemployment, and social discontent more generally, from 
rising even further.  
 
The continuation of value-subtracting economic activity in the virtual economy 
represented a type of ‗socialism from below‘ as the continuation of economic activity in 
these areas provided de facto soft-budget constraints (Bernstam and Rabushka, 2006). 
The perpetuation of the virtual economy – in conjunction with rising inflation 
expectations, itself in some part caused by monetary emissions solicited by actors within 
the virtual economy - resulted in the demonetization of the Russian economy (see Fig. 
6.5)  as the ratio of money (M2) as a proportion of total receivables (i.e. inter-enterprise 
debts) declined (Bernstam and Rabushka, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
121
 The virtual economy was a type of economy in which value-subtracting production was protected, often 
through resource transfers from profitable parts of the economy to unprofitable ones. The virtual economy 
is discussed in: Gaddy and Ickes (1998, 1999); Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer (1997); Barter, 
demonetization, and other aspects of the unofficial economy in Russia during this time are discussed in: 
Commander and Mummsen (1999); Woodruff (1999a, 1999b); OECD (2000); Shleifer and Treisman 
(2000); Bernstam and Rabushka (2006). 
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Figure 6.5 Indices of GDP (1991 = 100) (left scale), the ratio of M2 to receivables (year 
end) (1991 = 100) (right scale) and tax collection to Federal budget (% of GDP) (right 
scale), 1991-2006 
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Source: adapted from Bernstam and Rabushka (2006); tax collection from Russian Federation 
Ministry of Finance (2007); figures for 2005 and 2006, author‘s calculations.  
 
Thus, despite the tumultuous economic change that took place in the early 1990s, 
the Russian economy and its export sectors experienced very limited structural change. 
Primarily, this was caused by a collapse in investment, particularly in the private sector 
(Fig. 6.6). The perception, and indeed reality, of low state capacity to protect private 
property rights was clearly a major factor in discouraging investment (Buiter, 2000). This 
sentiment was shared by foreign investors with net foreign direct investment (FDI) very 
low, particularly when compared with other countries of the region (see Chapter Four). 
Of this very limited level of FDI, most was concentrated in the natural resources sector 
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(Robinson, 2007, p.252). The role of FDI is strongly associated with the technological 
upgrading of the economy, helping to diversify the production profile of those countries 
that receive high levels of outside investment (Connolly, 2008). This absence of 
significant investment – both domestic and foreign - resulted in the perpetuation of the 
prevailing production structure and export profile with the level of technological 
development still low in most sectors of the economy. Furthermore, as will be discussed 
below, low investment coupled with the patrimonial character of the privatization process 
meant that the market structure and distribution of ownership in Russia‘s leading export 
sectors remained very concentrated. Indeed, by 1998, the economic structure of Russia 
still bore many similarities to that of the Soviet Union.  
 
Figure 6.6 Gross capital formation as a percentage of GDP, private gross capital 
formation as a percentage of GDP, and net foreign investment inflows ($ bn), 1992-2000 
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6.3.2 Structure and ownership in leading Russian export sectors, 1991-1998  
 
The importance of the fuel and mineral extraction companies to the Russian 
economy was considerable. As Table 6.1 illustrates, 11 out of the 25 largest companies 
by market capitalization in Russia in 1997 were involved in the oil and gas sector. 
Together they accounted for just under 70 percent of the top 25 firms‘ sum of market 
capitalization. Although this reveals the size of enterprises in the natural resource sector 
relative to others within the economy, this still does not reveal the extent to which the rest 
of the economy was reliant on the ‗value redistribution‘ that took place as oil and gas 
rents were used to subsidize other, less efficient parts of the economy (Gaddy and Ickes, 
2005; World Bank, 2005). As has been discussed previously, it is estimated that these 
less visible transfers have been of significant importance.  
 
Elsewhere, the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was 
also impeded by the same factors that constrained investment elsewhere in the economy 
(e.g., poor business environment, weak property rights, etc). Whereas SMEs typically 
account for around two-thirds of employment in developed economies, in the mid-1990s 
legally registered smaller enterprises in Russia employed no more than a tenth of the 
workforce, with large firms (over 500 employees) accounting for around 63 percent of 
official employment in 1996 (Aslund, 1996, pp.12-16). This was not helped by the 
dominant method of privatization that gave insiders – managers and workers – an 
overwhelming degree of control over most enterprises, often hindering the restructuring 
process (see Earle and Estrin, 2001). In conditions of state weakness, and in which 
private property rights were only weakly protected, many smaller enterprises either chose 
‗exit‘ strategies, in which they avoided the recognition and monitoring of state 
authorities, or simply ceased to exist in the first place (Yakovlev, 2006, 2007).  
 
Although the overall picture was bleak during this period, there were some 
success stories. For example, companies in consumption industries (e.g. food processing, 
breweries, furniture producers, etc) bucked the trend of declining productivity and 
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output.
122
 However, such examples were of marginal significance when compared to the 
overwhelming economic and political importance of the natural resource sectors.   
 
Table 6.1 The twenty-five largest companies in Russia by market capitalization, 1997  
Rank Name Sector 
Capitalization 
Billion $ 
Proportion 
of Top 25 
(%) 
1 Lukoil Oil and Gas 5401 21.0 
2 Surgutneftegaz Oil and Gas 4085 15.9 
3 Gazprom Oil and Gas 3955 15.4 
4 United Energy System Electric Power 2989 11.6 
5 Sibneft Oil and Gas 1511 5.9 
6 Rostelecom Communication 912 3.6 
7 Mosernego Power 763 3.0 
8 Onako Vostochnaya Oil and Gas 675 2.6 
9 Neftyanaya Oil and Gas 639 2.5 
10 Norilsk Nickel Metallurgy 471 1.8 
11 Niznekamskneftehim Chemical 468 1.8 
12 Irkutskernego Electric Power 445 1.7 
13 Sberbank Finance 425 1.7 
14 Tatneft Oil and Gas 418 1.6 
15 Slavneft Oil and Gas 380 1.5 
16 Baltica-Brewery Food 346 1.3 
17 MokiTEK Oil and Gas 286 1.1 
18 N. Novgorod Machine Works Machine Works 273 1.1 
19 Yukos Oil and Gas 234 0.9 
20 St. Petersburg Tel Communication 210 0.8 
21 Moscow Tel Communication 196 0.8 
22 Sibneftegazperarabotka Chemical 188 0.7 
23 GAZ Autoworks Machine Works 141 0.5 
24 Magnitogorsk Metal Metallurgy 130 0.5 
25 Rosneft-Purneftegaz Oil and Gas 130 0.5 
Source: Expert.ru; author‘s calculations. 
 
Russia‘s export profile mirrored this tendency towards a reliance on the natural 
resource sectors as well as the concentration of ownership within these sectors. In 1997 
nearly three-quarters of Russian exports were probably of primary and resource-based 
products (see p.149). Of this, nearly 45 per cent of exports were oil and gas. Metals 
                                                 
122
 Between 1990 and 1998, the percentage change in industrial production was positive in only the fuel and 
energy sector (19.2  percent), the metallurgical sector (3.1 percent) and the food industry (1.7 percent). In 
other sectors, industrial production contracted over this period with the mechanical engineering sector 
declining 10.6 percent, light industry 10.3 percent and the chemical and wood sector 2.4 percent. Figures 
from Goskomstat (1999).   
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accounted for around 20 percent of total exports. The third largest sector export sector in 
1997 was labelled ‗goods not classified by kind‘. This refers to goods that are likely to 
include precious metals, such as gold and diamonds, and also armaments exports. This, 
however, says little about the market structure of each of these sectors.  
 
Although the data are only sketchy, there was not much evidence of intra-sectoral 
competition either. The average 4-firm concentration ratio in the Russian economy (the 
sum of the market shares of the top four producers) was about 60 per cent. Although, this 
is not that dissimilar to the 4-firm concentration ratio in some US industries, the majority 
of Russian industrial sectors was, during this period, characterized by a dearth of small- 
and medium-sized firms resulting in correspondingly low levels of intra-sectoral 
competition (Broadman, 2000). This was further exacerbated by the cross-ownership that 
was a defining feature of the financial-industrial groups (FIGs) that are described 
below.
123
   
    
In terms of intra-sectoral market structures, the natural resource extraction 
industries exhibited monopolistic and oligopolistic tendencies almost from the outset of 
Russian independence. This was perhaps unsurprising given the structure of these sectors 
within the Soviet economy and also because they are sectors that are traditionally 
dominated by large, capital intensive firms in other countries. The character of the 
privatization process reinforced these tendencies, with all of the natural resource sectors 
exhibiting a high concentration of ownership with relatively low levels of competition. In 
the gas sector, the old Soviet gas ministry was privatized (nominally) into a joint stock 
company, Gazprom, which retained a monopoly over the production, sale, and 
distribution of natural gas.
124
 Although nominally privately owned at this point, Gazprom 
                                                 
123
 The owners of the FIGs were a mixture of former state officials and entrepreneurs that had made their 
initial fortune in the aftermath of perestroika. Very often this was based on either illegal and semi-legal 
arbitrage activities, particularly using natural resource products, or on the exploitation of the nascent and 
wild financial system. The origins of FIGs are dicussed in: Johnson (1998); Freeland (2000); Brzezinski 
(2002); Hoffman (2002); Klebnikov (2002).  
124
 Discussions between the Ministry of Fuel and Power of the Russian Federation (Mintopenergo, or 
Ministerstvo topliva i energetiki RF) and the management of the State Committee for the Management of 
State Property (GKI, or Goskomimushchestvo) in 1992 resulted in the oil and gas industries successfully 
resisting reformers‘ efforts to privatize the fuel and power complex according to the same rules as other 
industries as an attempt to ensure greater competition. 
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was closely linked to the state. Similarly, Transneft enjoyed a monopoly in the 
management of the oil pipeline system and, like Gazprom, was nominally a private joint 
stock company, but was de facto controlled by the federal government. Just over a dozen 
companies were prominent in the oil industry, and by 1997 around half of these were 
mostly privately owned, with the state retaining a controlling share in the other half 
(Khartukov, 1997, p.38). Therefore, despite the privatization of some sections of the oil 
industry sector, the oil and gas industry as a whole was, by the end of the 1990s, 
predominantly state-controlled and characterized by monopolistic or oligopolistic market 
structures. 
 
In the metallurgical sector, private ownership was more prevalent and during the 
early to mid 1990s there was a slightly higher level of competition. However, the 
tendency towards concentration of ownership increased as FIG owners began to 
consolidate their holdings after gaining a foot-hold during the shares-for-loans period 
(Fortescue, 2006a, 2006b). Over the course of the mid- to late-1990s a number of large 
corporate control transactions resulted in a diminishing number of owners, increasing the 
oligopolistic structure of these sectors. Notable examples include Vladimir Potanin‘s 
Norilsk Nickel which controlled the majority of Russia's nickel, copper, and palladium 
production, and faced only fractured competition within Russia. This is significant given 
that Russia produces around 20 percent of the world‘s nickel. The titanium market was 
dominated by Vladislav Tetyukin‘s VSMPO-Avisma which was, and remains, the 
world's largest titanium company, controlling 30 percent of the global market and all of 
Russia's exported titanium. The iron, steel and coal industries were dominated by 
Severstal, Evraz and Magnitigorsk Iron and Steel Works. Elsewhere, Alrosa enjoyed a 
monopoly in the diamond industry while aluminum production was dominated by Rusal 
and SUAL, owned by Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg respectively. 
   
The only other significant export sector outside of the natural resource sector that 
remained competitive in the world economy was the arms industry. It also exhibited a 
monopolistic market structure. In 1992, there were 12 special exporters but this was 
drastically reduced in November 1993 when Rosvooruzheniye was created in a 
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reorganization and consolidation of the entire system of military-technical cooperation. 
After this, only MAPO (the Moscow Aircraft Production Organization) remained intact 
of the original 12 exporters. Indeed, by 1997, Rosvooruzheniye had effectively 
monopolized the arms trade, accounting for 90 per cent of Russian arms exports by 1997. 
Attempts at curtailing the monopoly of Rosvooruzheniye by allowing other enterprises to 
act as special exporters failed in 1996, and a year later the state succeeded in establishing 
Rosvooruzheniye as a unitary state enterprise after a number of Presidential decrees 
(Kommersant, 1997, 30
th
 July). This centralisation of arms export activity was significant 
because exports accounted for around 60 percent of all arms production (domestic orders 
plus exports) in the 1990s, making arms exports integral to the welfare of the wider 
defence industry, enabling one of the only high-technology sectors within the Russian 
economy to survive (Sanchez-Andres, 2004). According to calculations made by 
researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the average 
annual value of Russian arms exports between 1996 and 2000 was $3.4 billion (current 
US dollars), making armaments one of Russia‘s most important manufactured exports 
(SIPRI, 2009). However, unlike other high-technology sectors in the post-socialist region, 
the continuation of state ownership negated any potential positive spill over effects of 
competition and innovation that are often prevalent in high-technology sectors (Connolly, 
2008).  
 
6.3.3 The Russian economy under Yeltsin: conclusion 
 
In summary, the market structure within the leading export sectors was either 
monopolistic or oligopolistic during the period in which Boris Yeltsin served as the 
president of the Russian Federation. The de-monetization of the economy, the parasitic 
tendencies of many non-export industries and low levels of investment all contributed to 
limited structural change (Robinson, 2007). The nefarious character of the privatization 
process, the sectoral characteristics inherent to the natural resource sector, and continued 
high levels of state ownership in ‗strategic‘ industries (i.e. lucrative export sectors) all 
ensured that levels of competition were low. Combined with the patronage politics that 
are discussed next, this resulted in a limited-access economic order. The Russian state 
 167 
was fiscally and politically reliant on an economy characterised by ‗enclaves‘ 
specializing in the export of natural resources. This provided poor conditions in which to 
stimulate the development of the wider domestic economy.
125
 The only links that existed 
between the export sectors and the domestic economy were primarily manifested in the 
transfer of value from oil and gas output to the virtual economy. 
 
As will be discussed in the next section, the concentration of economic resources 
in the hands of either the state or powerful FIGs hindered the development of an open-
access political system, with the state fiscally dependent either on direct natural resource 
revenues from the state-owned organizations or on the banking arms of the FIGs for 
sporadic payment of taxes and, increasingly after 1996, the provision of loans. The 
owners of the natural resource sectors – whether private or public – provided the lion‘s 
share of tax revenues and consequently acquired a greater ‗voice‘ over policy and a 
sharper capacity for collective action than other sections of Russian society. The next 
section examines the role of the economic structure described above in shaping the 
capacity for collective action among economic and political organizations between 1991 
and 1998.  
 
6.4 Capacity for collective action among organizations in Russian politics, 1991-1998  
 
6.4.1 Financial-industrial groups (FIGs) and the state: the politics of patronage 
 
The capacity of organizations to engage in collective action within Russia during the 
1990s was primarily framed by two factors: the economic structure described above, and 
the formation between 1990 and 1993 of a strong executive presiding over a federal 
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 Wade (2004) argues that internal integation is a ―dense set of links between sectors…and a structure of 
demand such that a high proportion of domestic production is sold to domestic wage earners‖. Here, export 
demand is not the primary source of economic growth and ―robust political coalitions between capitalists 
and employees become possible…because capitalists, employees, and government recognize a common 
interest in wages as a source of sales and economic growth, not just as a cost of production‖. In contrast, 
economies with a low level of internal integration and a high level of external integration see wages as a 
cost, and not as a source of demand. Because domestic consumption is only weakly connected to domestic 
production, exports serve as the primary stimulus to economic growth with export sectors existing mainly 
as enclaves largely detatched from the domestic economy. Prime examples of enclave export sectors 
include oil, gas and other mineral extraction sectors. 
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system. The regression analysis in Chapter Four indicated that the economic structure of 
a country and government type were the two most statistically robust indicators of social 
order type across the post-socialist region. This was particularly apparent in Russia where 
the two existed in a dynamic relationship that gradually resulted in the most important 
political activity at the national level being conducted on an informal basis between the 
Presidential Administration (PA) and the owners of FIGs, thus limiting any dialogue 
between state and any other socio-economic interests outside of the FIGs (e.g., Hedlund, 
1999; Robinson, 2000; Rutland, 2001; Jensen, 2001; Freeland, 2001). With the autonomy 
of the state compromised by its close links with FIGs, the development of political parties 
and other civic organizations was relatively muted (e.g. Urban, Igrunov and Mitrokhin, 
1997; Evans, Henry and Sundstrom, 2006; Hale, 2006). Furthermore, the business-state 
nexus was replicated at the regional level where provincial governors
126
 often governed 
in close conjunction with powerful economic organizations (Orttung, 2004a; Orttung, 
2004b; Wenger, Orttung and Perovic, 2006; Hale, 2006).
127
 
 
This close business-state nexus emerged from the specific features of the Russian 
exit from the Soviet Union. As described previously, the economic crisis that Russia 
faced forced Yeltsin and the Gaidar government to undertake market reforms 
immediately (Aslund, 1995; Gaidar, 1997; Robinson, 2000). However, the weakness of 
the state also undermined its capacity to implement these reforms. As the credibility of 
Yeltsin‘s commitment to market reform was eroded over the course of 1992 in the face of 
fierce criticism from the Soviet-era legislature and the recalcitrance of much of the 
inefficient industrial complex, the presidency gradually began to make a number of 
alliances and compromises in the name of political expediency rather than economic 
reform. Initially, this involved strengthening the links between the state and the banking 
sector through the provision of special dispensations that favoured organizations with 
close links to the state. However, the capacity of the state remained low despite the fact 
                                                 
126
 For the sake of simplicity the term ‗governor‘ is used to refer to the heads of the executive branch in 
Russia‘s provinces even though the formal title does in fact vary across regions.  
127
 There is, however, considerable variation in the openness of political competition across Russia‘s 
regions (see Petrov, 2004). The argument put forward in this study would suggest that economic structure 
would be an important factor in explaining this variation, although this remains an under-researched area.  
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that export revenues from the natural resource sectors had propped up the fiscal capacity 
of the state during a period of otherwise low revenues.  
 
In the context of weakening state capacity, Yeltsin employed one of the remaining 
tools at his disposal: the sale of valuable state assets – particularly in the natural resource 
sectors - to domestic financiers, in return for both revenue (the proceeds of the sale of 
state assets, and taxes) and political support against his opponents.
128
 This process of 
patrimonial privatization ensured that some of the most lucrative assets were transferred 
to a relatively small number of financiers and led to the creation of powerful financial-
industrial groups on whose support the state became increasingly dependent.
129
 A 
considerable portion of the oil industry was privatized in this manner, along with much of 
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 Under this scheme, the Presidential Administration auctioned off significant packages of shares in some 
of the most desirable state-owned enterprises, such as those in the oil industry, the metallurgical sector, and 
also in telecommunications, as collateral for bank loans to shore up the state‘s poor fiscal position. In 
exchange for the loans, the state handed over assets worth many times as much. Under the terms of the 
deals, if the Yeltsin government did not repay the loans by September 1996, the lender acquired title to the 
stock and could then resell it or take an equity position in the enterprise. The first auctions were held in 
autumn of 1995 and were often conducted by the same FIGs that had provided the loans. The auctions 
themselves were usually held in such a way so as to limit the number of banks bidding for shares and thus 
to keep the auction prices extremely low. By the summer of 1996, major packages of shares in some of 
Russia's largest and most profitable firms (often in export industries) had been transferred to a small 
number of FIGs, thus facilitating the privatization of valuable enterprises at a low cost. In many respects 
this process represented the apogee of Yeltsin‘s strategy of securing political support through the use of 
patrimonial privatization,  particularly in the period before the 1996 Presidential elections. However, while 
the auction prices have been considered by many to be exceptionally low, it should be noted that the 
Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was, at the time of the auctions, considered to be a 
serious  electoral threat to Yeltsin. Given that a CPRF victory in the Presidential election carried with it the 
prospect of the expropriation of private sector assets, the low auction prices may very well have reflected 
the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the election (see Allan, 2002). A number of studies describe 
this episode in some colour: Freeland (2000); Brzezinski (2002); Hoffman (2002); Klebnikov (2002). 
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 The financial-industrial groups were composed of those individuals that had built up a capital base 
during the chaos of the late Soviet period. Although each FIG comprised banks, industrial interests and 
media outlets, it was primarily through their positions as financiers in the early 1990s that they were able to 
later acquire assets in the ‗real‘ economy. The close connections between the businesses that composed 
each FIG were often a product of Gorbachev‘s reforms, most notably the 1987 Law on State Enterprises 
and the Law on Cooperatives. These two laws enabled savvy individuals to create banks that were used to 
exrtract resources from their industrial assets and also from the state. After the shares-for-loans round of 
privatization, the ten largest FIGs had expanded to control around a third of Russian GDP and much of its 
export capacity. Although these FIGs were the most prominent due to the concentration of wealth that they 
represented, they were ‗unofficial‘ FIGs. Official FIGs were created at around the same time in an attempt 
by ‗statists‘ within the Russian government to create large integrated industrial groups owned by the state 
similar to the Korean chaebols and Japanese keiretsu (which were privately owned). Although considerable 
legislative and organizational attention was paid to the creation of these official FIGs in the mid-1990s, the 
fiscal incapacity of the state meant that their economic size never rivalled that of the unofficial FIGs. The 
emergence of  FIGs and the individuals that owned them are discussed in: Johnson (1998); Rutland (2001); 
Jensen (2001); Starodubrovskaya (1995). 
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the metallurgical sector (see above). Those sectors over which the state retained control 
were also used to increase state capacity by transferring value from the natural resource 
sector (mostly the gas industry) to the rest of the economy. In this way, the government 
was able to inject liquidity into illiquid parts of the economy, ―not in the form of money, 
but in the form of fuel‖ (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000, p.76). The concentration of 
political power in the hands of the executive and the concentration of real economic 
power in only a few extractive industries facilitated this informal, patrimonial 
relationship between business and state.
130
    
 
The close, informal relations between business and state were also prominent at the 
regional level, particularly in regions in which there existed a high level of concentration 
of economic power in the hands of a few organizations. On one hand, the patrimonial 
pattern of Yeltsin‘s rule ensured that governors in powerful regions were often given 
significant latitude in governing their constituencies in return for providing political 
support at the national level (Stoner-Weiss, 1997, 1999; Treisman, 1997, 1999; Solnick, 
2000, Hale, 2005). On the other hand, provinces in which economic power was 
concentrated in a few areas – often in natural resource sectors linked to the international 
economy – tended to see closer links between business and state. Thus, regional FIGs 
were often able to establish themselves through the penetration of regional political 
structures. In such instances, Russia's governors and the regional business community 
formed close and mutually beneficial ties, often giving the governors monolithic control 
over their regions (Petrov, 2004; Orttung, 2004a; Orttung, 2004b; Wenger, Orttung and 
Perovic, 2006). The governor in turn provided business organizations with access to state 
resources, licenses, favorable legislation, and protection from law enforcement agencies 
in exchange for electoral support and help dealing with potential challenges from 
Moscow or local opposition groups. For example, in Perm Oblast, LUKoil-Permneft was 
the dominant economic organization and possessed a correspondingly powerful political 
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 Although it is worth noting that mechanisms for resolving disputes or for ensuring co-operation were 
never established. Consequently, the ‗state capture‘ was only very loose and did not represent a systematic 
domination of the state by FIGs. It was this failure to establish a mechanism of co-ordination between FIGs 
that undermines any attempt to label Russia an ‗oligarchy‘ during this period.  
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apparatus that outstripped that of any other potential contenders, enabling it to pursue its 
economic agenda largely autonomously (Hale, 2006, pp.164-5).  
 
6.4.2 The weakness of organizations outside of the state and leading economic sectors 
 
This close relationship between business and state observed in the executive 
branch at both the national and regional level was not effectively checked by other 
independent organizations from elsewhere in Russian society. This was in part caused by 
the failure of economic restructuring, as new sources of economic power unconnected to 
the already powerful state and FIGs did not emerge on a scale necessary to provide a 
socio-economically defined constituency that might act as a counterweight. The 
weakness of other organizations was also a consequence of the low incentive to form 
political parties, active civic groups and business associations, etc. that was a function of 
the institutionally weak legislature. For budding economic or political entrepreneurs, 
FIGs and government networks connected to the executive (both national and regional) 
acted as attractive ‗party-substitutes‘ because they alone possessed either the formal 
institutional power or the organizational and financial resources necessary to be 
politically effective (Hale, 2005c; Hale 2006).  
 
This was not always the case. Before October 1993, the Soviet-era legislature (the 
Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People‘s Deputies) exploited the institutional 
ambiguity caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and acted as a focal point for ‗red 
directors‘ against the economic reforms of President Yeltsin and his Prime Minister, 
Yegor Gaidar (Colton, 1995; Brudny, 1995; Lowenhardt, 1995; Shevtsova, 1999). In the 
absence of a constitutional settlement after the collapse of the Soviet Union, groups 
within the legislature were able to contest the legality of Yeltsin‘s actions. After all, both 
the executive and the legislature had been elected in close proximity to each other in the 
late Soviet period. However, the struggle that culminated in military action by the 
President against the legislature resulted in the formation of a new constitution that 
removed any ambiguities that might have surrounded the power of the executive (Brown, 
1993; Ostrow, 2000). In many ways this episode summed up Boris Yeltsin‘s attitude to 
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working with alternative power bases outside of the Kremlin-backed patronage networks 
and signalled a ‗revealed institutional preference‘ for a style of governance based on 
informal ties with powerful regional and economic organizations (Hedlund, 1999).  
 
The newly formed bi-cameral legislature, composed of the State Duma and the 
Federation Council, were afforded relatively weak institutional powers (Remington, 
1999; Hale, 2006; Oversloot and Verheul, 2007) which were, in effect, further weakened 
by the imposition of an electoral mechanism that saw elections to the State Duma split 
between Single Mandate Districts (SMDs) and a party list (PL) system. This hybrid 
system discouraged the formation of broad national political parties as SMD candidates 
were often those connected with FIGs or the regional political elites. In this environment, 
only the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) was able to consistently 
appeal to a socio-economically defined constituency and perform well across the country 
in parliamentary elections, securing the largest share of the party list component in the 
Duma elections of 1995 and 1999 (see March, 2004). Notwithstanding the serious 
challenge posed by the CPRF in the Presidential election of 1996, two factors appeared to 
limit the importance of the CPRF as an opposition force. First, it failed to extend its 
electoral appeal beyond its core support, i.e. the elderly, the weak and those that generally 
felt most disadvantaged by the transition away from the planned economy. Second, the 
‗super-presidential‘ constitution limited the ability of the CPRF to translate its strength in 
the Duma to serious influence over government policy.    
 
 Other parties that aimed themselves at a specific socio-economic group, such as 
Yabloko, which pitched its message at the aspiring ‗middle classes‘, were only of 
marginal significance (Hale, 2004). State-backed ‗parties of power‘ were also present in 
both the 1993 and 1995 State Duma elections, but as well as registering mixed 
performances - Russia‘s Choice (Vybor Rossii) achieved 15.6 percent of total seats in 
1993, and its successor as ‗party of power‘, Our Home is Russia (Nash Dom Rossiya) 
achieving 12.2 percent in 1995 – did not have an organizational base outside of their 
connections to the state. As such, the party of power‘s political centre of gravity was 
always the president; in fact they never existed as real parties nor, because of the 
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institutional power of the executive, did they ever do much ‗ruling‘ either (Oversloot and 
Verheul, 2007). Thus, in general, participation and membership of political organizations 
was, outside of the CPRF, low (Remington, 1999; Howard, 2003; Fish, 2005).  
 
Other potential alternative sources of power independent of the state or FIGs 
might have been found within civil society, or through the articulation of business 
interests wider than that of FIGs. Again though, the institutional strength of the state 
relative to non-state groups discouraged the emergence of a sufficient number of non-
governmental groups that might challenge the state or big business (Howard, 2003; 
Evans, Henry and Sundstrom, 2006). Participation in social organizations was, like 
political parties, low, with informal networks often supplanting formal, non-
governmental organizations (Wegren, 2006). The 1990s also signalled a failure for the 
development of effective business associations. Although the years 1992-1994 saw the 
peak of interest-group creation by business, they were mostly ineffective due to either 
internal incohesion or a lack of access to politically powerful circles (Markus, 2007). 
Even the most prominent association, the Russian Union of Industrialists and 
Entrepreneurs (RUIE), waned in significance after the constitutional settlement of 1993 
reduced the importance of the legislature. In response, business leaders found it more 
fruitful to access the PA directly (Robinson, 2002, pp.72-90).  
 
In some ways, this weakness of civil society was a legacy of the exit from the 
Soviet period where social movements were primarily anti-regime and lacking in any 
durable socio-economically defined support bases (Fish, 1995; Uhlin, 2005). However, 
the constraints imposed by limited economic change must also be seen as important 
(McFaul and Treyger, 2004). Quite simply, ―Russia‘s new non-governmental 
organizations generally possessed insufficient material and human resources to allow 
them to become institutionalized – that is, to act as stable, recognized channels for 
societal constituencies to express their demands to the state and the wider public‖ 
(Sundstrom and Henry, 2006, p.311). Those that did emerge quickly found the 
―contradiction…between the rapid appearance of civil society actors and their limited 
power in practice‖ (Rutland, 2006, p.75). Thus, it was the institutional strength of the 
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executive at both the national and regional level that reduced the incentive to build 
organizations that would aggregate and articulate the interests of other sections of 
society.  
 
This was further exacerbated by the economic stagnation that was a feature of the 
1990s; limited structural change impeded the development of new socio-economically 
defined interest groups that might stimulate the development of new organizations. 
Instead, the organizations that owned the prized resource exporting sectors that were 
privatized approached the PA or regional governors directly, bypassing groups that might 
have otherwise claimed to have represented a broader cross-section of Russian society 
(Graham, 1995). In short, the emergence of alternative organizations in Russia was 
hampered by both supply and demand: the lack of economic change restricted the supply 
of potential new constituencies for change; while the demand from political and 
economic entrepreneurs for such organizations was also low due to the fact that it was 
either the PA or the regional elites that controlled the material or institutional resources to 
be politically effective. The preponderance of executive structures and FIGs therefore 
effectively ‗crowded out‘ the emergence of other alternative sources of power.   
 
6.5 Social order-type in Russia, 1991-1998 
 
The argument so far suggests that, over the course 1990s, a concentration of economic 
power in the hands of a relatively small number of industrialists emerged that mirrored 
and buttressed the concentration of formal state power in the hands of the Russian 
President and the regional governors that ruled beneath him. Both tendencies reinforced 
one another, with Yeltsin compensating for the lack of state capacity by using state 
resources – particularly those connected to the natural resource sector – to underpin his 
patrimonial style of rule. In effect, a limited-access economic order was created in which 
assets and other rent seeking opportunities were provided to selected actors within the 
Russian economy in return for political support. This resulted in a system of mutual 
dependence between the state and the FIGs, eroding any potential autonomy that the 
Russian state may have had.  
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The natural resource sector was the main target for FIGs as it represented the most 
lucrative source of foreign earnings as well as providing a source of leverage within the 
national economy through value-transfers. While ownership of organizations within the 
national economy was often viewed as an opportunity for asset stripping during this 
period, the natural resource sector held the key to a stable source of high returns and to 
political power. The strong influence of the natural resource sector on the Russian 
government during this period is illustrated by both the close links that were developed 
between them, and through this, by the manner in which government policy often 
reflected the interests of these leading sectors. The most obvious example of the 
dependence of the state on the natural resource sector can be found in the close links with 
the oil and gas sector. This was the largest sector in the Russian economy and its export 
earnings were a major source of taxation revenue, accounting for around 40 per cent of 
budget receipts during this period (Rutland, 2001). These sectors were particularly 
important as they offered a source of revenue that ill-performing enterprises within the 
virtual economy could not, and were tapped to provide the subsidies that the sector 
provided to the virtual economy in the form of value-redistribution and rent sharing.
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However, while the natural resource sector provided revenue to the state, it was only a 
fraction of the money earned by FIGs over this period as they exploited state weakness 
by evading much of the tax burden imposed on them (Tikhomirov, 1997).
132
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 The TEK (toplivo-energeticheskii kompleks) was in effect the ‗cash cow of the reforms‘. Its leading 
members were rewarded with direct representation in government and the ability to formulate its own 
‗reform‘ agenda. As well as appointing former Gazprom chief, Victor Chernomyrdin, as prime minister in 
1992 until 1998, the head of Tyumen Oil, Yurii Shafranik was appointed as minister for fuel and energy 
and Gazprom‘s Vladimir Kvasov was given the position of government chief of staff. Even after 
Chernomyrdin was replaced by Sergei Kirienko as prime minister in 1998, Sergei Generalov, former vice 
president of Yukos, was appointed minister for fuel and energy. The TEK included both private 
organizations (from the oil industry) and state organizations (Gazprom, Rosneft, etc). This cross-
representation between government and large natural resource organizations continued later under the 
presidency of Vladimir Putin. 
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 Other government policies also satisfied the preference of the FIGs. For example, monetary policy 
throughout the mid to late 1990s was focused on the creation of stable money in order to suppress inflation 
and maintain a strong currency. This satisfied the preferences of those competitive export sectors (oil, gas, 
arms, metals, etc.) that were represented by the FIGs and who also controlled many of the major 
commercial banks. These benefited from the government‘s monetarist policies as well as enjoying special 
privileges conferred upon loyal FIGs to run segments of the state‘s finances in place of the Central Bank. 
Thus, well-positioned actors within the banking sector were able to exploit the monetary policies that were 
a feature of the period of financial liberalization while most other Russians suffered. By contrast, directors 
and employees in the virtual economy were the obvious ‗losers‘ in this process as not only were they often 
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 Such close links between business and the state, and with the failure of significant 
structural change within the economy hindering the development of alternative sources of 
power, stifled the development of an open-access political order in Russia over the 1990s. 
Although World Bank Governance Indicators are not available until 1998, it is possible to 
make several broad observations on Russia‘s development along the three indicators 
selected to measure social order type across in this study.  
 
6.5.1 Voice and accountability 
 
 The level of political competition during this period was certainly an 
improvement on the Soviet period. After the military solution to the standoff between 
Yeltsin and the Soviet-era legislature in 1993, parliamentary elections were held in 1993 
and 1995 as well as a presidential election in 1996. Furthermore, state ownership of 
media outlets was considerably curtailed with a large proportion of media outlets owned 
or controlled by non-state organizations (Belin, Fossato and Kachkaeva, 2001; Oates, 
2006). Freedom of expression and association was, despite some flaws, at its highest 
level in Russian history. Unfortunately, while Russia appeared to make progress on at 
least the procedural indicators of an open and completive polity, the reality was 
somewhat different. As noted above, the close links between state and business, at both 
the national and regional levels, ensured that even freely elected parliaments exerted only 
limited control over government policy.  
 
Media outlets, while independent of the state, were often owned or connected to 
FIGs or regional political elites thus limiting their utility as checks on the power of the 
state or FIGs (Belin, Fossato and Kachkaeva, 2001; Ryabov, 2004). It is perhaps accurate 
to describe Russia as a delegative democracy during this period; the absence of strong 
counterweights to the state and business resulted in a failure to institutionalize the level of 
                                                                                                                                                 
denied access to capital from the state, but banks‘ more lucrative activities in exploiting the partial reforms 
of the government meant that they rarely lent to domestic economic organizations. The process of ‗reform‘ 
therefore saw interests outside of the FIGs largely ignored as the state became reliant on the FIGs – and by 
extension, natural resource exports – for tax revenue and, increasingly as time went on, loans.  
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accountability that is present in stronger, healthier democracies (O‘Donnell, 1994; 
Kubicek, 1994). Instead, the formal electoral accountability acted as only a nominal 
restraint upon executive power and policy was generally conducted in an informal, non-
transparent manner between the state and the owners of powerful export sectors. The 
concentration of economic power described above, and the institutional disincentive to 
form organizations independent of the state patronage network, both ensured that only a 
select few actors in Russia had voice over government policy and that such actors were 
rarely accountable to anyone outside  the elite.      
 
6.5.2 Rule of law 
 
In terms of the rule of law, excellent formal provisions have not been given 
substance by actions on the ground (Krasnov, 2004). The Russian procuracy - the central 
legal institution – was, after making some progress toward greater independence in the 
1990s, ultimately humiliated, subordinated, and placed under intense political pressure 
after it decided to investigate corruption in Yeltsin's government in the late 1990s. The 
parliamentary elections of 1999 allowed the owners of FIGs to obtain seats in the Duma, 
thereby acquiring parliamentary immunity. In the final months of 1999, major 
privatizations permitted members of the powerful elite to grab key Russian resources at 
bargain prices, perpetuating the insider deals of the loan-for-shares period in the mid-
1990s. Again, such venal behaviour was essentially facilitated by the absence of 
independent sources of power that could act as a check on the activities of the political 
and economic elites. As long as the economy failed to support the formation of durable 
interest groups and provide a demand for the substantive application of formal legal 
provisions, the executive and state officials in general did not feel obliged to supply it.   
 
6.5.3 Control of corruption 
 
 During the Yeltsin period, the state was simultaneously privatized and stolen as it 
was preyed upon from within - by venal state officials and regional elites - and outside – 
by powerful economic organizations. In many ways this represented a continuation of 
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practices in the late Soviet period (Solnick, 1998). Those close to President Boris Yeltsin 
were inextricably linked with massive tax evasion, insider privatization and licensing, 
and the siphoning off of financial assets, natural resources, and the state's industrial 
output. In this context, the state was weakened as it could not deliver on its promised 
functions (public goods such as maintaining order or providing social and medical 
services, for example) because of corrupt state administrative structures and, as a partial 
consequence, inadequate revenues. Although the shares-for-loans episode represents the 
most well-known and perhaps most lucrative example of corrupt collaboration between 
state and business, similar types of corruption were ubiquitous throughout the Russian 
system during this period. The absence of strong levels of economic competition ensured 
that national and regional elites could operate with autonomy, safe in the knowledge that 
they alone had access to the material and human resources to be politically effective 
forces.     
 
6.5.4 Conclusion: the culmination of the Yeltsin period and the 1998 crisis 
 
The practical outcome of the Yeltsin period described above was the 
concentration of the most lucrative economic assets in the hands of a small group of 
politically connected organizations, and the fortification of the nexus between power and 
property in Russia. Yeltsin‘s need for support in winning the 1996 presidential elections 
reinforced these tendencies. The role of the natural resource sector during this period was 
crucial: firstly, the ‗gift‘ of ownership of assets within this sector underpinned the state-
FIG nexus; secondly, although tax evasion in the natural resource sector was high, what 
revenues were derived from this sector contributed to the demonetization of the economy 
and the maintenance of the virtual economy through the transfer of value from the natural 
resource sector to the moribund industrial sector; thirdly, the transfer of these assets to 
the FIGs, weakened the state through the loss of a large portion of their revenues and 
compromised its autonomy by raising the power of FIGs relative to the state, leading to 
state ‗capture‘ (Hellman, 1998; Hellman and Kaufmann, 2001; Hellman, Jones and 
Kaufmann, 2003).  
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The interaction between export sectors, the domestic economy and the state all 
combined to leave Russia in a ‗partial reform equilibrium‘ at the end of the Yeltsin‘s rule. 
A weak state co-existed with a domestic economy that continued to suffer from many of 
the negative legacies bequeathed by the Soviet planned economy. Only those sectors that 
were competitive in the international economy, primarily the natural resource sector, 
performed well during this period, and despite many rents accruing to private owners 
who avoided taxation, the stream of revenue that it provided proved just enough to 
sustain this delicate balance. It was during this period that the Russian political leadership 
began to resemble a regime - an under-institutionalised power system which was not 
constrained either by a constitution or by institutions of mass representation - rather than 
a government - which is located within a form of legal-constitutional power relations 
(Sakwa, 2002, pp.454-8; Sakwa, 2004, Ch.4). Thus, the limited-access economic order 
described above, with its concentration of economic power in the hands of either the state 
or the FIGs, supported a limited access political order in which the holders of economic 
power supported the existing political order in return for continued access to economic 
assets.   
 
The delicate balance that existed between the virtual economy, predatory business 
groups and a weakened and ‗captured‘ state began to deteriorate from 1997 and 
culminated in the 1998 financial crisis. The build up to the 1998 crash marked the nadir 
of state dependence on big business. Consistently unable to secure the required tax 
revenues from either the FIGs or the wider virtual domestic economy, the government 
resorted to the issuing of high-interest short-term state bonds (GKOs) as a non-
inflationary way of funding the budget deficit. As with the shares-for-loans agreement, 
the major beneficiaries were the banks attached to the FIGs who on the one hand evaded 
paying their full tax bill, and on the other exploited the government‘s resultant need for 
cash by monopolizing the market for high interest bonds. Therefore, the  dependence of 
the state on big business not only impaired its autonomy, capacity and its will for reform, 
but also created the foundations for the 1998 financial crisis. Ultimately, the 1998 crisis 
can be seen as a function of the interaction between the prevailing economic structure and 
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the political system (regime and coalitions with FIGs) that had crystallized over the 
1990s.   
 
Without a deep pool of taxable economic activity throughout the economy, the 
state was fiscally dependent on those sectors that were able to provide tax revenues or 
provide loans. In an attempt to reduce the cost of borrowing and decouple the state from 
its dependence on the FIGs for loans (which covered the persistent inability to raise 
enough taxes to match expenditure), the Russian government opened up its debt market 
to foreign investors, leading to rapid inflows of foreign capital.
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 The Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 that soon spread to other emerging market economies then caused a flight 
to safety among foreign investors and the sudden withdrawal of short-term capital from 
Russia (Roubini and Setser, 2004). The weakening of global demand for commodities 
caused by the slump in output across emerging economies also resulted in a decline in 
prices across the range of Russian natural resource exports. Russia was plunged into 
crisis as the state defaulted on much of its domestic debt and the private sector defaulted 
on its foreign debt, leading to a collapse of confidence in Russian banks and the 
devaluation of the rouble.
134
   
 
In short, the experience of Russia during the Yeltsin period appears to offer 
support to both the first order and second order hypotheses generated in Chapter Two. An 
economic structure dominated by only a few economic sectors, themselves exhibiting 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures, stymied the emergence of a wider array 
of social forces that might have acted as a counterweight to the state and the most 
important economic organizations. Ultimately, this had broadly negative implications for 
social order development. It is also true, however, that many of the negative aspects of 
Russian social order development during this period are over determined; a range of other 
political, cultural and social factors are no doubt also important. The next section reviews 
economic structure and social order development in Russia under the leadership of 
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 This is estimated to have been over $40 billion  in 1997 (Robinson, 2002). 
134
 Full accounts of the 1998 crisis include: EBRD (1999); Illarionov (1999); Sapir (1999); Hanson (1999) 
OECD (2000). 
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Vladimir Putin. As will be argued, economic structure was a crucial variable in 
explaining the trajectory of social order development in Russia during this period.  
 
6.6 The reassertion of the state under Vladimir Putin, 1999-2007 
 
6.6.1 The capacity for collection action among Russia organizations: the strengthening of 
the state 
 
The first consequence of the 1998 crisis was the weakening of the financial branches of 
the FIGs. These banks had preyed upon the state‘s fiscal weakness through the provision 
of loans. However, as the market for state-issued bonds dried up, the opportunity for 
further profits from these activities ended. Although these groups still possessed 
considerable economic assets in the real economy, particularly in the oil and 
metallurgical sectors, the severing of the financial links between the state and the FIGs 
left them significantly weaker vis-à-vis the state. The second significant result was the 
beginning of the remonetisation of the domestic economy (Fig. 6.5). This was caused by 
two events. First, the Central Bank of Russia mandated the repatriation and domestic sale 
of foreign exchange reserves in order to accumulate foreign exchange reserves in 
response to the currency crisis (Bernstam and Rabushka, 2006). This restricted the capital 
flight from enterprise export earnings that had previously characterised the Russian 
natural resource export sector. As the Central Bank printed roubles to purchase foreign 
exchange reserves it expanded the monetary base. Second, international commodity 
prices rebounded after 1998 (Fig. 6.4). This resulted in increased export revenues, 
revenues that were now repatriated under the new rules. The third major effect of the 
crisis was that the remonetisation of the economy increased tax remittances that 
strengthened the fiscal position of the state (Table 6.3). This influx of revenue gradually 
increased the power of the state relative to other organizations in the economy, as it was 
no longer reliant either on loans or on redistributing property to shore up its political 
position.  
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Remonetisation and increased earnings on exports also contributed considerably 
to the wider economic recovery. Combined with the effects of a devalued currency, 
output within the economy increased sharply as spare capacity within the economy was 
utilized in the face of increased costs for imports, particularly in sectors that had 
previously faced stiff foreign competition, such as in the dynamic food processing 
industries which found themselves more competitive with a weaker rouble. This created a 
virtuous circle that reduced the prevalence of the virtual economy; expansion of the 
monetary base injected funds into enterprises that reduced the problem of arrears and 
non-payments. Increased domestic demand then buttressed and intensified the effects of 
remonetisation. Value redistribution from the natural resource sector continued, but was 
less important to the functioning of the wider economy than it was under the conditions 
of the virtual economy.  
 
Because of rising tax revenues, the state could now afford this value redistribution 
as the effective subsidisation of the economy that existed under the virtual economy 
declined. The role of natural resource exports in the recovery was intensified by the 
repatriation of foreign currency earnings. Between 1998 and 2004, Russian GDP 
increased by 48 percent. Of this, gross domestic spending (the sum of consumption, 
investment and government spending) accounted for 75 percent, with exports, 
predominantly from the natural resource sector, accounting for the remaining 25 percent 
(Goskomstat, 2005). Along with the influence of the continuation of value redistribution 
from the oil and gas sector, the natural resource sector clearly remained the leading sector 
within the Russian economy with the state increasingly empowered from earnings in this 
sector (Tables 6.2 and 6.3).  
 
Table 6.2 Earnings from oil and petroleum product exports, 2000-2006 ($ billion) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Earnings from Oil and 
Petroleum Product Exports 34.9 33.4 38.7 51.1 74.6 101.7 141.3  
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Finance (2007). 
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Table 6.3 Tax payments of the oil sector, 2000-2006 ($ billion) 
Tax payments ($ billion) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total tax payments 15.04 17.88 21.42 29.06 48.8 88.41 117.46  
Source: Russian Federation Ministry of Finance (2007). 
 
Like Yeltsin in 1990, Vladimir Putin began his reign as Russian president in 2000 
with overwhelming popular support, suggesting that he may have possessed an 
opportunity to exploit this window of opportunity and create the foundations of an open-
access economic and political order.
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 Indeed, on the eve of his accession to power, 
Putin emphasised the need to develop a society based on the rule of law (Putin, 1999). 
The potential to achieve this was all the greater for the autonomy that the state now 
enjoyed from both the FIGs and from the burden of subsidising the ill-performing 
enterprises within the virtual economy. Both of these changes were a direct consequence 
of the 1998 crisis.  
 
Initially, the reassertion of the state under Putin was focused on two areas. First, 
Putin concentrated on reining in regional leaders through reforms of the federal structure 
of the Russian Federation that resulted in the creation of seven federal okrugs 
(administrative regions) led by presidentially appointed envoys that were tasked with 
tightening the centre‘s grip on Russia‘s 89 regions (Hyde, 2001; Hale, 2005b). This 
represented another blow to business as they had often aligned themselves with regional 
actors against the centre. Instead, both business and regional elites were now encouraged 
to work through the new ‗party of power‘, United Russia (see below). Second, Putin 
launched an assault on two of the most prominent FIG owners, Boris Berezovskii and 
Vladimir Gusinskii. Under the guise of formal legal proceedings, both were expropriated 
of their major business interests in Russia, including two major media organizations as 
well as other industrial assets. It was the first instance of the use of a newly drafted 
                                                 
135
 It should be noted that Putin‘s popularity was initially based on his perceived direction of the second 
military campaign in Chechnya that began in the summer of 1999. The fact that his popularity had its roots 
in the military action in Chechnya also helped shape the compostion of the Russian state for years to come; 
officials from the siloviki (a term that loosely describes persons with a security or military background) 
became more numerous in the upper echelons of government. See Bacon, Renz and Cooper (2006).  
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bankruptcy law that was to prove useful in forcing mergers and acquisitions within the 
Russian economy over the next few years (Barnes, 2007, p.52). This realignment in the 
distribution of power between state and business signalled a renegotiation of the state‘s 
dependency on big business and the reassertion of a re-invigorated executive. 
   
Despite the fates of Berezovskii and Gusinskii, the balance of power between the 
state and business initially appeared to have reached only a more even level when 
compared to the dependency of the state under Yeltsin. Now that a healthy level of 
respect between state and business had been established, there appeared to be a greater 
chance than ever of moving towards an open-access political order; a more equal balance 
of power between state and big business might have represented the beginning of a more 
competitive era. The so-called shashlychnoe sagleshenie (the ‗shashlick agreement‘) of 
July 2000, where Putin and the owners of the FIGs ostensibly agreed to a negotiated 
compromise to end the excesses of the Yeltsin-era, indicated that while Putin would be 
more demanding in terms of extracting tax revenue from the FIGs, he would also 
preserve the distribution of property that had taken place under Yeltsin.
136
 Indeed, 
between Putin‘s victory in the 2000 presidential election and 2003, the state‘s role in the 
economy was relatively benign under the stewardship of economic liberals such as 
German Gref, Mikhail Kasyanov, Alexei Kudrin and economic advisor Andrei Illarionov; 
this period saw the introduction of a 13 percent flat tax which helped boost taxation 
revenues, a reduction in corporation tax, and later the creation of a stabilization fund for 
surplus export earnings.  
 
6.6.2 The continued weakness of counterweights to big business and the state 
 
While the balance of power between the state and business, and between the 
centre and the regions, might have changed, independent organizations remained 
extremely weak (Knox, Lentini and Williams, 2006). In a formal sense, political parties, 
business associations and civic organizations appear to play a more prominent role than 
                                                 
136
 This period has been labelled the ‗period of compromise‘. See Bunin (2004). However, there remains 
much uncertainty as to whether anything concrete was actually agreed between Putin and the business 
leaders; see Tompson (2005). 
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ever in Russian politics. The parliamentary elections that preceded Putin‘s victory in the 
2000 presidential election saw the emergence of a genuinely popular ‗party of power‘ in 
Unity (Yedinstvo), which after merging with Fatherland-All Russia (Otechestvo-Vsya 
Rossiya) later become United Russia (Yedinaya Rossiya). Although parties of power were 
not new in Russia, the degree of electoral support far outweighed that previously enjoyed 
by Yegor Gaidar‘s Democratic Choice in the 1993 Duma and, later, Viktor 
Chernomyrdin‘s Our Home is Russia in the 1995 Duma. This success of Unity – a party 
created just in time for the 1999 Duma elections without any form of organizational 
support or indeed grass-roots membership – presaged the electoral success of other 
‗virtual parties‘ (such as Just Russia) that existed solely to capture votes in elections and 
support the president in parliament.
137
 The success of virtual parties of power subservient 
to the president further emasculated an already constitutionally weak legislature. Unity, 
its successor, United Russia, and a number of other state-backed parties have since 
performed well in parliamentary elections. However, while they might be electorally 
successful and well organized, ―describing them as ‗ruling parties‘ reverses cause and 
effect and inverts its members‘ actual dependencies and loyalties‖ (Oversloot and 
Verheur, 2007, p. 194). The absence of independent groups with the material and human 
resources to challenge the state made its job of dominating the political party ‗market‘ 
much easier. In this sense, the wave of de-privatization since 2000 bodes ill for the 
development of anything approaching a genuinely competitive political party system. 
Thus, while the state‘s role has made the party-system stronger (i.e. a more 
institutionalized relationship between state and party), it has had the effect of making 
parties weaker (Mankoff, 2003; Wilson, 2007).    
 
 The formal involvement of business associations has also increased under Putin, 
suggesting that a more institutionalized dialogue between state and business has taken 
place. In 2000, Putin instigated the inclusion of many of the FIGs owners who had 
previously accessed the state through informal channels into RUIE, creating a new 
council that included FIG owners as well as representatives from some medium-sized 
enterprises (Rutland, 2003; Hanson and Teague, 2005). This was intended to 
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 For a discussion of the role of virtual parties in Russia and other post-Soviet states, see Wilson (2005).  
 186 
institutionalize relations between business and state and place relations on a more formal 
footing. In addition, the Union of Business Associations of Russia (OPORA), 
representing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) enjoyed deeper and more 
institutionalized channels of communication with the state, acting as  ―the prime interface 
for the exchange of information between governmental structures and the SMEs‖ 
(Markus, 2007, p.286).  
 
Elsewhere, the Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (RCCI) assumed a 
much greater lobbying role after the appointment of former Prime Minister Yevgenii 
Primakov to the leadership role of the RCCI in 2001. This group represents over 20,000 
companies and associations and also enjoyed greater consultative links with government 
after 2000, playing a considerable role, for example, in formulating the simplified Tax 
Code for SMEs (Markus, 2007, p.288). However, as with political parties, the extent to 
which business associations integrate and then articulate the interests of their members to 
the state is still quite limited. Instead, the state has tended to use business associations as 
a mechanism through which it can impose its will, using them as a tool through which it 
can implement policy more effectively (Markus, 2007).  
 
Thus, the state‘s relationship with business resembles that of its relationship to 
political parties; they are tools in which the flow of decision-making is generally one-
way. Moreover, in important matters, such as the appropriation of private resources 
employing pseudo-legal de-privatization strategies, the timidity of business associations 
becomes apparent, making a mockery of attempts at institutionalizing property rights and 
state-business relations. This has the added demonstrative effect of weakening the 
perception of private property rights at lower levels (from interviews).
138
 Again, while the 
most lucrative economic resources are in the hands of either the state or FIGs with close 
links to the state, the probability of business acting as a counterweight is quite low.     
 
                                                 
138
 A number of experts interviews were conducted in the course of the author‘s research for Chapters 6, 7 
and 8. However, many interviewees expressed discomfort with specific remarks being attributed to them. In 
order to maintain the anonymity of interviewees, all material derived from interviews is cited as ‗from 
interviews‘, without identifying the informants. A full list of interviewees is contained at the end of the 
bibliography.  
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Mirroring the state‘s efforts to create quasi-parties in the legislature, and 
supplicant business associations in the economy, the Kremlin-funded youth group Nashi 
has increased its share of the civil society ‗market‘, using its superior material resources 
and state-backed status to effectively nullify other independent groups within Russian 
civil society. Ostensibly, Nashi was created in 2005 to eliminate the ―regime of oligarchic 
capitalism‖ (Interfax, 2005, April 15th). However, in practice it has acted as tool of the 
regime to mobilize Russian youth, act as a vocal supporter of regime, and Putin in 
particular, and to ‗crowd out‘ other groups that might not be so supportive of the regime.  
 
Again, in the absence of strong, independently funded civic associations, the 
concentration of economic resources in the hands of the state or FIGs has both the active 
role of ensuring that vast material resources are at their disposal, and the more passive 
effect of reducing the probability of independent groups emerging in the future. 
Elsewhere, the media outlets appropriated from Berezovskii and Gusinskii were 
effectively taken over by the state and used to advance the interests of the ruling elite in a 
manner reminiscent of the Soviet-era. Although some independent print media remains, 
national television networks are either state-owned or practice a form of ‗self-censorship‘ 
that borders on obsequious (Ryabov, 2004; Oates, 2006). This ‗management‘ (Balzer, 
2003) and ‗creation‘ of civic associations renders the term ‗civil society‘ effectively 
meaningless in the Russian context; groups dependent on the state cannot act as 
counterweights to it.      
   
    In short, the structure of the economy and the general institutional weakness of 
the state further undermined the prospects of Russian politics developing into an open-
access order. Between 2000 and 2002, the distribution of ownership in the leading export 
sectors was, on the face of it, relatively evenly balanced between FIGs and the state. 
However, as commodity revenues increased, so did the relative strength of the state. 
Although revenues from the domestic economy had increased, the incentive to 
appropriate more rent from the natural resource sectors heightened. In this respect, the 
failure of the state to develop institutionalised links with the wider economy since 
independence was crucial. With a low capacity to administer tax and regulate the 
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economy, the incentive to tighten control over natural resources was considerable (see 
Tompson, 2006).  
 
Arguably, the defining moment in the move towards greater state control over the 
natural resource sector came with the assault on Yukos, the largest private oil company, 
over the course of 2003 and 2004 (Hanson and Teague, 2005; Thompson, 2005; 
Fortescue, 2006b; Barnes, 2007; Goldman, 2008; Sakwa, 2009).
139
 The behaviour of 
Yukos, and its owner, Mikhail Khordorkhovskii, had signalled a potential weakening of 
state control over the oil industry. Yukos was involved in negotiations with foreign oil 
companies over a possible merger that would have increased the integration of the 
Russian oil industry with the global economy and entrenched its independence from the 
Russian state (see Goldman, 2008). In addition, Khordorkhovskii had become 
increasingly prominent in domestic politics, establishing close links with independent 
groups in civil society and political parties not controlled by the Kremlin (Robinson, 
2007). This may have represented the beginning of a move towards a more open-access 
order as the separation of the state from a significant economic organization may have 
supported the emergence of politically independent actors. However, the increasing value 
of oil exports both increased the incentive for the state to appropriate extra rents, but also 
raised the cost of allowing them to remain in the hands of potential opponents (from 
interviews). Although the coercive power of the state had increased, along with greater 
fiscal capacity, the institutional weakness continued. The concentrated structure of the 
export sector both invited and facilitated de-privatization; a greater number of 
organizations or a wider dispersion of resources may have balanced the ambitions of the 
state. This tendency towards the increased concentration of ownership within the state is 
described below. 
 
 
                                                 
139
 There are a number of views as to why Yukos was chosen as the object of the state‘s attention. 
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear from where within the ruling elite that the decision to expropriate 
Khordokhovskii‘‘s assets emanated. The competing theories are summarised in Fortescue (2006, pp.121-
148) and Sakwa (2009).  
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6.7 Structure and ownership in leading Russian export sectors, 1999-2007: the de-
privatization of leading export sectors  
 
By 2006, the economic structure and export profile of Russia had not, in many respects, 
fundamentally changed since 1998, or indeed, 1991. Instead, because of historically high 
prices for oil and other commodities, the resource extraction sectors dominated the 
Russian economy more than ever, causing some concern that Russia is comparatively ill 
equipped to diversify its economy and end its dependence on resource extraction 
(Ahrend, 2005; Ahrend, Tompson and de Rosa, 2007; Cooper, 2006). Investment has not 
matched the levels seen in other emerging economies, and has fluctuated quite wildly 
since 2000 (Simola, 2008). In terms of the extent to which resource extraction companies 
dominated the domestic economy, Table 6.4 reveals that they accounted for over 80 per 
cent of the total sales volume of the 25 largest companies in Russia. In addition, the top 
three export sectors now accounted for 87 per cent of all exports, with the oil and gas 
sector accounting for nearly 50 per cent, goods ‗not classified by kind‘ (probably 
including arms and precious metals) accounting for nearly 22 per cent, and manufactured 
goods (dominated by metals) accounting for 15 per cent. The state‘s dependency on 
revenues from these sectors, particularly the oil sector, is also clear. Table 6.2 reveals that 
earnings from oil exports nearly tripled between 2000-2005, while Table 6.3 illustrates 
the dramatic increase in the taxation burden imposed on these earnings (an increase of 
over 500 percent). Again, this does not reveal some of the other less visible ways in 
which the state relies on the oil and gas sector to support other less efficient sectors 
within the economy through value distribution.  
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Table 6.4 The twenty five largest companies in Russia by sales volume, 2006  
Rank Name Sector
Sales 
Volume '000 
$ 
Proportion of 
Top 25 (%)
1 Gazprom Oil and Gas 489058 15
2 Lukoil Oil and Gas 462840 14.2
3 United Energy System Electric Power 270292 8.3
4 Russian Railways Transport 264645 8.1
5 TNK-BP Oil and Gas 248374 7.6
6 Rosneft Oil and Gas 176700 5.4
7 Surgutneftegaz Oil and Gas 157775 4.8
8 Sibneftegazperarabotka Oil and Gas 145853 4.4
9 Sberbank Finance 110248 3.3
10 Severstal Ferrous Metals 79645 2.4
11 AFK Systems Communications 75935 2.3
12 Svyazinvest Communications 74884 2.3
13 Norilsk Nickel Nonferrous Metals 68680 2.1
14 Slavneft Oil and Gas 67776 2
15 Evraz Group Ferrous Metals 65081 2
16 Transneft Transport 64166 1.9
17 Rusal Nonferrous Metals 63055 1.9
18 Tatneft Oil and Gas 60072 1.8
19 Russian State Insurance Company Health 56128 1.7
20 Magnitogorsk Metal Ferrous Metals 53800 1.6
21 Avtovaz Machinery 46847 1.4
22 Novolipetsk Ferrous Metals 44687 1.3
23 Mechal Ferrous Metals 38050 1.1
24 GMK Holdings Nonferrous Metals 34939 1.1
25 AK Alrosa Precious Metals 34229 1.1  
Source: expert.ru, 2007; author‘s calculations 
 
The key difference lay in Putin‘s attack on key FIG owners that ensured that this 
increased dependence on natural resource sectors was accompanied by a rise in state 
ownership or effective control in these and other sectors.
140
 It is estimated that the state-
owned share of Russia‘s equity market capitalization rose from 20 percent in mid-2003 to 
30 percent in early 2006 with a disproportionate increase in the role of the state in the 
                                                 
140
 Whether this increase is a result of design or of opportunism is unclear. Those who cite the de-
privatization process based on ownership of the commanding heights of the economy, specifically the 
natural resource sector, note the content of Putin‘s doctoral dissertation; see Balzer (2005). Evidence of any 
pre-conceived ‗plan‘ is largely irrelevevant, however. Such an extreme concentration of wealth in key 
export sectors would probably have increased the incentive for the government to assert state control and 
centralize rents under most circumstances. 
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natural resource sectors (OECD, 2006, p.2). This has risen since a large proportion of the 
remaining production assets from Yukos have come under state control along with the 
sale of Roman Abramovich‘s Sibneft to the state controlled Gazprom in October 2005 
(Vedomosti, 2005, October 13). Rosneft purchased Yukangskneftegaz (the primary 
production arm of Yukos), and stakes in Tuapse oil refinery, Verkhnechonskneftegaz and 
Udmurtneft. Along with other state acquisitions and pressure exerted upon major foreign 
investors, this period has seen a general increase in the concentration of state ownership 
in the country‘s leading export sectors. Foreign investors also saw their role in the oil 
sector diluted over this period. Royal Dutch-Shell‘s participation in the exploitation of 
the Sakhalin energy reserves was circumscribed when it was forced into ceding its 
majority ownership in the Sakhalin 2 project to Gazprom and was followed by TNK-BP‘s 
forced sale of its majority share of the license to develop the Kovytka gas field 
(Gazeta.ru, 2007, December 28). Later, the ongoing struggle between British Petroleum 
and TNK (Tyumen Oil) also signaled the intention of the state to further its control of the 
oil industry. Although the major shareholders in TNK (Mikhail Fridman, Viktor 
Vekselberg and Leonard Blavatnik) are private businessmen, it is seen as likely that they 
are acting on behalf of the state (Goldman, 2008). Of the major private oil companies, 
only Lukoil and Surgutneftegaz remained outside  state control at the end of 2007.
141
  
 
Formal state control is less prevalent in the metallurgical sector, but its influence 
remains strong. By 2006, the Russian metal industry was the country‘s third largest in 
terms of output (19 percent of total industrial output) and the second largest exporter after 
the oil and gas sector (18 per cent of exports) (Comtrade, author‘s calculations). Over the 
period 1999 - 2006 the output of ferrous metallurgy increased by 60 percent, that of 
nonferrous metallurgy by 58 percent. Against a backdrop of rising prices, metal 
companies made especially high profits which enabled them to expand investment and 
acquire new assets in Russia and abroad (Petrosyan, 2006).
142
 Companies have pursued 
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 The details surrounding the state acquisition of private assets is catalogued in much greater detail in 
OECD (2006, pp.33-34).  
142
 These acquisitions were, however, funded by capital rasied on markets abroad. This is reflected in the 
increase of private debt to the extent that it now dwarfs public debt; see Hanson (2007b, p.871). Because 
many of these organizations are state-controlled (e.g. Gazprom and Rosneft), the effective level of state 
debt is probably much greater than official statistics indicate.    
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vertical integration by taking over suppliers of iron ore and coking coal as well as steel 
mills, thereby gaining control over raw material costs and smoothing out fluctuations in 
their income streams. This, however, has resulted in the metallurgical industry becoming 
more concentrated in those areas that were not already monopolies. In 2006, for example, 
Rusal merged with SUAL to form a monopoly in an already concentrated aluminium 
industry (Vedomosti, 2006, October 30). Indeed, throughout 2007, Rusal was attempting 
to further its control of the Russian metal sector through the hostile acquisition of Norilsk 
Nickel (Kommersant, 2007, December 21). Activity in this sector has increasingly taken 
place under the shadow of the state. Pro-Kremlin industrialists, such as Oleg Deripaska 
(the owner of Rusal), have been favoured in their commercial endeavours over those who 
are not as close, such as the once influential Vladimir Potanin, owner of Norilsk Nickel, 
the subject of Rusal‘s advances (Vedomosti, 2008, April 7). 
 
In 2000, the Rosoboronexport State Corporation was created to take over the 
activities of the Rosvooruzhenie State Corporation and the smaller Promexport Federal 
State Unitary Enterprise (rosoboronexport.ru). This, in effect, simply reinforced a pre-
existing monopoly in arms production. The value of arms exports increased considerably 
between 2001 and 2007 with average annual sales reaching $5.6 billion (current US 
dollars; SIPRI, 2009). What is perhaps most notable about the behaviour of 
Rosoboronexport is its acquisitions of other sections of the economy that are unrelated to 
armaments exports. It has increased its stake in the country‘s diamond monopoly, Alrosa, 
acquired a 62 per cent stake in AvtoVAZ in October, 2005, and purchased a 41 per cent 
stake in the titanium monopoly, VSMPO-Avisma in September, 2006. This signalled the 
move from state control over assets in the natural resource sector towards greater 
involvement in other ‗strategic‘ sectors.143  
 
 
                                                 
143
 The definition of strategic appears quite loose and fluid and seems to suit the mood of elite. For 
example,after grain prices reached high levels during 2008, the state soon moved to announce its intention 
to form a State Grain Corporation (Rossikaya Gazeta, 2008, August 16). 
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Table 6.5 Selected state representation in major business organizations, 2007
144
 
Name Relationship with 
State 
Business and Position 
Sergei Chemezov Close Putin Ally Rosoboronexport (Chairman/CEO); 
Rostekhnologi (CEO) 
Sergei Ivanov 1st Deputy Prime 
Minister 
United Aviation (Chairman) 
Viktor Ivanov Deputy Head of Kremlin 
Adminstration 
Aeroflot (Chairman of Board); Almaz-Antey 
(Chairman of Board) 
Viktor Kristenko Minister of Industry and 
Energy 
Transneft (Chairman) 
Alexei Kudrin Minister of Finance Sberbank (Supervisory Board member); Alrosa 
(Chairman of Board of Directors) 
Igor Levitin Minister of 
Transportation 
Sheremetyevo Airport (Chairman) 
Dmitri Medvedev 1st Deputy Prime 
Minister 
Gazprom (Chairman) 
Sergei Naryshkin Deputy Prime Minister Rosneft (Vice Chairman) 
Segei Prikhodko Foreign Affairs Advisor 
to President 
Tvel (Vice Chairman) 
Igor Sechin Kremlin Staff Rosneft (Chairman) 
Analtoli Serdyukov Minister of Defence Khimprom (Chairman);  
Yevgenni Shkolov Presidential Aide  Transneft (Board of Directors) 
Igor Shuvalov Economic Advisor to 
President 
Russia Railways (Board of Directors); 
Sovcomflot (Chairman) 
Sergei Sobyanin Chief of Staff to 
President 
Tvel (Chairman) 
Vladislav Surkov Kremlin Staff Transnefteprodukt (Chairman) 
Vladimir Yakunin  Putin Ally Russia Railways (President) 
Source: author‘s record from various newspaper sources, December 2007. 
 
Since 2005, a number of other state corporations have been formed that have been 
charged with leading a state-led modernization process.
145
 This represents a further 
                                                 
144
 This list includes selected examples of the cross-representation of business and state and is accurate to 
the end of 2007. Subsequent changes have taken place in individuals‘ postions in both the state and 
business.  
145
 This process has been underway for several years with several enterprises already formed, either 
through the amalgamation of existing companies or through the creation of new ones. These comprise, inter 
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example of the state asserting its control over the economy, extending its remit beyond 
the natural resource sector and into the manufacturing sector. Investing public resources 
into state corporations also signals the lack of trust that the current regime appears to 
have in the market mechanism of resource allocation. The representation of the state on 
the boards of these corporations (see Table 6.5), as well as in the natural resource sector 
has also increased, and suggests that any institutionalization of the relationship between 
state and business will be based on state penetration of economic organizations. This fits 
the trend established by links that the state has established with political parties, business 
associations and civic associations. Notwithstanding intra-elite competition (as seems to 
be the case between Gazprom and Rosneft, for instance), this trend within the economy 
indicates that levels of competition could well decline further.    
 
6.8 Social order type in Russia under Putin: a further decline in the level of 
competition  
 
If the concentration in structure and ownership within the economy in Russia has been a 
constant feature since independence, the story of social order development in general has 
shown a similar trajectory. After political power shifted to  Vladimir Putin, first as Prime 
Minister in 1999, and then as President from 2000 to 2008, Russia first saw a brief 
increase in its scores on the Governance Indicators that are used here to measure social 
order type before declining steadily ever since. As Figure 6.6 illustrates, immediately 
after 1998 the score on the Voice and Accountability indicator actually increased until 
2002, while the scores for Rule of Law and Control of Corruption stayed roughly 
constant. Since 2002, the reassertion of the state in the economy and the recentralization 
of political activity have resulted in a decline on all three components. This supports the 
                                                                                                                                                 
alia, Rosteknologii (the core of which, Rosoboronexport, encompassess armaments, metals and the car 
manufacturer VAZ), Rosatom, Rosnanotekh, United Aircraft Company and the United Shipbuilding 
Company (although the latter two are not legally defined as state corporations). The role of state 
corporations in the future of the Russian economy is outlined in  the Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade draft programme for social and economic development to 2020 (the ‗Kontseptsiya 
dolgsrochnogo sotsial’no-ekonomicheskogo razvitiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii’ 
[www.economy.gov.ru/wps/portal/e-russia]). Although this draft programme does acknowledge the 
importance of competition, reduced corruption, foreign investment, and institutional development in 
general, the emphasis is firmly on the development of technologically innovative companies through 
greater state investment (raising R&D as a proportion of national income threefold in little over a decade) 
and through the creation of innovative establishments. This programme is assessed in Mau (2008)  
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basic proposition of this study: that economic competition is essential to guarantee 
political competition.
146
 While the component indicators were quite low to begin with, a 
minimal level of competition within the economy could be observed in the Yeltsin 
period. However, as even this small degree of pluralism was eliminated in the leading 
sectors of the economy after 2002, so the levels of corruption and lawlessness 
deteriorated further, accompanied, and perhaps caused, by a more severe decline in the 
Voice and Accountability component. These developments are discussed in more detail 
below.  
  
 Figure 6.7 Components of Social order development in Russia, 1998-2007 
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 It is worth noting, however, that a reassertion of state control in the economy does not by itself indicate 
that only low levels of economic and political competition cause states to increase their role within the 
economy.  There are numerous historical instances where states have increased their role within an 
economy through an open, transparent and politically contested process as seen, for example, in the 
expansion of the state in many advanced democracies after the Second World War.       
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6.8.1 Voice and Accountability 
 
 The suppression of big business that started with the persecution of Boris 
Berezovskii and Vladimir Guisinskii in 2000 began the process of shifting power from 
FIGs to the state, while the regional governors were placed under greater control through 
Putin‘s federal reforms of 2000. The reduced influence of these two sources of voice over 
state policy was considered quite positive, as indicated by the upward trajectory of the 
VA line on Figure 6.6. Since then, the ‗management‘ by the state of political parties, the 
media, business associations and some ‗civic‘ associations has limited any other 
independent sources of voice over state policy. Moreover, the formal or procedural 
aspects of democracy began to be curtailed after the Beslan terrorist attack in 2004. 
Federal governors were no longer popularly elected, but were instead appointed by the 
President. This removed any semblance that Russia was a federal state. The SMD 
element of parliamentary elections was removed in 2006. As a result, only candidates on 
party lists were able to obtain a seat in parliament, something that suited the Kremlin as it 
controlled the most popular political party in Russia. Even those pro-democracy parties 
such as Union of Right Forces (SPS) and Yabloko were either co-opted into United 
Russia or effectively excluded from parliament through the introduction of a rule that 
raised the barrier to entry in the Duma to 7 percent. Consequently, there no longer existed 
any significant forces that could hold the Russian authorities accountable for their 
actions. Instead, the state controls all institutions of power within Russia. The 
encroachment of the state further into the economy reduces the prospects for the 
emergence of any forces that might exercise a greater voice and hold the state 
accountable in the future.    
 
6.8.3 Rule of Law 
 
The suppression of independent voices described above, and the concomitant 
reduction in already low levels of accountability described above had negative 
implications for the rule of law in Russia. Putin, with his background in law and the 
security services, has often asserted the importance of establishing a law-based state in 
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Russia. However, without effective economic and political competition the incentive for 
state institutions and the population to obey the law has in general has been low and is 
declining. On the national stage, the law has frequently been used as an instrument of the 
state, used for political purposes. The state‘s use of legal instruments, particularly the 
2002 Bankruptcy Law, in its own favour has been seen most prominently in its dealings 
with Berozovskii, Guisinskii, Khordorkhovskii, Yukos more generally, and foreign oil 
companies, flagrantly disregarding the property rights of even the richest businesses 
(Barnes, 2007). It has also frequently flouted the key document in Russian law, the 
constitution. Putin‘s abolition of the direct election of provincial governors in the 
aftermath of Beslan, for instance, was in direct contravention of constitutional law 
(Nemstov and Milov, 2007). Contracts with foreign countries are also changed 
unilaterally as, for instance, energy is used as a tool of foreign policy (Duncan, 2007; 
Goldman, 2008; Mankoff, 2009).  
 
The degree to which the law is obeyed at lower levels reflects the general 
contempt for the law displayed by the authorities (Shevtsova, 2007). This is curious given 
the fact that members of the security apparatus (siloviki) became increasingly prominent 
within the state apparatus.
147
 Initially, this group was balanced by the presence of 
economic liberals and state administrators. However, as time passed siloviki became 
increasingly influential and populated many of the most important positions within 
government (see Bacon, Renz and Cooper, 2006). Furthermore, as the state extended its 
control over the economy, siloviki became increasingly active in the management of state 
controlled enterprises. Despite the formal concentration of immense political power in the 
authorities, and despite the appointment of siloviki in key public positions, the state has 
found that it has become increasingly impotent in achieving rule compliance among the 
general population. The absence of economic competition and, in turn, political 
competition is evidently a key factor in the persistently low incidence of rule compliance. 
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 The presence of the siloviki in the Russian government was not new. Putin himself owed his rise to 
power to the tendency of sioloviki to be represented in influential positions within the state. The two prime 
ministers that preceeded Putin, Sergei Stepashin and Yevgeni Primakov, both had intelligence 
backgrounds, while Boris Yeltsin‘s once influential bodyguard, Alexander Khorzhakov was also former 
KGB. Individuals with similar backgrounds were also prominent in the security organizations employed by 
wealthy businessmen.    
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6.8.3 Control of Corruption 
 
 This decline from an already low starting position in Russia in the respect for law 
has, quite logically, led to the perpetuation and intensification of corrupt practices 
throughout the state apparatus. The size of the state apparatus has ballooned since the 
Soviet period, rising from around 700,000 under Leonid Brezhnev to over 1.5. million in 
2007. Indeed, in the Federal Veterinary Inspection Service alone, the number of 
employees has risen from 116 in 2004 to 20,469 in 2007 (Shevtsova, 2007, p.59). This 
increase in the size of the state administration has taken place against a background of 
declining tolerance of public scrutiny and has allowed corruption to penetrate even the 
highest offices. State officials in prominent positions of economic power (e.g. in 
executive positions within Gazprom and Rosneft), have been widely implicated in the 
fraudulent appropriation of vast sums (see Nemtsov and Milov, 2007). Further down the 
scale, officials from the police to university admission officers are recorded as having 
frequently engaged in abusing their positions for personal gain. Such is the extent of 
corruption that Transparency International‘s corruption ratings place Russia as lower than 
even Togo, Gambia and Angola (Transparency International, 2007). According to a 
spokesperson from the INDEM foundation in Moscow, the absence of countervailing 
forces in Russia that are capable of holding state officials to account is central to this 
increase in corrupt behaviour (from interviews). The more economic resources are 
concentrated in the state, the lower the probability of a reversal of these insidious 
tendencies.   
 
6.8.4 Conclusion: social order regression under Putin 
 
To reiterate, developments under Putin, who was replaced as President by Dmitri 
Medvedev in 2008, saw a clear intensification of the traditional (inherited) patterns of 
state co-ordination and control of the leading sectors of the economy, particularly in the 
commodity export sectors. While dominance in the state-business nexus has shifted 
towards the state as increased growth and tax revenues empowered its fiscal capacity, the 
absence of any significant diversification of the economic base has ensured that the 
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concentration of ownership and mutual dependence of state and business remains the 
same. In essence, the Russian state remains fundamentally dependent on the revenue that 
it receives from the leading sectors of the economy. With commodity prices high, the 
incentive to engage in serious attempts at encouraging diversification is again, like the 
Soviet Union before it, low. The incentive system inherent to such a concentrated array of 
ownership in the economy encouraged Putin to rely on direct control and management of 
the economy rather than contract, regulation and taxation. These incentives were 
probably all the greater precisely because, whatever its other weaknesses in terms of its 
institutional capacity, the Russian state continued to possess considerable coercive 
capacities, capacities that are arguably out of all proportion to any of its other capabilities 
(from interviews). This assertion of state control, and the ambiguity that it confers on 
existing property rights, might also slow the spontaneous diversification of the economy 
‗from below‘ as the development of smaller enterprises may be impeded by the perceived 
fragility of property rights (from interviews; Gavrilenkov, 2006).
148
 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has traced the relationship between economic structure and political 
development in Russia since 1991. Specifically, it has examined the structure and 
ownership of leading export sectors that have, over time, ebbed between private and state 
ownership. It has been argued that the concentration of economic resources in the hands 
of the state and, at times, powerful FIGs has interacted with an inherited institutional 
structure that has concentrated formal power in the hands of the executive to produce a 
limited-access order in Russia. During this time, the strength of the state relative to 
domestic organizations has been closely correlated with commodity prices, particularly 
oil. When prices hit a low point in 1998, the state experienced a crisis. When prices rose 
under Vladimir Putin, the state became increasingly assertive, extending its ownership 
over ‗strategic‘ areas of the economy and, more importantly, increasing its control over 
these sectors. The quality of governance in Russia that was low in the 1990s has 
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 According to the World Bank‘s Ease of Doing Business Report (2007), Russia was ranked 96 out of 175 
countries worldwide. This was below countries such as Columbia, Ghana and Pakistan. Russia also ranked 
15
th
 out of the 19 countries that are examined in this study.  
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deteriorated since as economic and political competition has declined. The non-state 
economy is becoming increasingly limited to consumer sectors, leading some to describe 
Russia as a ‗dual-economy‘ where the state controls the more dynamic, export oriented 
sectors, while the domestic, consumer facing economy is left to the market (Sutela, 
1999). It is this duality that explains the puzzle of how Russia has developed many 
features of a market economy while remaining an essentially authoritarian system 
(Aslund, 2007). While the state no longer controls the economy to anything like the 
degree that it did in the Soviet Union, it controls the main sources of revenue in Russia, 
enabling it to suppress any potential alternative sources of economic and political power. 
Moreover, access to these sectors is limited to those involved in state patronage networks, 
limiting the chances of ‗entry‘ by outsiders. Until the Russian economy experiences 
significant structural diversification, this situation is unlikely to change.     
 
Whether the planned modernization and diversification of the Russian economy 
through the channelling of state resources (i.e. natural resource revenues) towards state 
corporations will be successful remains to be seen. This course of action is fraught with 
potential pitfalls. Most notably, large ongoing state commitments to financing and 
developing a more diverse and technologically advanced economy hinge on continued 
high commodity prices as well as an ability to continue to maintain, if not increase, 
existing production levels, something that it considered quite unlikely at this point 
(Hanson, 2007b). The last two crises experienced by Russia have come immediately after 
oil prices have dropped: in 1986 and in 1998. Without a more diverse economic base to 
tap for tax revenues, the state will remain dependent on the leading sectors of the 
economy and the vicissitudes of world commodity prices irrespective of whether these 
sectors are in state control or not. The experience of many oil rich countries in the 1980s, 
as well as its own experience under Soviet rule, highlights the dangers to this approach 
(Gaidar, 2006). As a result, Russia finds itself in a position whereby without a 
diversification of economic activity, the political system will remain closed and 
uncompetitive, and economic performance will remain beholden to the serendipity of 
forces within the international economy. Any crisis in Russia may result in more, not 
less, state control as the existing regime has succeeded in eliminating any significant 
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alternative sources of power that can offer a credible alternative to what is currently on 
offer.   
 
This first case study in the post-socialist era appears to confirm the hypotheses 
generated in Chapter Two. In terms of the two main first order hypotheses, limited 
economic competition and a vulnerability to fluctuating commodity prices that are set by 
international conditions has helped shape a social order that is becoming more limited-
access over time. The second order hypotheses also appear to be supported by the 
evidence in Russia. Limited economic competition has constrained the development of 
political parties and civil society, resulted in pliant and ineffective business associations, 
and invited a fusion of the state and the most important parts of the Russian economy. 
However, it is also possible that negative social order outcomes are over-determined in 
Russia by a range of equally significant factors. Indeed, the model used throughout this 
study may be mis-specified with other variables being of greater analytical significance. 
Three more cases are examined in the subsequent two chapters. If the hypotheses are 
further supported by the evidence in these chapters, raising the number of observations 
should permit greater confidence in the conclusions that have been drawn in this chapter. 
The next chapter examines Belarus and Romania, two cases that have experienced 
contrasting fortunes in terms of both economic restructuring and social order 
development.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Belarus and Romania: contrasting cases in  
structural transformation and social order development 
 
7. Introduction  
 
This chapter compares the relationship between economic structure and political 
development in two countries from the second cluster of cases identified in Chapter 
Three (Group B): Belarus and Romania. These cases are selected for comparison 
primarily because they display the greatest degree of change in the structure of their 
transnational sectors – the independent variable. Because Belarus has experienced an 
increasing dependence on natural resource exports, the hypotheses generated in Chapter 
Two would lead one to expect a decline negative social order development. Conversely, 
the diversification of the Romanian transnational economy, and the improvement in the 
technological sophistication of its production profile, would suggest an improvement on 
the indicators of social order development. Indeed, the two countries have displayed 
strikingly divergent patterns of integration with the international economy more 
generally, as well as different trajectories in social order development, and thus represent 
excellent test cases for the conceptual framework employed in this study.  
 
Because two countries are under examination in this chapter, the level of detail is 
not as high as in the other case studies. Consequently, only broad trends and patterns are 
highlighted. However, what this chapter loses in detail is outweighed by its comparative 
focus; the hypotheses generated in Chapter Two are tested with more rigour by analysing 
two countries that exhibit opposite tendencies on the independent variable. In short, 
increasing the number of observations that are given greater attention increases the 
strength of the overall conclusions drawn at the end of this study. As will be illustrated, 
Belarus has resembled Russia in both its record on economic restructuring and social 
order development, while Romania has, in recent years at least, tended to resemble 
Estonia, the case that is discussed in the next chapter. In both cases, the experience or 
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otherwise of economic restructuring has been the crucial variable in explaining social 
order development.   
   
Belarus has, from a starting point of relatively favourable initial economic 
conditions - although not as favourable as in Estonia (discussed in the next chapter) - 
simultaneously displayed an aversion to foreign capital and a rejection of market-oriented 
economic reform. This has resulted in a significant decline in the technology intensity of 
its export profile as well as a corresponding failure to develop competitive market 
structures within its leading export sectors. While output levels have not suffered the 
same severe decline as many other ex-Soviet republics did in the 1990s, this has largely 
been facilitated by the provision of cheap energy supplies from its larger neighbour, 
Russia. This has resulted in Belarus exhibiting many of the same characteristics as 
countries with large natural resource endowments. As in Russia, the Belarusian state has 
used revenues from natural resource exports to sustain a model of economic development 
that has not involved positive structural or institutional transformation of the economy. 
Rather Belarus has experienced a de-industrialization of its transnational economy, 
becoming more dependent on natural resource revenues to sustain both its economic 
model and its structure of political development. The absence of a diverse economic 
structure and a corresponding dearth of intra-sectoral competition inhibited the 
development of socio-economically defined actors that are independent of the state. 
Instead, the concentration of economic power within sectors that are closely linked to the 
state has stymied the emergence of an open-access order in Belarus. The selective 
disbursement of economic rents has been used to maintain a regime that is non-
transparent, unaccountable and based on the selective application of rules.           
   
By contrast, Romania has, despite an inauspicious beginning, used the anchor of 
international integration to facilitate both structural and institutional change in the 
economy, and to help build the foundations of an open-access political order. Progress 
has not been smooth; interludes of regression in economic policy, and an enduring 
inability to stamp out a deep-rooted tendency towards corruption, have at times slowed 
Romania‘s journey towards the higher levels of governance displayed by its neighbours 
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in Central and Eastern Europe. Of crucial importance is the role of the EU in shaping the 
policies of domestic elites within Romania (Vachudova, 2005; Gallagher, 2006; Hanson, 
2007a). Pressure from the EU, and the conditions imposed by it for Romania to undertake 
certain institutional changes, has at times been as important as internal, domestic factors 
in shaping the actions of Romania‘s rulers.149 The capacity for the EU to exert such 
pressure through the conditionality process is related to the pattern of development of 
Romania‘s transnational economy. Over the course of the 1990s, the EU became the most 
important destination for Romanian exports, as well as the primary source of FDI. This 
gave the EU considerable leverage and enabled it to appeal to domestic constituencies 
within Romania that were benefiting from closer links with the EU. Moreover, as 
investment flows increased, so the economy diversified, introducing greater competition 
into economy. Furthermore, specific exhortations from the EU to make progress in 
dealing with corruption and improving the quality of the legal system have also played an 
important role in encouraging social order development in Romania. This process is 
ongoing and Romania is far from the level of its Western neighbours in social-order 
development. However, the direction of progress has been positive, even if the speed has 
been disappointing at times.  
 
The argument contained within this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section 
identifies the most important economic and political legacies inherited from the socialist 
period. The second section locates the two countries within the wider international 
economy, describing the most salient features of the two countries‘ export profiles since 
the collapse of socialism. The third section highlights the most important economic 
developments relating to industrial restructuring in the transnational sector, and patterns 
of intra-sectoral competition in leading export sectors. In the fourth section, the effects of 
the contrasting degrees of economic competition within the two economies on the 
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 The main focus of the EU during accession was on ensuring that the single market would work in states 
that aspired to join. Thus, in general terms, the EU encouraged the general marketization of accession 
economies so that such states would possess the basic formal institutional framework that would enable 
economic agents from within those countries to withstand the competitive pressures imposed by the single 
market. Hence, accession partnership agreements emphasized privatization, financial liberalization and a 
general reduction in the role of the state in the economy. In tandem with the general encouragement of 
broad marketization, accession countries were required to adopt the community‘s acquis communautaire, 
the body of EU law.  
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capacity of socio-economic organizations to engage in collective action are considered.  
The fifth section examines basic patterns of social-order development since 1989-91. A 
final section summarises the main conclusions from within this chapter.  
 
7.1 The socialist legacy 
 
As in the two other post-socialist case studies contained in this study, the era of socialist 
rule represented a period of dramatic change, bequeathing a number of important 
economic and political legacies.
150
 In both cases, socialist rule facilitated the rapid 
industrialization of the two countries‘ economies and, despite many of the attendant 
negative characteristics associated with planned economies, represented perhaps the most 
rapid period of modernization in the history of the two countries. By the end of the 
socialist-era this period of modernization endowed both countries with considerable 
industrial capacities that left them with the potential to re-engage with the international 
economy on a competitive basis. However, the common affliction of concentrated intra-
sectoral market structures, a dependence on imported fuels, macroeconomic disarray, and 
essentially elite-led exits from socialist political systems that both facilitated insider-led 
spontaneous privatization of key industries and also led to a concentration of formal 
institutional political power with the socialist-era elite, all left both countries with much 
to do if they were to develop open-access social orders.     
 
7.1.1 Economic legacies 
 
 As was often the case under socialist regimes, the socialist period radically 
changed the structure of the two economies under examination here. Indeed, in both 
countries there remains a perception that the socialist period had a broadly positive effect 
on economic development. Prior to the Second World War, Belarus was, despite the 
increased industrial investment that took place in the first two Soviet five-year plans, a 
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 It is also the case that both countries experienced considerable geographic change in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. The redrawing of borders after the war resulted in a significant expansion of the 
Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, whereas Romania lost considerable land in the east to the Soviet 
Union (northern Bucovina to Soviet Ukraine, and Bessarabia to Soviet Moldova), while gaining sections of 
Transylvania from Hungary (see Vakar, 1956; Shafir, 1985; Marples, 2000; Light, 2006).  
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largely agrarian economy (Vakar, 1956). By 1940, only 21 percent of Belarus‘ population 
lived in cities and towns, compared to a figure of 34 percent in Russia and Ukraine (Ioffe, 
2004). Belarus then suffered particularly badly in the war which caused a reduction in the 
population from 9.2 million in 1940 to only 6.3 million in 1945, and resulting in 80 to 90 
percent of buildings being destroyed (Ioffe, 2008, p.106). Unfortunate as this was, the 
post-war reconstruction process facilitated a massive expansion of industrial capacity 
within Belarus. From the 1950s onwards, Belarus emerged as one of the major Soviet 
manufacturing regions, specializing in tractors, heavy trucks, oil processing, electronic 
components and other high-technology industry. A significant factor here was the strong 
presence of military-industrial (VPK) enterprises (IMF, 1992). Much of the industrial 
production within Belarus was located within and around Minsk and the eastern part of 
the country, with western parts remaining largely dependent on agrarian or labour-
intensive industries, such as textiles and food processing. However, productivity in both 
industry and agriculture was higher in Belarus than in most other Soviet republics. 
Belarus‘ industry was one of the most technologically advanced regions of the USSR and 
also had an unusually high share of export-oriented enterprises, with over 80 percent of 
industrial output exported to other republics or foreign countries (IMF, 1992).  
 
The foreign trade balance of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1988 is 
contained in Figure 7.1. This gives a picture, albeit imperfect due to the inter-linked 
Soviet economy, of where Belarus might tend to be competitive upon independence. This 
reveals that the processing and export of fuels were of particular importance to Belarus. 
From the 1970s onwards, Belarus became an important and strategic transit route for the 
expansion of Soviet oil exports to Western Europe as well as a location for considerable 
refinery capacity (Ioffe, 2008, p.106).
151
 This would prove to be one of the most 
important economic legacies of the Soviet period, exerting both positive and negative 
effects on the development of the Belarusian economy. While the relative diversity and 
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 The petrochemical industry is based on two refineries: NAFTAN, based in Novopolotsk, and Mozyr 
NPZ in Mozyr. NAFTAN remains the largest refinery in Europe, possessing a processing capacity of 
twenty million tons of crude oil annually. Mozyr NPZ has a capacity of twelve million tons a year. The 
combined capacity of the two refineries exceeds domestic demand by a factor of three, thus implying an 
export orientation. No other refinery in Russian and Eastern Europe possesses such a large surplus of 
refinery capacity after domestic demand is satisfied. Consequently, Belarus was to continue to be a key 
producer of fuel for export to Europe. See Ioffe (2004, 2008).   
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technological sophistication of the Belarusian production profile appeared positive, the 
size of firms across these sectors implied a monopoly position if the planned economy 
were dismantled. For example, the four main industrial branches, mechanical 
engineering, petrochemicals, radio-electronics and ferrous metallurgy, were dominated 
by just ten major industrial enterprises along with a similar number of smaller 
subsidiaries (Ioffe, 2004). The collapse of the Soviet Union also gave license to well 
placed insider managers to appropriate significant portions of Belarusian industry once 
the authority of the centre was irrevocably impaired (Kotz and Weir, 1997; Solnick, 
1999). Finally, of considerable significance was the effect of the Chernobyl disaster. 
Although this did not exert a direct effect on the structure of the economy, its 
demographic effects were considerable and signified a more general malaise in the 
capacity of the Belarusian authorities to respond to the needs of the population (Marples, 
1996, 1999).     
  
Overall, Belarus‘ role within the Soviet economy as a relatively efficient producer 
of high-technology products and energy transit route enabled it to enjoy one of the 
highest levels of living standards in the USSR, roughly comparable to Russia and 
Kazakhstan, and behind only the Baltic republics and Georgia (Maddison, 2003, p.110-
11). It was, however, also traditionally one of the most conservative republican 
leaderships within the Soviet Union, leading to the Belarusian party leadership being 
perhaps the most resistant to the economic and political liberalization that took place 
under Gorbachev (Marples, 1999). This is discussed further below. For now it is 
sufficient to note only that Belarus experienced very little in the way of even minimal 
institutional reform, even during the perestroika period. Indeed, the relative success of 
economic development in Belarus was, and remains, considered by some to be one of the 
most important factors shaping modern day developments; quite simply, Belarusians 
associate the Soviet period with stability and development, thus suppressing the urge to 
engage in radical change, both among the elite and the wider population (Marples, 1999; 
Ioffe, 2004, 2008).     
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Figure 7.1 Foreign trade balance of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) by 
sector, 1988 (million roubles) 
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Source: Vestnik Statistiki in IMF (1992, p.229).  
 
Like Belarus, the post-war period of rapid industrialization that took place under 
socialist rule transformed Romania from a relatively backward, essentially agrarian 
economy, in which around 75 percent of the working population were employed in 
agriculture at the end of the Second World War (Earle and Sapatoru, 1994, p.89), into a 
more modern, albeit Soviet-type economy, in which a large proportion of overall 
investment was directed to more technologically advanced heavy industries, such as steel, 
chemicals, and refining (Linden, 1986, pp.352-4). This resulted in gross industrial output 
increasing annually by an average of 10.6 percent in 1950-55, by 9.5 percent in 1955-58, 
15.4 percent in 1958-60, and 12.2 percent in 1960-63, one of the highest rates of 
industrial growth in socialist region (Montias, 1967, p.56; Shafir, 1985, p.107). The post-
war Romanian economy was not completely skewed towards heavy industry, either; until 
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1963, consumer goods and heavy industry contributed in equal measure to total industrial 
product (Montias, 1967, p.15). If the structure of the Romanian economy was familiar to 
observers of socialist-type economies, the trade policy that emerged first under the 
leadership of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and was then maintained by Nicolae Ceausescu, 
was something quite different. As part of wider foreign and domestic policy strategy that 
sought to achieve at least some autonomy from the Soviet Union, Gheoghiu-Dej 
encouraged the development of trade relations with a range of countries outside of 
COMECON.
152
 This divergence from standard COMECON practice took place as early 
as 1958 when trade with Western economies increased by 70 percent between 1958-61, 
in contrast to growth of trade with the Soviet Union of only 12 percent (Montias, 1967, 
p.136).
153
 Indeed, the proportion of exports to COMECON countries steadily declined so 
that by 1980 63 percent of Romanian exports went to non-COMECON countries (Farlow, 
1978; Lavigne, 1991, p.17).  
 
After the death of Gheorghiu-Dej in 1965, the same independent trade policy and 
program of industrialization continued under the new leader, Nicolae Ceausescu, with 
some success. During the Fifth Five Year Plan (1971-1975), Romanian industrial output 
increased faster than any other COMECON country and its GNP growth rate was the 
highest in Europe (Nelson, 1995, p.199). However, these impressive figures masked the 
reality of a decline in the standard of living for the vast majority of Romanians as the 
persistently high rate of industrial investment (approximately 35-40 percent of GNP) left 
increasingly limited resources for the consumer-oriented sectors of the economy (Nelson, 
1995). Furthermore, while the emphasis was on acquiring its own industrial base for 
political reasons, the economic rationale was not quite as clear. Romanian industry 
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 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Romanian leadership viewed COMECON with much suspicion. 
While the Ministry of Foreign Trade had a strong preference for buying machinery and equipment from 
countries that would in turn purchase Romania industrial products (known as ―reciprocity‖), other more 
industrially advanced countries such as East Germany and Czechoslovakia expressed a preference for trade 
based on comparative advantage. The program of reciprocity enabled Romania to build its industries at a 
substantially faster rate than other counties, and also decreased the degree of economic dependence on the 
Soviet Union (see Montias, 1967). This issue was the focus of economic policy disputes throughout the 
1950s and 1960s.  
153
 In this respect Romania was ahead of other Central and Eastern countries that began their switch 
towards trade with Western European economies some years later. This re-orientation of trading partners in 
Central and Eastern Europe was discussed in Chapter 4.  
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tended to produce goods of inferior quality that were not acceptable in the West or, 
indeed, in more advanced COMECON countries (Roper, 2000, p.53). In some part, this 
impelled the Romanian leadership to cultivate trade relations with Less Developed 
Countries (LDCs) that did not require the same quality of goods demanded by its more 
immediate neighbours (King, 1978). As the 1970s progressed, the domestic industrial 
policy aimed at increasing self-sufficiency faced severe problems. Internally, the reserves 
of labour and raw materials, particularly petroleum, were becoming exhausted, problems 
that also faced other socialist economies as the extensive model of economic 
development became less effective (Berend, 1996).Abroad, the oil shocks that followed 
1973 had the dual effect of increasing the price of Romanian fuel imports while the oil 
shock-induced recession in Western economies reduced demand for Romanian exports 
(Cojanu, 1994). Consequently, Romania developed persistent trade deficits in both hard 
currency and roubles that forced it to borrow heavily from abroad to finance its balance 
of payments deficits. The stock of external debt expanded rapidly, leading Ceausescu to 
announce that the government would repay all outstanding external debt ahead of 
schedule, a feat that was achieved in 1989 (Ben-Ner and Montias, 1991, pp.164-65).  
 
The debt payment plan marked the end of Romania‘s industrial policy that had 
been pursued since Gheoghiu-Dej‘s leadership after the Second World War. Whereas the 
1980s saw most other socialist states pursue variations of the decentralization and 
liberalization of the planned economies, the opposite was true of Romania.
154
 Control 
over the economy was tightened, imports of foreign goods, most notably higher-
technology goods, were cut dramatically, and living standards quickly dropped (OECD, 
1993, pp.11-13). Consequently, resources available for investment were drastically 
curtailed, while the return to what capital that was invested declined from 1.51 leu of 
value-added for each leu invested between 1976-1980 to a mere 0.21 lei in 1986-90 (Pop, 
2006, p.16). The 1980s thus saw a period of deterioration of the industrial base and 
represented a step backwards in the economic development of Romania.  
                                                 
154
 Attempts at decentralization and reform of the planned mechanism of resource allocation are discussed 
in Kornai (1992), Berend (1996) and Eichengreen (2007). 
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Romania was further afflicted by the same distorted production structure that was 
evident in other socialist economies. It was dominated by large enterprises, with 49 
percent of production taking place in firms of 3,000 employees or more (OECD, 1993, 
p.11). For many products, the industrial structure was often monopolistic or 
monopsonistic, with trade links between firms organized along closed, vertically 
integrated production chains (Pilat, 1996). However, while these were serious problems, 
Romania did possess a diverse export profile, with no obvious leading sector (Table 7.1). 
While refined fuel exports were the dominant export, they were by this stage in decline as 
domestic reserves were depleted and access to external supplies was limited by balance 
of payments pressures. There were also significant exports of medium- to high-
technology goods, such as nuclear machinery and railway equipment, as well as evidence 
of low-technology, labour intensive activities, such as apparel production. Finally, much 
of this industrial capacity was particularly energy intensive. By 1990 the gross primary 
energy intensity of Romanian economy was roughly three times the average of OECD 
economies and even higher than most other Central and Eastern European countries 
(World Bank, 1994). This would present considerable challenges in the post-socialist 
period.          
 
Table 7.1 Romanian exports (HS-92 classification), 1988 (percent of total exports) 
HS-92 
Code 
Percent of total 
exports    Description       
  27 18% Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc   
  84 14% Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc   
  72 9% Iron and steel       
  87 9% Vehicles other than railway, tramway   
  94 6% Furniture, lighting, signs, prefabricated buildings 
  62 5% Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 
  76 4% Aluminum and articles thereof     
  86 3% Railway, tramway locomotives, rolling stock, equipment 
  73 3% Articles of iron or steel     
  44 3% Wood and articles of wood, wood charcoal   
  27% Other          
Total: 100%           
Source: United Nations Comtrade (2007). 
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Thus, both countries approached the post-socialist era from a mixed position. On 
the one hand, both had experienced significant benefits from the post-war 
industrialization drive, transforming them from agrarian economies to modern, albeit 
over-industrialized economies. Because of this, both countries had some level of 
industrial capacity that could help form the basis for reintegration within the international 
economy based on some relatively productive sectors. Moreover, both economies did not 
suffer from the same dependence on a few industries that, for example, characterised 
Russia‘s integration with the international economy. Belarus‘ relatively diverse industrial 
profile (at least by Soviet standards), its intra-USSR specialization in higher-technology 
activity, and strategic position as a processing and transit route for Russian fuel exports 
could be seen as a positive legacy, while its conservative economic management of the 
economy and concentrated market structure of its main industries were perhaps more 
negative tendencies. Similar features defined the Romanian economy. However, the 
severe contraction of industrial investment, the extreme energy intensity of Romanian 
industry, and the recentralization of economic management of the 1980s, would later 
serve as significant handicaps for economic development.   
 
7.1.2 Political legacies  
 
Both Belarus and Romania were described by Kitschelt et al (1999) as countries 
experiencing forms of patrimonial communism in which regimes combined elements of 
extreme repression, extensive networks of patron-client relations and subtle competition 
among competing factions (Marples, 1999; Ioffe, 2008; Linz and Stepan, 1996; 
Gallagher, 2006; Pop, 2006). The distinguishing features of patrimonial socialist systems 
(vertical chains of dependence, extensive patronage networks, low rational—bureaucratic 
institutionalization of rules, and repression of opposition groups) made the selection of 
certain new post-socialist institutional structures more likely than others by forming 
particular patterns of interests and specific distributions of resources among these 
interests (Easter, 1997).  
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Within the context of overall CPSU control, Belarusian politics was dominated by 
Kiryl Mazurau (1956-1965) and his successor as First Party Secretary of the Belarusian 
SSR, Pyotr Masherau (1965-1980). Intra-republican elite circulation was quite limited 
and both leaders vigorously asserted the interests of the Belarusian SSR at the all-Union 
level while using the fruits of national economic development described above to 
maintain a high degree of popularity within Belarus (Urban, 1989; Marples, 1999, pp.20-
21). Perhaps because of the perception that Soviet rule had exerted broadly positive 
effects on Belarusian development, the leadership often adopted more doctrinaire and 
conservative positions than other member of the Soviet elite. This bore some similarities 
to the situation in Romania where Gheoghiu-Dej and Ceausescu both constructed a 
regime based on patronage that derived its legitimacy from its nationalist tendencies and 
economic achievements (Roper, 2000; Gallagher, 2006). However, by the 1980s, this 
system had atrophied under Ceausescu to become what has been described as a 
―sultanistic state‖ in which previously existing patrimonial tendencies became more 
exaggerated and associated with the ‗sultan‘, in this case Ceausescu and his immediate 
family (Linz and Stepan, 1996). The close connections between rulers and economy that 
form the basis of patrimonial regimes, along with the repression of any other form of 
independent political activity, ensured that the exit from socialism was, in both cases, an 
essentially elite-led process in which popular forces played a role that was limited both in 
scope and duration, despite the decapitation of the most important political actors from 
the socialist period.  
 
In Belarus, the events that led up to the Belavezha settlement that formally ended 
the Soviet Union and created an independent Belarusian state were orchestrated by 
members of the existing party elite with little reference to the views of the Belarusian 
Popular Front (BPF). This contrasted with, for example, Estonia and even Russia, where 
opposition forces located outside the party-elite were much more prominent and were 
able to co-operate with reformist elements from within the party-elite. Indeed, while the 
BPF did enjoy some support (around 25 percent of the population), it failed to present 
itself as a viable alternative to the existing elite and had little impact on, for example, 
institutional design in the late-Soviet-early independence period (Marples, 1999; Ioffe, 
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2008). Instead, key decisions on both political and economic matters continued to be 
made by Vyachaslau Kebich, chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Stanislau 
Shushkevich, the speaker in the Soviet-era parliament. As such, there was very little 
change at the elite level, something that was further facilitated by a rather passive 
approach to events by the more general population (Marples and Padhol, 2002). This 
represented a political environment that exhibited very weak signs of competition. Intra-
elite disagreements aside (e.g., between Kebich and Shushkevich), the Belarusian 
political landscape seemed to be dominated by the incumbent party-state elite, with only 
a marginal role enjoyed the main opposition force.      
 
 Broadly speaking, the situation was again quite similar in Romania. While the 
events surrounding the removal of Nicolae Ceausescu and his family remain contested, 
the outcome of the revolution was clearer (e.g., Siani Davies, 2005). In short, communists 
rather than the communist party exerted the most influence after the collapse of the 
Ceausescu regime (Gilberg, 1991, p.270). Two factors explain the ease with which the 
existing elite were able to quickly take control of the trajectory of post-socialist politics. 
First, the role of the elite in the revolution, while contested, has been painted as pre-
meditated, implying that sections of the elite that were disaffected with Ceausescu‘s rule 
moved to remove him under the pretence of a popular revolution that in fact enabled 
them to move swiftly to capture the post-revolutionary political process (Codrescu, 1992; 
Verdery and Kligman, 1992). Second, evidence supporting this thesis is provided by the 
extreme weakness of Romanian civil society at this point. Decades of political repression 
during which Ceausescu‘s regime was considered one of the most repressive in the 
socialist bloc severely limited the capacity for groups independent of the state to 
organize.
155
 Thus, the revolution of 1989 was a not a genuinely ‗bottom-up‘, popular 
uprising. Subsequent events further support the view that the anti-Ceausescu elite was 
able to ‗capture‘ events at the popular level, if not fully ‗script‘ the revolution to achieve 
their own ends. The National Salvation Front (FSN), established during the revolution, 
was quickly appropriated by leading communists under the influence of Ion Iliescu. Over 
                                                 
155
 See Linz and Stepan (1996, p.352)  for comparative data on numbers of social movements across the 
region in the revolutionary period. 
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the course of 1989-90, Iliescu and the FSN were able to achieve emphatic victories in the 
initial post-socialist elections and then proceed to engineer a constitutional design that 
gave more power to the President, Iliescu, than was common in most other Central and 
Eastern European countries (Fish, 1998; Pop, 2005; Gallagher, 2006). Indeed, while not a 
formally Presidential system, the fact that the FSN was linked so closely to the President 
gave the ex-socialist elite a firm grip on political and economic policy in the aftermath of 
the revolution.  
 
7.1.3 Conclusion 
 
The initial conditions in Belarus and Romania were neither as favourable as those 
in Estonia, examined in the next chapter, nor as unfavourable as in Russia. Both countries 
possessed relatively dispersed production profiles, albeit marked by concentrated intra-
sectoral production structures, as was common in many other socialist economies. 
However, the level of technological sophistication in some sectors was high, particularly 
in Belarus. Romania, by contrast, suffered from the decline in investment over the 1980s 
that accompanied the period of debt repayment. It was on the political level, perhaps, that 
both countries inherited more negative features. Like Belarus and Russia, both countries 
experienced essentially elite-led exits from the socialist period with very little evidence of 
sustained, broadly based popular participation. This enabled the ex-socialist elite in both 
countries to capture the political process after the collapse of the respective socialist 
regimes. Again, while this was certainly a negative tendency, it was not a wholly 
disappointing period. The leaderships in both countries indicated a commitment to 
market-based economic reform and democratic political systems, albeit systems that were 
controlled by, and run for the benefit of, ex-socialist elites. Compared to the other case 
studies contained within this study, both Belarus and Romania resembled Russia more 
than Estonia.  
 
In short, only tentative foundations were laid for the development of open-access 
social orders. But it was equally not apparent at this point that either country would 
develop into limited-access orders. Instead, the situation seemed evenly poised. However, 
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as subsequent events were to illustrate, the two countries would develop along markedly 
different lines. As will be argued throughout the remainder of this chapter, events relating 
to the structural transformation of the economy were crucial in explaining the different 
trajectories of social-order development that were to occur over the next decade and half. 
These issues are examined in the next section.      
 
7.2 General features of economic structure in Belarus and Romania  
 
7.2.1 Leading sectors and the position of Belarus and Romania in the international 
economy 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist trading bloc had a profound effect on 
both countries. Belarus suffered a severe contraction in economic activity shortly after 
independence that exacerbated the more general decline of the Soviet economy that 
occurred over the course of the perestroika period. The nature of the exit from socialism 
in which the existing party-elite continued to hold all powerful positions within 
government led to a general resistance to fundamental economic change (Marples and 
Padhol, 2002; Zlotnikov, 2002). Although some reforms were undertaken in the early 
1990s, they were much more limited than in most other countries of the region (EBRD, 
2002). Initial challenges included defence conversion, modernization of existing capacity, 
and an increasingly dire situation for consumer goods. Trade with former Soviet 
republics declined dramatically, causing significant disruption to a number of key 
Belarusian industries, not least the fuel industry which suffered a 43.3 percent decline in 
output over 1991-2 (Marples, 1999, p.32).  
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Figure 7.2 Structure of Belarusian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total exports)
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Source: United Nations, Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
However, by the early 1990s the volume of trade with both Russia and the wider 
international economy increased, leading a gradual crystallization in the composition of 
its export profile (Fig.7.2). Despite the reluctance of the Belarusian leadership to engage 
in substantial economic reform or to re-orient its trading links away from traditional (i.e. 
Soviet) trading partners, Belarus experienced both an increase in its overall ratio of trade 
to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and a switch in the direction of its trade away from the 
former Soviet Union to European countries.
157
 In 1997, the Belarusian export profile was 
quite diverse; by 2006, however, the processing and export of imported (subsidised) fuels 
                                                 
156
 These charts are based on 2-digit level data (United Nations Comtrade, 2008) that describe product-type 
rather than technology intensity. 
157
 As a proportion of GDP, trade (imports plus exports) increased from 70 percent in 1991 to 123 percent 
in 2007. Although this is a common feature of small economies, it worth considering that this proportion is 
comparable to that of much more liberal and openly integrationist economies. For example, in 2006, 
Estonia‘s trade turnover was 138 percent of GDP, 109 percent in Latvia, 129 percent in Lithuania, 399 
percent in Hong Kong, and 462 percent in Singapore (World Bank Development Indicators, 2008). In this 
respect, this belies accusations that Belarus is a more closed economy than its neighbours. In terms of the 
direction of trade, former Soviet republics absorbed 69 percent of Belarusian exports in 1992. By 2006, this 
had steadily declined to a more modest 44 percent of total exports. This decline was mirrored by an 
increase in trade with European countries which increased from 24 percent in 1992 to 58 percent in 2006 
(IMF Direction of Trade statistics).    
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from Russia had clearly become the leading Belarusian export activity.
158
 Unsurprisingly, 
this was accompanied by a decline in the technology intensity of exports (Fig 7.3). 
Indeed, the proportion of low, medium-, and high-technology activities has decreased 
relative to primary and resource-based products. Perhaps most significantly, the share of 
machinery exports – one of the more technologically advanced sections of the Soviet 
economy that contained considerable potential – has almost halved. To be sure, Belarus 
remained competitive in certain machinery exports, particularly of heavy trucks and 
tractors, which maintained a prominent share of overall exports, albeit one that has 
diminished over time. In these areas, Belarusian exporters were successful not only in 
former Soviet markets, but also in more advanced economies. However, this has been 
largely overshadowed by the sharp increase in fuel exports. As discussed below, this was 
as much a political decision by the Belarusian leadership under Alexander Lukashenka 
(since 1994) as a function of purely economic processes. This had generally negative 
implications for political development as well as the economy.  
 
Figure 7.3 Technology intensity of Belarusian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total 
exports) 
 
  
 
                
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
 
 
 
Source: United Nations, Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
                                                 
158
 Belarus registered a score of 0.15 on the Krugman Specialization Index in 1997, one of the lowest in the 
sample. By 2006, this had increased to 0.30.  
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Romania, like Belarus, experienced slow institutional reform, with market 
reforms being shallower and taking much longer than in most other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe (EBRD, 2002). As in Belarus, the grip of the socialist party-elite on 
the main levers of power certainly made them more resistant to the implementation of 
vigorous economic reform. Rather, well-connected individuals embarked on a process of 
wide-scale appropriation of state property (Pop, 2005; Gallagher, 2006). Initially, the 
most obvious challenge was familiar to the Romania leadership: how to obtain affordable 
fuels that could be processed using Romanian refinery capacity at a rate that would: (a) 
supply the energy intensive domestic industrial structure; and (b) leave a surplus that 
could be exported for hard currency earnings. Despite these constraints, trade became 
larger as a proportion of GDP and the already westward-oriented direction of trade 
intensified.
159
 The Romanian export profile has also become more diversified since 1997, 
registering a score of 0.32 on the KSI in 1997, moving to a lower score of 0.23 in 2006.     
 
Figure 7.4 Structure of Romanian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total exports)
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Source: United Nations, Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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 As a proportion of GDP, trade (imports plus exports) increased from 42 percent in 1990 to 78 percent in 
2006 (World Bank Development Indicators, 2008). In terms of the direction of trade, former Soviet 
republics accounted for only 21 percent of Romanian exports in 1989, declining to 5 percent in 2006. Trade 
with European countries continued to increase from a starting point of 52 percent in 1989 to over 92 
percent in 2006 (IMF Direction of Trade statistics).    
160
 These charts are based on 2-digit level data (United Nations Comtrade, 2008) that describe product-type 
rather than technology intensity. 
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Figure 7.5 Technology intensity of Romanian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total 
exports) 
 
  
 
                
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
 
Source: United Nations, Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
However, despite sharing some of the same initial problems as Belarus, such as a 
dependence on cheap imported fuel, an elite-led exit from their respective socialist 
regimes, and a general reluctance on the part of leadership to engage in deep economic 
reform, Romania‘s pattern of integration with the international economy has gone in the 
opposite direction. Where Belarus has showed signs of de-industrialization and an 
increasing dependence on fuel exports, Romania has experienced a diversification in its 
export profile and an increase in the general level of technological sophistication of its 
activities. Figure 7.4 shows how low-technology textile exports have gradually been 
replaced by medium-technology machinery manufacturing as the leading export sector. 
The share of most other sectors at the two-digit level has remained roughly stable. 
Medium-technology manufacturing encompasses a range of activities ranging from the 
manufacture of electrical components and motor vehicles, associated with FDI, to more 
traditional activities such as iron and steel production (Egresi, 2007). High-technology 
exports have also doubled as a proportion of overall exports between 1997 and 2006 
(Figure 7.5). Possible causes for these two quite different trajectories of industrial 
development in the two countries‘ transnational sectors are discussed later on, followed 
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by an examination of some of the political implications of the divergent patterns of 
economic development.        
 
7.2.2 Sectoral characteristics 
 
The export profiles of both countries are quite diverse. However, the main trends 
appear to be de-industrialization of Belarus‘ transnational economy, particularly of its 
machinery exporting sectors, and an increasing dependence upon fuel exports, with an 
increase in machinery exports in Romania and a continued specialization in textile 
activities. Hence, this section will briefly outline the defining characteristics of these 
three types of activities.  
 
The oil sector in Belarus displays some important differences between most other 
oil exporters, most notably the absence of any domestic oil deposits and the reliance on 
subsidised imports from Russia. Notwithstanding this peculiarity, the Belarusian oil 
industry continues to display the same core characteristics of other natural resource 
sectors in the extent to which it is characterised by high levels of capital intensity and 
economies of scale, as well as by high asset specificity and low levels of production 
flexibility. Such characteristics tend to result in specialized infrastructure, management 
and labour, and often raise the barriers to entry for other organizations (Shafer, 1994, 
p.22-24). The high cost of sector-specific investments in capital, infrastructure and labour 
also tend to ensure that barriers to exit are also high. As was evident in the case of Russia, 
as well as a range of other oil-exporting economies, such factors also tend to result in 
monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures as well as close links with the state. 
 
The importance of Russia as a supplier of subsidised oil adds a further dynamic to 
this set of sectoral characteristics as the entire Belarusian oil industry is dependent on the 
actions of an external set of actors, i.e. the Russian state and, to a lesser extent, Russian 
oil companies. This is added to the more general problem of fluctuating oil prices. As 
was noted in Chapter Two, dominance by natural sectors can increase the incentive for 
rent-seeking among elite actors and reduce the incentive for the state to promote the 
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diversification and restructuring of the economy (Auty, 1990; Chaudhry, 1997; Karl, 
1997;  Ross, 2001).    
 
Textile industries are traditional Romanian activities that have continued to 
occupy an important part in the overall export profile. In 1997, it accounted for 39 
percent of total exports, although by 2006 this share had diminished to around 27 percent. 
The textile sector exhibits almost the opposite characteristics to the natural resource 
sector (Shafer, 1994, pp.106-107). Generally speaking, capital intensity tends to be low 
with labour tending to account for the bulk of production costs, while the prevalence of 
small firms also indicates limited economies of scale (Glyn, 2006; Dahlman, 2008). 
Because of low capital requirements, asset specificity tends to be low and production 
flexibility tends to be high. As a result, barriers to entry are often low: fixed capital costs 
are low; economies of scale are unimportant; production is often divisible; skill 
requirements tend to be low; technology is often standardized and easily available; and 
infrastructure requirements are unspecialized. Low barriers to entry ensure competitive 
market structures and relatively low profit margins. Strong competition – both 
domestically and internationally - ensures that neither firms nor states possess the 
capacity to control the market; instead, firms can only conform to it. Together, these 
factors reduce the incentive for textile firms to pressure the state, as well as their capacity 
to do so.                  
 
The third group of export industries discussed covers a range of medium-
technology activities. This group comprises a technologically diverse range of 
manufacturing activities with differing sectoral characteristics. In Belarus and Romania, 
these tend to include activities that were described in Chapter Three as medium-
technology products, encompassing the automotive and engineering subgroups of 
medium-technology production (MT 1 and MT3), as well as MT2 activities such as iron 
and steel production. The MT1 and MT3 sectors are of particular importance in this 
chapter due to the contrasting fortunes of the two countries in developing competitiveness 
in these areas. 
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MT1 and MT3 activities, which in 2006 accounted for 25 percent of Romanian 
exports and 17.2 percent of Belarusian exports, tend to be very linkage-intensive, and 
require significant inter-firm interaction. The automotive and engineering sectors 
emphasize product design and development and require a higher standard of human 
capital. Many have mass assembly or production plants and extensive supplier networks, 
both domestic and foreign (small and medium enterprises are often important in these 
sectors). Barriers to entry tend to be higher due to economies of scale and moderate to 
high capital intensity. Production flexibility and asset specificity are also lower. 
However, these sectors do not tend to display the same degree of market concentration as 
natural resource sectors due to the importance of dispersed supplier networks. Thus, 
levels of competition can vary, and the potential for sectorally organized collective action 
lies somewhere between primary- and resource-based activities and high-technology 
activities. In addition, the role of foreign investment and international production 
networks (IPNs) is particularly prominent in these industries.  
 
MT2 activities, which in 2006 represented 11.4 percent of Belarusian exports and 
7.3 percent of Romanian exports, comprise industries that produce chemicals and process 
basic metals, such as iron and steel. Such process sectors tend to produce stable and 
undifferentiated goods; they too are often characterized by large economies of scale, and 
possess relatively high levels of technological sophistication, particularly in the 
production of higher value-added steel products, chemicals, and plastics. Barriers to entry 
tend to be larger due to economies of scale and moderate- to high-capital intensity. 
Production flexibility and asset specificity are also lower. Fierce international 
competition ensures that firms are often price-takers, while cyclical investment cycles 
that are contingent on changes in international demand can cause sharp variation in 
average annual prices. Consequently, the incentive for firms to pressure the state to 
insulate them from international pressures can be considerable.     
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7.2.3 Conclusion  
 
This section has identified the contrasting patterns of structural transformation 
and integration within the international trading system experienced by Belarus and 
Romania since the collapse of socialism. Perhaps the most important contrast is in the 
different trajectories taken on by medium-technology industries in the two countries. 
Whereas Belarus has seen the relative decline of medium-technology activities, 
particularly in MT1 and MT3 industries, Romania has experienced the largest 
proportional increase of these industries in their share of overall exports. In Belarus, this 
decline in manufacturing competitiveness has been mirrored by an increased dependence 
on the import, processing and export of subsidized Russian oil. These tendencies have 
been accompanied by a wider diversification of the Romanian transnational sector and an 
increased concentration in the export profile of Belarus. The general organizational 
features of the most important sectors were then described, along with several basic 
implications for the market structure and capacity for collective action that these sectoral 
syndromes imply.  
 
The contrast in fortunes of the two countries in upgrading and diversifying their 
export profiles indicates varying success in integration with the international economy 
more generally. These broad patterns are discussed in the next section. However, at this 
point it is useful to note that the initial conditions described in the previous section did 
not appear to weight the dice in favor of any particular direction of structural 
development: both entered the post-socialist period with similar political dynamics and a 
broadly comparable array of industries of varying technological intensity. Indeed, the 
change in fortunes experienced by the two economies did not become significantly 
apparent until the end of the 1990s. As will argued in the following section, the role of 
privatization patterns, external influences and divergent patterns of investment – both 
domestic and foreign - appear to have been the most crucial variables in explaining the 
different outcomes. This then exerted opposite pressures on the development of the social 
orders of the two countries.    
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7.3 Main economic developments and market structure of leading export sectors 
 
7.3.1 Main economic developments in the post-socialist period  
 
The elite-led political transition following the collapse of the socialist regimes in both 
countries left them governed by political elites that were broadly resistant to fundamental 
economic reform (Marples, 1999; Zlotnikov, 2002; Roper, 2000; Gallagher, 2006). In this 
respect, both countries bore more similarities to Russia than Estonia, although it could be 
argued that even Russia undertook more rapid economic reform than these two countries, 
at least in the early 1990s. Belarus has occupied an outlying position on indices of 
economic reform since 1991, leading it to be described as a ‗command economy without 
central planning‘, in view of the persistent dominance of administrative controls over 
prices, output and foreign trade (Nuti, 2000). While Romania did at least register greater 
progress than Belarus in the early 1990s, both countries were relative laggards when 
compared to other countries within the region, particularly those in Central and Eastern 
Europe (see, e.g., Nuti, 2000; EBRD, 2001). Both countries experienced a protracted 
burst of inflation as ailing industries in both countries  were able to influence each 
respective political leadership and exact burdensome subsidies that the state was unable 
to afford through existing revenues. Consequently, the money supply was increased and 
inflation was the inevitable consequence.  
 
Prolonged bouts of inflation, falling state revenues, and underdeveloped financial 
systems limited the availability of capital that might have facilitated economic 
restructuring. This meant that access to foreign capital was essential to effect meaningful 
restructuring of the two economies. In this respect, both countries performed quite poorly 
relative to the regional average, at least throughout the 1990s. However, large FDI 
inflows from 2002 onwards enabled Romania to experience rapid restructuring thereafter. 
Space constraints do not permit an analysis of all of the important economic 
developments in both countries. Instead, this section will assess three areas that are of 
particular importance to this study: privatization; investment patterns; and the role of 
external actors. Developments in these three areas have exerted a strong influence over 
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the degree to which competitive tendencies have existed in both economies with 
important implications for social order development.  
 
7.3.2 Privatization  
 
The pace of privatization was slow in Belarus, even before the ascent of 
Alexander Lukashenka to power in 1994 (Brukoff, 2002; Zlotnikov, 2002). While a 
number of laws on privatization and the transition to a free-market economy more 
generally were promulgated in the early 1990s, they remained only paper commitments 
(Marples, 1999, p.33). The ruling elite were, as indicated previously, generally resistant 
to radical change, with only the minority opposition, the BPF, in favour of wide-scale 
privatization of state assets. Between 1991 and 1993, only 308 enterprises were 
privatized, encompassing just 2.8 percent of the workforce (Mamenok, 1996, p.5). Of 
this, many were those managed by managers that were close to the political leadership, 
representing only a mild case of insider-privatization (Zlotnikov, 2002). However, even 
this slow pace was reversed under Lukashenka, who was elected as President in 1994, 
who repudiated the market-based reforms that were undertaken in many other countries 
across the region and maintained heavy state control of the economy, leaving Belarus 
with a comparatively feeble proportion of private sector economic activity (Figure 
7.6).
161
 This domination of economic activity by the state caused a fusion of economic 
and political power and represented a situation not too dissimilar from the preceding 
Soviet period.      
 
 Privatization in Romania was considerably deeper than in Belarus, approximating 
the regional average since 1993 (Figure 7.6). In the immediate aftermath of the 
revolution, only ‗spontaneous privatization‘ took place as well-connected insiders, as 
well as farmers, appropriated state assets while the state was weak and before it could 
formulate a consistent privatization program. In many ways, this suited the FSN and the 
supporters of Iliescu as they were more often than the primary beneficiaries of insider 
                                                 
161
 Even where privatization has occurred, it has not improved the efficiency of Belarusian enterprises, due 
to the fact that the high degree of state ownership that is present elsewhere in the economy has reduced the 
overall institutional environment in which Belarusian firms operate (see Estrin and Bakanorova, 2007). 
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deals (Pop, 2005, Ch.3). Furthermore, the state was reluctant to privatize the most 
profitable enterprises, most notably in the energy and resource-extraction sectors, because 
of their fundamental importance in state subsidization of less efficient industries as value-
added from profitable sectors was transferred to loss-making sectors (Smith, 2006, p.30). 
Consequently, governments from both ends of the ideological spectrum implemented 
privatization programs in a slow and fitful manner. After 2000, however, the private 
sector share in the economy began to accelerate again largely as a result of direct sales of 
enterprises and financial institutions to foreign owners (IMF, 2006; Smith, 2006).    
 
Figure 7.6 Private sector share of GDP (percent) in Belarus and Romania compared with 
un-weighted regional average, 1993-2007 
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Source: EBRD (2008); author‘s calculations.  
 
7.3.3 Investment 
 
After initially impressive figures, the slow pace of privatization and its eventual 
reversal after the mid-1990s caused investment levels to track below the regional average 
in Belarus (Figure 7.7). This was further exacerbated by some of the lowest levels of net 
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FDI inflows in the region. The focus on ties with Russia meant that it also shunned FDI 
to a large degree (Balmaceda, 2002; Brukoff, 2002; Zlotnikov, 2002; Sannikov, 2002). 
Foreign ownership was met with enthusiasm by neither the state, which controlled most 
of the economy anyway, nor the general population (Colton, 2002). Consequently, the 
amount of capital that was available for improving the technological sophistication of the 
Belarusian economy was much reduced. Moreover, the level of capital formation 
contained in Figure 7.7 disguises the nature of Belarusian investment over this period. 
The financial system was under-developed and subject to state repression, leading to 
savings being diverted towards camouflaging state deficits caused by a high degree of 
subsidy of state-controlled industry (Korosteleva, 2004). Indeed, much of what was 
invested in the Belarusian economy was focused on sustaining existing state-controlled 
industry rather on developing new industries. Instead, the Belarusian state came to rely 
increasingly on revenues derived from existing oil refinery capacity from the Soviet-era 
and the disbursement of subsidized energy supplies.  
 
Figure 7.7 Gross capital formation rates (percent of GDP) and annual net inflows of FDI 
(percent of GDP) in Belarus compared to an un-weighted regional average, 1993 to 2006 
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By contrast, Romania was far more successful in attracting FDI inflows, 
particularly after 2001-02 (Figure 7.8). Large FDI inflows can be observed in the motor 
vehicle industry and the electrical components industry (Smith, 2006; Eversi, 2007). This 
helped develop industries that were, prior to these inflows, of minor importance to the 
Romanian transnational sector. Such inflows compensated for an otherwise low level of 
domestic investment, a characteristic that was in large part a function of the rent-seeking 
and corruption that defined much of Romanian political economy in the 1990s (Pop, 
2005; Gallagher, 2006). As in Belarus, much of the domestic investment that took place 
over the course of the 1990s was largely directed towards industries linked to members of 
the ruling elite (Roper, 2000; Gallagher, 2006). The role of foreign investment was thus 
of crucial importance in explaining these divergent patterns of investment. In this respect, 
the roles of external forces in both countries were important and are discussed below.  
 
Figure 7.8 Gross capital formation rates (percent of GDP) and annual net inflows of FDI 
(percent of GDP) in Romania compared to an unweighted regional average, 1993 to 2006 
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7.3.4 External factors  
 
The role of external factors also separates the two countries. For Belarus, the 
determination of the political and economic elite to maintain strong ties with Russia has 
caused it to largely shun the process of integration within EU structures that has taken 
place in its western neighbours (Balmaceda, 1999; Marples, 1999; Drakohrust and 
Furman, 2002; Ioffe, 2008).
162
 Domestic political choices were of crucial importance 
here; ignoring the views of the main opposition force in Belarus, the western-oriented 
BPF, Lukashenka has instead focused on exacting favourable terms of trade, particularly 
in energy imports, from Russia (Balmaceda, 1999; Lewis, 2002; Korosteleva, Lawson 
and Marsh, 2005). Specifically, this has involved maintaining cheap oil imports as well as 
securing market share in the former Soviet space for industrial exports (Nuti, 2004). 
Russia and other former Soviet countries have proven to be vital export markets for 
Belarus, acting as ‗un-demanding customers‘ for Belarusian manufactures. This is 
particularly true outside  the richest areas of Russia and in other poorer post-Soviet 
economies where Belarusian goods serve as substitutes for unaffordable imports from 
other countries. In the 1990s relations were so close that Lukashenka was assertive in his 
attempts to achieve closer political integration between the two countries, perhaps even a 
formal union. However, the Russian side was less keen and Lukashenka has since 
distanced himself from such integrationist tendencies (see Danilovich, 2006). It should be 
noted that this choice was not without domestic support; opinion polls, as well as election 
results, indicate that the majority of the Belarusian population have supported this pro-
Russian tendency in trade policy (Colton, 2002; Ioffe, 2008).  
 
However, while the Belarusian elite and general population have supported 
stronger ties with Russia, events within Russia – most notably, the desire to maximize 
revenues from fuel exports, particularly from regimes that did not pledge fealty to 
                                                 
162
 Belarus has, like Russia, also failed to achieve membership of the World Trade Organization, while 
Romania achieved WTO membership in 1995.  Belarus is, however, a member of the Eurasian Economic 
Community, a collection of former Soviet states that includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan. Given that these former Soviet republics have traditionally served as markets for Belarusian 
goods, it is not clear that links with these countries have had a discernibly positive effect on Belarus‘ 
economic development.   
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Moscow - began to undermine Lukashenka‘s model of development from 2004 onwards. 
As the export data presented in this chapter illustrate, Belarus had, by 2006, become 
increasingly reliant on cheap fuel imports from Russia which were processed and re-
exported. Furthermore, while the EU has acted as an agent of transformation in Estonia 
and Romania, Russia‘s influence in Belarus has not been as positive, largely leaving 
domestic politics to run its own course. However, the decision of Russian policy makers 
to exact better terms for Russia from its trade relations from 2005 undermined this policy 
of dependence on Russia. Efforts to increase the price of oil sold to Belarus revealed the 
fragility of the Belarusian development model to that date. Moreover, the lack of 
investment, particularly in new industries, has left Belarus in a precarious position. 
 
By contrast, Romania did look to the West and the EU in particular (Phinnemore, 
2006). Over the course of the 1990s, two trends were apparent in Romanian attitudes 
towards the prospect of integration with EU structures. On the one hand, the elite 
surrounding the President and his parliamentary supporters from the successor parties to 
the FSN spent the early period of the 1990s denying the right of the EU to intervene in 
Romania‘s affairs. Content with promoting ‗original democracy‘ in Romania (i.e. 
democracy without political parties), the EU was viewed as an irritant that opposed the 
actions of the predatory elite that was ruling Romania throughout this period (Gallagher, 
2006). On the other hand, however, opinion poll evidence suggests that the general 
population was well-disposed towards EU integration (Light, 2006, p.22-4). 
Consequently, as the grip on power of Iliescu and his supporters weakened in the face of 
internal splits, weak economic performance and a resurgent opposition, Iliescu was 
forced to perform a volte face and campaign on a policy of deeper ties with the EU.  
 
With both the ex-socialist elite and the more Western-inclined opposition 
promulgating pro-EU policies, the EU was able to act as an agent of real institutional 
change in Romania, using the prospect of membership and lucrative transfers as an 
incentive for even the predatory ex-socialist elite to change their behaviour. In this 
respect, EU pressure caused the Romanian elite to see a change in the broad direction of 
marketization as a necessary step towards securing the ‗carrot‘ of EU membership; thus, 
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they were able to maintain some of the specifically Romanian elements of capitalism, 
while still moving in the direction demanded by the EU (see Pop, 2005; Gallagher, 2006; 
Hanson, 2007a). As the prospect of membership became stronger so foreign investment 
increased, causing a sharp restructuring of the Romanian transnational sector. Moreover, 
the presence of foreign firms and local enterprises linked to these, injected much needed 
competition into the Romanian economy after a period of stagnation (OECD, 2002).  
 
7.3.5 Market structure of leading export sectors 
 
The divergent patterns of transnational sector diversification and upgrading that 
have emerged in the two countries since the early 1990s have also resulted in distinct 
market structures characterising the leading sectors within each respective economy. In 
Belarus, the state has maintained an overwhelming share in the economy, investment has 
been directed predominantly at existing state-controlled industries, foreign investment 
has been severely limited, and the government have strived to sustain close links with the 
Russian economy, primarily as a means to acquiring cheap energy supplies. This has led 
to minimal structural and institutional change within the Belarusian economy. The Soviet 
pattern of industrial concentration remains largely untouched. As was mentioned in 
section 7.1, the Belarusian fuel processing industry is dominated by two large enterprises, 
NAFTAN and Mozyr NPZ. This is consistent with the dominant pattern of market 
structure in energy sectors in most other countries. The fact that both companies are 
controlled by the state is also perhaps not too surprising. 
 
The market structure of other leading Belarusian transnational industries is also 
highly concentrated, often in sectors where concentration of production is not usually the 
case elsewhere. This point is particularly important. As will be shown below, the 
development of the machinery, automobile and electronic component industry in 
Romania appeared to facilitate, if not cause, greater intra-sectoral diversification. 
However, in Belarus this was not the case. MTZ (tractors), MAZ, (trucks), MoAZ (self-
propelled scrapers, earth movers), Gomsel‘mash (harvesting combines), MZKT (heavy-
duty tractor trailers), and BELAZ (heavy mining trucks) all dominate every stage of the 
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production process in each of their respective sectors (Ioffe, 2008; Smith, 2008). 
Competition within each of these sectors is nearly non-existent. Moreover, each company 
is state-controlled. These patterns are repeated elsewhere. For example, the Minsk-based 
Integral dominates the radio-electronics industry, while Belarusian Metallurgic Plant in 
Gomel region dominates the steel products industry. In short, the heavy hand of the state 
and a lack of investment have left Belarus with much of the Soviet-era production 
structure intact and un-reformed. Moreover, the fact that many of these products are 
exported to relatively undemanding former Soviet customers has further reduced the 
incentive for restructuring and modernization of these sectors. The limited role of small- 
and medium-sized enterprises in Belarus (SMEs) leaves very few sections of the 
economy characterized by competitive market structures. Indeed, even in the non-state 
owned sections of the economy, company performance is hindered by the poor 
institutional environment that is present in Belarus (Estrin and Bakanorova, 2007).  As 
will be discussed in the next section, this has not necessarily caused the political system 
to become more closed; however, it has reduced the scope for the emergence of any 
future counterweights to the Belarusian state.     
 
In Romania, on the other hand, diversification of the overall inter-sectoral export 
profile has been accompanied by an increase in the level of intra-sectoral competition. 
This is primarily a function of the types of industry that were dominant in the past (e.g., 
textiles) or have become increasingly important in the aftermath of increased flows of 
foreign investment (e.g., automobile manufacturing, electronic components). As was 
described in section 7.2, the labour-intensive textile industry in which Romania has 
traditionally specialized in exporting (it was the leading sector in 1997; see section 7.2) 
tends to be fiercely competitive and dominated by large numbers of small firms. This is 
no different in Romania where over 50 percent of enterprises of domestic origin employ 
less than 10 members of staff, and only 3 companies employ over 250 (Romania Institute 
for National Statistics, 2007). This was Romania‘s second most important sector in 2006.  
 
In the sectors that have emerged in response to increased foreign investment flows 
since 2000, including automobile production and the manufacture of electrical 
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components, levels of competition are also high (EBRD, 2002; Smith, 2006; Egresi, 
2007). Collectively, the machinery manufacturing sector is now the leading export sector 
in Romania. Such industries often have a large impact on local economies as they 
stimulate the growth of a wide range of local enterprises that supply components and 
services. This is certainly the case in the automotive industry. Here, production plants use 
a wide array of components and materials, and are linked to an equally wide range of 
manufacturers, ranging from textiles to plastics to steel (Havas, 2000; Dicken, 2003). 
Moreover, the dominant just-in-time production model common in the automotive sector 
requires domestic suppliers to locate close to the main assembly plants, exerting positive 
multiplier effects on the local economy and stimulating the growth a range of SMEs 
(Dicken, 2003; Egresi, 2007). Major foreign investors in the Romanian automotive 
industry include Renault (through Dacia) and Daewoo (through Automobile Craiova). 
Although the two companies do dominate the automobile assembly industry, their 
substantial investments in Romania have caused the growth of a large number of SMEs 
that act as suppliers of services and components (Egresi, 2007), resulting in a high level 
of intra-sectoral competition. Thus, despite the fact that Romania was slow to embrace 
structural change in the 1990s, the inflows of foreign investment since 2000 have helped 
diversify the overall Romanian production profile and introduce higher levels of 
competition into a number of leading export sectors, as has been the case in other 
countries from the region that have opened up to outside investment (see, e.g., 
Drahokoupil, 2008).  
 
7.3.6 Conclusion   
 
Overall, the three contours of economic development in Belarus and Romania 
described in this section – privatization, investment patterns, and the contrasting role of 
external actors – all played a crucial role in shaping the economic structure of the two 
countries. The contrast in these areas between Belarus and Romania largely explain how 
they have experienced divergent patterns of development in their export profiles 
(described in section 7.2). This has resulted in little or no structural change in Belarus, 
while the dominance of the state within the economy has left very limited evidence of 
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intra-sectoral competition. In contrast, while Romania got off to a slow start in 
privatization and attracting foreign investment, the positive role of the EU stimulated 
greater investment after 2000. This has resulted in considerable change in the Romanian 
export profile, with increasing numbers of medium- and high-technology enterprises 
replacing more traditional low-technology and resource-based activities. This change in 
the sectoral composition of Romanian production has also caused an increase in intra-
sectoral competition. As the next section argues, the positive structural change observed 
in Romania exerted a positive influence over social-order development in Romania after 
2000. By contrast, the absence of significant structural change in Belarus, and the heavy 
influence of the state in the economy, have consolidated a limited-access order in Belarus 
and suppressed the emergence of forces that might act as a counter-weight to the state.  
 
7.4 Capacity for collective action in Belarus and Romania 
 
The stylized facts surrounding structural transformation in the transnational sectors of 
Belarus and Romania suggest two contrasting trajectories. Belarus has seen an increase in 
the concentration of significant production within only a few sectors along with a 
concomitant concentration of intra-sectoral market structures. By contrast, Romania has 
experienced a greater degree of dispersion in both the overall export profile, and in the 
level of intra-sectoral competition evident within leading sectors, particularly after the 
upturn in foreign investment after 2000. According to the hypotheses generated in 
Chapter Two, the two countries should experience different trajectories of social-order 
development. In Belarus, the concentration of economic activity within a few sectors, and 
the low level of intra-sectoral competition caused by a high proportion of state 
ownership, should lead to a non-transparent, sometimes arbitrary social-order in which a 
state that has direct control of economic resources is able to formulate and implement 
policy with little reference to non-state interests. Indeed, non-state agents in the form of 
civil society, political parties or independent business associations should be expected to 
exist in only a limited and ineffective form.  
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In Romania, on the other hand, increased economic competition that is a function 
of a more diversified production profile should be expected to cause the state to operate 
with more autonomy from the wider array of socio-economic organizations. Such 
competition should ensure that business-state relations are more open and transparent, 
facilitating the development of an open-access social order. As a consequence of greater 
dispersion of economic activity, groups within civil society, political parties and 
independent business associations should be more effective in acting as a counter-weight 
to state activity. The existence of strong, socio-economically defined organizations 
independent of the state should ensure that Romania has a greater chance of developing 
into an open-access order. The presence or otherwise of such independent forces and their 
capacity for collective action are examined in this section. Again, due to constraints on 
space, only the most salient contours of development along these four intervening 
variables will be presented.   
 
7.4.1 Business associations  
 
As in most other countries, organizations representing businesses in Belarus and 
Romania can be classified into two groups: sectorally defined business associations 
(BAs) that represent the interests of enterprises according to their industry; and broader 
umbrella organizations that encompass a broader range of industrial interests.  
 
In Belarus, the high proportion of state ownership in the economy, along with the 
presence of monopolistic or oligopolistic market structures in most of the important 
transnational (and national) industries, has reduced business associations to a subservient 
status for much of the time since independence. The prominent role of the state in the 
economy in general is unsurprisingly translated into state control of business associations. 
For example, the Belarusian Chamber of Commerce and Industry – a nominally 
independent organization - is composed of 1,400 enterprises accounting for over 80 
percent of industrial production (BCCI, 2008). 90 percent of these enterprises are 
estimated to be owned directly or controlled indirectly (through joint-stock status) by the 
state. The ability of the BCCI to act as an independent voice is thus severely 
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compromised. Moreover, SMEs are cajoled into signing up to broader umbrella 
organizations, such as the National Federation of Entrepreneurship or regional Unions of 
Entrepreneurs and Employers, where their actions can be monitored by the Presidential 
Administration (PA) and the state more generally (IFC, 2006, p.3).  
 
     The more diversified economy of Romania, and the higher number of 
enterprises within sectors, has helped facilitate the emergence of a much broader base of 
sectorally-organized and umbrella business associations, most of which are not controlled 
by the state. The largest BA, the Romanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIR), 
is like the BCCI in Belarus, a nominally independent organization encompassing over 
23,000 enterprises of different sizes and from a broad panoply of industries (CCIR, 
2008). The relative importance of different sectors within the BCCI does vary, however. 
For example, enterprises with close links to the state, or those from sectors characterised 
by concentrated market structures such as energy and resource extraction, are reputed to 
be more influential in setting the CCIR agenda than smaller, less powerful enterprises.  
However, if the degree of pluralism is not quite as high as in Estonia, the CCIR does 
appear to be a more representative and independent organization than comparable BAs in 
Belarus and Russia. Moreover, the diversification of the Romanian economy that has 
continued apace since 2000, and the corresponding increase in levels of competition, 
should ensure that a broader array of businesses will compete with each other in seeking 
to shape state policies.    
 
7.4.2 Civil society  
 
 During the initial post-socialist period, civil society in both countries was inchoate 
and weak, with what popular activity there was quickly de-mobilizing after the collapse 
of the ancien regimes (Nicholson, 2006; Marples, 1999; Ioffe, 2008). To a large degree, 
this partial and essentially weak level of mobilization helped members of the socialist 
elite in both cases to capture the transitional political process.     
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After a period of only limited mobilization in which the BPF was the most 
prominent organizer of civic activity, independent civil society in Belarus has been 
effectively suppressed and marginalized by the government. State control of the majority 
of the economy has reduced the scope for socio-economically defined civic activity to 
flourish. Quite simply, independent funding of independent movements is severely 
limited. This process of repression has increased incrementally since Lukashenka‘s 
ascension to power in 1994. The arbitrary use of state power has been frequently 
deployed to prevent the emergence of even limited independent civic activity. For 
example, in 2005, articles to the criminal code were adopted that criminalized 
unauthorized social activism. In the run up to the March 2006 presidential election, these 
provisions began to be applied to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were vocal 
in opposing the Lukashenka regime (Financial Times, January 27
th
, 2006). The 
government harassed legally existing NGOs by demanding retroactive tax payments and 
evicting them from state-owned premises. Moreover, the state has also attempted to 
maintain control over the internet in Belarus (OpenNet Initiative, 2007). While this has 
not been wholly successful, it has resulted in some self-censorship in the media. This 
repression of civic activity (and of other forms of organized opposition) appears to follow 
the electoral cycle, with elections bringing increased state repression. Despite this 
persistent suppression of Belarusian civil society, a number of groups continue their 
activities. According to the Ministry of Justice, there were 2,247 NGOs, 16 unions of 
NGOs, and 41 trade unions in Belarus as of March 2006 (Freedom House, 2007). 
However, many of these are either state-sponsored or deemed to be de-politicized to the 
point that the regime does not consider them a threat.  
 
 After a slow start, Romania, which shared with Belarus a weak and disorganized 
civil society in the immediate revolutionary period, has experienced an upsurge in the 
level of independent civic activity (Nicholson, 2006; Gallagher, 2006). In the 1990s, this 
weakness persisted and appeared to present a serious challenge to the emergence of 
independent forces that might help counter-act the activities of the ex-socialist elite that 
were driving the political process during this period. However, according to Freedom 
House (2007), Romanian civil society started to organize more effectively after 1999 and 
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was able to become increasingly assertive on an array of issues, ranging from issues 
relating to parliamentary corruption (e.g., the Romanian Coalition for a Clean Parliament) 
to raising the issue of crimes committed under the socialist regime. Two factors appear to 
have been crucial in influencing the development of an increasingly active and assertive 
civil society in Romania. First, the dispersal of economic activity has enabled groups to 
form that have access to funding independent of the state or state-linked enterprises 
(Light, 2006). Second, once EU membership was placed on the agenda, external funding 
disbursed through the Romanian Civil Society Development Foundation was 
instrumental in facilitating increased independent civic activity. Moreover, the bipartisan 
commitment to EU accession that was to prove electorally popular also forced 
governments of all persuasions to take note of EU concerns regarding the suppression of 
civil society (Gallagher, 2006; Phinnemore, 2006).  
 
7.4.3 Political parties  
 
 The development of political parties in the two countries has also moved in 
different directions. Again, both countries started from similar starting points; opposition 
parties formed around the main opposition movements in the revolutionary period – the 
BPF in Belarus and the FSN in Romania – were either electorally marginalized (the 
BPF), or captured and manipulated by the ex-socialist elite (the FSN). However, the 
institutional design chosen in the aftermath of the collapse of socialism was also crucial 
in laying the foundations for the future emergence of strong political parties independent 
of the state. In Belarus, the failure to establish post-Soviet institutional arrangements in 
the immediate period after the collapse of the Soviet Union impeded the emergence of a 
range of viable and independent political parties (Marples, 1999; 2006). Instead, the 
Soviet-era institutional distribution of power between the Supreme Soviet (led by 
Shushkevich) and the Council of Ministers (under the leadership of Kebich) perhaps 
contributed to the general dissatisfaction of the electorate in 1994 with the existing 
system, ultimately leading to Lukashenka‘s emergence as president (Marples, 1999; 
Marples and Padhol; Ioffe, 2008). This suggests a failure on the part of key politicians 
during this period to undertake a course of institutional design that would have 
 240 
encouraged the development of political parties. Instead, political success in the initial 
independence period was based largely on the personality of key political actors. 
However, it is also plausible that this failure to generate independent, electorally viable 
political parties can be explained by the economic legacies inherited from the Soviet 
system and the failure to institute rapid privatization and economic restructuring. Even 
before Lukashenka created a system based on super-presidential power, a socio-
economically defined base from which opposition forces might have emerged was 
suppressed by the concentration of economic power in the hands of the state and the 
associated failure to create a class of independent private property owners. The only party 
without strong links to the state that has persisted throughout the independence period has 
been the BPF. However, its appeal is based not on socio-economically defined 
constituencies, but on an appeal to an independent Belarusian identity that does not 
appear to be shared by the majority of Belarusian voters (Ioffe, 2008). Consequently, 
independent political parties have enjoyed only a marginal role in Belarusian politics.      
 
 With regards to political party development, the Romanian case is less clear-cut 
than the Belarusian case. Initially, the ex-socialist elite was able to shape institutional 
design in its favour (i.e. the selection of a semi-presidential system that initially endowed 
Iliescu with considerable formal and informal power) and the emergence of viable 
opposition forces took place slowly, eventually emerging victorious in the 1996 elections 
(Light, 2006). Indeed, the development of political parties in the 1990s was as much 
defined by splits within the ex-socialist elite as by the emergence of genuinely 
independent political forces. Throughout the 1990s, and for much of the time since, 
political parties in Romania have been stricken by accusations of corruption and a general 
disregard for the interests of the electorate (Pop, 2005, Gallagher, 2006; Light, 2006).
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Moreover, the ex-socialist elite have been able to maintain a grip on power and remain 
electorally successful (1990-1996 and 2000-2004). Some have argued that this is 
indicative of a party system that exists only for the benefit of the elite and that is not 
responsive to the needs of the general population (e.g., Gallagher, 2006).  
 
                                                 
163
 This, of course, is true of a number of other countries from the region.  
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This is, however, perhaps a harsh judgement. While Romanian party politics 
could be characterised as a battle between the ex-socialist elite and an anti-socialist elite 
of comparable venality, this fails to appreciate the fact that while the parties have often 
remained the same (in substance, if not in form, due to the repackaging of different 
elements of elite parties), the policies have changed significantly over time. First,  EU 
accession proved an issue on which the ex-socialist elite were encouraged by popular 
sentiment to adapt to electoral pressures, although members of the elite connected to 
certain economic sectors also saw EU accession in more self-serving terms (Phinnemore, 
2006). Second, once the EU accession process and its attendant conditionality were 
underway, both groups of political parties were forced to adjust their behaviour to 
external demands. Indeed, the influence of the EU appears to have been crucial in the 
development of Romanian political parties since the late 1990s; however, this is largely 
due to the effects that this had upon on Romanian political economy. Once a commitment 
to accession was accepted by the most important political groups in parliament, the 
emergence of socio-economically defined organizations that benefited from closer links 
to the integrationist process helped buttress calls for further integration (Pop, 2005). Such 
views were then incorporated into the policy agenda of the most prominent political 
parties. In short, the generation of a more dispersed economic structure facilitated the 
emergence of a range of interests that in turn helped shape party policies.       
 
7.4.4 Direct links between state and business 
 
 Direct links between state and business that are not mediated by representative 
organizations can be a source of corruption, increasing the incentive for state officials to 
use their offices for personal gain and for business to ‗capture‘ state policy. Indeed, the 
essence of limited-access orders lies in the limiting of market access and competition by 
the state in order to ensure that organizations – whether private or public – are able to 
accrue rents. In Belarus, after an initial case of ‗mild oligarchy‘ between 1992-94, in 
which links between the state and independent businesses were stronger than any point 
before or after, the Lukashenka regime has limited market access to most important 
sectors of the economy and has channelled accrued rents directly to the state (Zlotnikov, 
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2002). This has enabled Lukashenka to transfer wealth from the more profitable sectors 
(fuels, trucks, etc) to subsidize the wider Belarusian economy, thus maintaining a system 
that is functionally very close to the Soviet-era planned economy (Nuti, 2000, 2004, 
2007b). Thus, state-business relations are strong in Belarus precisely because the state is 
the business in the majority of cases, a situation even more extreme than observed in the 
late Putin-era described in the previous chapter.  
 
The situation in Romania has been altogether different. Strong informal (i.e. not 
mediated by organizations such as business associations that conduct their affairs on a 
more formal basis) links between business and the ex-socialist elite were developed in the 
1990s and continue to exist today (Roper, 2000; Gallagher, 2006, Light, 2006). Thus, in 
contrast to the Belarusian case, the intertwinement of business and power was considered 
to be more of a case of ‗state capture‘, in which well-connected and powerful economic 
interests exerted a disproportionate influence over state policy, than of domination of 
business by the state (Roper 2006).
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 In this respect, state-business relations Romania in 
the 1990s resembled that in Russia during the same period. After 2000, however, the 
influence of business over the state has waned. Again, the EU accession process has 
helped here by exerting pressure on the Romanian state to become more transparent in its 
ties with business, and also through its funding of civic organizations that have exerted 
pressure ‗from below‘ (Nicholson, 2006; Freedom House, 2007). Furthermore, the 
diversification of the economy has also been of some significance as increased levels of 
economic competition have forced the state to at least try to reduce its use of differential 
access to markets and rents.    
   
7.4.5 Conclusion 
 
The emergence of two contrasting economic structures in the two cases under 
review here appears to have directly shaped the development of organizations that 
represent and articulate the views of interests outside of the state. This has, in turn, 
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 Similar tendencies have been observed elsewhere in the region; see: Hellman (1998); Grzymala-Busse 
and Jones-Luong (2002); Grzymala-Busse (2002, 2006); O‘Dwyer (2004, 2006); Ganev (2005, 2007); 
Haughton (2008). 
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caused divergent patterns of state autonomy. In Belarus, a concentrated industrial 
structure owned and controlled entirely by the state has resulted in extremely limited 
capacity for collective action among any independent groups. The absence of competitive 
tendencies in the four areas examined here suggests that social-order development will be 
largely negative. On the other hand, while economic competition took time to emerge in 
Romania, when it did, after 2000, it facilitated the emergence of a diverse array of groups 
independent of the state. The situation in Romania is by no means perfect; the political 
party system remains fluid as an ever-growing number of parties appear to be represented 
in each parliament, civil society is perhaps too reliant on external funding, and ties 
between state and business remain disconcertingly close in some instances. However, the 
direction of change has been broadly positive, if not the magnitude. As will be argued in 
the next section, the emergence of an increasing number of organizations on the back of a 
diversifying industrial structure has affected social-order development in a broadly 
positive manner.   
 
7.5 Social order types in Belarus and Romania, 1991-2007 
 
The different trajectories of structural economic transformation, and the effects that these 
have had on the emergence of independent organizations with the capacity to compete 
with each other and pressure the state, have resulted in divergent patterns of social-order 
development. This section highlights the most striking characteristics on the three 
component indicators of social-order development: voice and accountability; control of 
corruption; and the rule of law. The data for these indicators are contained in Figures 7.9 
and 7.10. Broadly speaking, the overall trajectories of social-order development 
according to these data are consistent with the hypotheses generated in Chapter Two. 
Belarus, which has suffered an absence of economic competition and from a dearth of 
independent groups, has deteriorated on all three indicators since 1998, dragging the 
average score down with it. Of course, Belarus already had a low score at the starting 
point from when the data are available. The direction of social-order development in 
Romania has reflected the diversification of the economy and the increased level of 
political and economic competition that has occurred since 2000.     
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Figure 7.9 Components of social order development in Belarus, 1998-2007 
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Source: Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi (2008); author‘s calculations 
 
Figure 7.10 Components of social order development in Romania, 1998-2007 
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Source: Kaufmann, Kray and Mastruzzi (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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7.5.1 Voice and Accountability 
 
 Belarusian politics experienced some limited positive political change between 
1992 and 1994. However, after Lukashenka was elected the first president of the newly 
independent state in 1994, there has been a gradual deterioration of open-access politics 
in Belarus. In 1995-6, he extended his own formal powers, and proceeded to stretch even 
these loose constraints on his considerable powers (Marples, 2007; Nuti, 2007b). This 
was accompanied by an assault on the powers of the elected parliament, replacing it with 
an appointed Palace of Representatives and extending his five year tenure to seven. This 
pattern was repeated again in 2004 when he amended the constitution and extended his 
powers further. Compounding an already dire situation is the fact that the opposition in 
Belarus is both divided and unpopular, leaving no credible alternative to Lukashenka 
(Frear, 2008). The minute proportion of private economic activity in Belarus is surely an 
important factor here; without independent economic actors, the state has a Soviet-like 
control over all important aspects of political life. The government in Belarus is now 
effectively based on unlimited presidential authority. While elections are periodically 
held, the autocratic power of the state impedes the emergence of organized opposition 
groups. This has led some observers to describe the Belarusian political system as a 
‗demagogical democracy‘ and as ‗isolationist authoritarianism‘ (Korotseleva, 2003; 
Wilson, 2007). Whatever the description, Belarus is most certainly a limited-access order, 
with Lukashenka assuming full control over all important aspects of its politics.  
 
  In contrast, Romania started slowly, but gradually increased its progress in 
developing a system that provided adequate room for the expression of different voices to 
that of the successor socialist party that initially captured the political process after 1989. 
Furthermore, as greater political competition has resulted in more voice for different 
sections of Romanian society, so the state has become more accountable to its citizens. 
As will be described below, there is still much evidence of corruption and weakness in 
the rule of law in Romania. However, the turnover of parties during parliamentary 
elections since 2000 is evidence of a much healthier and more competitive political 
system (Pop, 2005). Again, while this progress appears modest on the chart above, it does 
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compare favourably to the situation that characterized Romanian politics in the early- to 
mid-1990s, when the FSN and its associates and successor groups dominated the political 
system. This improvement appears to have coincided roughly with the gradual 
diversification of the Romanian economy that occurred after 1999. Indeed, conflict 
resolution between the governing coalitions that have ruled in recent years has improved.  
 
7.5.2 Rule of law  
 
 The dominance of Lukashenka and his supporters over the economy and political 
life has resulted in one of the lowest scores for Rule of Law in the region. Without a 
credible alternative to Lukashenka, the extent to which the state is pressured into obeying 
legal requirements has remained low. Judges are not considered to be impartial, and the 
Soviet-era use of psychiatry as a tool of political harassment highlights lack of 
independence of the legal system. Indeed, at around the time of the 2006 presidential 
elections, there was an increase in the arbitrary arrests of political opponents, amid 
allegations of physical and mental abuse of detainees in jail. Opposition figures have 
found it difficult to defend themselves against the state, particularly in the absence of 
significant financial support.   
 
 Perhaps surprisingly, given the progress that has been made in economic 
diversification and on the voice and accountability score, the rule of law indicator 
displays a slight decline in Romania since 1998. This suggests that institutional change – 
both formal and informal – can take time to develop, with negative practices persisting 
even when other indicators are improving. Although a very modest improvement can be 
observed after hitting a low point in 2002, a number of problems within the judicial 
system prevent the universal application of law in Romania. A particularly important 
constraint on the development of an independent judicial system is related to the adoption 
of a Latin American model of a self-governing judiciary. This involved the creation of an 
independent body – the Superior Council of Magistrates (SCM) - that is elected by 
magistrates. However, the judicial administration was able to exploit the lack of conflict-
of-interest regulations to elect itself as head of the first SCM. This has attracted criticism 
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from the EU, who argue that a clear distinction must exist between the controller and 
administrative positions of SCM members. This is indicative of a wider problem that 
impedes the consistent interpretation and application of the law in Romania. EU pressure 
has seen a range of formal measures adopted; however, there remains a dissonance 
between formal and informal practices.    
 
7.5.3 Control of Corruption   
 
 Before 2000, control of corruption was considered to be an area where Belarus 
performed relatively well; its score was low, but did not reflect the low levels of voice 
and accountability that were present in Belarus. The state was considered by some to be a 
relatively benign force, providing much needed poryadok (order) to a population that was 
still reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union (Leshchenko, 2004; Ioffe, 2008). 
However, even if this assessment were accurate, it is no longer. Since 2000, Belarus has 
experienced a downward slide in corruption ratings by the independent surveys that make 
up the Control of Corruption indicator used in this study. The country‘s highly 
centralized economy creates ubiquitous opportunities for bribery and abuse by 
authorities, whereas the government‘s anticorruption measures have been largely 
ineffective in tackling the root problems - a lack of transparency and accountability. The 
prosecution of top government officials on corruption charges is subject to approval by 
the presidency, which creates possibilities for bargaining in criminal cases or bypassing 
the legal system altogether. It appears that it is corruption within the state that is the 
primary problem in Belarus; evidence of corruption in the lives of ordinary citizens does 
not appear to be as prevalent as in, for example, Russia or Ukraine. Instead, the 
domination of the Belarusian economy by the state appears to cultivate patterns of 
‗managed corruption‘ in which bribery and abuse takes place within the state-controlled 
economy by the state. This is consistent with the hypotheses that underpin this study; 
limited economic competition prevents the emergence of political competition, thus 
reducing transparency and accountability.   
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 Since 1998, control of corruption in Romania has improved, albeit slowly. The 
existence of close state-business relations that was more prevalent in the 1990s has 
persisted, although the diversification of the economy, increased foreign investment and 
more private economic activity have reduced the scope for the abuse of official positions 
that was a feature of the 1990s. Under pressure from the EU, as well as from domestic 
organizations, the quantity and quality of nonpartisan investigations into allegations of 
high-level corruption has steadily increased up to 2007. Since the appointment of Daniel 
Morar as the anticorruption prosecutor general in 2005, over 1,000 defendants (including 
7 MPs, 2 ministers and a deputy minister, several magistrates, and numerous employees 
in law enforcement agencies) have were charged with corrupt practices, with over 400 
convictions secured (up to 2007), leading to praise by the European Commission (EC 
Report, 2007). Despite this improvement in anticorruption efforts, there remains a 
widespread use of official positions for private gain, from low level officials in 
universities to higher ranking state officials. Thus, the effects of increased economic and 
political competition that have been evident since 2000 do appear to be exerting a slow 
but positive influence over the control of corruption in Romania.  
 
7.5.4 Conclusion 
  
This section has highlighted some of the most notable tendencies and developments in 
social order development in Belarus and Romania since the collapse of socialism in 1991 
and 1989 respectively. Reflecting their divergent fortunes in economic restructuring, both 
countries have experienced different types of social order development. Belarus, like 
Russia, is a limited-access order. The domination of the economy by the state has 
restricted the scope for the emergence of any groups independent of the state that are able 
to provide significant political competition. Consequently Belarus scores lowly on the 
three indicators of social order used in this study: voice and accountability are almost 
non-existent; the state is not constrained by the law; and corruption is high, particularly 
within state structures which, given the fusion of state and economy in Belarus, extends 
to a large portion of Belarusian society.  
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Romania, on the other hand, has improved on all three indicators since the mid- to 
late-1990s. Initially, the low level of competition evident within the economy hindered 
positive political competition. However, as economic restructuring picked up in pace 
towards the end of the 1990s, greater political competition became evident. This has 
resulted in slow but steady progress, particularly on the voice and accountability 
indicator. Progress has, however, been slower on the other two indicators. This might 
indicate either that the model used to explain social order development in this study is 
lacking, or that improvements in rule of law and control of corruption lag developments 
in economic restructuring, particularly where informal institutional practices were 
relatively deep-rooted, as they were in the socialist and initial post-socialist periods. 
Again, where the role of the EU in promoting and facilitating economic restructuring has 
been successful, it remains to be seen whether external pressure might help Romania 
become more successful in reducing corruption and improving its quality of rule of law.    
Notwithstanding this qualification, it does appear that levels of economic competition are 
strongly correlated with social order development in these two cases.     
  
7.6 Conclusion: contrasting trajectories of economic and political development 
 
This chapter has examined the relationship between economic structure and political 
development in Belarus and Romania in the post-socialist period. The first section 
highlighted some of the more salient economic and political legacies inherited from the 
socialist period. It was argued that, in terms of economic structure, both countries 
possessed advantages and disadvantages at the beginning of the post-socialist era. 
However, both had experienced an elite-led exit from the socialist era, undermining the 
prospect for immediate progress in social order development due to the disorganized and 
essentially insignificant nature of opposition forces in the two countries. The third section   
highlighted some of the more important economic developments relating to industrial 
restructuring in the transnational sector, and patterns of intra-sectoral competition in 
leading export sectors. Here, it was argued that Belarus became increasingly dependent 
on subsidized Russian fuel imports. Coupled with low levels of investment – both 
domestic and foreign – this has led to a deterioration in the technological sophistication 
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of the Belarusian economy. Furthermore, the continued high level of state ownership has 
kept economic competition in Belarus at a very limited level. By contrast, Romania has, 
after a slow start, enjoyed more success than Belarus in diversifying its transnational 
sector. This has resulted in greater economic competition. These positive tendencies only 
became evident after 2000 once serious steps were made towards EU accession. In this 
respect, the EU has played an important part in stimulating economic restructuring in 
Romania due to the increase in FDI flows that accompanied progress in accession 
negotiations. These FDI inflows compensated for a relatively low rate of domestic 
investment, although this has also picked up in recent years.  
 
A fourth section described the effects of the contrasting degrees of economic 
competition within the two economies on the capacity of socio-economic organizations to 
engage in collective action are considered. In Belarus, the absence of a diverse economic 
structure and a corresponding dearth of intra-sectoral competition inhibited the 
development of socio-economically defined actors that are independent of the state. 
Instead, the concentration of economic power within sectors that are closely linked to the 
state has stymied the emergence of an open-access order in Belarus. The selective 
disbursement of economic rents has been used to maintain a regime that is non-
transparent, unaccountable and based on the selective application of rules. Furthermore, 
the continued dependence on Russia to sustain the existing system in Belarus has meant 
that external pressure to conform to more rigorous standards on corruption and the rule of 
law has been decidedly absent. In Romania, by contrast, economic restructuring has 
correlated with greater political competition, something that has occurred alongside more 
active pressure from the EU in encouraging better standards on corruption and the rule of 
law in general. Finally, the fifth section examined basic patterns of social-order 
development since 1989-91, arguing that Belarus has experienced a continued decline 
along the indicators used in this study, while Romania has shown signs of slow but steady 
improvement since 2000. 
 
In the context of the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter Two, both cases 
appear to confirm the first order hypotheses contained in the conceptual framework. A 
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decline in economic competition in Belarus was accompanied by a corresponding decline 
in social order quality. This was facilitated by the dependence on Russian subsidised fuel 
imports. In contrast, the increase in economic competition in Romania has been 
accompanied by a steady improvement in social order quality. As in Estonia, wider 
developments in the international economy – in particular the motivation of MNCs to 
exploit the opportunities for cost reduction through FDI – helped stimulate levels of 
competition within the Romanian economy that were previously evident. The two 
opposing tendencies observed in these two cases were then further reflected in the 
capacity for collective action evident elsewhere in the two countries. Limited economic 
competition in Belarus has left the state as the only significant economic and political 
actor in Belarus with negative consequences for social order development. However, in 
Romania, increased economic competition since 2000 has helped support the emergence 
of a broader array of competing forces in both the economy and in political spheres, 
helping to shape a steady improvement in social order quality. This higher level of 
economic and political competition was buttressed by external pressure from the EU to 
make progress along the social order indicators used in this study. Indeed, the importance 
of the EU suggests that external political influences can be of considerable importance.  
Thus, the evidence contained within this chapter appears to confirm both the first and 
second order hypotheses that make up the conceptual framework employed throughout 
this study.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
Estonia: economic diversification and  
open-access social order development 
 
8. Introduction  
 
This chapter examines the relationship between economic structure and political 
development in Estonia, a country that represents the third group of countries identified 
in Chapter Three (Group C). Estonia is an example of a country that has developed a 
diverse, and in some areas, technologically sophisticated, economy. Because of 
favourable initial economic and political conditions, and as a result of judicious and 
autonomously formulated policy choices made early after independence from Soviet rule, 
economic pluralism and competition have been defining characteristics of Estonian 
development. Estonia‘s integration within the wider international economy has been deep 
(i.e. it displays a high degree of openness to trade) and based on a diverse range of 
activities, meaning that no single sector dominates Estonia‘s export profile. This has been 
complemented by vibrant competition within sectors, thus facilitating the development of 
an open-access political system that has so far proven to be one of the success stories of 
post-socialist Europe. Rapid economic restructuring based on deep integration with the 
international economy, a diversification of the production profile, and market structures 
characterised by high levels of competition, have all helped cultivate a competitive 
political system, resulting in a broadly positive trajectory of social order development. 
Indeed, Estonia‘s experience – both in terms of its economy and its political development 
- contrasts sharply with the three other countries that are examined in the other case 
studies contained in this study.  
 
Unlike many other former Soviet republics, the perestroika period did not 
bequeath a set of generally negative institutional legacies. Indeed, as will be argued 
throughout this chapter, elements of institutional and economic path dependency 
weighted the dice heavily in favour of the emergence of a broad array of economic, 
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political and social forces that would compete openly for political power. In particular, a 
vibrant independence movement acted as a counterweight to the state, first during the 
latter years of Soviet rule, and then in the period immediately after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. After independence, the vibrancy of opposition, and a general (although 
not always exclusive) desire to remain independent of Russia, both contrived to propel 
Estonian policy makers in the direction of rapid integration into European economic and 
political structures. Estonia‘s success in doing so was in many ways a function of the 
autonomous nature of decision-making that has characterised Estonian politics since 
independence. This autonomy was, in turn, a consequence of the fierce economic 
competition within the country; in the absence of a single or a few dominant economic 
sectors, the Estonian government has been able to formulate policy relatively independent 
of powerful economic forces. This has resulted in policy making that is more technocratic 
than political due to the autonomy afforded to the Estonian state by the diverse 
distribution of economic forces within the economy. This economic pluralism, along with 
robust growth levels, has helped sustain a broad range of groups that are independent of 
the state, and which compete with each other for influence, resulting in an open-access 
political order.   
 
The argument contained within this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section 
locates Estonia within the wider international economy and describes the main features of 
Estonia‘s export profile since independence. The second section identifies the most 
important economic and political legacies inherited from the Soviet period. Of particular 
importance is the relative diversity of Estonia‘s production profile under Soviet rule, and 
the strong desire to forge a destiny independent of Russian influence. The third section 
considers the main economic developments since independence, and examines the degree 
of competition that is present within Estonia‘s most important export sectors. Here, the 
most salient characteristics are rapid levels of economic growth, a competitive currency, 
macroeconomic stabilization, an open privatization process, high levels of investment, 
and a widespread absence of monopolistic or oligopolistic tendencies across sectors. The 
fourth section examines the effects of economic competition on political competition 
within Estonia. The diversity and competition of the economy supports formal 
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institutions that represent a broad cross-section of societal forces, a relatively vibrant civil 
society, and a ferociously competitive business community. The final section considers 
how the strong levels of competition between such diverse interests all ensure that 
competitive tendencies – both economic and political – are channelled in an open and 
transparent manner. In sum, Estonian society is shown to have benefitted from strong and 
open economic competition that has, in spite of half a century of Soviet occupation, 
facilitated the rapid emergence of an open-access political order.  
 
8.1 The socialist legacy 
 
8.1.1 Economic legacies 
 
The period of Soviet occupation that followed first the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact in 1939, 
and then after Nazi occupation, in 1944, had a profound effect on the structure of the 
Estonian economy. First, the Second World War caused severe damage to the Estonian 
economy, both in the loss of human life through death or displacement, and in terms of 
the loss of material stock. Following the end of the war and the resumption of Soviet 
occupation, the Stalinist model of forced industrialisation was imposed upon Estonia. The 
previously dominant agrarian sector suffered as a result of this, although in subsequent 
years the level of productivity in this sector still outstripped the all-union average (Raun, 
2001). Most significantly, Soviet centralised investment in industry rose substantially, 
leading to an increase in the share of industry in the wider Estonian economy (Misiunas 
and Taagepera, 1983; see Table 8.1). This served as a mechanism for Russification as 
large scale industrial development required a significant influx of workers from outside 
Estonia. Subsequently, Estonian industrial production rose dramatically. As a result of 
this integration within the Soviet economy, Estonian industry and agriculture were 
heavily dependent on intra-union deliveries which were administered by the central 
planning mechanism. As a result, Estonia was, according to Soviet calculations, only a 
net exporter (i.e. to states outside of the USSR) of three product groups: oil, processed 
food products, and wood and paper products (Figure 8.1).  
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Despite the constraints placed upon the Estonian economy, material living 
standards in Estonia remained well above the Soviet average; in 1990, the Estonian per 
capita income (at purchasing power parity) exceeded that of all other Soviet republics 
(Maddison, 2003, p.110). There were problems, however. The industrial sector 
represented the largest proportion of the republican economy, and was also the sector that 
was most strongly integrated into the Soviet planned economy. This model of industrial 
development produced a large number of effective oligopolies and oligopsonies, resulting 
in a larger average size of industrial enterprise than would be the case in developed 
economies, both in terms of employment and production, and also in terms of market 
share within the Estonian economy. Despite this perversion of the sectoral characteristics 
of the Estonian economy there were some features of the Estonian economy under Soviet 
rule that distinguished it from the wider Soviet economy, leading it to retain a relatively 
high level of diversity both across and within economic sectors.   
 
Table 8.1 The sectoral division of Estonian employment in 1934 and 1989 (percent) 
Sector 1934 1989
Industry 18 32
Agriculture and forestry 45 13
Education and culture 12 12
Construction 4 10
Trade 6 9
Transport and communication 3 8
Other 12 16
Total 100 100
 
Source: Van Arkadie and Karlsson (1992, p.97). 
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Figure 8.1 Foreign trade balance of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic (ESSR) by 
sector, 1988 (million roubles)  
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Source: Vestnik Statistiki in IMF (1992, p.229).  
 
The agrarian sector was, by Western standards, characterised by 
disproportionately large farming units. For example, total production in 1990 was 
concentrated in only 325 collective and state farms, with each employing an average of 
300 persons  (Van Arkadie and Karlsson, 1992, p.101). Despite this concentration in 
agricultural production, the number of private farms was, by the end of the 1980s, much 
higher than in other republics, with Estonia leading the way in exploiting the 
opportunities afforded by economic liberalization under Gorbachev. Indeed, by early 
1991, over 4000 private farms had been established. Although this was in the context of 
wider efforts at legalising and promoting private farming (such as the Law on 
Cooperatives in 1988), this ratio was still high when compared to other republics. It is 
noteworthy that Estonia had 4119 private farms in 1991 with 143,000 workers in the 
agricultural sector, representing a ratio of 34.7 workers per farm. In contrast, Latvia had a 
ratio of 35.1 and Lithuania a ratio of 91.6 (Van Arkadie and Karlsson, 1992, p.290). 
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Thus, private agricultural activity was relatively high in Estonia, and, as a result, the 
average size of each farm was smaller than elsewhere within the USSR, therefore 
dispersing agricultural production.     
   
In industry, traditional activities were complemented by new growth sectors, 
including electricity generation, machine tools and metallurgy, and chemicals. In 
addition, existing centres of industry were supplemented by new industrial concentrations 
based almost entirely on immigrant labour, especially in the oil-shale region in the north-
east. Sectors that were important before the war, such as light industry and the food 
industry, remained important. Table 8.2 summarises the sectoral composition and 
structure of Estonian industry in 1989. Several observations can be made about the 
structure of Estonian industry at the end of the Soviet period.  
 
Table 8.2 Estonian industrial structure, 1989 
Share of 
industrial 
production 
(%)
No. of 
enterprises
Employees 
(thousands)
Share of 
employment 
(%)
Average 
number of 
employees 
per 
enterprise
Electrical energy 6 10 7.2 3.3 720
Fuel energy 2.6 14 11.3 5.1 807
Chemicals 9.2 17 16.2 7.3 953
Machinery/metalwork 14.4 46 58.2 26.3 1265
Timber, pulp, paper 9.1 48 28 12.7 583
Building, materials 3.6 21 14.3 6.5 681
Light industry 26.4 45 43.3 19.6 962
Food industry 23.9 51 28.2 12.7 553
Others 4.8 28 14.6 6.6 521
All enterprises 100 280 221.3 100.0 779  
Source: Eesti statistika aastaramat (1990); author‘s calculations. 
 
First, there was no single sector that overwhelmingly dominated the economy. 
The food industry and light industry together accounted for around half of Estonian 
industrial production, but this was supplemented by the machinery/metalwork, chemical 
and timber related products sectors that together represented nearly a third of production. 
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Therefore, sectoral concentration was relatively low in Estonia, which was perhaps 
surprising given that this structure had crystallized in the context of a heavily 
industrialized Soviet-type economy. Second, the relative efficiency of light industry and 
the food industry was clear. While the machinery/metalwork sector accounted for over a 
quarter of industrial employment, it produced only 14.4 per cent of industrial production. 
In contrast, both light industry and the food industry employed a smaller proportion of 
workers, but accounted for proportionately more output. Third, the average number of 
employees in each enterprise was considerably higher in the machinery/metalwork sector 
than in other sectors. Finally, Estonian industry was characterised by lower levels of all-
union enterprises controlled in Moscow than other republics. For example, while in 
Lithuania and Latvia around 40 per cent of all enterprises were controlled by all-union 
structures in 1989, this share was only 20 percent in Estonia. This was probably due to 
the fact that Estonia possessed lower levels of heavy industry than most other republics 
within the USSR. Indeed, this is reflected in the comparatively small importance of 
enterprises subordinate to the Soviet Military-Industrial Commission (VPK). For 
example, while the all-union share of industrial employment in the VPK sector in 1985 
was 21.3 percent, it was only 5 percent in Estonia (Van Arkadie and Karlsson, 1992, 
p.253).   
 
As well as possessing a more dispersed production profile than the other republics 
of the USSR, Estonia also spearheaded a number of institutional experiments which 
ultimately served as the model for many of the all-union reforms undertaken later by 
Gorbachev and his government during perestroika. The first reforms took place in the 
agricultural sector in 1975. Initially they were only organizational, but were gradually 
extended to a reduction in plan indicators and an increase in the use of self-financing. The 
next set of reforms was implemented in 1985 and introduced the use of contracts as a 
substitute to vertical plans and directives. From 1985 onwards, Estonia also pioneered the 
reform of the hierarchical branch-oriented production structure through a reorganization 
of light industry. Again, plan indicators were reduced as enterprises and the ministries  
were given more autonomy and flexibility. However, as the ministry itself constituted a 
natural monopoly, the reforms were too limited to increase competition. The importance 
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of these limited reforms should not be exaggerated. However, they did place Estonian 
firms in a relatively healthy position to take advantage of the changes that would take 
place during the perestroika period and also served to infuse Estonian officials and 
economists with enough confidence to continue to advance calls for further 
decentralisation of the Soviet system even after Gorbachev‘s reforms in 1987-88.165  
 
Table 8.3 Joint ventures in the Baltic republics, 1990 (thousands of valuta roubles) 
No. of 
joint 
ventures Exp. Imp.
Sales 
(Soviet 
market)
No. of 
joint 
ventures Exp. Imp.
Sales 
(Soviet 
market)
Estonia 91 3285 7947 4097 105 2861 3967 2748
Latvia 30 1122 4706 1528 47 2884 1234 498
Lithuania 13 989 2204 991 18 541 3057 2627
 1st January 1990  1 July 1990
 
Source: Van Arkadie and Karlsson, (1992, p.267).  
 
Estonia also led the way in attracting foreign capital to participate in joint 
ventures, something that was permitted after the introduction of new Soviet joint-venture 
laws in January 1987. Table 8.3 illustrates the proliferation of Estonian joint venture 
policies relative to the other two Baltic republics. It is probably safe to assume that the 
figures for joint ventures were considerably lower in other Soviet republics, so the fact 
that Estonia greeted the opportunity to set up joint ventures with more alacrity than its 
Baltic counterparts demonstrates how unique Estonia was in this respect. This success in 
promoting joint ventures may well have been related to the earlier experiments carried 
out in Estonia that enabled Estonian officials to cultivate closer foreign economic 
relations in the late 1980s (Van Arkadie and Karlsson, 1992, p.265). Again, these reforms 
should not be exaggerated. As was discussed in Chapter Four, other factors such as 
                                                 
165
 The effects of this on Estonian ‗exceptionalism‘ are perhaps illustrated by survey data collected by 
Soviet authorities in 1990. When asked whether they viewed individual capitalist activity favourably, 30.1 
percent of Estonians agreed, while only 21.9 percent of Latvians and 14.8 percent of Lithuanians agreed. 
The all-union average was just 14.7 percent (Laar, 2002, p.56). Evidentally, the Estonian population 
appeared more receptive to a more market-based economy. Also, see Norkus (2007) for a discussion of 
possible cultural explanations for the unusually positive – when compared to other Soviet republics - 
reception of free-market ideas in Estonia.   
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geographical proximity, historical links and cultural ties (particularly to Scandinavia)  
were also likely to have been of some importance, although presumably this would have 
also applied to Lithuania and Latvia where joint ventures were much less numerous.  
 
Overall, the Estonian economy was, despite occupation and the imposition of the 
Stalinist economic model, comparatively well equipped to make the transition to a more 
open economic system. Unlike many other republics, its economy was not beset by the 
same degree of industrial concentration. Instead, a broader array of economic 
organizations existed in Estonia than was usual in the USSR, even during the late Soviet 
period. This would have positive implications for the development of the Estonian state 
once it was free from Soviet occupation as no single sector would be in a position to 
direct or obstruct the course of economic and political reform. Furthermore, Estonia was 
also in the privileged position among Soviet republics of having experienced at least 
some degree of institutional decentralisation during Soviet rule, thus giving it a slight 
head start over other Soviet republics.  
 
8.1.2 Political legacies 
 
Kitschelt at al (1999) describe Estonia as experiencing a form of national 
consensus socialism in which a semi-democratic pre-socialist polity existed, with a strong 
base for political mobilisation, but with weaker prospects for class-based politics. These 
socialist regimes were said to exist alongside a weak working-class power base with a 
relatively weak domination of civil society. Such regimes adopted ‗national consensus‘ 
strategies in which society was co-opted rather than repressed, and in which the regimes 
permitted moderate levels of contestation and interest articulation alongside strong 
professional bureaucratic organisations. As was argued in Chapter Four, this is almost 
certainly an exaggeration in relation to Estonia; the Communist Party was unchallenged 
in Estonia, until at least 1987, and civil society was extremely limited. Consequently, no 
groups outside a few politically repressed dissidents existed which the ruling party could 
co-opt, even if it had been inclined to do so. Furthermore, while traces of Estonian 
national identity (such as language) were not eradicated entirely, they were certainly 
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subservient to supra-national (or pro-Russian) ideology of the ruling Communist Party 
(Hosking, 2000; Smith, 2001; Raun, 2001).    
 
Where Estonia did differ with most other Soviet republics, however, was in their 
historical experience of both independence and democracy in the inter-war period 
(Lieven, 1993; Raun, 2001; Uhlin, 2004). This provided the basis for a vigorously 
assertive independence movement to emerge in response to the gradual liberalization of 
the political space under Gorbachev (Lieven, 1993; Uhlin, 2004). Indeed, while in Russia 
and Belarus, the move to independence featured only sporadic participation from popular 
forces (Fish, 1995; Marples, 1999), in Estonia the move towards independence was 
characterized as a ―profound and broadly based desire for the restoration of political, 
cultural, and economic self-determination‖ (Raun, 2001, p.222). Initially, this took the 
form of environmental movements that were ―environmental in form… [but] nationalist 
in content‖ (Smith, 2001, p.44). This mobilization of popular forces, such as the Estonian 
National Independence Party and the Popular Front of Estonia, along nationalist lines 
quickly became the most important factor in Estonian politics (Misiunas and Taagepera, 
1993). As early as 1988, grass-roots mobilization was credited with being at least 
partially responsible for the removal of the unpopular Karl Vaino as Estonian Communist 
Party first secretary (Lieven, 1993, p.227). Popular mobilization intensified over the 
course of perestroika and resulted in the emergence of a number of independent political 
parties. 
 
 By the middle of 1990, the Estonian political spectrum had developed an array of 
political parties representing various different interest groups, ranging from 
environmental organizations, such as the Estonian Green Party, to groups articulating the 
interests of socio-economically defined constituencies, such as the Estonian 
Entrepreneurial Party and the Estonian Rural-Centre Party (Lagerspetz and Vogt, 1998). 
This diverse and dispersed array of political forces ensured that politics was far more 
openly contested in Estonia than in all other Soviet republics outside of the Baltic region 
(Easter, 1997). By 1990-1991, perhaps the only issue on which there was a national 
consensus was on the need for national independence and for rapid economic reform 
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(Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju, 2008). Following the failure of the coup in August 1991, 
the Estonian legislature moved quickly to call for the convocation of a special assembly 
to draft a new constitution (Taagepera, 1994).   
 
The relative dispersion of economic resources described above, and the open and 
fiercely contested nature of the political struggle for independence, all moved post-
independence Estonian politics along a different trajectory to the cases examined 
elsewhere in this study. Compared to most other Soviet republics, the ‗pre-privatization‘ 
or ‗spontaneous privatization‘ of state assets by well-connected individuals was not as 
prevalent. While it did occur, it was not as widespread as in, for example, Russia (from 
interviews). Indeed, even when it did occur, the open and competitive political 
environment ensured that it was placed under critical public scrutiny and resulted in 
much popular dissatisfaction, later leading in a popular disillusionment towards the 
privatization process in general (Frydman et al., 1993, p. 188; Terk, 2000). Along with a 
relatively dispersed production structure, this tendency to avoid turning a blind eye to the 
enrichment of the Soviet elite prevented the ‗capture‘ of large swathes of Estonian 
economic resources, further facilitating the maintenance of competitive politics due to the 
failure of any single group to appropriate a decisive portion of economic resources (from 
interviews).  
 
Thus, the exit from the Soviet Union, and the emergence of an independent state, 
saw Estonian politics develop according to principles inimical to those experienced under 
Soviet rule. A competitive political environment, the failure of the Soviet-era elite to 
appropriate a large proportion of Estonian assets, and a strong desire on the part of the 
ethnic Estonian population to avoid the sort of concentration of power that was 
developing in Russia, all led Estonian politicians to instead look to the parliamentary 
systems of western Europe as the source of inspiration for institutional design (Ostrow, 
2000). Indeed, the Estonian case demonstrates the importance of elite calculations in the 
context of a dispersion of economic and organizational resources. This dispersion 
engendered a competitive political environment and paved the way for the emergence of 
a parliamentary system. Old regime elites were denied access to economic and power 
 263 
resources, while parliamentary institutional mechanisms were created to prevent the 
dominance of any single group (Easter, 1997).  
 
8.1.3 Conclusion 
 
In contrast to most other Soviet republics, the relatively favourable initial 
conditions and dispersed structure of the Estonian economy at the end of the Soviet 
period, along with higher levels of popular activism, facilitated greater political 
competition between dispersed elites, higher levels of public scrutiny, and a weaker 
nexus between business and state than was evident in, for example, Russia and Belarus. 
This economic and political diversity would ultimately result in greater state autonomy 
for the Estonian state, leaving politicians and officials to undertake comprehensive 
reforms in a more technocratic and less overtly political manner. Although some 
weaknesses were evident at this early stage – in particular the status of ethnic Russians – 
the nature of the Estonian ‗exit‘ from the Soviet Union laid firm foundations for the 
development of an open-access social order thereafter. The next section identifies the 
leading export sectors that have tied Estonia to the international economy since 
independence.   
 
8.2 General features of economic structure in Estonia  
 
8.2.1 Leading sectors and Estonia’s position in the international economy 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and its vast, inter-linked and centrally planned 
production network, in which exports from Estonia to non-USSR states were very 
limited, the Estonian economy quickly shifted towards an export-oriented model of 
growth based on a diverse mix of export products (Lumiste, Pefferly and Purju, 2008).
166
 
This has involved a shift in both the direction of trade (i.e. in the composition of its 
                                                 
166
 As is common in small, open economies, the trade turnover (imports plus exports) regularly exceeds 
GDP. In 2006, Estonia‘s trade turnover was 138 percent of GDP (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2008), 
compared with 109 percent in Latvia, 129 percent in Lithuania, 399 percent in Hong Kong, and 462 percent 
in Singapore (World Bank Development Indicators, 2008).  
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trading partners) and in the product structure of trade (i.e. the types of goods that are 
imported and exported).
167
 As was argued in the previous section, this shift took place 
against the backdrop of perhaps the most favourable of initial conditions from within the 
former Soviet Union (FSU). However, notwithstanding these favourable initial 
conditions, the rapid restructuring of the Estonian economy was impressive in its scope. 
While traditional industries remained, such as wood and wood products, food processing 
and textiles, they have declined in relative terms as exports of machinery, electronic 
components, and mineral fuels have expanded rapidly (Figure 8.2).
168
 This has resulted in 
a diverse export profile where no single sector appears overwhelmingly dominant, 
although the machinery sector has increased its share of total exports. In addition, the 
general level of technological sophistication of Estonia‘s exports is high compared to 
other countries within the region.
169
 However, while the share of capital- and knowledge-
intensive industries has increased in Estonian exports, there remain a relatively high 
proportion of industries that are natural resource- and labour-intensive (Figure 8.3). This 
absence of an overwhelmingly dominant export sector, and the presence instead of a 
diverse mix of sectors characterised by a generally high level of technological 
sophistication, have all contributed to the relatively smooth trajectory of Estonian politics 
as it has moved from a limited-access order under Soviet rule to an open-access order 
since independence.   
 
 
                                                 
167
 For example, Russia‘s share of Estonian exports diminished from 17 percent in 1995, to only 6 percent 
in 2006. By contrast, Finland, Sweden and Germany accounted for 44 percent of Estonia exports in 1995, a 
share which remained roughly stable with a figure of 43 percent in 2006. The biggest increase came in 
exports to Latvia and Lithuania which increased from 12 percent of total exports in 1995 to 17 percent in 
2006. China also grew in importance as an export market, increasing its share of Estonian exports from 
next to zero in 1995 to nearly 5 percent in 2006 (Statistical Office of Estonia, 2008).     
168
 As will be discussed later, the increase in the share of mineral fuels is based primarily on transit trade, 
rather than through any increase in domestic production. 
169
 The data presented in chapter 3 describes these tendencies. According to the Krugman Specialization 
Index, Estonia has one of the most diverse export profiles within the region. In 1997, it had a score of 0.20, 
and by 2006, had become even more dispersed, registering a score of 0.16. The technological intensity of 
Estonian exports (as measured by the proportion of medium- and high-technology goods in total 
manufactured exports) increased from 33.8 percent in 1997 to 38 percent in 2006. The composite 
Technological Development and Diversity Index (TDDI) displayed a corresponding increase from 0.57 to 
0.61 over the same period of time. 
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Figure 8.2 Structure of Estonian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total exports)
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Source: United Nations, Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
Figure 8.3 Technology intensity of Estonian exports, 1997 and 2006 (percent of total 
exports) 
 
  
 
      
  
        
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
Source: United Nations, Comtrade Database (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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 These charts are based on 2-digit level data (United Nations Comtrade, 2008) that describe product-type 
rather than technology intensity. 
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8.2.2 Sectoral characteristics 
 
Because of the diversity of Estonia‘s export profile, it is difficult to identify any 
general characteristics that are shared by all of the leading export sectors. It is, however, 
possible to disaggregate the export profile into three main sectors: natural resources; light 
manufacturing; and machinery and electronic component production. The oil shale 
industry, metallurgical sector, and to a lesser extent, the wood and forestry industry, are 
similar to other natural resource sectors in the extent to which they are characterised by 
high levels of capital intensity and economies of scale, as well as by high asset specificity 
and low levels of production flexibility. Such characteristics tend to result in specialized 
infrastructure, management and labour, and often raise the barriers to entry for other 
organizations (Shafer, 1994, p.22-24). The high cost of sector-specific investments in 
capital, infrastructure and labour also tend to ensure that barriers to exit are also high. As 
was evident in the case of Russia, such factors also tend to result in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market structures as well as close links with the state. Together, the wood 
and other natural resource export sectors accounted for approximately 40 percent of total 
exports by 2006.  
 
The food and textile industries are traditional Estonian activities that have 
continued to occupy an important part in the overall export profile. In 1997, the two 
industries accounted for just under 30 percent of total exports, although by 2006 this 
share had diminished to around 14 percent. Both the food and textile sectors are part of 
what can be broadly described as light industrial sectors. Light industrial sectors exhibit 
almost the opposite characteristics to the natural resource sector (Shafer, 1994, pp.106-
107). Generally speaking, capital intensity tends to be low with labour tending to account 
for the bulk of production costs, while the prevalence of small firms also indicates limited 
economies of scale (Glyn, 2006; Dahlman, 2008). Because of low capital requirements, 
asset specificity tends to be low and production flexibility tends to be high. As a result, 
barriers to entry are often low: fixed capital costs are low; economies of scale are 
unimportant; production is often divisible; skill requirements tend to be low; technology 
is often standardized and easily available; and infrastructure requirements are 
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unspecialized. Low barriers to entry ensure competitive market structures and relatively 
low profit margins. Strong competition – both domestically and internationally - ensures 
that neither firms nor states possess the capacity to control the market; instead, firms can 
only conform to it. Together, these factors reduce the incentive for light industrial firms 
to pressure the state, as well as their capacity to do so.                   
 
The third group of export industries is dominated by machinery and electrical 
component production. This group comprises a technologically diverse range of 
manufacturing activities with differing sectoral characteristics. In Estonia, these include 
high-technology activities, such as the manufacture of light industrial products (described 
in Chapter Three as HT1 products), and the automotive and engineering subgroups of 
medium-technology production (MT 1 and MT3). 
 
HT1 activities include the manufacture of electronic equipment such as 
computers, computer components, audio-visual equipment and office equipment. Many 
of these products are labour-intensive in the final assembly stage, and their high value-to-
weight ratios make it economical to locate this stage of production in low wage areas. 
The role of multinational corporations (MNCs) and integrated international production 
networks (IPNs) are of crucial importance as the different stages of production can be 
distributed across countries to capitalize on differences in labour costs (Lall, 2000). In 
Estonia, the share of HT1 activities in total exports is relatively high: in 1997 they 
accounted for 11.3 percent of total exports, and by 2006 had increased to 15.9 percent. 
Estonian exports of these products tend to focus on the final, labour-intensive assembly 
stage and not in the higher value-added earlier stages, such as R&D, or earlier, high-tech 
production of components for assembly (Runiewicz, 2005; from interviews). Generally 
speaking, the emphasis on labour means that such industries display relatively low levels 
of capital-intensity and economies of scale, and relatively high levels of asset specificity 
and production flexibility. Consequently, barriers to entry are lower, leading to higher 
levels of intra-sectoral competition and greater constraints on the capacity of firms to 
engage in collective action aimed at the state.  
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MT1 and MT3 activities, which in 2006 accounted for 16.1 percent of exports, 
tend to be very linkage-intensive, and require significant inter-firm interaction. The 
automotive and engineering sectors emphasize product design and development and 
require a higher standard of human capital. Many have mass assembly or production 
plants and extensive supplier networks, both domestic and foreign (small and medium 
enterprises are often important in these sectors). Barriers to entry tend to be higher due to 
economies of scale and moderate to high capital intensity. Production flexibility and asset 
specificity are also lower. However, these sectors do not display the same degree of 
market concentration as natural resource sectors due to the importance of dispersed 
supplier networks. Thus, levels of competition can vary, and the potential for sectorally 
organized collective action lies somewhere between primary- and resource-based 
activities and high-technology activities.  
 
8.2.3 International trends in Estonian export activities 
 
 The diversity of Estonia‘s export profile again hinders any attempt at 
discerning common international trends in those activities that are of considerable 
importance to the Estonian economy. Nevertheless, it is possible to make several very 
basic observations. The first set of international trends relates to the natural resource 
sector. This sector is, to a large degree, governed by the same pressures as the other 
natural resource sectors described in Chapter Six. Thus, while global or even regional 
economic growth is strong, the demand for natural resource products tends to grow. In 
Estonia, the robust economic growth across the global economy up until 2007 exerted a 
positive effect on the price of mineral exports, and to a lesser extent, on the price of wood 
and forest products, the unit price of which has tended to rise in recent years (Ukrainski 
and Varblane, 2005).
171
 Second, developments in the light industrial and manufacturing 
sectors have been shaped by a number of key global trends that have affected production 
in these sectors across the entire international economy (Dahlman, 2008, p.46). These 
                                                 
171
 Although this is, to some degree, explained by the increasing level of technological intensity within the 
Estonian wood and forestry sector. The higher value-added activities within this sector (e.g., furniture, 
sawnwood, etc) have increased their share of wood and forest sector exports at the expense of lower value-
added activities (e.g., industrial roundwood).   
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trends are described below and include: increasing speed in the creation and 
dissemination of knowledge; trade liberalization, globalization; and the increased role of 
multinational corporations (MNCs) and international production and distribution 
networks (IPNs).   
 
In terms of Knowledge creation and dissemination, advances in science, 
combined with the information revolution (itself a product of these advances), have 
driven an acceleration in the creation and dissemination of knowledge that has, in turn, 
compressed the time between basic scientific discovery and commercial application, 
particularly in the electronic products industries (Dahlman, 2008, p.33). The increased 
importance of new technology can be observed through the increasing variety of goods 
and services produced, and is further reflected in the increasing importance of 
manufactured products and services in trade.
172
  
 
Since the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) there has been a trend 
towards increasing trade liberalization among most countries, with average tariff levels 
falling across the world (UNCTAD, 2006). In addition, non-tariff barriers have fallen. 
There is also a movement towards greater openness in trade in services, including not 
only financial and business services, but also education. Many services areas that were 
once considered non-tradable have now become tradable to the extent that they can be 
digitized and provided remotely, across national boundaries, through the internet 
(Dahlman, 2008, p.47). This tendency towards freer trade has increased the level of 
competition in manufacturing industries across an increasing range of domestic markets.  
 
The two trends discussed above are part of a wider phenomenon, often described 
as globalization – the greater integration of economic and social activity around the 
world (see, for example, Wolf, 2004; Bhagwati, 2004, Stiglitz, 2006). The reduction in 
communication and transportation costs combined with trade liberalization has resulted in 
                                                 
172
 Globally, the share of manufactured products in trade has increased from 58 per cent in 1965 to 65 per 
cent in 1980, 73 per cent in 1990 and 74 per cent in 2006 (World Bank, 2008). This is partly because the 
demand for manufactured products is more income-elastic than for primary commodities. 
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a dramatic increase in international trade.
173
 Moreover, as the previously inward oriented 
economies of China, India, and the socialist bloc increased their participation in the 
international trading system, the net effect has been that the global labour force has 
effectively doubled (Freeman, 2006; Glyn, 2006).
174
  
 
One of the key drivers of globalization is the increased role of MNCs that form 
part of wider IPNs. It is estimated that the value added by MNCs in their home countries, 
plus that in foreign affiliates, represents 27 per cent of global GDP (UNCTAD, 2005). 
However, the influence of MNCs is greater than this. They affect a much larger share of 
GDP if one takes into account backward and forward linkages, as well as their role in 
demonstrating new technologies and putting pressure on domestic firms to upgrade 
production processes. Although there is no accurate estimate, probably more than half of 
the remaining trade is done through supply chains controlled by multinationals as part of 
vertical chains or through distribution chains (Dahlman, 2008, p.51). MNCs also often 
operate as independent global agents. Rather than responding to the needs of any country, 
even their original home country, their objective is often to operate globally in the best 
way to increase returns to their investors, whoever they are and wherever they may be. 
Consequently, competition among developing economies to attract FDI, or to become 
integrated within global supply chains controlled by MNCs, is fierce.    
 
8.2.4 Conclusion  
 
This section has identified those export sectors that tie Estonia to the international 
economy: natural resources, light industry, and machinery and electrical component 
production. The general organizational features of these sectors were described, followed 
                                                 
173
 The ratio of imports and exports to global GDP has increased from 38 percent in 1990 to 55 percent in 
2005 (World Bank Development Indicators, 2008). 
174
 This has important implications for labour intensive industries, whether in developed or developing 
countries, as the expanding supply of labour exerts downward pressure on wages. This doubling of the 
global labour force has increased the marginal productivity of capital (Glyn, 2006). As a result, that share 
of value added that is going to capital has increased, while that which is going to labour has decreased. The 
principal beneficiaries of this globalization and rebalancing of relative wages are the multinational 
corporations (MNCs) which are the most effective agents at intermediating and taking advantage of 
differences in global factor prices.  
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by a brief overview of the main recent international trends evident in these industries. 
The fact that the share of manufacturing and light industry in total exports has increased 
in recent years suggests that Estonia has coped reasonably well with changing 
international conditions. Indeed, Estonia has enjoyed far more success in developing a 
diverse transnational economy than any of the other cases examined in detail in this 
study, even compared to Romania, which although it has made considerable progress, 
was much slower in attracting significant levels of FDI.  This has been due to a 
combination of the favourable initial conditions described in the first section, rapid 
macroeconomic stabilization, energetic economic reform, a competitive exchange rate, 
and relatively high levels of investment, both from abroad and domestically. The next 
section first describes how these factors have helped anchor Estonia within the wider 
international economy. This is followed by an outline of the market structures of 
Estonia‘s leading export sectors.     
 
8.3 Main economic developments and market structure of leading export sectors 
 
8.3.1 Main economic developments since independence  
 
The political consensus that emerged from the independence struggle identified the need 
for fast and substantial economic reform (Laar, 2002, 2007; Lumiste, Pefferly, and Purju, 
2008). However, the hyperinflation that occurred in the rouble zone during and after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed household savings, limiting the resources 
available for economic restructuring and effective privatization. Consequently, currency 
reform and the adoption of a national currency were central to economic reform. 
Additionally, access to foreign capital was considered the means to compensating for the 
dearth of capital that was a feature of the Estonian economy at this point. This stands in 
stark contrast to the experiences of the other cases in this study, where foreign capital 
was, at least initially, viewed with suspicion and was thus limited in scope. Both currency 
reform and access to foreign capital were part of a wider process of ensuring 
macroeconomic stabilization and integrating Estonia within the wider international 
economy, specifically the European economy. Currency reform, and the policies required 
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to achieve this, would help achieve wider macroeconomic stabilization and credibility, 
thus attracting more foreign capital. This in turn would inject greater competition into the 
Estonian economy and help boost the level of investment, thus generating rapid economic 
restructuring and a more diverse economic system.    
 
 A new currency and monetary reform represented the spine of economic reform 
(Laar 2002, 2007). Estonia introduced the fully convertible kroon (Crown) in June 1992, 
fixing the exchange rate to the German Deutschemark (DEM), and later the Euro (in 
1999), through a currency board arrangement (from interviews).
175
 The exchange rate 
between the kroon and the DEM was set at the level of the previously prevailing 
exchange rate between the rouble and the DEM.
176
 This fixed exchange rate ensured that 
Estonia would experience no nominal appreciation or depreciation with its main trading 
partners. Consequently, the kroon conferred a high level of competiveness for Estonian 
firms vis-à-vis its trading partners for over 18 years.
177
 As well as boosting the 
competitiveness of Estonian firms and making Estonia an attractive destination for 
foreign investment, the fixed exchange rate based on a currency board also had the effect 
of depoliticizing monetary policy and limiting the role of the Estonian state in the 
economy.    
 
 Monetary reform and the constitutionally enforced limits on public spending 
helped ensure macroeconomic stabilization and laid the foundation for the privatization 
process and the rapid opening up to foreign investment (Rybczynski, 1997; Lainela and 
                                                 
175
 In this respect, the prompt return of gold reserves from the United Kingdom that had been held since the 
Soviet invasion helped give Estonia a head start over most other newly independent republics.  
176
 The exchange rate between the kroon and the DEM at the time of the currency reform was set at the 
level of the exchange rate between the rouble and the DEM determined in inter-bank auctions. Due to the 
scarcity of currencies offered and the abundance of the rouble, the rouble rate was undervalued and that, in 
turn, determined the Estonian price and wage level after the currency reform. The average wage was $41 or 
60 DEM, two times lower than in Poland and three times lower than in Czechoslovakia at that time. The 
similar level in Russia had mandated the initial low wage level, which was at the time the key trading 
partner of Estonia. In comparison with productivity, the wage and price levels were very low in Estonia.  
The applied exchange rate made Estonia‘s imports more expensive and favoured exports of goods and 
services. Such conditions were favourable for attracting foreign capital. 
177
 Although this was eroded by domestic wage inflation that surpassed its trading partners, thus resulting in 
a real appreciation of the kroon. However, over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, the competitive 
kroon acted as an effective subsidy to Estonian firms. This further insulated the Estonian state from 
pressures from business, as all firms enjoyed a competitive advantage relative to competing firms based in 
the economies of trading partners.   
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Sutela, 1997; Laar, 2002, 2007), thus facilitating energetic structural change in the 
Estonian economy. The privatization process of companies was organized by the 
Estonian Privatization Enterprise, founded in 1992, and was followed by the Estonian 
Privatization Agency, which was founded in 1994 and operated until 2000 (Terk, 2000). 
This process employed some elements of the Treuhand scheme used for East German 
enterprises, and mandated that sales were not to be made without the restructuring of 
companies. Companies were sold through open tenders with the primary aim of securing 
core owners. Minor shares were sold for vouchers. International tenders were the primary 
means of selling larger companies (Frydman, Rapaczynski, Earle et al, 1993; Pelikan, 
1997). Unlike Russia, there was no reservation of shares for employees and employers, 
thus further limiting the potential for the socialist managerial elite to transfer ownership 
of assets to themselves (Easter, 1997).This performed the dual function of placing assets 
in the hands of agents that were serious about economic restructuring while also 
weakening the socialist managerial elite. Both prevented the concentration of economic 
resources within the hands of a small group of owners.     
 
Figure 8.4 Gross capital formation rates (percent of GDP) and annual net inflows of FDI 
(percent of GDP) in Estonia compared to an un-weighted regional average, 1993 to 2006 
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The privatization process was fast and effective with the private sector playing a 
crucial role in generating economic wealth by the mid-1990s (Purju, 1999, pp.199-235). 
According to official estimates, the private sector was generating some 70 per cent of 
GDP in 1996, one of the highest levels in the region at that stage (EBRD, 1999). Access 
to capital also improved in the aftermath to the banking crisis of 1998-99 (from 
interviews). As well as being a source of cheap, but relatively skilled labour, foreign 
investment was also encouraged by investor-friendly rules, such as the provision allowing 
foreign companies to buy land rather than simply lease it (Runiewicz, 2003). These 
incentives meant that levels of FDI were always comparatively high: the stock of FDI had 
reached nearly $2 billion by 2000 (EBRD, 2001, p.8), with cumulative FDI inflows per 
capita among the highest in the region by 2006 (UNCTAD, 2008; see Chapter Three). 
The main effects of Estonia‘s rapid privatization process in which the interests of 
‗insiders‘ were largely disregarded, and in which openness to foreign capital was a core 
element, was a dispersion of ownership within the economy, supported by rapid structural 
transformation as a result of investment rates that were high relative to the rest of the 
region (Fig. 7.4), with FDI, on average, accounting for 20 percent of capital formation 
between 1994 and 2006 (Lumiste, Pefferly, and Purju, 2008, p.13).
178
 The main 
determinants of FDI in Estonia included potential market growth, financial stability, 
exchange rate competiveness, and political stability (Varblane, 2001; Roolaht, 2006; 
Vissak, 2006).
179
 As was the case in Romania, prospective membership of the European 
Union (EU) also played an important role in the harmonization of Estonia‘s institutional 
framework with its main trading partners (Hanson, 2007a). This helped reduce 
transaction costs and make Estonia even more attractive as a destination for foreign 
capital.     
 
                                                 
178
 This compares favourably to the investment rates of many of the fast-growing East Asian economies. 
For example, between 1994 and 2003, the average proportion of GDP devoted to gross capital formation 
was 28.8 percent in Hong Kong, 21.9 percent in Indonesia, 32.1 percent in South Korea, 29.9 percent in 
Singapore, 22.1 percent in Taiwan, and 29.5 percent in Vietnam. Data are taken from World Bank 
Development Indicators (2008).  
179
 The main sources of FDI in Estonia were Sweden (accounting for 39.5 percent of the total FDI stock in 
2006) and Finland (26.4 percent). Data are taken from Bank of Estonia (2008) and author‘s calculations.  
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 Finally, the role of external anchors was also a crucial feature of Estonia‘s 
economic development between the early 1990s and 2007 (Lumiste, Pefferly, and Purju, 
2008). The concept of external anchor refers to the role of imposed conditions that are 
used to mandate certain requirements that reflect the values, objectives and aims of a 
socio-economic alliance and that also frame the economic policy of that country. These 
imposed conditions are primarily related to the development of the institutions within the 
country in question. For Estonia, rapid integration with international institutions was 
viewed as essential given the small size of the country (Laar, 2002, 2007). Consequently, 
any attempt to preserve any semblance of sovereignty within the wider international 
economy was abandoned. The three main external anchors through which Estonia tied 
itself to the international economy were the EU, the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
and the regional Scandinavian economy.
180
 The Estonian state actively encouraged the 
absorption of the Estonian economy within these structures in order to increase their 
independence from Russian influence, and also to facilitate rapid economic development 
and structural transformation.      
 
As was discussed with reference to Romania, in practical terms, the 
implementation of the formal rules and standards of the EU helped to increase the 
competitiveness of Estonian companies by improving market access to the EU and other 
markets, while at the same time making Estonia a more attractive destination for EU 
investors (Pettai and Zielonka, 2003; Vilpisaukas, 2003; Vachudova, 2005; Roolaht, 
2006; Vissak, 2006; Coricelli, 2007; Hanson, 2007a). Similarly, attaining WTO 
membership (achieved in 1999) entailed the adoption of a range of new laws related to 
the removal of technical barriers to trade. Moreover, doing so prepared Estonia for the 
process of EU integration. Finally, although the anchor of the regional Scandinavian 
economy did not require the same degree of conformity to formal rules, it did require the 
close vertical integration of Estonian companies within regional clusters of production.
181
 
As well as injecting more competition into the Estonian economy through the exposure of 
                                                 
180
 The accession of Finland and Sweden to the EU in 1995 played an important role in motivating Estonia 
to seek membership.  
181
 The region accounts for over 70 percent of FDI and over 40 percent of trade with Estonia (Estonian 
Statistical Office, 2008).  
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Estonian enterprises to harsh international standards, this process also ensured that 
Estonia moved quickly towards attaining a high level of institutional convergence with its 
main trading partners.  
 
Overall, the three main features of Estonian economic development described 
here – macroeconomic stabilization, rapid privatization based on openness to foreign 
investment, and the use of external anchors to raise the performance of Estonian 
enterprises – all helped Estonia achieve a high rate of economic growth, attain 
institutional convergence with its main trading partners, and ensure a high degree of 
competition within the Estonian economy. However, it is crucial to note that the decision-
making process that led to these policies being adopted in the first place was largely 
insulated from powerful business interests (from interviews). This autonomous policy 
formulation process was shaped by the dispersion of business interests in Estonia, even in 
the early post-independence period. This point is expanded upon later on. Before this, the 
next section identifies the market structures of the most important Estonian export 
sectors.  
 
8.3.2 Market structure of leading export sectors 
 
 Successful macroeconomic stabilization, rapid institutional reforms, high levels of 
investment, fast and open privatization, and an initial production structure that 
emphasized light industrial activities all helped facilitate the rapid diversification of 
Estonia‘s export economy. The previous section of this chapter described how this 
affected the distribution of production across sectors. This section describes the market 
structure within Estonia‘s leading export sectors. It is argued that all of Estonia‘s leading 
export sectors, with the exception of the oil extraction industry, exhibit extremely 
competitive market structures, with no monopolistic or oligopolistic markets. This is a 
tendency that is reflected in the Estonian economy as a whole (Table 8.4). Since 1997, 
small enterprises (i.e. less than 9 employees) increased their share of total employment 
from 16.4 percent in 1997 to 21.9 percent in 2006. Indeed, if small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) are defined as enterprises that employ less than 250 employees, the 
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overall share of employment of SMEs has increased from an already high level of 73.4 
percent in 1997, to an even higher level of 77.5 percent in 2006. The presence of such a 
large number of SMEs is consistent with what one would expect given the prevalence of 
a wide array of light manufacturing activities (see the previous section). The remainder of 
this section describes the most salient features of market structure within each of 
Estonia‘s leading export sectors.    
 
Table 8.4 Number of enterprises and size by employment in Estonian economy (at end of 
year), 1997 and 2006 
Size of 
enterprise by 
No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 20357 73.7 65885 16.4 39330 82.8 99491 21.9
10-19 3492 12.6 45630 11.3 4120 8.7 56051 12.3
20-49 2359 8.5 69439 17.2 2556 5.4 74501 16.4
50-99 858 3.1 56748 14.1 821 1.7 53739 11.8
100-249 399 1.4 57636 14.3 486 1.0 68972 15.2
250 and more 162 0.6 107275 26.6 177 0.4 102377 22.5
Total 27627 100 402613 100 47490 100 455131 100
1997 2006
Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
 Energy: Oil and gas exports from Estonia accounted for 4.6 percent of Estonia‘s 
exports in 1997 (out of a share of 9.1 percent of total exports by minerals – see figure 
8.2). By 2006, this share had increased dramatically to 15 percent of total exports (from a 
share of 17.2 percent of total exports by minerals).
182
 This statistical leap is not, however, 
due to the discovery of oil deposits. Instead, a change in the reporting procedures at 
Estonia‘s statistical office in 2004 signalled the inclusion of goods that crossed Estonia as 
transit that were previously omitted (Estonian Statistical Office, 2006, p.10). As in 
Belarus, transit trade – primarily oil, oil products and gas from Russia through Estonia to 
Western Europe – has played an important role in Estonia‘s economy.183 Some estimates 
suggested that the absorption of profits from Russian oil exports accounted for up to 20 
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 For a more detailed summary of the oil-shale industry in Estonia, see Parkman (2008). 
183
 Although Lithuania also supplies refined oil products from the Mazeikiai refinery and Finland supplies 
oil that is re-exported.  
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percent of Estonia‘s GDP (see, for example, Bronshtein, 1999; Purju, Dedegkajeva, and 
Soosaar, 2003).
184
 Thus, no domestic producers of exportable oil are present in Estonia. 
Electricity current powered by Estonia‘s oil-shale deposits near the north-east city of 
Narva constitute the only other source of energy exports from Estonia. Here, oil-shale 
extraction is, as in many other natural industries, concentrated in only one enterprise, the 
state-owned Eesti P˜olevkivi (Estonian Statistical Office, 2008). Similarly, power 
generation at thermal power plants is monopolized by Eesti Energia (Estonian Energy). 
However, while Eesti Energia accounts for nearly all of Estonia‘s domestic electricity 
consumption, its share of total exports declined to almost zero by 2006. This decline in 
the share of exports in the oil-shale and electricity sectors indicates that although they are 
characterised by monopoly, their relative weight in the Estonian export profile is quite 
limited.  
  
Table 8.5 Number of enterprises and size by employment in forestry and logging sector 
in Estonia, 2000 and 2006
185
  
Size of enterprise 
by No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 378 82.7 1248 38.9 444 88.4 1152 33.3
10-19 48 10.5 647 20.2 39 7.8 503 14.5
20-49 26 5.7 748 23.3 16 3.2 446 12.9
50-99 1 0.2 77 2.4 1 0.2 92 2.7
100-249 4 0.9 485 15.1 1 0.2 246 7.1
250 and more 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.2 1019 29.5
Total 457 100 3205 100 502 100 3458 100
2000 2006
 
Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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 But this has changed since 2007 and the breakdown in relations with Russia.  
185
 Due to changes in statistical reporting procedures in 2000, data for 1997 are not available at a 
sufficiently disaggregated level to permit meaningful comparison with more recent data. Consequently, 
data for 2000 and 2006 are presented to give an indication of change over time in production concentration 
across each sector under discussion in this section.   
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Table 8.6 Number of enterprises and size by employment in wood processing and 
manufacturing sector in Estonia, 2000 and 2006 
Size of enterprise 
by No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 421 57.3 1566 11.1 744 68.2 2573 13.5
10-19 130 17.7 1847 13.1 140 12.8 1984 10.4
20-49 121 16.5 3670 26.0 131 12.0 3859 20.2
50-99 40 5.4 2711 19.2 42 3.8 2773 14.5
100-249 19 2.6 2566 18.2 25 2.3 3416 17.9
250 and more 4 0.5 1770 12.5 9 0.8 4525 23.7
Total 735 100 14130 100 1091 100 19130 100
2000 2006
 Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
Forestry and wood processing: The other natural resource-based sector of 
significance in the Estonian economy is related to products derived from: (a) the forestry 
and logging industry; and (b) the wood processing and manufacturing industry.  Together 
they constitute one of Estonia‘s more significant export industries, accounting for nearly 
14 per cent of total exports in 2006. The forestry industry has a long tradition. Of 
Estonia‘s total land area, 47 per cent consists of forest (2 million hectares), which 
represents the highest wood supply per capita in Europe. These sectors underwent a rapid 
restructuring process in the early 1990s and privatization was completed by 2000. 
Foreign investment has played a major role in this transformation process, with foreign 
owners prominent at in both sub-sectors. For example, the Finnish-Swedish enterprise 
Stora-Enso, an integrated forest products company, acquired the largest forestry group in 
Estonia, AS Sylvester (from interviews). Elsewhere, Larvik Cell, a Norwegian company, 
created a cellulose plant in Kunda, on the northern coast. Moreover, the presence of 
strong foreign investors did not reduce competition within the forestry and wood 
processing sectors; both sub-sectors display a high level of dispersion in terms of the 
number of enterprises and the distribution of employees between these enterprises 
(Tables 8.5 and 8.6). In the forestry and logging sub-sector, well over 80 percent of 
enterprises employ less than 9 employees. In the processing and manufacturing sub-
sector, nearly 70 percent of enterprises employ less than 9 workers. Indeed, in the wood 
processing and manufacturing sector, there are 9 large enterprises that employ over 250. 
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Consequently, the market structure in the forestry and wood processing sector has 
continued to be extremely competitive.    
 
 Light industry - the textile and food processing sectors: Outside the natural 
resource sector, competition remains high. In the two sectors that are traditional 
mainstays of Estonia production – the textile and food processing industries – a high 
degree of dispersion is again evident. In both cases the dominance of small firms (i.e., 
less than 250 employees) is marginally less obvious than in the forestry and wood 
processing industries. Whereas only around a quarter of employment is accounted for by 
large (i.e., greater than 250 employees) enterprises in the forestry and wood processing 
sectors, large enterprises account for just less than 50 percent of total employment in both 
the food processing and textiles sector. Again, foreign investors play a prominent role. 
Prominent companies such as Saku Brewery (Baltic Beverage Holding AB of Sweden) 
and A. Le Coq (Olvi Oyj of Finland), for example, are owned by foreign companies. 
Indeed, net sales of enterprises that involve foreign capital constitute nearly 80 percent of 
the total sales of the sector (Enterprise Estonia, 2008). While this domination by foreign 
enterprises has resulted in a slightly higher tendency towards concentration than the 
highly dispersed forestry and wood sector, for example, the market structures remain 
highly competitive. In both the food processing sector and the textiles sector, there are 
nearly 20 companies accounting for only approximately 40 percent of sectoral 
employment (Tables 8.7 and 8.8), with a large number of small and medium enterprises 
making up the remaining 60 percent of employment. 
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Table 8.7 Number of enterprises and size by employment in food processing sector in 
Estonia, 2000 and 2006  
Size of enterprise 
by No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 232 48.4 942 4.7 150 38.8 648 3.8
10-19 76 15.9 1076 5.3 80 20.7 1103 6.4
20-49 84 17.5 2479 12.3 79 20.4 2407 14.1
50-99 38 7.9 2382 11.8 33 8.5 2135 12.5
100-249 29 6.1 4302 21.3 26 6.7 3600 21.0
250 and more 20 4.2 9025 44.7 19 4.9 7216 42.2
Total 479 100.0 20206 100.0 387 100 17109 100.0
2000 2006
 
Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
Table 8.8 Number of enterprises and size by employment in textiles sector in Estonia, 
2000 and 2006  
Size of enterprise 
by No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 265 46.3 1111 4.9 340 55.6 1188 6.0
10-19 110 19.2 1510 6.7 83 13.6 1156 5.9
20-49 117 20.5 3672 16.3 107 17.5 2959 15.0
50-99 46 8.0 3145 14.0 39 6.4 2322 11.8
100-249 14 2.4 2221 9.9 25 4.1 3229 16.4
250 and more 20 3.5 10829 48.2 18 2.9 8876 45.0
Total 572 100 22488 100 612 100 19730 100
2000 2006
Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
 Electrical components: The electronic manufacturing industry is perhaps the most 
dynamic sector within the Estonian economy (from interviews). As is the case elsewhere 
in the Estonian economy, high levels of foreign investment and integration within 
regional production networks has facilitated the rapid development of a range of 
production capacities, with production gradually shifting from labour-intensive activities 
in the mid-1990s to higher value-added operations more recently as real wage costs have 
risen. In 2000, the electronics industry consisted of 286 registered companies, increasing 
to 345 in 2006 (Table 8.9). The largest of these is Elcoteq Tallinn, a subsidiary of the 
Finnish company, Elcoteq, employing around 2000 people in 2006. Other prominent 
companies include OU JOT Eesti, a subsidiary of the Finnish company JOT Automation 
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OY, and one of the most innovative and productive companies in the Estonian economy 
(from interviews). The presence of such powerful foreign competitors has not deterred 
smaller Estonian firms from entering the market, however. Nearly 50 percent of all 
employment exists in firms with less than 250 employees. Indeed, the level of 
competition even among large (over 250 employees) firms is considerable, with 9 
companies of this size present in 2006. These competitive market structures appear to be 
strengthening, with the number of firms, both large and small increasing over time.  
 
Table 8.9 Number of enterprises and size by employment in electronic manufacturing 
sector in Estonia, 2000 and 2006  
Size of enterprise 
by No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 187 65.4 526 4.8 236 68.4 640 4.4
10-19 39 13.6 576 5.2 23 6.7 305 2.1
20-49 26 9.1 953 8.6 36 10.4 1152 7.9
50-99 19 6.6 1476 13.4 17 4.9 1243 8.6
100-249 9 3.1 1669 15.1 24 7.0 3609 24.9
250 and more 6 2.1 5821 52.8 9 2.6 7564 52.1
Total 286 100 11021 100 345 100 14513 100
2000 2006
 
Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
 
Table 8.10 Number of enterprises and size by employment in machinery sector in 
Estonia, 2006 
 
Size of enterprise 
by No. Of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
No. of 
enterprises
% of 
enterprises
No. of 
employees
% of 
employees
1-9 183 59.4 674 7.5 132 52.0 337 3.7
10-19 41 13.3 572 6.3 38 15.0 537 6.0
20-49 42 13.6 1309 14.5 41 16.1 1248 13.9
50-99 22 7.1 1537 17.1 24 9.4 1681 18.7
100-249 15 4.9 2352 26.1 15 5.9 2982 33.2
250 and more 5 1.6 2567 28.5 4 1.6 2204 24.5
Total 308 100 9011 100 254 100 8989 100
2000 2006
 
Source: Estonian Statistical Office (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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 Machinery:  The machinery sector is also characterised by a very competitive 
market structure. Between 2000 and 2006 there has been a degree of consolidation within 
this sector, with the number of enterprises decreasing from 308 to 254 (Table 8.10). 
Moreover, the proportion of employment accounted for by enterprises that employ more 
than 100 people has increased from 54.6 percent to 59.7 percent. This, however, is to be 
expected in what is a relatively capital-intensive industry. Furthermore, despite this 
marginal tendency towards concentration in this industry, there remains a high degree of 
competition. For example, there are 19 enterprises within the group of companies with 
over 100 employees. Small companies (less than 100 employees) still account for 42.3 
percent of total employment. Again, integration within international production networks 
has been a defining feature of the machinery sector in Estonia. For instance, a 
considerable proportion of activity in this sector is directed at producing goods for the 
transport vehicles and parts industry. Over half of turnover in this sector is derived from 
subcontracting for larger European (particularly Scandinavian) companies (Enterprise 
Estonia, 2008). Thus, domestic research and development in this sector has tended to be 
low as companies undertook activities for foreign partners. However, integration within 
these networks has begun to increase the transfer of knowledge and technology, gradually 
increasing the technological sophistication of indigenous production (from interviews).   
 
8.3.3 Conclusion 
 
 This section has described the most important features of Estonian economic 
development since independence. Macroeconomic stabilization based on the credibility 
of a competitive kroon, rapid privatization based on openness to foreign investment, and 
the use of external anchors to raise the performance of Estonian enterprises have all 
facilitated the attainment of robust growth, institutional convergence with its main trading 
partners, and, perhaps most importantly in the context of social order development, the 
existence of competitive market structures in all of the main industrial sectors of the 
economy. This resulted in further restructuring due to the absence of collusive capacity. 
The next section discusses the implications of this for the capacity of forms to engage in 
collective action. As will be discussed in the following section, this dispersion of 
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production and competitive markets caused Estonian firms to relate to the state in a 
manner that is quite distinct from business-state relations in most other post-socialist 
societies, particularly those observed in Belarus, Romania and Russia that were discussed 
in the previous two chapters. With no dominant sector, and strong competition within 
sectors, business has been unable to exert undue influence over state policy. Instead, 
business-state relations are based on constructive dialogue with the state able to formulate 
policy in an autonomous manner.   
 
 
8.4 Capacity for collective action in Estonia
186
 
 
The data presented above indicate a high dispersion of employment and production 
within and across Estonia‘s leading export sectors. According to the conceptual 
framework outlined in Chapter Two, this should lead to greater state autonomy as 
competition within and across sectors reduces the capacity of sectors to ‗capture‘ the 
state, while also reducing the incentive of the state to rely too heavily on revenues from a 
few disproportionately powerful sectors. Under such conditions, robust competition 
should ensure that business-state relations are more open and transparent, facilitating the 
development of an open-access social order. Chapter Two identified four main arenas in 
which business might compete with other social forces to attempt to influence state 
policy:  business associations; groups located within civil society; political parties; or 
through direct access to state structures. This section assesses the capacity for collective 
action of Estonian businesses relative to other social forces in these four arenas.  
 
8.4.1 Business associations  
 
Organizations representing business in Estonia can be classified into two types: 
sectorally defined business associations (BAs) that represent the interests of enterprises 
                                                 
186
 This section is based primarily on research undertaken in Tartu and Tallinn between the 18
th
 and 30
th
 
August, 2008. This involved a series of interviews with representatives from political parties and business 
associations, as well as interviews with prominent experts in the areas under examination in this study. A 
full list of interviewees in contained within the bibliography.   
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according to their industry; and broader umbrella organizations that encompass a broader 
range of industrial interests.  
 
Each industry in Estonia has at least some form of capacity to represent the 
interests of its constituents. For example, the Federation of the Estonian Engineering 
Industry represents over 100 enterprises from within the machinery sector, while the 
Association of the Estonian Food Industry is an umbrella organization that unites 
companies from within the food industry. However, the high degree of dispersion present 
in nearly all major industries presents problems for associations aspiring to present the 
interests of each industry in a cohesive manner. A case in point is the Estonian Forest 
Industries Association (EFIA). It is the largest and most influential industry association in 
the forestry and wood products sector and is chiefly composed of wood purchasing 
companies and sawmills (EFIA, 2008). Other associations are left to represent the other 
sub-sectors from within the forestry sector (such as logging, manufacturing, etc). The 
EFIA itself is composed of 56 members of varying sizes and interests, something that 
often makes it difficult to ―define a common interest‖ among its members (from 
interviews). Furthermore, within most sectorally arranged business associations, a divide 
exists between larger, foreign-owned enterprises and smaller, indigenous companies 
(from interviews). With each of these enterprises competing with other companies within 
the sector rather than acting collectively against other sectors, the capacity for collective 
action is quite limited. Consequently, sectorally organized BAs do not tend to perform 
the function of pressure groups due to the difficulty in forming a collective interest. 
Instead, BAs are often active in engaging in marketing activities (both domestically and 
abroad), technical preparation for EU integration, organizing training, and in providing 
and disseminating information, both upwards towards state, and downwards from the 
state to smaller businesses (from interviews).   
 
By far the largest and most prominent of the Estonian umbrella BAs is the 
Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ECCI). It is composed of over 3600 
companies, and is not restricted to industrial interests, with the commercial sector (e.g., 
wholesale and retail trading), construction, banking, transport and other services all 
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represented (ECCI, 2008). Originally founded in 1925, it was re-established in 1989. The 
ECCI has the largest organization of all Estonian BAs, with its role, according to Sim 
Raie, the Director General, being ―to develop entrepreneurship in Estonia through 
participation in the designing of economic policy, as well as through the provision of 
business services‖ (from interviews). However, the ECCI does not act as a pressure group 
or attempt to influence the broader policy making process. Rather, it acts as an 
intermediary between state and business, playing an active role in ensuring that 
companies are familiar with changes in the regulations that are relevant to its members. 
Indeed, like the sectorally organized BAs, its role is essentially that of providing 
technical information to its members and promoting their activities to the wider 
international business community. According to Raie, the large and sectorally dispersed 
composition of its membership prevents the ECCI from asserting a ―collective policy 
stance‖ on most issues. Consequently, it tends to concentrate its efforts on ensuring that 
regulations and laws passed in the legislature are simple and transparent, ensuring that the 
overall business environment is conducive to economic activity.       
 
Figure 8.5 Distribution of member companies from within the Estonian Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry by their size (number of employees), 2007 
 
Source: Estonian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (2008). 
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8.4.2 Civil society  
 
 Since the restoration of independence, Estonia‘s non-governmental organizations 
have undergone considerable change, with a number of specialized non-profit 
organizations emerging to play an important role in articulating the interests of groups 
that are perhaps not represented by political parties or business associations. By the end 
of 2002, there were 17,285 registered NGOs and 490 foundations (see Trummal and 
Lagerpetz, 2001). These groups represent a range of interests, from women‘s issues (such 
as Civil Courage) to the interests of the country‘s ethnic minorities (e.g., the Estonian 
Union of National Minorities). However, while the level of civic activism is high relative 
to countries such as Russia and Belarus, the extent of popular participation in NGOs is 
constrained by funding problems, a widespread view that civic initiatives will not solve 
the country‘s social and economic problems, and the more region-specific phenomenon 
of a distrust of voluntary activities because of the Soviet practice of enforcing ‗voluntary‘ 
activity among its citizens (Uhlin, 2005). According to a 2001 study by CIVICUS and the 
Open Estonia Foundation, these factors have led to over half of all registered NGOs 
being unable to enjoy active membership bases, with nearly half of those that do 
reporting membership bases of less than 30 people (Trummal and Lagerspetz, 2001). 
Consequently, the organizational and institutional capacity of NGOs in Estonia is quite 
limited.  
 
There are, however, some signs of progress. First, the Network of Estonian 
Nonprofit Organizations (NENO), an umbrella group for NGOs, have worked with 
Parliament to define complementary roles for the public and non-profit sectors and to 
outline mechanisms for the development of a more active civil society (from interviews).  
This has had some success, with NGOs expressing increasing confidence that their 
interests are absorbed into the policy-making process (from interviews). Second, the 
Bronze Soldier affair of 2007 had the inadvertent effect of mobilizing popular groups – 
both Estonian and ethnic Russian – into exerting greater pressure on the state to consider 
their views on cultural policy. During the episode, many non-Estonians felt that the 
Estonian government was failing to take their historical identity seriously, while many 
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Estonians felt that the actions of the Russian minority confirmed a suspicion that they 
constituted a ‗Trojan horse‘ for Russian foreign policy (from interviews). However, while 
the period of popular mobilization did result in considerable tensions between the two 
groups, the actions of hundreds of community representatives and organizations did result 
in the Estonian government making preparations to draft a new seven-year cycle for the 
policy program that demonstrated a renewed commitment to work on ethnic relations 
(from interviews). Indeed, immediately after the crisis, the Tallinn city government 
convened a ‗civic peace forum‘ that integrated the whole spectrum of views on the 
matter, demonstrating that local government was also responsive to increased civic 
activism. Therefore, while Estonian civil society is weak in some areas, it does play an 
important role in complementing the activities of business and political parties in 
integrating and articulating the interests of the Estonian population.       
 
8.4.3 Political parties  
 
 The general development of political parties in Estonia is not the subject of this 
section and is covered elsewhere (e.g., Pettai and Kreuzer, 1999; Sikk, 2006; Ehin, 2007; 
Mikkel, 2007). What is important in the context of this study is the degree to which 
industrial interests are able to pressure political parties, and the extent to which the party 
system exhibits competitive tendencies more generally. In terms of the ability of 
industrial interests to ‗capture‘ political parties and use them as a vehicle through which 
their interests are channelled into the Riigikogu, the evidence suggests that this is very 
low. The breadth of business interests that exist within Estonia make ‗capture‘ of political 
parties extremely difficult; the presence of a large number of companies with diverse 
interests dilutes the impact of pressures exerted by business on parties. Moreover, 
because of the diverse economic structure the range of socio-economically defined 
constituencies within Estonian society is wide, forcing political parties to define 
themselves in very broad terms. Thus, the Reform Party casts itself as the liberal, market-
friendly party, while the Centre Party is characterised as the party of social justice.
187
 
                                                 
187
 Although the Reform Party has revealed that the natural resource company, Eesti Polevki has been a 
major donor (from interviews). 
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Only the agrarian People‘s Union Party openly represents a single, narrowly defined 
constituency.  
 
Evidence derived from interviews with a small, but broadly representative sample 
of MPs, indicates that while business interests do attempt to influence the development of 
party agendas, their success is limited by the sheer diversity of interests on offer. 
Therefore, the fiercely competitive Estonian economy acts as an obstacle to business 
domination of political parties. The law on party financing, passed in 1996, and the ban 
placed on corporate contributions to political parties applied in 2003, have further 
consolidated this independence from business (from interviews). While this might result 
in controversy regarding the intertwinement of party and state structures, this is a 
relatively small concern.
188
    
    
 But this has not stopped the development of a large number of political parties 
since 1990. Rather, the dispersed structure of the economy and the fluidity of socio-
economically defined constituencies resulted in a party system that is characterised by 
relatively low barriers to entry and high levels of inter-party competition. This is not a 
unique phenomenon in the post-socialist region. Because of the fluid socio-economic 
situation in countries engaged in deep economic transformation, stable party systems 
often take time to crystallize (e.g., Kopecky, 1995; Mainwaring, 1998; Grofman et al, 
2000). In Estonia, the party system has undergone some consolidation since 
independence; since 1990, the number of registered political parties has decreased from 
31 to 16 in 2007 (author‘s calculations). During this time, parties have developed greater 
organizational capacity and are each associated with broadly defined ideological 
positions. The Reform Party, Pro Patria and Res Publica (both now merged into the Pro-
Patria-Res Publica Union) occupy the centre-right pro-market, limited government 
position, while the Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party, and the People‘s Union 
Party are considered to be more concerned with social justice. There are also a number of 
parties that represent Estonia‘s Russian population. However, they have been unable to 
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 Indeed, this is to some degree a natural consequence of pressures associated with post-communism, such 
as the dearth of skilled professionals available to political parties, and of the small size of Estonia. See Sikk 
(2006).  
 290 
pass the 5 percent threshold of support to achieve parliamentary representation in recent 
years.  
 
Res Publica‘s mere existence is testament to the low barriers to entry and high 
level of competition within the Estonian party system (Taagepera, 2006). It emerged in 
2001 as a reaction to perceived corruption within the country and quickly established 
itself as a major political actor. After winning power in 2003, Res Publica was, however, 
considered a failure in government, leading it to merge with Pro-Patria in order to 
survive. While this fluidity has been criticised by some (e.g., Mikkel, 2007), not least 
because it prevents the stabilization and consolidation of the Estonian party system, it is 
important in the context of this study to note the high degree of competition among 
political parties that has been evident since independence.       
 
8.4.4 Direct links between state and business 
 
 Unlike the other cases in this study, there is little evidence of direct links between 
state and business that circumvent formal business associations. Instead, the main 
substance of business-state relations is funnelled through the business associations 
described above. This is a function of three main factors. First, the constitutional limits 
placed on state expenditure and borrowing reduces the incentives for business groups to 
approach the state directly in the hope of securing favourable terms or economic rent. 
Second, the high degree of competition in the Estonian economy that is described above 
– both between and within sectors - acts to reduce the degree to which the state can create 
differential access to Estonian organizations. Consequently, the relationship between 
business and state is one of open and accountable dialogue, with wide-ranging 
consultation being much more prevalent than examples of penetration by small numbers 
of groups (from interviews). Finally, the relatively low share of the state in the Estonian 
economy also reduced the scope for close state-business relations.
189
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 According to the EBRD (2008), the private sector share in the Estonian economy has approximated 80 
percent of GDP since 1999, and 75 percent since 1995. This compares favourably to the regional average 
(see Figure 7.6 in the previous chapter).  
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There have, however, been several examples of the state using this autonomy to 
direct economic development in an open and transparent manner with little evidence of 
rent creation for special interests. For instance, by 1992 the Estonian governments under 
Edgar Savissar and Tiit Vahi granted monopoly power for a decade to Eesti Telecom (in 
which it had a minority share of 25 percent). This was done in return for the 
comprehensive overhaul of the entire telecommunication sector. Upon the expiration of 
this monopoly status, more competitive market structures were put in place (Hogselius, 
2007). This policy ultimately proved very successful; by the beginning of the 21
st
 century 
Estonia had a world-class communications infrastructure with digital cables laid 
throughout the country. Furthermore, the state moved to create the conditions for greater 
competition within the telecommunication sector and did not abuse its position to create 
additional rents.  
 
More recently, the Estonian government has come under increasing pressure to 
pursue an active industrial policy to stimulate the development of high-technology 
industries (from interviews). On one hand, this pressure is a consequence of the decline in 
competitiveness that is a product of strong real effective exchange-rate appreciation in 
recent years. It is also due to the inflows of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds since 2004 
that mean that the Estonian state is, for the first time since independence, in a position to 
disburse significant funds to industrial lobbies. However, while the incentive for 
businesses to pressure the state has certainly increased, it has so far been unsuccessful 
due to the absence of any dominant industrial interests (from interviews). Instead, the 
existing industrial policy of sorts is based on very liberal assumptions, with the state 
being seen as responsible for providing infrastructure and attractive business conditions 
rather than direct funding (from interviews).      
 
8.4.5 Conclusion  
 
The high degree of competition that exists both between and within industrial 
sectors within Estonia has resulted in a low capacity for collective action among Estonian 
industrial interests. Business associations and the political party system are both free 
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from the influence of overbearing sectoral interests, leading to both sets of organizations 
striving to represent a broader array of economic interests. This has increased the 
autonomy of the Estonian state, enabling it to conduct economic policy in a technocratic 
manner, relatively free of industrial pressures. This has not been to the detriment of 
economic policy nor business; the autonomy afforded to the state has been mirrored by 
active measures from governments of all stances to engage business in a constant 
consultative process. The weakness of industrial lobbies due to the relatively dispersed 
Soviet Estonian economy at the onset of independence certainly helped; crucial decisions 
relating to institutional reform, monetary policy, integration with the international 
economy, and privatization were made without fierce opposition from vested interests. 
These decisions enabled further structural transformation and greater economic 
competition as time progressed, setting Estonia off down a path of virtuous development; 
as the economic structure of the country became more competitive, so were economic 
agents constrained to act to change this structure. Again, the autonomy of the state during 
the past two decades stands in stark contrast to the other cases studies contained in this 
study. The next section describes how the high level of competition within the Estonian 
economy, and the low capacity for collective action among industrial sectors, have both 
propelled Estonian politics towards becoming an open-access political order.    
 
8.5 Social order type in Estonia, 1991-2007 
 
The dispersion of structure and ownership in industry and the wider Estonian economy 
has ensured a high degree of economic competition, a hallmark of an open-access 
economy. As described in the preceding section, this has resulted in a relatively low 
degree of influence by industrial interests over business associations, political parties, and 
Estonian state structures. This has been complemented by a reasonably active and 
assertive civil society that has further contributed to the general pluralism that is evident 
in Estonian political life. In short, a wide variety of groups – from business and outside – 
compete for influence in Estonia. As Figure 8.6 illustrates, this has been a crucial factor 
in the development of an open-access political order. All three component indicators 
show a steady improvement since 1998, leading Estonia to possess one of the highest 
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overall scores in the post-socialist region by 2007 (see Chapter Three). While data are not 
available for the period before 1998, events during this period also suggest a rapid 
transformation from the closed-access socialist period (see e.g., Smith, 2001; Raun, 
2002). This is consistent with the basic proposition of this study: high levels of economic 
competition help support and maintain an open-access political order, which in turn helps 
sustain further economic competition as political competition forces down the potential 
for discretionary rent creation and the use of differential access to economic resources as 
a means to maintaining closed-access orders.  
 
Disentangling the precise cause and effect at each step of Estonia‘s development 
is beyond the scope of this short chapter. However, it would appear reasonable to suggest 
that the simultaneous increase in levels of competition in both the economic and political 
arenas has buttressed further positive development in both areas. This suggests that there 
is a strong case for asserting that Estonia has enjoyed a positive form of path dependence, 
with each increment of competition facilitating further competition. This contrasts with 
the other three cases examined in greater detail in this study, where generally negative 
path dependencies have been evident (Belarus and Russia), or were at least evident for 
much of the initial post-socialist period (Romania). Each of the three component 
indicators are discussed below.         
  
Figure 8.6 Components of social order development in Estonia, 1998-2007 
 
Source: Kaufmann, D., A. Kray, and M. Mastruzzi (2008); author‘s calculations. 
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8.5.1 Voice and Accountability   
 
 Following a two-year transitional period in which Estonia reverted to the inter-
war constitution, a new constitution was approved by referendum on June 28
th
, 1992.
190
 
This constitution has provided the formal institutional framework through which a wide 
range of groups within Estonia are able to articulate their views. The dispersed economic 
structure described earlier in this chapter has added substance to these formal provisions 
and has resulted in a wide range of interests – both economic and otherwise – being able 
to compete for representation in the Riigikogu. The ferocity of this competition is evident 
through the high turnover of governments since 1992 that has taken place through regular 
and free elections (Sikk, 2006). The nationalism that initially dominated politics shortly 
after independence became less prevalent after the country had consolidated its 
sovereignty, except where the primacy of the Estonian language is concerned. This 
diversity of political forces has, despite appearing incoherent at times, resulted in an open 
and competitive political environment. Moreover, the dispersion of economic and 
political organizations in Estonia has enabled successive Estonian governments to 
implement policies in a relatively autonomous manner. For example, there has been a 
broad consensus among the major political parties, in or out of power, on, for example, 
liberal economic policies and European integration. The autonomy of the state to 
undertake reforms relatively independently of socio-economic forces can be seen as 
partially a function of the absence of any overwhelmingly powerful economic interests.  
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 This provides for a unicameral 101-seat parliament, the Riigikogu, whose members are elected directly 
by proportional representation. Parties need a minimum of 5 per cent of the vote to be entitled to 
parliamentary representation, and members may also sit as independent deputies. The constitution makes 
all persons equal under the law, and gives all citizens over the age of 18 the right to vote. It does, however, 
exclude those residents who have failed to pass a citizenship test, which includes competence in Estonian, 
although they are allowed to vote in local elections. Relations with Russia suffered as a result of this, as 
many of Estonia‘s Russian minority were disenfranchised. Executive power rests with the Council of 
Ministers, consisting of deputies from the governing party or parties. A largely ceremonial presidency was 
also created. However, it does possess powers that include the right to appoint the prime minister; to return 
legislation to parliament for reconsideration (thereby delaying its implementation); and to declare a state of 
emergency. The president is elected by the Riigikogu by secret ballot for a four-year term, and may serve a 
maximum of two consecutive terms. Moves towards introducing direct presidential elections were rejected 
by parliament, despite overwhelming public support for a change to the system 
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 There remain, however, some considerable flaws in the Estonian political process. 
Most notably, the question of citizenship surrounding ethnic Russians has continued to 
blight Estonia‘s otherwise impressive development towards becoming an open-access 
order. While approximately 30 percent of the population is denied an equal voice in the 
political process, it is difficult to conceive of Estonian politics as being fully open, 
despite the impressive degree of competition that is evident throughout the different 
layers of Estonian society.  However, because this issue is one of deep historical and 
cultural contention, it is to some degree independent of the relationship between 
economic structure and politics that is the subject of this study. Indeed, if one examines 
the influence of ethnic Russians on the political process more generally (i.e., outside  the 
citizenship issue), it is clear that Russian economic organizations are just as important as 
Estonian organizations. The evidence derived from interviews with members of the 
Riigikogu, former government ministers, and business association representatives, 
indicates that while ethnic Russians may not enjoy the same citizenship status as 
Estonians, they are just as active in competing for political influence as Estonian 
organizations. This was particularly true before 2007, when the lucrative transit trade 
with Russia was largely dominated by ethnic Russian organizations (from interviews).
191
    
 
8.5.2 Rule of law  
 
 The open and accountable political process described above has exerted a positive 
influence over the quality of the rule of law in Estonia. On a formal level, the supply of 
legislation from an autonomous parliament, the adoption of a constitution in 1992, and 
the rapid establishment of an independent and professional judicial system, have all 
provided an excellent framework through which Estonia can function effectively as a 
rule-based society. In addition, the process of EU integration, with the attendant 
absorption of the acquis communitaire, has added further layers to the legal framework as 
well as facilitating institutional convergence with Estonia‘s major trading partners. While 
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 However, the rapid decline in the transit trade since 2007 will presumably reduce the influence of these 
ethnic Russian organizations.  
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the citizenship status of ethnic Russians remains problematic, the EU has argued that the 
rights of the Russian-speaking minority are largely observed and safeguarded.        
 
While these formal provisions are, in general, comprehensive and meet tough 
European standards, the experience of other countries from within the post-socialist 
region (and elsewhere in the world) shows that the gap between formal provision and 
practical application of law is likely to be large unless a widespread demand for the 
application of law exists. In this respect, the diversity of organizations present in Estonian 
society described previously, and the competition that is prevalent between them, have 
helped ensure that formal provisions contained within the legal framework are largely 
adhered to. This is evident on two levels.  
 
First, the implementation of the wide body of commercial laws has led to Estonia 
being considered as an exemplary case among post-socialist countries in protecting 
property rights and reducing transaction costs for business. Organizations such as the 
World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Heritage 
Foundation have all consistently ranked Estonia highly in the years since independence 
on rule of law indicators.
192
 Second, the application of the law has been universal, 
affecting not only businesses and ordinary citizens, but also the central government, 
individual politicians, and the judiciary. For instance, the Bronze Soldier affair resulted in 
the Tallinn City Government successfully appealing to the Estonian constitutional court 
to re-examine the decision making process that led to the central government‘s decision 
to relocate war memorials. Elsewhere, Tiit Vahi, a serving prime minister at the time, was 
forced to resign over corruption charges in 1997, while a relative of former president 
Lennart Meri was investigated for allegations of human rights abuses after World War 
Two (from interviews). Finally, the judiciary itself has been subjected to scrutiny since 
2006 when a former county judge, Ardi Suvalov, was accused of taking bribes to issue 
favourable verdicts.       
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 These sources, among others, are used in the construction of the Rule of Law component indicators 
employed in this study. 
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While these examples are not necessarily directly traceable to a dispersed and 
competitive economic structure, the presence of a wide array of different social and 
economic interests in Estonia has ensured that there is an ample demand for the universal 
application of the legal framework. 
 
8.5.3. Control of Corruption 
 
 The wide array of organizations present in Estonia that demand the universal 
application of rules has also had a beneficial effect on the control of corruption in the 
years subsequent to independence. By 2007, a survey of corruption in Estonia conducted 
by the Estonian Ministry of Justice reported that just 3 percent of individuals and 12 
percent of businesses reported that they had paid a bribe in the previous year, with over 
80 percent of respondents claiming to have never paid a bribe (Estonian Ministry of 
Justice, 2007, pp.22-23). Indeed, this low perceived level of corruption ranks as one of 
the highest in the post-socialist world and compares favourably to more mature, advanced 
economies (see Chapter Three). What makes this perhaps more impressive is the fact that 
Estonia is an extremely small country (population of just over 1.4 million) where there is 
a high degree of cross-circulation of business and political elites. Therefore, the fact that 
state officials do not tend to resort to using public office for personal gain is even more 
noteworthy.  
  
 There are several explanations for this success. First, the regulations and legal 
framework in Estonia, particularly relating to business activity, are quite simple and 
limited in scope, leaving little room for the exploitation of permit requirements by state 
officials or the issue of fines for ostensibly trivial matters. This contrasts with the other 
cases in this study where a plethora of minor regulations are often associated with a high 
level of petty corruption. Second, the small population, and concomitant cross-circulation 
of business and political elites can, in some cases, work in a country‘s favour. According 
to several senior politicians, the fact that elites have a high degree of familiarity with each 
other can cause an increase in ‗social capital‘ without necessarily causing this to result in 
corruption (from interviews). While the validity of this argument is difficult to measure, 
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the presence of other supporting conditions might offer additional explanation. For 
example, Estonia has also consistently prosecuted those officials that have been caught 
engaging in corrupt practices. The example of Tiit Vahi was mentioned previously, but is 
particularly noteworthy. Elsewhere high level officials from the Ministry of Finance were 
removed from office in 2000 for the comparatively trivial crime of purchasing a car at a 
discount through the ministry and then selling it on to another official for private use at 
the same price (from interviews). Such acts might be considered relatively tame by 
Russian and Romanian standards. More recently, Villu Reiljan, a former Minister of 
Environment and leader of the agrarian People‘s Union party, was, along with other 
senior state officials, investigated for complicity in illegal deals carried out by the 
Estonian Land Board (from interviews). Finally, the presence of a diverse array of social 
and economic forces in Estonia are able to act as a counterweight to business and state, 
and play a vital role in ensuring that corrupt officials are held to account.        
 
8.5.4 Conclusion 
 
 This section has briefly outlined the successful development of an open-access 
order in Estonia. In contrast to the other three cases selected for closer examination, 
Estonia has, throughout the entire post-socialist period, enjoyed considerable progress 
along the three component indicators used to measure the openness of a social order. 
Notwithstanding the validity of other explanations for this successful trajectory of 
development, it is highly likely that the dispersed and competitive structure of the 
Estonian economy, and the vibrant organizational base within society that this supports, 
have helped to shape the direction of Estonia‘s recent political development. As was 
discussed in the previous two chapters, economies that do not exhibit strong economic 
competition appear far less likely to develop a broad array of independent organizations 
that can challenge both the state and each other.   
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8.6 Conclusion: economic competition and the development of an open-access order 
in Estonia 
 
This chapter has examined the relationship between economic structure and political 
development in Estonia since 1991. The first section highlighted some of the more salient 
economic and political legacies inherited from the Soviet period. It was argued that the 
relative diversity of Estonia‘s production profile under Soviet rule, and a strong, broadly 
based desire for independence, provided a firm foundation for the development of an 
open-access social order upon independence. The second section located Estonia within 
the wider international economy and described the main features of Estonia‘s industrial 
export profile since independence. The third section outlined some of the most important 
aspects of economic development since 1991. Macroeconomic stabilization based on the 
credibility of a competitive kroon, rapid privatization based on openness to foreign 
investment, and the use of external anchors to raise the performance of Estonian 
enterprises were shown to have contributed to robust economic growth, institutional 
convergence with its main trading partners, and, perhaps most importantly in the context 
of social order development, the existence of competitive market structures in all of the 
main industrial sectors of the economy. This resulted in further restructuring due to the 
absence of significant collusive capacity within the most important economic sectors. The 
fourth section explored the effects of economic competition on political competition 
within Estonia. The diversity and competition of the economy supported the development 
of formal institutions that represent a broad cross-section of societal forces, a relatively 
vibrant civil society, and a ferociously competitive business community. The final section 
argued that these factors have helped shape a political order in which competitive 
tendencies – both economic and political – are channelled in an open and transparent 
manner.  
 
In the context of the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter Two, the 
Estonian case vividly illustrates the importance of structural factors in explaining how a 
social order can develop according to open and transparent tendencies. This appears to 
confirm the first order hypotheses contained in conceptual framework. A high level of 
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economic competition was evident in Estonia from very early on in the post-socialist 
period, helping shape an open-access social order. Indeed, wider developments in the 
international economy – in particular the motivation of MNCs to exploit the opportunities 
for cost reduction through FDI – helped buttress and enhance the already competitive 
tendencies evident in the Estonian economy. This contrasts sharply with the fortunes of 
Belarus and Russia where developments in the international economy, along with very 
limited economic competition, appeared to have stymied the development of open-access 
social orders. Indeed, in Romania, steps along the path towards an open-access order 
were only taken after it opened itself up to the same forces that had helped shape 
Estonia‘s economic development. These two tendencies in turn helped provide the 
conditions for the emergence of a broad array of non-state organizations that competed 
with each other, resulting in a high degree of state autonomy in Estonia, something that 
has not been evident in Belarus and Russia, and only to a limited extent in Romania. In 
this sense, the evidence also appears to confirm the second order hypotheses that make up 
the conceptual framework employed throughout this study. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
9. Introduction 
 
In the introduction to this dissertation, it was noted that structural economic variables 
have been underplayed in explaining political outcomes across the post-socialist region. 
This study has sought to remedy such an oversight by analysing the interaction between 
economic structure – as defined in terms of countries‘ merchandise export profiles – and 
social order development across the region. After outlining the basic building blocks of 
the conceptual framework in Chapter Two, a small number of simple hypotheses were 
laid out to test the theory that structural economic factors might be important in 
explaining variation in social order development in the region. The empirical analysis 
that followed, including both a broad cross-country statistical and historical analysis, as 
well as the more detailed case studies, suggested that the hypothesized relationships 
between the specified variables do appear to exert a significant influence over divergent 
patterns of social order development in the region. This short chapter offers some 
concluding remarks on the strengths and weaknesses of the approach adopted in this 
study, and highlights some of the more important implications for future social order 
development. It finishes with a consideration of the role of economic structure and social 
order type in shaping the region‘s ability to cope with future challenges, not least the 
effects of the global financial and economic slowdown that began in the summer of 2007.  
 
9.1 Economic structure and social order development 
 
The conceptual framework outlined in Chapter Two suggested two first-order 
hypotheses. First, it was hypothesized that developments in the wider international 
economy affect the prospects for domestic structural economic change which in turn 
shapes the development or otherwise of greater levels of economic competition. This 
study has focused on some of the broader trends that were considered of potential 
importance in shaping domestic economic and political behaviour. Thus, reference was 
made to the importance of changes in the behaviour of multinational corporations 
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(MNCs), shifting tendencies within international production networks (IPNs), the role of 
international institutions, and fluctuations in the world prices of commodities and 
manufactures. This short list of factors is not exhaustive; other trends and developments 
may also have exerted an influence over economic restructuring. For example, 
international capital flows were not considered outside of flows  foreign direct investment 
(FDI). While such capital flows may have been of crucial importance in enabling or 
constraining economic restructuring across the region, they were not considered in this 
study. Service exports were not covered either. Therefore, any future research would 
have greater credibility if such factors were included. Again, the primary focus on 
merchandise trade contained within this study, specifically on the organization of export 
sectors, is useful for heuristic purposes and facilitates the formulation of simple 
hypotheses. It does, however, leave some gaps in the explanatory utility of the conceptual 
framework that is used here.  
 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the evidence does suggest that the influence 
of the international economy upon domestic economic developments (and, in turn, on 
political behaviour) is often of crucial importance. As was argued in Chapter Five, 
fluctuations in the price of oil had a considerable impact upon Soviet political economy, 
influencing the timing of reform and, to a lesser extent, the capacity of the Soviet state to 
implement reform. Developments in post-Soviet Russia also indicate that commodity 
prices, especially hydrocarbons, continue to represent perhaps the most important 
variable in explaining Russian political economy, largely due to the fact that those groups 
that control, if not necessarily own, the hydrocarbon sectors are the dominant political 
actors in Russia. A dependence on hydrocarbons has also indirectly supported the 
Belarusian economic model that sustains the dominance of the state in the Belarusian 
economy. Elsewhere, the importance of the global diffusion of manufacture production 
through MNCs and IPNs appears to have exerted a broadly positive influence over 
economic restructuring in Estonia and Romania, not to mention the other countries of 
central and east Europe. Utilizing comparative advantages in labour costs and proximity 
to final markets, these countries have used integration with the international economy to 
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upgrade the technological sophistication of their own transnational economies as well as 
introduce greater levels of economic competition.    
  
The second first-order hypothesis – that higher levels of technological 
sophistication and competition throughout the economy causes political development 
along more open-access lines; in short, that there exists a ‗double balance‘ between 
economy and polity – also appears to be have been confirmed by the evidence presented 
throughout this dissertation. The case studies contained within this dissertation, as well as 
the broad overview of the relationship between economic structure and social order-type 
contained in Chapters Three and Four, suggests that economic structure – as specified 
according to a country‘s export profile – is an important factor in explaining the 
considerable variation in social order that is evident across the sample of countries 
covered here. However, the simple measurement of this variable that is offered in 
Chapter Three conceals a number of other variables that might also be of analytical 
utility. For example, in order for a country to register a high score on the Technological 
Development and Diversity Index (TDDI), it is likely that the country in question will 
have also experienced considerable positive developments in areas such as 
macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, state-building, etc. The experience of Estonia, 
and Romania in the period after the late-1990s, certainly appears to support this view as 
important policy decisions and economic reforms enabled economic agents to increase 
output in new areas, thus diversifying the economic structure and increasing the level of 
competition within the economy. It is thus conceivable that TDDI acts only as a proxy for 
such variables and that they in fact are responsible for exerting a crucial influence on 
subsequent political outcomes.  
 
 While the argument that economic competition causes greater political 
competition does appear to be supported by the evidence, several issues that are raised 
throughout this study suggest that this is not in itself a satisfactory explanation. Most 
notably, the case studies illustrated the importance of legacies embodied within the 
existing economic structure that constrained the room for maneuver of important policy 
makers from the start of the post-socialist period. Such legacies can be either broadly 
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positive or negative. For example, the Estonian case demonstrates that an economic 
structure that is, at the starting point, relatively diverse increased the level of economic 
competition almost immediately, leaving government and state actors to formulate 
policies in a more autonomous manner. By contrast, the Russian case illustrates the 
obstacles that face political agents (such as Gaidar) who might have positive intentions 
vis-a-vis economic restructuring, but are nonetheless impeded by a concentrated 
economic structure that hinders the development of alternative political groups, the 
support of which would be needed to push through reforms that might be inimical to 
those of the dominant economic interests. It is in this respect that economic structure can 
be seen as exerting an influence over issues of political economy from the beginning of 
the post-socialist period. Indeed, given the prolonged and messy nature of the collapse of 
socialist economic and political structures, particularly in the former Soviet Union 
(although not exclusively), economic structure may have played an important role, even 
before the collapse of the ancien regime, as well placed economic and/or political actors 
moved to exert control over key economic areas. This was evident in, for example, both 
Belarus and Romania (in the 1990s), where socialist-era ‗insiders‘ asserted control over 
the leading sectors of the economy and captured the political process.        
  
The broadly unicausal relationship between economic structure and social order 
development contained within this study might also conceal a more complicated 
underlying process of political and economic change. The argument presented throughout 
this study is essentially that changes in economic structure, and the effects that this has 
upon wider economic competition, exert a decisive effect over the degree to which 
political competition is present, thereby shaping the prospects for positive or negative 
social order development. Of course, economic and political legacies are considered 
important, but only so far as they give a starting point and additional context to the 
subsequent narrative that follows the broadly unicausal trajectory implied by the 
conceptual framework. While this parsimonious model is perhaps useful as a heuristic 
device, its empirical plausibility is not so clear. Instead, the relationship between 
economic structure and social order development is no doubt far more circular or 
mutually constitutive than would be implied by the model contained within this study, 
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with social-order type itself likely to be a key factor in explaining the degree of economic 
restructuring. Two other factors appear to have been of more or less importance in 
shaping the prospects for economic restructuring in the case-studies contained in this 
dissertation: the rate of investment; and the nature of privatization. These two factors are 
considered briefly below.  
 
First, a high rate of investment is clearly a pre-requisite for economic structuring. 
However, the sort of factors that might influence economic agents to invest or not would 
clearly be affected by the sort of institutional environment (i.e. social order-type) that 
these agents exist within. Thus, Estonia‘s success in restructuring its transnational 
economy was based on a consistently high level of investment; however, this compulsion 
on the part of Estonians and foreigners to invest in the economy might have been due to 
the initial success in implementing far-ranging institutional reforms immediately after 
independence. Similarly, the relatively low rate of investment in Russia since 1991 might 
be seen as a response to the poor institutional environment that economic agents operate 
within. Thus, establishing the precise direction of causation at each point of the 
development process is extremely difficult.  
 
Second, the nature of the privatization process, and the effects that this has upon 
market structure and ownership within an economy, is also of crucial importance in 
explaining why some countries exhibit a greater degree of economic competition than 
others. In those countries in which privatization was either stalled, incomplete or has 
been subsequently reversed, economic competition has clearly suffered. Belarus, which 
undertook only a minimal degree of privatization in the early 1990s, has experienced only 
very limited economic competition since. Indeed, the Belarusian case illustrates the 
limitations inherent to the measure of economic competition used in this study. Despite a 
high degree of state ownership within the economy it still has a relatively diverse (in 
inter-sectoral terms) and, in some areas, technologically sophisticated, export structure. 
However, the domination of the economy by the state has reduced intra-sectoral 
competition. Furthermore, the Russian case demonstrates the importance of recognizing 
the role of control as well as ownership when assessing economic competition. While it is 
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certainly true that the natural resource sectors in Russia are, in some areas, characterized 
by private ownership, the role of the state has tended to ensure that even privately owned 
natural resource companies are constrained in the extent to which they can operate freely. 
This further illustrates the problem of economic structures that are dominated by only a 
few leading sectors; the dependence of the state on a limited source of revenue increases 
the incentive for it to become involved in the management of these important sectors.   
 
The relatively short case studies contained within the study did not afford the 
necessary time and space to establish the precise direction of causation between these 
variables at different points in time; indeed, given the very nature of economic and 
political phenomena, it is not clear whether this is ever possible. As such, further research 
– probably in the form of more detailed single case-studies - would be required to make 
progress on this front. The study as it stands does at least offer an original and 
parsimonious account of social order variation across the post-socialist region; it is, 
however, imperfect and these flaws should be considered when drawing any conclusions 
from the evidence presented here.     
 
 The role of the intervening variables specified in this study – civil society, 
business associations, political parties, and business-state relations in general – are also of 
crucial importance to the credibility of the conceptual framework tested throughout this 
study. Again, mis-specification of the causal mechanisms linking economic structure with 
social order development is a potential problem. The possibility always remains that 
variation on the intervening variables may not in fact be shaped by economic structure, or 
at least not to the extent that is implied in this study. Instead, other factors might be of 
more utility in explaining why, for example, a broader array of political parties are able to 
develop in countries like Estonia, but not in Belarus and Russia. However, the fact that 
four different intervening variables were examined in each case study, and that all four 
move in the hypothesized direction outlined in Chapter Two, indicates that they are 
correlated at least with both the independent and dependent variables. Again, the 
direction and strength of the causal relationship is potentially problematic and for this 
reason further research – including a more in-depth analysis of a single case, as well as a 
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large-n analysis with a scope beyond the post-socialist region – would be necessary 
before one could conclude that the explanation offered in this study stands up against 
competing explanations.    
 
9.2 Areas for future research  
 
The brief discussion presented above has already identified some issues that would 
require further research, such as the need for more detailed case-studies to identify which 
variables are doing the analytical work at which time. However, while the model tested 
throughout this study does appear to be of some analytical utility when analyzing the 
countries of the post-socialist region, the issue of its wider applicability also remains an 
open question. It is possible that the trends and relationships between variables identified 
here are specific only to either the region, the time-frame selected for analysis, or both. 
While diverse economic structures and open-access politics do also appear to be 
correlated within advanced economies, as well as in the region under examination in this 
study, a cursory glance at the range of economic structures that are prevalent from around 
the developing world suggests that the simple relationship between economic structure 
and social order development does not always hold. For example, the structure of the 
Chinese transnational economy is relatively diverse and technologically sophisticated 
(see Connolly, 2008). However, the prevailing social order in China is overwhelmingly 
limited-access. Thus, one observes a situation where economic diversity – as measured in 
this study – is juxtaposed against a system characterized by low political competition. 
Clearly the Chinese case does not confirm the hypotheses that underpin this study. There 
are several reasons that may explain this important anomaly. First, the theory may simply 
not be universally applicable. Second, the theory may only be relevant to particular types 
of countries or during a specific period of time. Third, the measure of economic structure 
used here may be flawed. Fourth, the mechanisms linking the independent and dependent 
variable may take longer in some countries to produce the hypothesized relationship. It is 
possible that particularly rigid limited-access orders lag in the extent to which they 
change in response to changes in economic structure; in short, a temporally monotonic 
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relationship between the two variables may not always occur. Identifying which of these 
reasons explains the Chinese anomaly, for example, would require further research.          
 
9.3 Economic restructuring, social order development and future challenges facing 
the region  
 
This dissertation has focused on describing the main contours of economic restructuring 
that has taken place across the region over the past two decades, and the effects that such 
restructuring has had upon institutional development. As was described in Chapters Three 
and Four, there are distinct patterns of development across the region, with countries 
forming three broad clusters according to the development of their transnational 
production profiles, with some countries experiencing more success than others in 
climbing up the value-added ladder of production. As the scope for exploiting differences 
in labour unit costs diminishes – as is happening across the region as domestic wage 
inflation reduces the competiveness of many of the economies of the region – so it will 
become more important for them to become more productive in their economic activities. 
Thus, economic restructuring and climbing up the global value-added ladder of 
production represents the first of what appear to be the three main challenges facing the 
region in the near future. The other two challenges are: (i) the ongoing (at the time of 
writing) financial and economic crisis that has afflicted the global economy since the 
summer of 2007; and (ii) the impending demographic decline that faces most countries 
from within the region.  
 
 All three challenges affect one another. For example, demographic pressures may 
reduce the availability of domestic capital for economic restructuring, in turn making the 
region more dependent than it already is on access to foreign capital. However, access to 
international capital may be more difficult for those countries with large external debt 
burdens. This study has so far addressed only the extent of economic restructuring across 
the region. The other two challenges are described briefly below. If anything, the 
existence of these other two challenges makes economic restructuring even more urgent; 
if external debt is to be repaid, or consistently rolled-over, and if pension obligations are 
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to be met, the countries of the region will be compelled to improve their productive 
capacities. Indeed, progress or otherwise in addressing these three issues should exert an 
important influence on further social order development; if states adopt a state-centric 
approach – as opposed to a market-based approach - to dealing with these challenges, the 
degree of economic competition may decline, perhaps then leading to a corresponding 
weakening of political competition.    
 
 The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 has so far caused a 
contraction in economic activity across the whole world that is deeper and more 
widespread than anything since the Great Depression of the 1930s (IMF, 2009).
193
 
Unfortunately, there are reasons to believe that the region covered in this study is 
particularly vulnerable to the effects of continued distress in international capital markets 
and to declining levels of international trade. By the second quarter of 2009, a large 
number of economies from within the region displayed extreme vulnerabilities to any 
contraction in capital flows that might occur as a result of the financial and economic 
crisis.
194
 The contraction in the volume of capital flows to this region and other emerging 
markets is likely to be exacerbated by the enormous volume of sovereign bond issues by 
advanced economies as they seek to compensate for declining private demand in their 
domestic economies. Indeed, by April 2009, the IMF warned that capital flows to 
emerging market regions might dry up completely, thus representing a ‗sudden stop‘ 
(Calvo, 2000; IMF, 2009) Therefore, after enjoying an extended period of sustained 
economic growth that was, in many cases, accompanied by an accumulation of high 
levels of external debt built up through persistent current account deficits, the region now 
faces the prospect of much lower levels of economic growth as it moves towards a 
situation of greater macroeconomic balance. While the public sector has not generally 
contributed too much towards this accumulation of debt, it is likely that fiscal balances 
will be stretched as private sector agents struggle with the multitude of financial 
mismatches that threaten the economic health of many countries of the region. Indeed, 
                                                 
193
 Indeed, according to data from Eichengreen and O‘Rourke (2009), the contraction in industrial output 
and world trade is more severe than at the chronologically equivalent stage of the Great Depression.   
194
 This section is based on a summary of the financial vulnerabilties of the region outlined in Connolly 
(2009). 
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any banking crisis that might occur will also increase the contingent liabilities of 
domestic governments.  
 
The downturn in trade that has accompanied the financial element to the crisis is 
also likely to exacerbate what are already challenging economic conditions. As was 
outlined in Chapter Four, and also in the case study chapters, many of the countries from 
within the region are open, export-oriented economies that are particularly reliant on 
trade with the European Union. However, the contraction in economic activity in the EU 
that has occurred as the global economic downturn has deepened has already caused a 
dramatic decline in the demand for exports from the post-socialist region. For those 
countries that were tightly integrated within the EU-focused manufacturing network, such 
as the countries of central and eastern Europe and the Baltic economies, the crisis has 
seen a dramatic decline in levels of trade as demand for manufactures declined. For those 
countries that were dependent on commodity and primary product exports, such as 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and to a lesser extent, the Baltic states, the downturn has also 
resulted in a slump in demand for exports. This has resulted in a sharp decline across all 
commodity groups that has reduced these countries‘ export revenues. For manufacturers 
and commodity exporters alike, the downturn has savaged demand for the region‘s 
exports, leading many countries of the region into recession. If this situation persists, the 
susceptibility of some of the economies covered in this study to a financial crisis is likely 
to increase.   
 
The financial and trade vulnerabilities of the post-socialist region to the ongoing 
economic downturn is likely to result in reduced economic activity as macroeconomic 
imbalances are evened out, and also in increased levels of public sector debt as states 
compensate for reduced private expenditure and, in some cases, provide the funds to bail 
out ailing financial systems.
195
 Should the stock of debt across the region increase in 
response to the crisis, the more difficult it will be to respond effectively to the third of the 
challenges facing the region, that of demographic decline. The countries of the region 
                                                 
195
 Recent research suggests that the real value of government debt expands on average by 86 percent in 
countries that experience a financial crisis (Rogoff and Reinhart, 2008). 
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have, with few exceptions, experienced a dramatic decline in annual population growth 
rates since the 1980s. According to projections from the United Nations Populations 
Division (UNPD, 2009), the countries of the post-socialist region are currently 
experiencing, or will in the near future, a faster decline in population growth than any 
other developing region. Indeed, while the countries of developing Asia, Central Asia, 
Latin America, and the United States, are all projected to experience only a slowing of 
the population growth rate, the countries of the post-Socialist area are already 
experiencing negative population growth, with the declines being sharpest in the Baltic 
countries and those of south eastern Europe.  
 
This rapid depopulation of the region will result in a sharp decline in the 
proportion of the population that is of working age, leaving the post-socialist region with, 
on average, the lowest working age proportion of the population among all developing 
regions, and lower than some advanced economies, such as the United States. Such 
pressures are likely to increase the fiscal burden of the states of the region as the demands 
of increasing numbers of pensioners become more pronounced, while lower numbers of 
people of working age will be called upon to support these pension commitments. The 
declining availability of labour may also result in increased wage inflation as labour 
markets become increasingly stretched. Coupled with the likely effects of the current 
financial crisis, the governments and populations of the region are likely to be burdened 
with high levels of debt, large future spending commitments in the form of pensions, a 
diminishing tax base, and potentially irresistible inflation. All of these pressures make it 
even more imperative that the countries of the region either begin, or continue to 
increase, productivity levels. Economic restructuring is a crucial component of this 
challenge.  
    
Dealing with all of these pressures will be challenging enough with flexible, open 
and transparent political structures. However, as outlined in Chapters Three and Four, 
there is considerable variation in the quality of social order across the region. The type of 
social order, however, is likely to be of crucial importance in determining how the states 
of the region respond to the challenges outlined above. Primarily, the type of social order 
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might be expected to influence the choice made by states in focusing on state-centric 
solutions or market-based solutions. Where levels of economic and political competition 
are lower, it is probably more likely that state-centric approaches to these challenges are 
adopted as existing elites resist the entrance of other actors into the economic and 
political processes as they seek to retain their access to rents. In such circumstances, the 
likelihood of states overcoming the immense challenges that face them would appear to 
be limited. Indeed, even in those states where the type of social order is more open and 
competitive, the capacity to meet the challenges that lie ahead is not assured.     
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